Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1991

Essay-Review

Paul Hollander

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COVER: The tide of democratic revolution sweeps through Prague on November 20, 1989, as thousands of demonstrators near the St. Wenceslaus monument demand free elections. Photo by AP/Wide World.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Revolution in Eastern Europe—Revolution in the West?

Ernst Kux

The revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe marked the triumph of individual liberty over Marxist collectivism and expressed the region's determination to "return to Europe." Western Europe, which provided much of the inspiration for these events through its capitalist and democratic institutions, now faces the challenge of modifying institutions such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Community to accommodate new forces created by the revolutionary developments in the eastern part of the continent.

Civil-Military Relations in China: Tiananmen and After

Harlan W. Jencks

The degree to which civilian politicians can maintain and exercise institutional authority is the crucial civil-military issue for the People's Republic of China today. When civil authority proved inadequate or irresolute in the face of civil demonstrations in China during the spring of 1989, the hard-liners in the party leadership decided they had no choice but to turn to the People's Liberation Army to restore "order." This decision could be of major significance to the military, which, in 1989, appeared well on its way to becoming a professional body generally removed from political involvement. Now the military can be expected to play an important role in political succession; it may even find itself involved in the regionalization of Chinese politics in the absence of an orderly succession.

Defense Reform in China: The PLA Air Force

Richard J. Latham and Kenneth W. Allen

The reforms of the 1980's in China were not restricted to the civilian sector. During the decade, the Air Force of the China's People's Liberation Army effected significant reforms that advanced a process of internal regularization and professionalization begun in 1949. In the process, the PLAAF has succeeded in recovering from the shocks administered to it by the Sino-Soviet rift and the Cultural Revolution. Yet, further progress may be impeded by China's inability to create or acquire modern weapons for its Air Force.

The Soviet Military: *Glasnost'* Against Secrecy

Mikhail Tsypkin

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, political *glasnost'* has been accompanied by military *glasnost'*—acceptance by the Soviet Union of confidence-building measures and arms-control agreements, the publication of the military budget, and open debate on some aspects of military policy. However, the attempt to open up the Soviet military to public and international scrutiny has run up against the Russian/Soviet tradition of military secrecy and staunch resistance from the military leadership, which sees *glasnost'* as a threat to its institutional prerogatives and to Soviet security. Moreover, military *glasnost'*—and *glasnost'* in general—has yet to be institutionalized in the Soviet political and legal system. Thus, in the volatile political situation in which the Soviet Union now finds itself, any regime in Moscow will find it difficult to maintain, much less strengthen, military *glasnost'*.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Polish-Lithuanian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Stephen R. Burant

Since Lithuania declared its independence on March 11, 1990, Polish-Lithuanian relations, which had lain dormant for 50 years, again became part of the foreign policy agendas of Warsaw and Vilnius. For more than 400 years, the two nations were part of the same state, but conflict broke out between them in the late 19th century. Today, leaders of both countries claim adherence to democratic values. These shared principles—and the moral and political support Poland has given to Lithuania since its independence declaration—provide grounds for optimism regarding future relations between the two countries.

Eastern Europe and the "Energy Shock" of 1990–91

John M. Kramer

The "energy shock" of 1990–91, wherein the Soviet Union is substantially reducing the volume of, and increasing the price for, its energy exports, constitutes one of the preeminent challenges facing the postcommunist regimes of Eastern Europe. The means by which each East European country responds to the challenges posed by the energy shock will differ. However, the evidence indicates that after experiencing considerable short-run dislocations, over the long term, East European countries have the potential to mitigate—and even benefit from—the effects of the energy shock.

Third World Decollectivization: Guyana, Nicaragua, and Vietnam

Frederic L. Pryor

The process of decollectivization—the conversion of state and collective farms into either private (individual or corporate) farms or genuine producer cooperatives—in current or former Marxist states in the Third World differs from that observed in Eastern Europe. The political forces in agriculture are different; many Third World socialist countries began collectivization without a previous land reform, which increases the difficulties involved in returning to the status quo ante; and their governments often do not have the administrative capacity to implement the key measures known to facilitate decollectivization and the development of private agriculture. Examination of the process in Guyana, Vietnam, and Nicaragua reveals the diversity of decollectivization experiences.

Note

Who Ousted Nikita Sergeyevich?

Werner Hahn

In the current wave of *glasnost'* and filling-in of "blank spots" in Soviet history, new information about the plot to oust Soviet leader Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev has come to light. This information, which has been provided mainly by leading Soviet officials of the period who were directly involved in the conspiracy, undermines the long-held view that Khrushchev's political opponents—notably Mikhail Suslov—led the plot. Most recent versions assert that Suslov had little to do with it. Instead, the new information makes it clear that the plot to overthrow Khrushchev was led by his own protégés—Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolay Podgornyy, and Aleksandr Shelepin.

Essay-Review

Communism and Its Discontents

Paul Hollander

Western specialists on communist systems gravely overestimated the extent of these systems' legitimacy, material accomplishments, stability, and staying power. Many in the West also vastly underestimated the discontent these systems engendered among the people who had to live under them. As the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the continuing upheaval elsewhere in the communist world show, overwhelming state power in communist systems can discourage resistance and suppress dissent for lengthy periods of time, but it cannot legitimate—and thus sustain in the long run—systems that can neither satisfy the spirit nor nourish the body.

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Revolution in Eastern Europe—Revolution in the West?

Ernst Kux

The great revolution of 1989 which, in my view, was a revolution in all of Europe and not just in its eastern part, ushered in a new era in world politics that will endure well into the fast-approaching 21st century. During a few eventful days and weeks of the spring and fall of 1989, seen by the world on television immediately as the events unrolled, the people of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria brought about peacefully a change of power. Only in Romania did bloodshed occur. The communist regimes, which had exercised totalitarian rule as satellites of the Soviet Union for more than 40 years, collapsed and were swept away. Communist symbols—red flags, hammers and sickles, statues of Lenin—were torn down and replaced by traditional emblems from national history and culture. New social and political forces achieved national independence for their countries, freeing them from Soviet hegemony and colonial rule, and set out on a path away from "real socialism" to democracy and the market economy under stirring slogans like "we the people" and "return to Europe."

The goal of this "uprising against despotism," like the goal of every genuine revolution according to Hannah Arendt, is the "founding of freedom."[1] One consequence of the 1989 revolution is already fully apparent: the post–World War II era has come to an end. The division of Europe and of Germany, which paralyzed the European continent for so long and which repeatedly caused dangerous crises and confrontations, was overcome suddenly and smoothly without serious conflict, not to speak of war.

At their meeting in Malta on December 2 and 3, 1989, the leaders of the two superpowers, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, declared the cold war at an end. The Soviet Union lost its East European "buffer zone," and felt humiliated by this loss. Now the Soviets themselves are asking whether the Soviet Union can still pretend to be a "superpower."[2] The Soviet bloc, the "socialist community," has dissolved and its principal institutions, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), are being dismantled.

The creation of the "socialist world system" through the victorious advance of the Red Army to the Elbe had been described as the most important event of World War II. It was asserted in 1947 and still believed in 1986 that this event decisively shifted the "correlation of forces between the two systems, the socialist and the capitalist, in favor of socialism."[3] Moscow had regarded it as a geopolitical maxim that control of Eastern Eu-

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Ernst Kux writes on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. *In 1991–92, he will be a Fellow at The Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington, DC).*

This article is an adaptation of Dr. Kux's farewell lecture in February 1991 at St. Gallen University in Switzerland, where Dr. Kux taught for over 30 years.

[1]Hannah Arendt, *Über die Revolution* (On Revolution), Munich, R. Piper & Co., 1974, p. 184.

[2]See V. G. Anufriyev at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on February 6, 1990, *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5–7 fevralya 1990 goda* (*Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, February 5–7, 1990*), Moscow, Politizdat,1990, p. 187. See also Ernst Kux, "Moscow and the Revolution in Eastern Europe Decline of Superpower Soviet Union," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zürich), Dec. 1–2, 1990.

[3]*Informationskonferenz der Vertreter einiger kommunistischer Parteien in Polen Ende September 1947* (Information Conference in Poland of Representatives of Some Communist Parties Held End of September 1947), Moscow, Verlag für Fremdsprachliche Literatur, 1948, p. 16. At this meeting on September 22–27, 1947, the "Cominform" (Communist Information Bureau) was formed. Tito's Yugoslavia was expelled from it in 1948. Nikita Khrushchev dissolved it in 1956 when the USSR was seeking better relations with Tito.

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rope was a prerequisite for world power.[4] Now even Soviet observers admit that recent developments in Eastern Europe clearly show a change in the balance of forces in favor of the European Community.[5] The communist revolution with its universal ideological pretensions and myth of irreversibility, which had so greatly influenced our century, has failed. At the same time, visionary attempts to find a "third way" between capitalism and socialism or to seek "convergence" between them have also been discredited.

The crucial result of the 1989 revolution is the victory of the idea and values of individual liberty over the collectivism of Marxist ideology and the communist system, which subordinated people to dogmas and the vanguard party. Even Gorbachev has presented his *perestroyka* as "the return of the individual to the political process" since, as Gorbachev said, "in our country, as you can see, the individual is treated as if he were just a tool, the nuts and bolts."[6] Democracy with a separation and control of powers replaces the "dictatorship of the proletariat"; the monopoly of power of the party can no longer withstand the plurality of interests. The socialist planned economy, which is actually nothing other than control of production and consumption by the party, is yielding to a free market economy. This is the historic success of the revolution in Eastern Europe.

In reality, this successful revolution does not yet mean the disappearance of communism, which is still trying by all available means—including the use of force as in the Baltic states—to stay in power. The 1989 revolution also does not signify the end of history, as forecast by Francis Fukuyama.[7] Rather, it confronts us now with two key questions about the future: What will be the shape of future developments in Eastern Europe? What impact will the revolution in Eastern Europe have on the rest of Europe and on the West in general?

To answer these questions requires a thorough analysis—an analysis that is still to be undertaken—of the origins, forces, and course of this revolution.

Dialectics of the Revolution

In general terms, the revolution in Eastern Europe appeared to follow the historical dialectic described by Alexis deTocqueville and Jacob Burckhardt or by the revolutionary strategists Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin. In his Basel lectures "On the Study of History," written 120 years ago, Burckhardt closely scrutinized "great crises" in history, going all the way back to classical antiquity. Burckhardt pointed out that crises are a long time in the making , and then explode suddenly:

But when the time is ripe, the contagion spreads with electrical speed over hundreds of miles and among populations that otherwise are hardly conscious of one another. The message flies through the air and suddenly everyone is in agreement on the one thing that matters, even if it is only a vague "Things must change!" Finally, all those who want things to be different than they were join in.[8]

The accumulated protest against the past blends with a "glorious vision of the future." According to the Basel historian, it is also true that the more relentlessly an institution combats the spirit of renewal, the more inevitable perhaps is its final collapse."[9] Burckhardt says that a crisis starts "when most matters in their present constitution have lost the legitimating connection to their original purpose."[10] On the one side there is an "excessive expansion of power" and its misuse, while "other elements must suffer excessive restriction." As a consequence, "something erupts somewhere" and is either suppressed or leads to a "general crisis of the overall state of affairs," which can last "for generations and affect all or most nations with similar values."

Suddenly, the global process accelerates dreadfully; developments that otherwise take centuries seem to pass by like fleeting phantoms within months and weeks and thus to be finished off.[11]

Burckhardt also points out "that it is not the most miserable but the upward striving, especially if they are edu-

[4]See Igor Malashenko, "Russia: The Earth's Heartland," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 7, July 1990, pp. 46–54.

[5]Sergei Karagonov, "The Problems of the USSR's European Policy," ibid., pp. 72–80.

[6]Speech to cultural workers, November 28, 1990, published in *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 1, 1990. For a translation of the speech, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Nov. 30, 1990, p. 44. The phrase "nuts and bolts of communism" became current under Stalin.

[7]Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Washington, DC), Summer 1989, pp. 3–18.

[8]Jacob Burkhardt, *Über das Studium der Geschichte* (On the Study of History), the text of the "Studies on World History" based on handwritten manuscripts, Peter Ganz, Ed., Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1984, p. 350. Burkhardt's lectures on world history, which were compiled posthumously and published in 1905, were delivered in the winter semesters of 1868–69, 1870–71, and 1872–73.

[9]Ibid., p. 213.

[10]Ibid., p. 348.

[11]Ibid., p. 349. In Burkhardt's view, world history goes through cyclical crises: "A recurrent fundamental phenomenon: a historic power of the highest momentary legitimacy comes into being; temporal forms of life of all kinds develop from it and, after some time, consider themselves to be the pillars of this power. The spirit continues its work, leading to resistance of these life forms and breakdown through revolution or gradual decay. Meanwhile, the spirit builds something new, the outer shell of which will meet with the same fate after some time." Ibid., p. 165.

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cated, who start the revolution and endow it with its initial idealistic luster."[12] Finally, "forces, completely different from those that—accidentally—started the revolution bring it to an end" and "the original movement dies down."[13]

As I see it, the usefulness of Burckhardt's thought for our time is that he discussed in detail the role of culture, religion, and the constitution in an "age of revolution,"[14] and especially that he recognized in modern crises "the impact of the press and communication, and ultimately the expansion of universal suffrage from elections to all other matters."[15]

Neverthless, classic philosophies of history, conceptually stimulating though they may be, cannot provide a full interpretation of the 1989 revolution in Eastern Europe. Unlike previous revolutions, not only was the 1989 revolution peaceful, but neither Terror nor Thermidor have followed in its wake. Moreover, modern totalitarianism cannot be compared with an "ancien régime." But the revolution in Eastern Europe is connected by a historical thread to the two earlier cataclysms of this century: first, the collapse of the great continental empires at the end of World War I—tsarist Russia, the empire of Wilhelm II, the Habsburg monarchy, and the Ottoman empire in the Balkan region—which made possible the independence of the Eastern European countries; and second, the defeat of fascism in the course of World War II, which was followed by the expansion of the Soviet empire to the Elbe and Danube rivers and by the division of Europe.

Marxist theory of revolution also fails to explain recent developments. The turn of events in Eastern Europe was neither a result of "class struggle" nor of "contradictions between production forces and production relations."[16] Closer to the mark may be as yet neglected comparisons between the decolonization in the Third World after World War II and the "process of desatellitization"[17] in Eastern Europe—which did, after all, lead to the decline of the last colonial empire, the Soviet Union. Parallels also suggest themselves with the transition from fascism to democracy in Western Europe after 1945.[18] In a broad sense, however, the revolution of 1989 represents a "modernization crisis" brought on by the information revolution. This modernization crisis exists not only in the backward socialist countries of the East, but also in the highly developed industrialized countries of the West.

The Failure of *Perestroyka*

If we do not wish to go back as far as the 1953 workers' uprising in East Berlin, the 1956 Hungarian revolution, or the 1968 Prague spring,[19] we can use the 1980–81 crisis in Poland, when "contradictions within socialism" came to the forefront, as the date for the starting point of the revolution in Eastern Europe.[20]

An impetus for the crisis in Eastern Europe also came from outside—indirectly from developments in the West, and directly from Gorbachev's policies since 1985. While Gorbachev's role and influence should not be underestimated, he did not, as he is credited with doing in many places, give his colonies freedom like some enlightened and benevolent Kremlin tsar. Gorbachev's *perestroyka* first inspired and then accelerated the developments in Eastern Europe. Ultimately, however, it was the *failure of* perestroyka as a "revolution from above" in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that brought on the "revolution from below" in Poland, Hungary, Leipzig, Prague, Sofia, and Bucharest.

When Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 11, 1985, as successor to hoary gerontocrats, he quickly grasped that "everything had turned rotten" and be-

[12]Ibid., p. 211.

[13]Ibid., p. 206. The "paralysis of the original movement and its metamorphosis into something different or opposite [results] (a) due to the former incredible exaggeration, the massive number of participants falls off; (b) all kinds of aroused forces devour the movement; wherever there is power, it reflects, comes to a decision, and suddenly, in the turmoil, demands its spoils; (c) due to the fall of the most vital; (d) due to change in the remaining carriers of the movement itself, some of whom want to reap benefits and some of whom simply want to save themselves. Ultimately, the end result: something of the original movement succeeds in prevailing permanently."

[14]Ibid., p. 248.

[15]Ibid., p. 211.

[16]According to Marx, "all collisions in history" originate from the "contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production," which "had to explode in a revolution every time." *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (Marx-Engels Complete Edition), Berlin, Marx-Engels Verlag, Vol. 5, 1932, p. 63. The "contradiction between proletariat and bourgeoisie" is a "struggle of class against class," which means a "total revolution" and gives rise to a "new political power." Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 227. Lenin's simple formula for "revolutionary situations" is more applicable: "the lower orders won't, the upper classes can't." See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, Vol. 36, p. 326.

[17]*Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1990, p. 105.

[18]See Barrington R. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1966; and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1969.

[19]At the CPSU CC plenum on February 6, 1990, Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo, pointed out that "alarm signals" had already surfaced in 1953, 1956, 1968, and 1980, but were ignored. *Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 5–7 fevralya 1990 g.*, p. 230.

[20]See Ernst Kux, "Contradictions in Soviet Socialism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1984, pp. 1–27. Timothy Garton Ash, *We the People—The Revolution of '89*, (Cambridge, Granta Books, 1990, p. 133) identifies the papal visit to Poland in June 1979 as the "beginning of the end."

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came convinced (and not only "vaguely" as Burckhardt had said) "that we could not live as we had lived previously."He said he was determined "to look for ways in which one might live." To that end, Gorbachev found "the simple formula of *perestroyka*—more democracy, more *glasnost'*, more humanity . . . first and foremost freedom, political freedom, human and spiritual freedom, economic freedom, greater justice, the quality of life of the people, culture."[21] The new leader in the Kremlin confronted a stagnating economy, corruption in the "ruling party" and its *nomenklatura*, rampant demoralization in Soviet society, and an overall "deformation of socialism" that also prevailed in the "fraternal countries" following the Soviet model. The ideology had run into a crisis because its forecasts had turned out to be wrong—including the predicted general crisis of capitalism, the catching up with America by 1980, the creation of a "new man" or a "Soviet people," and so on—and nobody in the world still believed that the future belonged to communism.

In view of this state of affairs, the absolute and total claim to truth by Marxism-Leninism and Moscow's claim to leadership of the communist world could no longer be asserted. On April 10, 1987, in Prague, Gorbachev admitted: "No single party possesses a monopoly on the truth."[22] With the abandoning of communism's claim to truth, the belief in a predetermined communist future is lost as well, and thus it becomes impossible to justify the use of any and all means in order to achieve it. Moreover, the ideologically based legitimation of communist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and of Moscow's hegemony in its satellite empire, is shattered.

Perestroyka was intended to be a "revolution from above" that would reform the communist system by fiat under the leadership of the party; by no means was it intended to abolish the system. Stalinism was to be transformed into a "humane and democratic socialism," and the inefficient central planning system was to be improved by economic reform. Gorbachev linked *perestroyka* to "new thinking" in foreign policy. In order to carry out internal reform, external expansion was cut back and a dialogue was initiated with the West, which was expected to provide loans and technologies, on the one hand, and which was to be prevented from exploiting the obvious weaknesses of the Soviet Union, on the other.

At the same time, Gorbachev wanted to bring about a "*perestroyka* of the socialist community." On July 6, 1989, before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev disavowed the notorious "Brezhnev doctrine" and conceded "freedom of choice"[23] to the Eastern Europeans. Gorbachev argued that intervention in the affairs of the "fraternal countries" in Eastern Europe would not be in line with "new thinking": "We cannot force our *perestroyka* on people."[24] A Soviet military intervention, as in Budapest in 1956 or Prague in 1968, would have meant the end of *perestroyka* in the Soviet Union and a renewed confrontation with the West.[25]

Gorbachev's restraint during the initial changes in Eastern Europe was prompted not only by concern that interference might spoil relations with the West, but also by the growing problems in the Soviet Union itself. He was also convinced that what was happening in Eastern Europe in 1989 was "part of the renewal process under way in all the socialist countries."[26] He had earlier blamed the difficulties experienced by the East European communists on "miscalculations by the ruling parties" and the alleged attempts by the West to "undermine the development of the socialist states, to trip them up."[27] In his bestseller *Perestroika*, Gorbachev predicted:

Revolutionary changes are becoming part and parcel of the vast socialist world. They are gaining momen-

[21]In his speech to cultural workers, November 28, 1990, Gorbachev revealed how he had lived "in this plagued house," how his family was persecuted during Stalin's time, and how revelation and conversion came over him in the night preceding March 11, 1985—the day of his election as the new Kremlin leader, during a walk in Pitsunda with Eduard Shevardnadze when "the concept of *perestroyka* was born." See *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1990, and *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 30, 1990, p. 43.

[22]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Vol. 4, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1987, p. 480. See also Ernst Kux, "Gorbachev's 'Renewal of Socialism'—Ideology in the Crisis of Communism," *Studies in Soviet Thought* (Fribourg), Vol. 40, Nos. 1–3, 1990, pp. 89–111.

[23]*Pravda*, July 7, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 7, 1989, pp. 29–34.

[24]*Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1990.

[25]After Shevardnadze had already resigned as foreign minister, he revealed for the first time that during the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 an alternative was proposed (without identifying by whom): "We were urged fairly actively to apply force, that is, to restore the doctrine according to which a crisis of power in one country of the 'socialist community' must be overcome by armed intervention by the other countries. In other words, it was suggested that we act according to the scenarios of 1953, 1956, and 1968." Shevardnadze stated that his analysis is backed up by "extremely solid data." He went on: "What did our opponents suggest? We had to intervene in some way, to think of something. What? Place interception and covering divisions on the borders, as some said? Start the tank engines? But that is the brink of war. Yes, yes, do not be surprised—World War III. With the concentrations of arms that existed in central Europe, any power struggle involving troops was fraught with that risk." Interview in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 14, Apr. 10, 1991, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 12, 1991, p. 32.

[26]"M. S. Gorbachev's Replies to Questions from Delegates to the All-Union Student Forum, Nov. 15, 1989," *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1989. Gorbachev went on: "But if we look at the broader context, we can see that the entire world is changing and adapting to the present time and the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution. And the thrust of the change if it prevails is nonetheless a positive thrust toward a better world and cooperation among the peoples."

[27]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika—New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, p. 163.

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tum. This applies to the socialist countries, but it is also a contribution to the progress of world civilization.[28]

However, Gorbachev was no longer able to control the course of events in Eastern Europe. Reforms of relations among the socialist countries, announced by both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, had bogged down. In the early 1980's, East European leaders like János Kádár and Erich Honecker, but also Nicolae Ceauşescu, had gone their own way and sought better relations with the West. In contrast to some of his predecessors, Gorbachev did not impose a change of leadership in the "fraternal countries" when he came to power, on the grounds that he did not want to intervene in their affairs. The General Secretary was reproached for losing Eastern Europe by his conservative opponents at the 28th Congress of the CPSU.[29] Eduard Shevardnadze, the foreign minister, defended nonintervention before the Congress delegates: "Even if what is happening in Eastern Europe were at variance with our interests, we would rule out any interference in these states' affairs. Any other position involves a return to total chauvinism, the imperial great-power mentality."[30]

The Soviet leader was evidently more interested in maintaining the status quo than in reforms so as to avoid unrest in the empire's outposts and misunderstandings with the West. Good relations with the West had priority consideration in his foreign policy. East European advocates of reform who tried to align themselves with Gorbachev or cling to him opportunistically, such as Lubomir Štrougal in Prague and Mieczysław Rakowski in Warsaw, were not able to stand up to the old guard in their own leadership, in part because they received no support from Moscow. The conservative East European party leaders opposed the introduction of Gorbachevian reforms in their countries because they considered them a "deviation from socialism" and feared that their regimes would be shaken.

However, when Honecker, Gustáv Husák, and Ceauşescu tried to instigate a revolt against Gorbachev and *perestroyka* at the July 7–8, 1989, Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Bucharest, he reacted. Feeling threatened by a conservative front stretching from Beijing to Bucharest, Prague, East Berlin, and the Kremlin, Gorbachev pushed for the removal of his opponents. During his visit to East Berlin on October 8, 1989, for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, Gorbachev directed an unmistakable warning at Honecker: "History has its own laws. To ignore them means to create new problems."[31] Shortly thereafter, Honecker was removed, followed in rapid succession by Husák in Prague, Todor Zhivkov in Sofia, and Ceauşescu in Bucharest.

But Gorbachev's move came too late and was overtaken by the dramatic events of autumn 1989. In any case, the attempted power intrigues and changes of leadership involving Egon Krenz and Hans Modrow in East Berlin, Ladislav Adamec in Prague, and Petŭr Mladenov in Sofia failed, as had been the case earlier with Rakowski in Warsaw.[32] The belated stabs at communist reform and the loss of authority resulting from the change of leaders opened the floodgates to the mass demonstrations that overthrew the East European communist regimes within a few days.

The Uprising of the People

The revolution in Eastern Europe was unleashed by the will and determination of the people. They exercised their "freedom of choice," but it did not turn out to be the "socialist choice" that Gorbachev had expected and demanded of them. Toward the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, changes began to take place in the countries of Eastern Europe that diverged markedly from developments in the Soviet Union, or at least were more rapid than in the Soviet Union. General Secretary Yuriy Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev in November 1982, acknowledged that, in an earlier time, the "world of socialism" had been expected to become increasingly uniform, but that over the past two decades it had instead become diverse and complex, creating significant differences among the socialist countries.[33] According to Andropov, integration was not advancing; instead, increas-

[28] Ibid., p. 170.

[29] This point of view was, for instance, expressed in a closed session of the Congress by Lieutenant General Ivan Mikulin, chief of the Political Administration of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (Hungary): "Is it not true that we have lost practically all of our allies in Eastern Europe? Is it not true that today the European military balance, which for years has served as a reliable foundation of the continent's security, has been seriously disturbed?" *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 18, September 1990, p. 16.

[30] *Pravda*, July 5, 1990, p. 2.

[31] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Oct. 9, 1990.

[32] Apparently, such a change in leadership seems to have succeeded only in Bucharest with Ion Iliescu's seizure of power. According to available information, the Soviet military command opposed Erich Honecker's orders to fire at demonstrators in Leipzig, and the KGB is said to have been in favor of the demonstrations in Prague.

[33] Speech at the CPSU CC plenum of June 15, 1983. See *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 14–15 yunya 1983 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, June 14–15, 1983. Stenographic Record), Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, pp. 126–28.

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ing nationalist tendencies threatened to lead to conflicts among the socialist states.

During the troubles in the Kremlin in the first half of the 1980's, when struggles for power and the successive changes from one gerontocratic leader to another were taking place, the "fraternal countries" became more independent. Not only the leaders but the Eastern Europeans generally realized the increasing weakness of the hegemonic power, the Soviet Union, which in 1983 was unable to prevent NATO's weapons modernization or to split the Western alliance, and which was involved since 1979 in a war in Afghanistan that it was not able to win. Because of Afghanistan, Moscow could not afford to react more forcefully during the 1980 crisis in Poland. But above all, the nuclear accident in nearby Chernobyl' in April 1986 and the resulting danger to them proved to the Eastern Europeans how little they could rely on "fraternal assistance" from Moscow.

At the same time, the East European political and economic system, copied from and imposed by the Soviet Union, the system that for many years had guaranteed stability in Eastern Europe, became a destabilizing factor because it could no longer be reformed.[34] Economic integration with the framework of CEMA, which was to be a counterpart to the integration in the European Community, remained on the drawing board. The impact of the oil crises of the 1970's was equally severe in both the socialist and the capitalist economies; in the East, however, the oil crisis did not stimulate an impulse to adjustment and modernization. Western loans granted for this purpose only created debts that now hamper the transition to a market economy. The Soviet Union, whose economy had come to a standstill, could neither render aid to the "socialist community" nor serve as an example worthy of emulation.

In this situation, and under the influence of Gorbachev's *perestroyka,* a complete change in the political and intellectual atmosphere in Eastern Europe took place, and deepened the gap between rulers and ruled. The party elites, which owed their power to Moscow and which had doggedly followed its orders, stopped paying attention to *perestroyka* and distanced themselves from the Kremlin. On the other hand, the fundamentally anticommunist and anti-Soviet peoples of Eastern Europe were enthusiastic about Gorbachev and had high hopes for his reforms. It should be noted, however, that the Eastern Europeans were as impressed by the actual reform successes of Deng Xiaoping in China as they were with the promise of *perestroyka* by Gorbachev.

Major social transformations had taken place in East European societies as a result of Stalinist industrialization and the dissolution of the traditional rural societies. Since these countries had basically identical political and economic systems, the changes were also similar. Timothy Garton Ash, a prominent eyewitness and interpreter of developments in Eastern Europe, sees this fact as Hegel's "irony of history" in action, since "communism had a great part in creating the social unity that contributed decisively to the end of communism."[35] A new middle class emerged that viewed itself as belonging neither to the *nomenklatura* nor to the "proletariat," although it also had no resemblance to the liquidated precommunist bourgeoisie. A number of factors have contributed to the rise of these new middle strata: better educational opportunities, new technical professions, bureaucratic specialization, and—perhaps most important—modern service and information functions. (Such functions have appeared in socialist societies, but with a time lag due to the scientific and technical backwardness of Eastern Europe relative to the capitalist industrialized nations.) A *young generation* grew up that no longer believed in communist ideology, that no longer obeyed the authority of party and state, and that no longer depended on the *nomenklatura* for social mobility and personal achievement.

The emergence of the new middle classes and the young generation did not accord with the social dogmas and youth policy of the communist regimes, which were trying to keep them down. But the threat of suppression did not have the same inhibiting effect on the new classes as it had on the older generation that was scarred by the Stalin era. A revival of terror, on the other hand, would have had negative consequences for both the economy and foreign policy. The Helsinki process, which was instituted in 1975 and which has had a greater influence on developments in Eastern Europe than Gorbachev's *perestroyka,* inspired these new social groups and encouraged their self-confidence and the expression of their political interest.

As a result of the human rights guarantees in the Helsinki Agreement, new movements like Solidarity in Poland and dissident groups like "Charta 77" in Czechoslovakia developed; church activities and town meetings were launched. Such civic activities proved and tested the limitations of despotism. Under the influence of the Helsinki process and modern electronic media, the East European societies, long isolated behind the Iron Curtain, began to open up. According to M. P. Pavlova-Silvanskaya, a Soviet expert on Eastern Europe,

[34]See Ernst Kux, "Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1980, pp. 21–37.

[35]Timothy Garton Ash, op. cit., p. 146.

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On December 4, 1989, demonstrators on St. Wenceslaus Square reject the communist reform government and call for free elections. About 200,000 people attended the rally.

—AP/Wide World.

this opening was a crucial factor in the 1989 revolution:

The East European societies ceased being closed. The information revolution no longer allows official propaganda to cover up the unseemly aspects of life.[36]

Further, Pavlova-Silvanskaya noted, *perestroyka* had taken away East European fear of Soviet tanks. The revolution of 1989 was not instigated by an underground conspiracy or a military coup and it was not abetted from the West—which rather apprehensively advised caution and was concerned about stability. Nor was the revolution a mob action, like the storming of the Bastille. Rather, it consisted of peaceful, surprisingly orderly mass demonstrations by citizens, among whom young people stood out. These citizens not only wanted to do away with "real socialism," but they also had an alternative to it: an orientation toward the West and integration into Europe.

The Influence of the West

The West has exerted considerable influence on developments in Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union by proving capable of maintaining stability and security while developing democracy, economic well-being, and closer cooperation during the years of the East-West confrontation. In the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's, when the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were sliding into the so-called period of stagnation, a real "*perestroyka*"—the information revolution—started in the West. The United States regained its economic and military strength under President Ronald Reagan. Europe began to prepare for the transformation of the Common Market that is to go into effect in 1992. Japan overtook the USSR as the second largest industrial economy in the world. It is true that during the same years—the 1970's—the Soviet Union achieved military and strategic parity with the United States, albeit at great economic and social cost, and expanded its influence in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Africa, and Latin America. But this expansion caused the Soviet Union to become internationally isolated and to miss the "scientific-technical revolution."[37] On November 4, 1987, Gorbachev admitted before party

[36]M. P. Pavlova-Silvanskaya, "A Pit Instead of a Castle," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 3, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 5, 1990, p. 26.

[37]See Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West: Quest for New Relations," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 18, 1988; trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 20, 1988, pp. 4–8.

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leaders from Eastern Europe gathered in Moscow to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution that the capitalist countries were taking advantage of this scientific-technical revolution, while "real socialism" lagged behind capitalism in technological development; thus, he continued, the "familiar formula of the constantly worsening general crisis of capitalism" could no longer be maintained.[38] Gorbachev discussed socialism's lag in development in greater detail before an all-Union student forum in November 1989:

The world is on the threshold of a new information society. We have to recognize that any delay in that direction of the development of society is equal to a strategic defeat. Moreover, if we continue to develop at the previous rates, we run the risk of hopelessly lagging behind the world scientific, technical, and social progress.[39]

The new middle classes and in particular the young generation in Eastern Europe wanted to take part in the modern information revolution, which they could not do under the central planning dictatorship and the information monopoly of the party. They compared the failed integration of CEMA with the successful integration of the European Community. They saw the West's functioning democracies, markets, freedom, and well-being of the population. All this was a magnet for the East European societies, which historically had seen themselves as belonging to Europe.

The evolution of democracy in the West through new political and social processes influenced the Eastern Europeans no less than the West's economic successes.[40] Gorbachev himself adapted modern Western ideas into his "new thinking." Civic committees, the activation of women and young people, reforms in the churches, the emergence of the "Greens," legal strikes, peace demonstrations, as well as the work of Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund, inspired the establishment of similar groups in Eastern Europe, such as Solidarity in Poland, the citizen forums in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, church peace initiatives, Helsinki monitors, environmentalists, and others. These groups opposed the ruling regime and became the core first of dissident movements, then of peaceful and orderly mass demonstrations. Finally, many became active participants in the change of power in their countries.

By penetrating the Iron Curtain, whose main purpose was to block "imperialistic propaganda," television played an important role in the revolution of 1989. When Eastern Europe could no longer be barred from Western television, the information monopoly of the party was broken and its propaganda unmasked as a lie. Moreover, Western television broadcasts of the demonstrations spread the uncensored slogans of the protests, had a mobilizing effect on other citizens, and in all probability inhibited the authorities from using force and so contributed to the peaceful course of events. The 1989 revolution was the first television revolution in history.

In a broad sense, the revolution in Eastern Europe is both a result of the new shift of power in favor of the West, both on the continent and globally, and a major factor in helping to accelerate this shift.

Prospects for Democracy and Market

In many aspects, the trends in Eastern Europe are reminiscent of Western Europe after World War II, when men like Charles de Gaulle, Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, and others, who had not been connected to fascist parties or who had been in the resistance against fascism, began reconstruction. They had no intention of restoring the French Republic of the interwar period, the Italian monarchy, or the Weimar republic. It was their experiences of the past that induced them to create new democracies and new parties. Between these new democracies and parties, new forms of cooperation developed that were unknown to the "Concert of Europe," and this cooperation in turn led to the founding of the European Community. In Eastern Europe as well, new leaders have risen to power who had dissented from communist totalitarianism or who had even been in its prisons. While they are set on dismantling the communist system, they are not trying to restore the Piłsudski dictatorship, the Beneš republic, or the Horthy regency. Instead, they want to create new political structures modeled on successful contemporary examples in the West.

It is true, however, that in Western Europe, private property, legal norms, and capitalist enterprises had survived amid the ruins of World War II and drew renewed strength from liberal economic reforms and the massive Marshall Plan. By contrast, Eastern Europe is burdened with the catastrophic economic and environmental consequences of a planned economy. Transforming this system into a market economy will be diffi-

[38]M. S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i,* Vol. 5, p. 439.
[39]*Pravda,* Nov. 16, 1989.
[40]See Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, *Challenging the Political Order—New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies,* Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990.

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cult and costly. So far, the theoretical and practical knowledge of how to bring about a transition from totalitarianism to democracy and from plan to market is just being acquired, and this will certainly create additional problems. The difficulty of the undertaking has been pointed out by Karl Popper:

Of course it's impossible to accomplish a direct transition from totalitarianism to democracy, if only because this period is characterized by an immense information vacuum—as a consequence of the closed nature of society. It is more difficult to pass over from totalitarianism to democracy than from democracy to totalitarianism. . . . Totalitarianism, especially in the absence of private property, completely stifles democracy. . . . Democracy calls for deep-going, value-oriented changes in the public mentality—it calls for time.[41]

Among the problems of transition are not only how to deal with the consequences of "real socialism," such as economic underdevelopment, devastating ecological damage, the lingering effects of ideological indoctrination, but also how to deal with the communists themselves. In the West after the war, Nazis, fascists, and quislings were prevented from reentering political life by the victors, the political climate, the rejection of recent history, and the question of war guilt. War criminals were punished, and their parties prohibited. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the communists are still very much around, and their parties have merely been renamed. They still control their parties' vast wealth, hold positions in national and local government, or continue to operate from the underground like the Stasi (East German secret police) cells in Germany. They lay claim to human rights and freedom of speech for themselves, the very rights they had denied to others. Moscow for its part seeks to protect the comrades in the former "fraternal countries" from persecution by invoking the Helsinki Accord. At the same time, party apparatchiks and planning bureaucrats, who had led their countries into misery and had taken repressive measures against all private enterprise, now seize "socialist property," state and collective combines, for their personal benefit. Their conversion into liberal politicians and entrepreneurs is rather doubtful. There is growing popular indignation and resentment of the former oppressors, who are unfit for the democratic reforms or even sabotage them—and who perhaps are scheming to stage a comeback. Settling accounts with the communists in Eastern Europe will remain a difficult moral and political task and a test for the new democracies.

Future developments in Eastern Europe will certainly hinge on the success of *perestroyka* and democracy in the Soviet Union. By the same token, the success of the East European revolution set an example for the democratic forces in the Soviet Union and for the nations who struggle for independence from the center. It has also evoked the dismay of Soviet conservative forces over the "loss of Eastern Europe." A relapse in Moscow into reaction or dictatorship would pose a burden and a threat for the young democracies. On the other hand, the intensifying relationships between some East European countries and the Baltic republics, Belorussia, and Ukraine, which are also striving for independence and democracy, offer the prospect for new forms of cooperation in Eastern Europe.

In Eastern Europe, the dramatic days and the elation of 1989 were followed by a letdown and even disappointment—this is only natural. However, fears and predictions began to be voiced that the vacuum left by communism would be filled by a dangerous nationalism and that the "Balkanization" of Eastern Europe or even chaos was around the corner. Communists consider it self-evident that only they can create order and progress and that, without them, catastrophes and chaos are inevitable. Thus, after the turn of events in Eastern Europe, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze predicted in March 1990 that surprises, crises, and catastrophes would happen there, and after the East European reforms failed, power would be seized by "a great dictator or an operetta dictator."[42] (In his resignation speech of December 20, 1990, Shevardnadze expressed fear that "dictatorship is coming" even earlier to the Soviet Union itself.)[43] Leftist circles in the West, whose illusions about a "third way" were crushed by the revolution in Eastern Europe, also cannot find anything positive in the expansion of the despised bourgeois system east of the Elbe and the Danube rivers.

The contest between the old totalitarian structures and the new state of law in the East European countries is in fact a power struggle between communists and anti-communists. It influences or causes the outbreak

[41]Karl Popper interview in *Moscow News*, No. 46, Nov. 25–Dec. 2, 1990, p. 16.

[42]Interview with *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 11, March 1990, p. 3. Professor Ralf Dahrendorf's view was just as pessimistic: "In East Central Europe, many unhappy combinations are thinkable. Quickly changing governments and even regimes which leave few traces other than a near-total disenchantment are as possible as new political monopolies, and as prolonged states of confusion and disorientation." Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, New York, Random House, 1990, p. 111.

[43]See *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 20, 1990, p. 12.

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of national conflicts, for instance, between the Slovaks and the Czechs, when peoples and regions want to break loose from a dogmatic and dictatorial center that for a long time had negated their aspirations and welfare (as is also the case in the bloody conflicts in Yugoslavia or in Soviet republics). With the collapse of communism, nationalism is seen as the new enemy-image and the new cause for alarm. Communism, which had shown little understanding for nationalism from Marx to Gorbachev and had tried to replace it with "proletarian internationalism," proved unable to suppress national feelings. National identity was at the core of individual and group self-confidence and became the seed from which resistance to communism grew. In this sense, nationalism has a positive function of which the people can be proud and it can also help heal the effects of the trauma of the past 40 years. Nineteen-eighty-nine was not characterized by ethnic or nationalistic conflicts, it was "a year of solidarity within and among the nations."[44]

Currently, the conditions do not exist for a revival of the extreme nationalism that turned Eastern Europe into an epicenter of conflict between the two World Wars. Interwar nationalism arose in agricultural societies with feudal upper classes; both have disappeared. Nor do large Jewish minorities which were the target of anti-Semitism still exist (although the disappearance of the Jews has not led to a disappearance of anti-Semitism). A former function of nationalism was the autarkic protection of a self-sufficient national economy and the repulse of foreign investments—which are now more than welcome. Additionally, interwar nationalism in Eastern Europe was fueled and utilized by the great powers of the time—Germany, France, but also Great Britain and the Soviet Union—in their struggle for spheres of influence and markets.

Today, the East European societies are as changed as are their international surroundings. The "German threat," for example, which until recently stirred nationalist resentment or drove people into Moscow's embrace, no longer seems to cause much alarm, not even after reunification. This does not preclude internal or external forces (possibly the East European communists or Moscow, from whom the loudest warnings against nationalism come) from fanning the fires of nationalism for their own purposes. But advanced European integration and the modern world as a whole are not a fertile ground for nurturing nationalism's former virulence. We should also not forget that Eastern Europe was once characterized by a high degree of religious and cultural tolerance, that most of its educated citizens were multilingual, and that the same liberal ideas were shared by them.

Assertions that these peoples and countries are unfit for democracy and a market economy because they have not known them in the past is both historically inaccurate as well as unfounded and presumptuous. They supported and fought for democracy when it was already becoming stale and sluggish elsewhere. Through television, East Europeans learned how democracy functioned in the West and so had no cause for illusions. The first free elections were held in Poland in June 1989, and in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in 1990. They resulted in majorities for the democratic forces and inflicted defeat upon the communists and their successor parties, forcing them into opposition. The elections showed that the new democracies functioned amazingly well even after 40 years of totalitarianism.[45] The new parliaments in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest function neither better nor worse than those in Paris, Bonn, and Bern.

In economic terms, the East European countries possessed raw materials, a developed agriculture, an incipient modern industry, and a flourishing trade with East and West. In addition to the destruction during the war and German occupation, these assets fell victim to communist expropriation, central planning, and Soviet exploitation. Anyone who knew these countries before the war and revisits them now is struck by their backwardness in comparison to what existed before the war. The Eastern Europeans experienced the market in the most primitive form of capitalism, the black market, which grew immensely under the stagnating planned economy. Their expanding foreign trade with the West brought them into contact with modern management.

The crucial point is that the people, nations, and states of Eastern Europe are impelled toward the West and toward Europe, to which they traditionally have belonged. This impulse arises not only from understandable materialistic reasons—it is also a matter of conviction and an expression of their new freedom. A continental shift is under way in which the parts that had been driven to the East are returning to Europe. Some see in this shift the specter of an imminent *Völkerwanderung,* although, for the time-being, the threat of a massive migration should be regarded more as a form

[44]Timothy Garton Ash, op. cit., p. 145.

[45]During the East German elections on March 18, 1990, the SED, which had changed its name to "Party of Democratic Socialism" (PDS) received only 16.3 percent of the votes. On March 25, 1990, the "Hungarian Socialist Party" (formerly the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) received only 8.5 percent, and on June 10, 1990, the Communist Party of Czechslovakia received only 13.6 percent. These parties had claimed 90 percent or more of the votes in the elections held under their control.

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Table 1: Eastern Europe, 1988

Country	Area in km.^{2}	Population	Labor force
Bulgaria	111,000	8,987,000	4,057,000
Hungary	93,000	10,590,000	3,840,000
East Germany	108,000	16,675,000	7,950,000
Poland	313,000	37,775,000	12,812,000
Romania	238,000	23,112,000	7,843,000
Czechoslovakia	128,000	15,624,000	7,217,000
Total	991,000	112,763,000	43,719,000

Source: *Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik Stran-Chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomoshchi* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member-Countries of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance), Moscow, "Statistika," 1989.

of political blackmail and a worst-case scenario, than a real possibility.[46]

After all, what is new and significant today is that Western Europeans are not competing among themselves for spheres of influence in the East as they had done from time immemorial. Instead, they are ready jointly to help their freed neighbors and to open the doors for them to institutions like the Council of Europe and the European Community. The end of the division of Germany and the return of Eastern Europe, which represents an area the size of France, Italy, and the former German Federal Republic combined, and which has more than 100 million inhabitants and a labor force of over 40 million people (see Table 1), represents not simply a burden but also an enrichment and growth potential for Europe, which will be needed in the 21st century. Indeed, as we know from the history of economic development, it is possible for the more backward countries to overtake the more advanced. Thus, there exists the chance that after clearing the rubble from the planned economy, the East European countries will introduce the most up-to-date technologies, experiment with break-through processes, and even compete with the older industrialized states—as Japan and Germany have managed to do with the United States.

Thus, there are reasons for optimism in assessing the future prospects of Eastern Europe. This does not mean ignoring justified concerns and skeptical estimates like those expressed by Professor Dahrendorf, who writes that a new civil society "will not grow in a season or a parliamentary period." The path "is fraught with risks and obstacles," there is the "dilemma of political and economic reform," and it is even possible that "the attempt can fail."[47] To be sure, the Eastern Europeans are eager for the comforts of a consumer-oriented society; yet they fear its drudgery, deceits, and glitter. Despite all the problems, difficulties, and uncertainties that should not be underestimated, the predominant trend is the impulse of the Eastern Europeans toward the West, their desire to belong to a united Europe and to lead a "normal life" in a European framework. On the Western side, there is the willingness and the resources to support this striving of the East European neighbors. On this point, I concur entirely with Dahrendorf, who writes:

I delight at the signs of an openness all over Europe which, far from being a threat to the British, the French, the German constitutions of liberty, reaffirm their principles and call upon us more fortunate Europeans to help—to help understand what is happening, and perhaps even to help lay foundations for the open society.[48]

Revolutionary Change in the West

Despite justified joy and relief over the turn of events in Eastern Europe, it is not yet time to proclaim a victory of the West or the "triumph of capitalism" and then to rest on one's laurels. In view of these entirely changed circumstances, the Western states, communities, and organizations cannot go on as usual or act as if nothing will change for them. They too will find revolutionary change inescapable even though it will not entail an actual change of power. A radical change in ways of thinking, in institutions, and in forms of cooperation is essential. Inspired by the actions of the Eastern Europeans, the peoples of the West will have to reconsider and test what freedom and democracy mean to them. The West can learn from the East European political experience, moral courage, and cultural achievements despite oppression, as well as from the nonviolent demonstrations and the "round table" negotiations. Such lessons can be put to use in the service of Western democracy and cooperation.

Postwar development of Western Europe was shaped by the necessity for economic reconstruction and the creation of free democracies and markets, defense in view of the threat from the Soviet Union and, related to it, the nuclear umbrella provided by

[46]Timothy Garton Ash summarized a 1987 poll on the opinion of Polish secondary school students in *The Uses of Adversity* (Cambridge, Granta Books, 1989, p. 249) as follows: "What they want is to travel to the West for a year, earn some hard currency, maybe learn some capitalist skills, and then return to set up a small private firm in Poland. . . ."

[47]Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 106–07.

[48]Ibid., p. 32.

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Czechoslovak President Václav Havel and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner at the center of the conference table at NATO headquarters on March 21, 1991.

—NATO Photo.

the United States. Last but not least, there was the need to make the Federal Republic of Germany an integral part of Europe. These tasks were carried out successfully and led to new forms of cooperation and integration in the political, economic, and military spheres. German-French reconciliation was a major achievement in this process. Conceptual and organizational efforts were aimed at *stability, security, and predictability*; with regard to the East, efforts were concentrated on the maintenance of the status quo and equilibrium. Concepts like "roll-back," the liberation of Eastern Europe, or the reunification of Germany remained empty, inoperative slogans. The new geopolitical era, by contrast, will be characterized by *permanent change, instability, uncertainty, and risk,* both globally and on the European continent.

A completely new situation has arisen in Europe. The division of the continent has been overcome and with it the "historic contradiction between the two systems, socialism and capitalism" has ended. The Soviet Union, which had been a threat and a force to be reckoned with in Europe during the postwar era, has had to withdraw from Eastern Europe and lost its outer empire. It is not certain if the Soviet Union will make it into the 21st century as a superpower and centralized state. The present process of disintegration and renewal in the inner Soviet empire represents a factor of uncertainty in Europe and will pose new tasks.

The instability created by new, future-oriented forces could be magnified by a different instability coming in the wake of attempts at restoration by old forces, such as the Communist party and the Soviet army. The two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, which have been decisive forces in the maintenance of the status quo on our continent since Yalta and Potsdam, will lose some of their influence. Therefore, the Europeans will have to make their own decisions on security and foreign policy. The existing collective structures and plans for their expansion are hardly suited to the new tasks. They have become obsolete or, like the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, have already disappeared.

Although the CSCE made a significant contribution to the democratization of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and to a peaceful resolution of conflicts, the Helsinki process functioned only in the framework of a bipolar security structure and aimed at maintaining the status quo and cooperation between East and West on an equal footing. For this reason, the Helsinki pro-

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cess, too, belongs to the past. Perhaps it was a mistake that over the past three or four years, as Gorbachev's policy of openness was just beginning, no determined attempt was made to create a new security organization in Europe in which "the entire Soviet Union would be included, and thereby support provided to those forces that had always wanted to open Russia to Europe."[49] Doubts about the solidity and future effectiveness of the CSCE structures were increased by the difficulties that emerged during and after the fall 1990 meeting in Paris with regard to the establishment of new institutions and the achievement of conventional disarmament.

NATO has proved itself a successful defense alliance for containing the Soviet Union and will probably retain in the near future certain security functions, which, until now, have been focused exclusively on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet army positioned on the Elbe. Now NATO faces the difficult task of converting a military alliance into a political organization, of adapting transatlantic ties to the new circumstances, and, above all, of strengthening the sporadic cooperation with America and defining the future role of the organization in the United Nations framework and in regional conflicts. In general, military-strategic considerations, which were dominant over the past 45 years, will have to yield to economic considerations.

The European Community is looking toward an enlarged and cohesive market in 1992, whose impact on the existing institutions in Brussels and Strasbourg cannot be predicted. Its present structure, however, will also be changed or even burst apart as a result of Germany's reunification and its political and economic dimension in the center of Europe as well as in the Community. The Community still has to come to terms with this new development. The larger Federal Republic has yet to demonstrate its role as an integrating factor in the EC and as a bridge to the East. The EC will also change due to the inevitable inclusion of the East European countries and the probable membership of the European Free Trade Association countries. The challenges of an expanded market, the integration of a growing number of new members, and the global interdependence with America, the Soviet Union, and the Asian-Pacific area will hardly allow the EC to isolate itself behind the ramparts of the Rome Accords and the bureaucracy in Brussels.

The enormous dimension of these processes and their breakneck speed have not even begun to penetrate our consciousness. They can be dealt with only by jettisoning obsolete ways of thinking and excessively narrow notions of stability and by consciously accepting instability and risks. A deliberate participation in the processes of change is needed, in order to direct this change into foreseeable and controllable channels. Of course, the current development does not mean the sudden end of CSCE, NATO, the EC, and other institutions, but these institutions will have to undergo substantial reorganization if they want to maintain their existence. Moreover, new mechanisms will have to be created in the areas of politics, economics, ecology, and culture, as well as in security and foreign policy, which can build on existing experience and the new trust in multilateral cooperation.

The revolutionary changes in Europe will also have an impact on national institutions and processes. The economic processes and the requirements of the modern information society will have a revolutionary impact on financial systems, banking, production, management, and marketing. The new quality of information, in the sense of dissemination and constant innovation, will influence the media both as a "productive force" and a "fourth estate."

The governmental, economic, and intellectual tasks that appear on the horizon can be mastered only by a corresponding adaptation and preparation of the educational system. This is especially true for universities and colleges. Their organization, teaching, and research are predicated on Western thought, political order, and methods of work, and are thus currently oriented toward stability and predictability. Innovation often is largely outside this frame of reference. Meanwhile, a structuralist perception and a general preoccupation with microprocesses prevent us from focusing on larger interrelationships and future developments. However, quite different types of knowledge and cadres will be required for a new era of permanent change, instability, and risk, with inherent perils as well as opportunities.

[49]See former commander of NATO forces, General Gerd Schmückle in *Politik und Wirtschaft* (Zürich), Special issue, No. 22, January 1991, p. 21.

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Civil-Military Relations in China: Tiananmen and After

Harlan W. Jencks

By resorting to brute force on June 3–4, 1989, the elderly "hard-liners" of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) brought enormous discredit upon political institutions of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and increased their dependence on the military. Although the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has shown little sign of disloyalty or disobedience, Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun and the hard-line party "elders" have been deeply concerned about military loyalty since the Tiananmen Incident. Their concern was heightened by the violent collapse of the Ceauşescu regime in December 1989 and the spectacle of Romanian security police fighting soldiers—with Chinese weapons—in the streets of Bucharest.[1]

The 1989 crisis saw Deng Xiaoping repeat many of the mistakes that Mao Zedong made in his declining years. Deng demolished the political arrangements he had set up to assure a peaceful transition after his own death, and left the PLA as the primary institution that will determine China's future. Ironically, Deng's own reforms spawned the demonstrations that forced his hand. In the end, he had little choice but to accede to, and join with, the aged coterie of hard-liners who had opposed his reforms all along. Today, Deng is only "first among equals" in this "gang of elders," which includes himself, Yang Shangkun, Li Xiannian, Yao Yilin, Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, Wan Li, Bo Yibo, Deng Yingzhao, and Peng Zhen. Together they have ultimate political authority, including authority over the Politburo of the CCP. The authority of this uneasy coalition is entirely extra-legal, based on personal prestige and influence, as well as on patronage networks.

Like Mao before him, Deng has endlessly advocated party control of the PLA. Since his return to power in 1977, he has labored, with limited success, to reestablish the organizational strength and the prestige of the CCP. He also attempted to carve out separate roles for the party, the PLA, and the government. These reforms implied that the military would no longer be used to settle political disagreements within the party. Yet when Deng's own power and policy preferences were challenged, he used the military to override the party's internal decision-making and control mechanisms. In the 1989 crisis, the party failed to function as an institution, largely because Deng (its real leader) opposed Zhao Ziyang (its nominal leader).

In April-May 1989, while the leadership was paralyzed by internal divisions, the situation in the streets got out of hand. No one acted when the demonstrations were still manageable. The military high command avoided taking sides in the political debate, and apparently hesitated to obey (possibly contradictory) orders from ad hoc or irregular sources. There were instances of PLA and police commanders refusing to carry out orders from the supposedly retired "proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation." A few days before martial law was declared, a rumor had it that a People's Armed Police (PAP) commander in Beijing had refused to suppress the demonstrations because his orders to do so were *illegal*. Lt. Gen. Xu Qinxian, commander of 38th Army, similarly refused and then resigned, partly for the same

Harlan W. Jencks is Research Associate at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California (Berkeley), and Adjunct Professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. *The author wishes to thank Monte Bullard, Paul Godwin, Jason Hu , Richard Latham, Roderick MacFarquhar, and Allen Whiting for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.*

[1]AFP (Hong Kong), Dec. 27, 1989, reported a secret Politburo meeting on the Romanian situation. See also Willy Wo-lap Lam in *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), Dec. 27, 1989. Both reports are reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Dec. 27, 1989, p. 10.

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Deng Xiaoping, together with Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, and Wan Li in September 1989.

—Eastfoto.

reason. These incidents speak volumes about the reforms of the 1980's. Raising the issue of *legality* (i.e., the formal chain of command) would not have occurred to any Chinese a decade earlier. In 1989, it was one of several ways soldiers tried to keep out of the debate, and out of the political arena. But they were ultimately pulled in, and forced to commit themselves.

In late May 1989, central authority was clarified. Despite their reservations about the wisdom of their orders, and about the ad hoc authority of the "gang of elders," the vast majority of PLA officers obeyed. Troops went into the streets, and did what they were ordered to do. It certainly was not a "military takeover." The PLA recognized that a unified, disciplined, national army enforcing bad policy is better than a divided army at war with itself even for the best of reasons. However, many officers resented being cast as the instrument of repression, and being thrust back into factional politics. Most of all, they resented losing the respect and affection that most people still held for the PLA, despite the abuses of the Cultural Revolution and the less-than-glorious war with Vietnam.

Commanding the Gun

Virtually all students of civil-military relations agree that the strength of civilian political institutions is the crucial determinant of the character of civil-military relations.[2] Weak or unstable political systems spawn military praetorianism. A given in politically developing states is that when civilian political institutions (democratic or otherwise) become discredited, they are vulnerable to military penetration. Even a professional officer corps may intervene, regarding itself as the "guardian" of national virtue.[3]

In China in the 1920's and 1930's, the noted philosopher, diplomat, and literary figure Hu Shi correctly insisted that China's most basic problem was not the strength of warlordism, but rather the lack of "secure civil authority, and this lack was not the fault of the soldiers; it was the fault of the civilians themselves."[4] Hu Shi's analysis would further suggest that total reliance on the military for the maintenance of authority in the wake of Tiananmen reflects not so much aspirations on the part of the military to hold civil power as it does the failure of the government to create a strong and autono-

[2]Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977, p. 9. This discussion draws heavily on Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977, Ch. 4.

[3]On "guardianship," see Huntington, op. cit., pp. 225–33. Perlmutter describes "arbitrator" praetorianism in similar terms in op. cit., pp. 104–07 and 141–44.

[4]Arthur Waldron, "Warlordism Versus Federalism: The Revival of a Debate?" *China Quarterly* (London), March 1990, pp. 121–22.

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mous civil administration, both nationally and locally. In 1989, leading dissident Yan Jiaqi argued that "only the creation of a true constitutional system . . . will open the possibility of making the military national, and not political [*guojiahua he fei zhengzhihua*]."[5]

Mao was right that political power comes from the barrel of a gun. If the military leaders who control a nation's weapons are not to dictate to, or take over, the civilian administration, they either must be controlled by countervailing forces like the secret police (what Samuel Huntington calls "subjective civilian control") or they must themselves accept that it is in the best interest of the state and of the military itself to accede to civilian authority. They may do so because of their own military professionalism, or for ideological, religious, or other reasons.

Fully developed professionalism (military, medical, legal, or whatever) is impossible in a Leninist state. True professionalism involves autonomy, which implies social-political pluralism, which even CCP reformers like Zhao Ziyang have rejected. However, the level of military professionalism in the PLA did increase markedly during the 1979–89 decade of reform. The PLA would not have obeyed as well, nor closed ranks so quickly, in June-July 1989, if it had been as factionalized and regionalized as it was 10 years earlier.

Today's civil-military crisis is shaped by the PLA's relatively increased level of military professionalism. "If nothing else, the rhetoric that came with a decade of military reform created an expectation," Richard Latham argues, "that orders to the military would become regularized" and legal.[6] Many PLA officers were led to believe that factional political exploitation of the PLA was a thing of the past. In the 1989 crisis, however, this aspect of political institutionalization, like so many others, collapsed when the two main architects of the military reforms, Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun,[7] reverted to ad hoc authoritarianism.

The reforms of the 1980's tried to reconcile irreconcilables: a Leninist vanguard party and regularized procedures; "absolute party control" and military professionalism. A Marxist-Leninist party is defined by its "correct line," whereas "seeking truth from facts" implies tolerance, multiple truths, pluralism, and compromise.[8] Deng and Yang are still Marxist-Leninists, after all; they refused to compromise and repudiated regularized procedures. As in the Cultural Revolution, the PLA ultimately intervened in response to an illegal, factional order from the maximum leader rather than to an order of the CCP. Naturally, the PLA's hesitancy to follow this order is officially attributed to ideological "contamination" rather than to the illegality of the order.

The June 4 Incident also created considerable confusion about the command mechanism(s) that shifted the PLA to military intervention. Irregular or arbitrary procedures confused military command and control. They included "the nonutilization of available procedures" and "the intrusion of leaders without formal military responsibility (in particular, Premier Li Peng and the leadership of the Beijing Municipal People's Government) into armed forces channels."[9]

Deng's "extraordinary action of redeploying troop units from other military regions to Beijing and its environs," as well as the martial-law authorities' heavy reliance on main-force units and strategic reserves, betrayed doubts about Beijing-based PLA and PAP units. Moreover, Zhao Ziyang, supposedly the "leader" of the Central Military Commission (CMC),[10] was excluded from decision-making after May 19, a move that seems to have been the basis for several commanders' questioning of the *legality* of their orders. Deng and Yang resorted to "out-of-channel" arrangements that preempted Zhao Ziyang's ultimate assumption of supreme civil and military authority. According to Jonathan Pollack, it is "entirely possible that a majority of the then-extant executive committee of the Military Commission (Zhao Ziyang, Yang Shangkun, Hong Xuezhi, Liu Huaqing, and Qin Jiwei) would have opposed or seriously questioned the decision to impose martial law."[11] Ultimately, however, extra-legal arrangements, justified by "quasi-statutory procedures and regulations," outmaneuvered moderate party and army leaders who voiced reservations about the use of force. In the process, these arrangements created enormous confusion, plus a continuing authority crisis.

In retrospect, "confusion" best characterizes the mil-

[5]Yan Jiaqi, "China Is No 'Republic'," *Huaqiao ribao* (New York), July 24 and 25, 1989, p. 8, as cited in Waldron, loc. cit., p. 125.

[6]Richard J. Latham, "China's Party-Army Relations After June 1989: A Case of Miles' Law?" unpublished paper, July 1990, p. 8.

[7]Yang Shangkun generally supported Deng's reforms throughout the 1980's. He was given overall responsibility for reforming military manpower and organization in 1983. See Yuan Houqun, "Brief Stories of the Chinese PLA Reorganization and Force-Reduction Process," *Kunlun* (Hong Kong), March-April 1987, pp. 6–7.

[8]Kenneth Jowitt prompted this discussion.

[9]The following is drawn from Jonathan D. Pollack, "Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System," forthcoming in a volume on bureaucracy and policy-making in China, edited by David Lampton and Kenneth Lieberthal, University of California Press, 1991. Draft MS pp. 43–44. I have offered my own detailed analyses of the 1989 crisis in Harlan W. Jencks, "The Losses in Tiananmen Square," *Air Force Magazine*, (Arlington, VA), November 1989, pp. 62–66; and Harlan W. Jencks, "The Military in China," *Current History* (Philadelphia), September 1989, pp. 265–68, 291–93.

[10]In June 1988, Deng told a Polish delegation, "I have handed over my duties, and the Central Military Commission is now under the leadership of Comrade Zhao Ziyang." *Zhongguo xinwen she* (Beijing), June 7, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 8, 1988, p. 8.

[11]Pollack, loc. cit., p. 44.

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itary aspects of the Tiananmen tragedy—confusion about who ultimately commanded the army and how. Richard Latham has pointed out that "some party apologists have laid the blame at the feet of individual PLA officers." But, he argues, "there is reasonable cause to conclude . . . that the bedrock problem is *how the party commands the gun*."[12] According to Latham, there was never any question about the PLA's loyalty to what he calls the "party of policy." Official post-hoc commentary, by focusing on the "party-commands-the-gun" issue, has glossed over the dangerously flawed command-and-control system at the military/political apex.[13]

Latham further contends that neither the reformers nor the hard-liners can be comfortable with the actual or rumored command relationship between the party and army. He emphasizes that we do not know, and quite possibly nobody in China knows, just what is the "accepted or legal military chain of command at the top of the national command structure." The most fundamental "party-army question arising from [the Tiananmen crisis] was 'Who in the party controls the army [and how]?' rather than 'Does the party control the army?'"[14]

In the late 1980's, a discrepancy between actual and formal authority developed as a result of the retirement of Deng and the elders from their formal party and state positions to the "second line." Although Premier Li Peng and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang were given formal authority, Deng and other senior officials retained actual authority. This lack of connection between formal and actual authority would have caused problems even during a "normal" military crisis like an invasion; in the intra-party factional clash of 1989, it caused delay, confusion, and contradictory orders coming from multiple sources. "There is no way to know how even the best-intentioned PLA and CCP leaders understood the political maneuvering in early June" 1989.[15]

Foreign news coverage of the June 4 Incident was full of rumors and reports of opposition to PLA action by old military leaders, disobedience by some officers, reports that troops abandoned their weapons and equipment, references to armed clashes between "loyal" and "disloyal" units, etc. Such reports probably added to the confusion of the political leadership as well, increasing their misgivings about the loyalty and discipline of the PLA.[16]

In this century, Chinese politics have been a zero-sum game, and most CCP elders still think in terms of solving political problems with military force. The majority regard control of the military as necessary not only to protect the party, but to protect themselves and their policy positions. Events in Eastern Europe in late 1989 only reinforced that belief. Thus, whether formal rules specifying the chain of command exist or not, Chinese politicians tend to fall back on personal relationships (*guanxi*) and factional alliances in any civil-military crisis.[17]

Eberhard Sandschneider argues that the PLA's political role varies, almost routinely, with the political situation: The army is quiescent in times of political normalcy, but intervenes, or is used to intervene, in times of political conflict.[18] However, as Latham points out, Sandschneider disregards the enormous practical difficulties the PLA has encountered in shifting between these disparate situations. Such "shifts are neither routine nor easily accomplished, [and] the role changes have been controversial and divisive for the PLA." Moreover, as the PLA professionalized during the 1980's, it focused more sharply on its military missions. As a result, force structure and weapons became more directly linked to those missions than to internal political imperatives. The June 4 Incident reveals that "many of the party's leaders were unaware of how force modernization constrains political employment options."[19]

Although the PLA has shown little sign of disloyalty or disobedience, the "gang of elders" has sought to reassert its authority with traditional "Maoist" methods, especially since the toppling of the Ceauşescu regime in Romania. They have strengthened surveillance over society, government, and the army. They have instigated campaigns to indoctrinate the population and to strengthen the PLA's internal political control system. The relationship of the PLA to the party is being recast in strongly Maoist terms. Lei Feng, the perennial PLA model hero, is once again held up for emulation.[20] "Redness" is again regarded as more important than "expertise" for cadre selection and promotion. Ironically, like Mao in the early 1960's, Deng and Yang hold up the PLA as a political model for the rest of society, even as they strive to shore up PLA loyalty.[21]

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[12]Latham, loc. cit., p. 21 (emphasis in original). This section draws heavily on Latham's analysis.

[13]Ibid., p. 3.

[14]Ibid., p. 17.

[15]Ibid., pp. 17 and 18.

[16]Ibid., p. 16.

[17]Seventeen years ago, William Parrish made the same point in his critique of the "field army elites thesis." See William L. Parrish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *China Quarterly*, October-December 1973, pp. 667–99.

[18]Sandschneider makes this "military participation" argument in his "Military and Politics in the PRC," in June Teufel Dreyer, Ed., *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy*, New York, Paragon House, 1989, pp. 331–50.

[19]Latham, loc. cit., p. 12.

[20]*Xinhua*, Feb. 24, 1990, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1990, pp. 23–24; and *Xinhua* Domestic Service, Mar. 6, 1990, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 8, 1990, pp. 35–36.

[21]Wang Changhan, "Uphold the Party's Absolute Leadership over the Army with Great Firmness," *Jiefangjun bao* (Beijing, hereafter–*JFJB*), Dec. 18, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 16, 1990, Supplement, pp. 37–39; and Lao Yi, "The Gun Should Be Put Firmly in the Hands of People Loyal to the Party," *JFJB*, Feb. 13, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1990, pp. 24–25.

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One of several truckloads of Chinese People's Armed Police drive through the streets of Kunming in China's Yunnan province.

—AP/Wide World.

The old leaders are addressing the gravely damaged relationship between the PLA and the people with a campaign for "National Defense Education." The campaign's ostensible purpose is to implement the new, 1990 Law on Protecting Military Installations, which is "different from education in preparation for war," and aims rather at "forestalling subversive schemes by hostile forces at home and abroad,"[22] promoting patriotism, "safeguarding solidarity," preventing "any illegal activities that may jeopardize and sabotage military facilities," and enhancing respect for the military.[23]

Internal-Security Forces

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre, the "gang of elders" has been concerned not only about PLA loyalty, but also about popular unrest. Deng Xiaoping and the elders were particularly dissatisfied with the People's Armed Police (which had been specifically organized to maintain security) and its role in the events of April-May 1989, especially its performance in Beijing. Some PAP soldiers had openly supported the demonstrators in May and June.[24]

Between June 1989 and January 1990, several division-sized units from various PLA group armies in the Beijing area were reportedly transferred to the PAP.[25] The police also began to get more publicity. Pictures

[22]*Renmin ribao*, (Beijing—hereafter, *RMRB*), July 26, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 30, 1990, p. 30.

[23]Wuhan, Hubei Provincial Service, July 22, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 24, 1990, p. 28; Guangzhou, Guangdong Provincial Service, July 25, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 27, 1990, p. 34; Wuhan, Hubei Provincial Service, Aug. 2, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 3, 1990, pp. 46–47; Zhengzhou, Henan Provincial Service, Aug. 6, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1990, p. 53; and Nanjing, Jiangsu Provincial Service, July 21, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 26, 1990, p. 35.

[24]Tai Ming Cheung, "Security Reshuffle," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter, *FEER*), Mar. 1, 1990, p. 20; and *Tang Tai* (Hong Kong), Feb. 3, 1990, p. 8, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 16, 1990, Supplement, pp. 31–32.

[25]*The New York Times*, Apr. 15, 1990. I am grateful to Ellis L. Melvin for sharing his meticulous order-of-battle analysis of the June 4 Incident (private correspondence, Apr. 5, 1990).

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appeared showing them engaged not only in riot-control training, but also in counter-terror exercises like hostage rescue. Elite PAP units were organized into "shock attack units" (*tuji dui*). Such publicity was intended to improve the morale and image of the PAP while warning dissidents that the police were ready to deal with them in a no-nonsense fashion.[26]

In fall 1989, as European communist regimes crumbled, military authorities in coastal provinces expressed concern for the security of militia weapons-storage installations, and instituted inspections and other measures.[27] In February 1990, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed the Draft Law on Protection of PRC Military Installations.[28] Several provincial governments decided to reinforce the PAP by establishing rapid-response militia and reserve detachments. These detachments were to set up a "contingency system throughout the province with an emphasis on the coastal areas and cities."[29] In December, although there was no Chinese public response to events in Romania except on a few college campuses, the central leadership reportedly placed PAP forces, plus eight group armies in the Beijing and Shenyang military regions, on maximum alert.[30] In early 1990, party authorities called for "an anti-riot force system" to be set up at "provincial, prefectural, and key-county levels," and for formation of special riot-control forces in all large cities.[31]

On February 14, *Renmin Ribao* announced a major reshuffle of the People's Armed Police leadership. The national commander, Lt. Gen. Li Lianxiu, and the political commissar, Maj. Gen. Zhang Xiufu, and their deputies were replaced by regular-army officers. The new commander is Maj. Gen. Zhou Yushu, who commanded the 24th Group Army when it pacified Beijing's university district during the June crisis. The 24th Army[32] reportedly did its job with better discipline and less violence than most other units.[33] The reshuffle resulted in the PAP having four deputy commanders instead of three, and two commissars instead of one, which tends to corroborate the reports of PAP expansion.

During the reshuffle, foreign reporters made much of the PAP being officially placed under the Central Military Commission. Actually, the CMC has always ultimately controlled the PAP.[34] Moreover, PAP units have long responded to orders issued by military commanders at regional, provincial, and local levels. Despite the recent expansion of and emphasis on the PAP, there is no evidence that CCP leaders intend to convert it into a countervailing force like troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the KGB in the Soviet Union.

Strengthening Party Control

At the Fifth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee (November 6–9, 1989), Deng Xiaoping resigned as chairman of the party CMC and announced he would resign as chairman of the state CMC during the National People's Congress session in March 1990. The plenum appointed Jiang Zemin as the new chairman of the party CMC. Yang Shangkun was appointed first vice-chairman; General Liu Huaqing, vice-chairman; and General Yang Baibing, secretary-general. Yang Baibing was also elevated to the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee.[35] Following the plenum, on November 10 to 12, there was an "enlarged meeting" of the party CMC, most likely attended by all commanders and commissars down through group army level.[36]

In his farewell speech to the CMC, Deng called on the PLA to persist in "revolutionization, modernization, and regularization." The reversed order of these three goals is significant: before Tiananmen, "regularization" [*zhengguihua*] was always listed first. Reportedly, all of the participants agreed that although Deng is officially retired, "the theory and principles he raised for army-building will be followed."[37] The military hierarchy, however, is not likely to accept Jiang Zemin as the "core of the leadership." He has virtually no authority or

[26] *JFJB*, September 1989, pp. 8–9; and *Jiefangjun huabao* (Beijing—hereafter, *JFJHB*), October 1989, pp. 26–27; Changchun, Jilin Provincial Service, Aug. 1, 1990; and *RMRB*, July 29, 1990, both trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 3, 1990, pp. 53 and 54.

[27] Hangzhou, Zhejiang Provincial Service, Dec. 19, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 27, 1989, p. 33; and Nanchang, Jiangxi Provincial Service, Nov. 6, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 15, 1989, p. 61.

[28] On discussion of the law and its promulgation, see *Xinhua* Domestic Service, Dec. 22, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 27, 1989, p. 16; and *RMRB*, Feb. 24, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 1, 1990, pp. 35–36.

[29] Hangzhou, Zhejiang Provincial Service, Feb. 27, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 5, 1990, p. 41; and *JFJB*, Jan. 20, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 16, 1990, Supplement, pp. 39–40.

[30] Tai Ming Cheung, "Haunted Dreams," *FEER*, Jan. 18, 1990, pp. 16–17.

[31] *Tang Tai*, Mar. 3, 1990, pp. 7 and 8, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 8, 1990, p. 16.

[32] I use the terms "army" and "group army" interchangeably to translate *jituan jun* (combined group army), the highest level of PLA tactical command. There are about 24 armies.

[33] *FEER*, Feb. 22, 1990, p. 14; and *The New York Times*, Apr. 15, 1990.

[34] Evidence of CMC control before June 4 is that Minister of Public Security Wang Fang, who theoretically supervises the PAP and is nominally PAP First Political Commissar, was not discredited along with "his" troops. Wang remained in office and accompanied Premier Li Peng to Moscow in May 1990.

[35] "Deng Retires, Jiang Appointed Military Chief," *Beijing Review*, Nov. 20-26, 1989, pp. 5–6.

[36] "Deng Urges PLA to Stay Loyal," ibid., Nov. 27–Dec. 3, 1989, p. 9. The group picture of the CMC "enlarged meeting" included at least 350 people. *JFJHB*, December 1989, pp. 6–7.

[37] "Deng Urges PLA to Stay Loyal," loc. cit., p. 7.

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prestige within the military, and will need Deng's active support indefinitely. There was an almost plaintive tone in Deng's assertion that Jiang was the "qualified chairman of the military commission because he is the qualified general secretary of the party." Both Deng and Jiang called for strengthening the CCP's (read: their own) "absolute leadership over the army." Party organs at all levels were to strengthen and improve ideological work "in a bid to keep the army and the Central Committee united."[38]

Perhaps because of Jiang Zemin's lack of prestige with the PLA, the reportage of his attempts to court military favor in spring and summer 1990 was effusive. In June, *Jiefangjun bao* reported Jiang's visit to Guangdong and the southern special economic zones (SEZ's): "Facing the scorching sun of summer days in the south and enduring the hardships of a long journey," Jiang "made certain he called on PLA men." Having done some homework prior to his visit, Jiang had a sound understanding of the glorious history of one regiment. Visiting the 42nd Army, "With the burning sun directly overhead, he walked as if on wings and mounted scores of steps . . . where he talked with soldiers. . . .The utmost solicitude shown by the General Secretary touched the hearts of the soldiers very much."[39] Accompanied by PLA Chief of the General Staff Chi Haotian, Jiang visited the PLA and the PAP in Tibet in late July, where he "inspected work at . . . the grass roots, despite fatigue from the long journey and the oxygen deficiency. . . . Braving the drizzling rain, General Secretary Jiang Zemin continued his inspection tours."[40]

It was not, however, mere rhetoric when Jiang called for PLA "party-building" at the Fifth Plenum. The PLA's internal party apparatus had deteriorated seriously during the 1980's; many CCP committees were little more than shells by 1989. The enlarged CMC meeting allegedly directed that 70 percent [sic!] of PLA training time be devoted to politics.[41] An All-Army Political Work Conference convened on December 11 promulgated a document entitled "Concerning Certain Problems in Strengthening and Improving Political and Ideological Work in the Army Under the New Situation." It cited the dangers of bourgeois liberalism and peaceful evolution and warned that domestic and foreign "anti-socialist elements" were trying to infiltrate the PLA.[42]

A common practice in PRC politics is to have a major policy departure announced by someone known to have opposed it.[43] So it was Chief of the General Staff Chi Haotian, a leading proponent of military professionalization and modernization, who enunciated the neo-Maoist view on party-army relations in a long *Qiushi* article in January 1990. General Chi wrote: "Under the new historical conditions of reform, opening up, and modernization, the basic principle of the party's absolute leadership over the army is seriously challenged by the . . . climate both at home and abroad," including bourgeois liberalization. Bourgeois liberalization includes the notion of "nonpoliticization of the army" and "separation between the party and the army." Such doctrines, according to Chi, are being blindly copied from the bourgeois military theories of the West by a "tiny number of people" influenced by Western thought. They are to blame for spreading the idea of weakening the party's absolute leadership. Chi reiterated the Marxist view that every army serves a particular class, and quoted Mao's famous aphorism that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun should never be allowed to command the party."[44]

General Chi's *Qiushi* article addressed the matter of the 1982 constitution, which had created a "state" Central Military Commission alongside the party CMC. At the time, Premier Zhao Ziyang had commented that the state CMC was necessary because "the army is an important component of the state."[45] This was, however, a controversial position, advocated primarily by reformers like Zhao, Hu Yaobang, and (presumably) Deng Xiaoping. It was opposed by many of the old revolutionaries who were forced to retire to the "second line" in the mid-1980's.[46]

Chi pointed out that while the armed forces serve the people and the state, the constitution also stipulates that the party leads the state and the people. Therefore,

[38]Ibid., p. 9.

[39]*JFJB*, June 30, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 27, 1990, pp. 11–13.

[40]Lhasa, Tibet TV, July 31, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 7, 1990, pp. 13–16; also see Lhasa, Tibet TV, Aug. 2, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1990, p. 55. Hong Kong's *Wen Wei Po* reported that Jiang had traveled by car from Qinghai to Tibet, and claimed that the trip "Shows the work-style of the CPC leaders of the third generation: traveling with a minimum of pomp and without reporters." It all proved to be untrue; he flew to Lhasa with a big entourage. See *Wen Wei Po*, July 28, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 30, 1990, p. 15.

[41]Tai Ming Cheung, "Rank Insubordination," *FEER*, Feb. 1, 1990, p. 22.

[42]*RMRB* (Overseas ed.), Dec. 18, 1989; and *Tang Tai*, Dec. 30, 1989.

[43]Examples include Liu Shaoqi's announcement of the Great Leap Forward in May 1958; Jiang Qing's denunciation of radical Red Guard violence on September 5, 1967; and Hua Guofeng's presentation of the "Resolution on Questions of Party History" to the Sixth Plenum in June 1981.

[44]Chi Haotian, "Strive to Raise the Leadership Level of the Party Committees and Ensure the Party's Absolute Leadership Over the Army," *Qiushi* (Beijing), Jan. 16, 1990, p. 2, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 8, 1990, p. 36. The article is based on a speech to party committee secretaries of the General Staff.

[45]Interview with Premier Zhao Ziyang, NHK-TV (Tokyo), June 4, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 7, 1982, pp. D/1–2.

[46]Ian Wilson and You Ji, "Leadership by 'Lines': China's Unresolved Succession," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1990, pp. 28–44.

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he concluded, the army is still ultimately the servant of the party. And thus those who argue that party and army should be separated, and the army depoliticized, "sow discord between the army and the party."[47] This assertion ignored the efforts that Deng and the other reformers, including Chi Haotian himself, had made throughout the 1980's to disengage party committees from the day-to-day affairs of state, army, and economic units and enterprises.

General Chi also argued in his article that the PLA faces a "very complicated environment" because the PLA is the greatest barrier to those who would seize state power and destabilize China, and thus "certain numbers of military men have been confused." The remedy in his view is the reconstruction of the party committee system at all levels in order to insure that the troops are kept fully in line with the central authorities, "ideologically and politically and in their actions."[48] Although party organizations are a "unified nucleus of leadership and unity of the troops," they must carry out "a scientific division of work. . . . They are not allowed to assert their independence, or scramble for military power." Thus, Chi reasserted the traditional division between political command and military command, personified in every PLA unit by the political commissar and the military commander.

It is not clear whether the reemphasis on the party and commissar systems will mean a return to the traditional political control functions of the PLA's General Political Department (GPD). Jonathan Pollack has noted the emergence of the Discipline Inspection Commission (*Jilu jiancha weiyuanhui,* or *Jiwei*) of the party CMC. He has argued that the *Jiwei*, which was first identified in the press in 1984, may have assumed some of the political-control functions previously exercised by the GPD, especially after the June 1989 crisis.[49] Until the summer of 1990, the secretary and deputy secretary of the *Jiwei* were, respectively, General Guo Linxiang and General You Taizhong. Although Guo was concurrently a deputy director of the GPD, he was senior (in terms of PLA service) to GPD Director Yang Baibing, so he presumably could act somewhat autonomously. Until mid-July 1990, the *Jiwei* appeared to be operating separately from, and possibly in competition with, the commissar system. Why this additional parallel hierarchy within the political control apparatus? Perhaps it is because the unit political commissars are not trusted either. Like the military commanders, they have been "professionalizing" since the late 1970's.[50]

In July 1990, Chi Haotian addressed a rally commending "outstanding discipline inspection cadres in the General Staff Headquarters." He emphasized that unit party committees should support "discipline inspection cadres," but did not even mention commissars or the GPD. Nor did he explain why "discipline inspection activities" duplicate traditional commissar functions. He did imply that discipline inspection cadres were not popular:

Party committees . . . should be aware of the difficulties encountered by the discipline inspection organs and the discipline inspection cadres in their work, and should protect discipline inspection cadres who are exposed to retaliation in the course of enforcing discipline and performing official duties.[51]

The news report did not indicate who might attempt to retaliate against discipline inspection cadres, nor why. Could the *Jiwei* have been competing with the GPD system, at the behest of General Chi, the General Staff, and other "professionals"?

In July 1990, the *Jiwei* was formally subordinated to the GPD,[52] General Guo retired, and General You simply dropped out of the news. Lt. Gen. Wang Ruilin is the new *Jiwei* secretary. The discipline inspection system is now formally under General Yang Baibing's control, which may give him access he previously did not have to some personnel records. The *Jiwei* continues to be an interesting puzzle.

As often happens in CCP literature, Chi Haotian's *Quishi* article skirted the real issue. The decade of reforms and "depoliticization" had created the expectation that the army would no longer be used as an instrument in intra-party factional conflict, but military loyalty to the CCP was never in question. As Monte Bullard has pointed out, "separating party and army functions does not necessarily mean depoliticization of the army, nor does it mean any lessening of the degree of party control over the army."[53] When martial law was declared on May 19, 1989, the PLA—not just a few of its leaders, but the army as an institution—was drawn into the internal CCP policy dispute, over the objections of some senior active and retired soldiers, an issue obfuscated in General Chi's article.

Chi Haotian devoted the longest part of his article to

[47]Chi Haotian, loc. cit., p. 37.
[48]Ibid., p. 38.
[49]Pollack, loc.cit., p. 24.
[50]Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–81*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982, p. 241; *RMRB*, Jan. 24, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1980, p. L/15; Wuhan, Hubei Provincial Service, Jan. 24, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1980, p. P/2; and *Xinhua*, Oct. 15, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 23, 1978, p. E/6.
[51]*JFJB*, July 2, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 25, 1990, pp. 32–33.
[52]Tai Ming Cheung, "Basic Marxist Training," *FEER*, Aug. 23, 1990, p. 46.
[53]Private correspondence with Monte Bullard, July 1990.

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Chi Haotian, chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

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the troublesome relationship between collective leadership, personified by the party organization and political commissar on the one hand, and the individual responsibility of commanders, on the other. In terms reminiscent of the early 1960's, he called upon military and political cadres to learn from each other and to train "military cadres who are both red and expert."[54]

In late 1989, as many as 3,500 PLA and PAP commanders and commissars were rumored to be under investigation for alleged misbehavior during the spring crisis. Few of them were formally charged, and most seem to have gotten off with reprimands for such activities as signing petitions, expressing sympathy with demonstrators, or opposing the use of violence. However, a few serious cases were dealt with quite sternly. The most important of these was Lt. Gen. Xu Qinxian, former commander of 38th Army, who feigned illness to avoid commanding his troops in the armed suppression of the capital. Xu reportedly was court-martialed and imprisoned. In an address to army cadres in November 1989, General Political Department Chief Yang Baibing reportedly said that 20 officers at the division level and above, and 36 officers at the regiment and battalion level, were under investigation for serious crimes.[55]

In February 1990, a *Jiefangjun bao* editorial called for "stability, concentration, and unification . . . to guarantee the important requirement that the army will always be politically qualified [*zhengzhi shang yongyuan jige*]." This was deemed necessary in order to "smash the 'peaceful evolution' conspiracy of hostile forces within and without the country . . . and for revolutionizing, modernizing, and regularizing the army."[56] The editorial thus confirmed the new order of priorities in the reordering of the military.

Although the Beijing garrison commander and commissar were replaced in July 1989, a routine reshuffle of military region (MR) commanders, due at the end of 1989, was delayed until spring 1990. Evidently, the delay was meant to avoid upsetting an already sensitive situation. An extensive reshuffle of MR officers began quietly in April, and was reported by the Hong Kong press in May;[57] it was publicized in the PRC only in July.[58] As of late 1990, six of the seven MR commanders and four of the MR political commissars had been transferred or retired. The Beijing MR commander (Lt. Gen. Zhou Yibing) and political commissar (General Liu Zhenhua) were replaced. Three MR commanders rotated to command different MR's. At the military-district level, 18 of 27 commanders and 12 of 27 political commissars had been transferred or retired. All three commanders and all three commissars of the major garrison commands (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) were replaced.

The national leadership has taken pains to depict the transfers as adhering to a "traditional PLA system" of frequent cadre reassignment. Supposedly, this system is being reasserted in accordance with a directive issued by Deng Xiaoping just before his retirement from the CMC in fall 1989.[59] While it is true that Deng called for routine officer rotation as early as 1975, it seems more than fortuitous that a hitherto unpublicized directive to this effect should surface in the midst of the most thorough officer shake-up in at least five years. (A cynic might even expect to see more of Deng's "previously unpublicized directives" appear to justify future actions by Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, et al.) Beginning in July, the press announced a policy of routine "exchange" of civilian, as well as military, cadres. So far, transfers in the

[54]Chi Haotian, loc. cit., p. 40.

[55]Tai Ming Cheung, "Rank Insubordination," loc. cit., p. 22.

[56]"A Programmatic Document that Strengthens the Political Construction of Our Army," *JFJB*, Feb. 28, 1990, trans. *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 1, 1990, pp. 32–33.

[57]*Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), May 6, 1990, p. 18, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 7, 1990, pp. 53–54; "Deng Xiaoping Gives Yang Baibing Military Power," *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), June 1990, pp. 14–17; Tai Ming Cheung, "Stars and Bars," *FEER*, June 14, 1990, p. 32; and *China Post* (Taipei), June 14, 1990, p. 1.

[58]Urumqi, Xinjiang Regional Service, July 26, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 30, 1990, p. 51.

[59]*Tang Tai*, Aug. 4, 1990, p. 23, citing "the latest issue of *JFJB*," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 7, 1990, p. 23.

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civilian sector have not approached the scope of the military reshuffle, however.[60]

Many of the changes do appear routine, notably the retirements of such old men as Navy Political Commissar Admiral Li Yaowen, National Defense University Political Commissar General Li Desheng, *Jiwei* Secretary Guo Linxiang, and (apparently) *Jiwei* Deputy Secretary You Taizheng—all of whom are in their 70's. The reshuffle has fallen heavily upon the Navy, and has even reached into the Strategic Rocket Forces, two organizations little involved with the June 4 Incident.

Official commentaries boost "cadre exchange" as a way to prevent factionalism. This is ironic because many current changes seem to enhance the power of the "Yang family gang" (*Yangjia bang*). Overseas Chinese also note the continued prominence of veterans of Deng's old Second Field Army.[61] Clearly, too, many of the current changes are either reward or retribution for "June 4." (All observers agree that Jiang Zemin, who has little connection with either the victims or the beneficiaries of the PLA shake-up, is not even a player in the game.)

On the other hand, most of the men promoted into positions vacated by disgraced or transferred officers are well-qualified by professional military standards, even if they have been vetted politically. Of about 100 newly promoted officers, all but four or five definitely held positions that made them logical contenders for promotion to their new jobs. The most obvious exception is Maj. Gen. Zhang Gong, the new commissar of the Beijing MR, who "sky-rocketed" past dozens of senior officers. In his previous post, as deputy director of the MR political department, Zhang was the principal government spokesman dealing with the foreign press following the Tiananmen massacre.

At this writing, the shake-up seems to have run its course through the military regions, districts, and garrisons, the services' headquarters, and the major military academies. It is now spilling into the group armies, local garrisons, and lower military schools, as some officers move up.[62] Few politically-motivated forced retirements can be identified at this level, except among group armies heavily involved in the June 1989 crisis.

The Defense Budget

When the National People's Congress met in March 1990, it announced a new defense budget of RMB (*renminbi*) 28.97 billion, up from the 1989 budget of RMB 25.1 billion. This was 11.4 percent of the total national budget. Perhaps more important, it constituted a 15.2 percent increase, compared to an overall increase of only 4.8 percent in government spending. It was the first real increase in military spending in almost 10 years.[63] Although there had been slight increases in *renminbi* amounts over the past decade, inflation had caused an effective annual reduction of about seven percent. Since 1980, defense spending had dropped from 15 percent of GNP to less than 6 percent.[64]

It has been widely supposed that this defense budget increase was a reward for the Tiananmen massacre, or a bribe for continued PLA loyalty. If so, it was a meager one indeed—the increased sums were designated almost entirely for essentials that previously had not been funded. A substantial part of the increase will be devoted to improving soldiers' living conditions.[65] Over the past decade, much of the real reduction in military spending has been borne by the rank and file. The PLA's severe lack of funds literally impoverished individual soldiers, depriving them of food, lodging, and services. Pay for soldiers and officers was raised for the first time in many years in 1988, but soldiers' pay is still far below that of factory workers.[66]

Individual and collective poverty has lowered the prestige of the PLA and hampered recruiting and retention. Although PLA regulations prohibit individuals from engaging in business, since about 1987, units have been encouraged to do so. Indeed, there were reports that units could not conduct proper training because they were expending their time and energy on self-sufficiency production and commercial enterprises. By mid-1988, discipline and morale were suffering in a cli-

[60] *Zhongguo xinwen she*, July 23, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 24, 1990, pp. 14–15; and "Let Cadres Temper Themselves and Mature Healthily in the Course of Exchange," *RMRB*, Aug. 4, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 6, 1990, pp. 22–23.

[61] Yü Yülin, "Reshuffle of Regional Military Leaders in Mainland," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), June 1990, pp. 1–4.

[62] *Tang Tai*, July 28, 1990, p. 21, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 31, 1990, pp. 25–27.

[63] Tai Ming Cheung, "Political Payoff," *FEER*, Apr. 5, 1990, pp. 23–29. Also see *Ming Pao Yue Kan* (Hong Kong), October 1989, pp. 3–15, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *JPRS-CAR*), Jan. 22, 1990, pp. 1–17; and *Wen Wei Po*, Mar. 22, 1990.

[64] The budget was RMB 20.96 billion in 1987 and RMB 21.53 billion in 1988. International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988–1989*, London, 1989, p. 147; *Jane's Defence Weekly* (London), Apr. 30, 1988, p. 819; and *Xinhua*, June 26, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 27, 1988, pp. 32–33. While the trends in PRC military spending are clear in the officially announced budgets, American CIA estimates of actual defense spending are more than double the official figures. In 1986, for example, the CIA estimated it at RMB 45 billion, while the Chinese announced RMB 20 billion. Central Intelligence Agency, *China: Economic Policy and Performance in 1987*. Report submitted to the Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, April 21, 1988, pp. 17–18.

[65] *Xinhua* Domestic Service, July 26, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug 7, 1990, pp. 22–23.

[66] Ibid.; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Jan. 28, 1989, p. 187; and *China Daily*, June 27, 1988, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 28, 1988, p. 23.

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mate of semi-official bribery, profiteering, and "bureaucratic racketeering." Because of their financial plight, PLA units were vulnerable to local authorities and state enterprises, which extorted illegal taxes and fees for goods, services, and real estate.[67] The February 1990 law on protection of military installations mentioned above was intended, in part, to address this situation.

Four months after the announcement of the increased military budget, a remarkable article by two naval officers appeared in *Jingji yanjiu*.[68] The authors argued for a much bigger defense budget (at least 2 percent, ideally 3 percent, of GNP), which would expand proportionately with GNP growth. The authors agreed with nearly all foreign observers that the PLA is still much too large, and that excessive personnel costs have eaten up the savings that the 1985–87 force reduction was supposed to produce.[69] Some of the authors' statistics appear questionable, and their analysis is blatantly self-serving of Navy interests, but most foreign observers agree with their assessment that a "too great and too rapid decrease in military expenditure" has damaged the PLA. The authors write:

First, the modernization of China's national defense has been held up. Second, the livelihood of officers and soldiers . . . has become difficult. Third, the production program extensively launched in the army for maintaining the original scale of military expenditure will inevitably result in lax discipline and a decrease in the army's combat effectiveness.[70]

At the March 1990 NPC session, the shift of PLA units to internal-security forces, which are being outfitted with riot-control gear and associated equipment (much of it imported from Japan), was designated a budget priority. Although this represents an expansion of interest in internal-security forces, the PLA had since 1986 expended a disproportionate amount of resources on selected units that were designated for "rapid response" in "limited-war" situations but also were useful for internal-security affairs. Some of these units are supposed to be high-tech, and they are quite expensive.[71]

In 1990, rapid-response militia and reserve detachments were ordered to set up "contingency systems" in coastal areas and cities, explicitly for both "limited-war" and internal-police missions.[72] As a July 1989 *Jiefangjun bao* article pointed out, "suppressing class enemies" remains a primary PLA mission.[73]

Minimal improvement in military living conditions, plus expenditures on the expanded PAP and on dual-mission (internal-security and "limited-war") "rapid-response" forces will leave little of the budget increase for anyone else.[74]

The Chinese Officer Corps

In early 1989, after 10 years of reform, the PLA officer corps was far more professionalized than ever before. Even senior officers by and large had withdrawn from factional politics. Officers obeyed orders in the expectation that the orders would be legal, and were officially encouraged in that expectation. Alan P. L. Liu has noted the absence, by all accounts, of PLA involvement in "crisis management" in the weeks before June 4, 1989.[75] Once the hard-liners won the power struggle and authority clearly was established at the top, however, PLA officers almost unanimously obeyed orders—even though the orders were not what most would have wished.

On May 17, 1989, 150 active and retired senior PLA commanders reportedly submitted a letter to Deng Xiaoping and the CMC, declaring that the PLA should not spill the people's blood.[76] Signatories were said to include Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, Chief of the General Staff Chi Haotian, and CMC member (former PLA Gen-

[67]Harlan W. Jencks, "Organization and Administration of the PLA in the Year 2000," in Richard Yang, Ed., *SCPS PLA Yearbook 1988/89*, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, 1989 (published in the US by Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 52–54.

[68]Chen Bingfu, as edited by Zhan Shaohong (both of the PLA Navy Service College), "An Economic Analysis of the Changes in China's Military Expenditure in the Last Ten Years," *Jingji yanjiu* (Beijing), June 20, 1990, pp. 77–81, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 6, 1990, pp. 30–35.

[69]Vice-Minister of Civil Affairs Fan Baojun corroborated this point in *RMRB*, July 29, 1990, p. 4, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1990, pp. 36–38.

[70]*Jingji yanjiu*, June 20, 1990, p. 33.

[71]Harlan W. Jencks, "Organization and Administration in the PLA in the Year 2000," loc. cit., pp. 47–49. For a recent report, see *Xinhua* Domestic Service, July 27, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 1, 1990, p. 25.

[72]Hangzhou, Zhejiang Provincial Service, Feb. 27, 1990; and *JFJB*, Jan. 20, 1990, p. 2, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 16, 1990, pp. 39–40.

[73]*JFJB*, July 14, 1989.

[74]Three months after the increased budget was announced, the PLA Air Force canceled the production phase of its biggest and most prized foreign technology contract, the F–8 II fighter upgrade by the US Grumman Corporation. While political factors obviously were involved, industry observers and military attachés widely identified the high cost of the program as a major factor in the cancellation. I would argue that economic cost was the main reason. There was great political advantage to keeping the F–8 II program going, as a "foot in the door" of the American defense establishment in the aftermath of Tiananmen.

[75]Alan P. L. Liu, "Aspects of Beijing's Crisis Management: The Tiananmen Square Demonstration," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), May 1990, pp. 505–21.

[76]The reputed contents of the letter were broadcast over "the Tiananmen Square broadcasting station of the student hunger strikers" on May 18. That version was summarized in *Zhongguo Tongxun She* (Hong Kong), May 18, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1990, pp. 38–39.

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eral Logistics Department director) Hong Xuezhi. Others included former Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, former Chief of the General Staff Yang Dezhi, former Navy commander Ye Fei, and former commandants of the Higher Military Academy Sun Shilun and Xiao Ke. On May 21, following the declaration of martial law, the two surviving marshals of the PLA, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, published statements calling for civil order, but arguing that the PLA should not resort to force.[77] Both the letter and the marshals' statements were explicit rejoinders to Deng's April 24 "Three Don't Be Afraid" admonitions: Don't be afraid of domestic reactions, don't be afraid of foreign opinion, and don't be afraid of bloodshed.[78]

In June 1989, the Western press, in part influenced by the letter of the senior officers, propagated the view that parts of the PLA were "liberal" and favored the demonstrators and agreed with their political views. This was simply not true. There is a vast difference between hesitating to murder people in the streets and agreeing with their political objectives. A great many PLA officers disapproved of clearing the streets with brute force, because they felt it would escalate the disorder and discredit the army. But they also disapproved of the demonstrations because, like professional military officers everywhere, they valued social and political stability. In this, they probably reflect the view of most Chinese, who deeply fear chaos (*luan*).[79] However, PLA officers also have a personal interest in maintaining the status quo, in which they are a favored elite. While most recognize that they have a major stake in industrial, scientific, and technical reform, they perceive that they have little or no stake in political or social reform. Quite the contrary. Like other Chinese elites in China's recent history, these officers fail to see the inevitable connections between modern political and social forms (*ti*) and modern technical methods (*yong*).

The officer corps is far from homogeneous, of course. Age, experience, organizational affiliation, and rank form particularly significant divisions. The military reforms of the 1980's regularized PLA command arrangements and personnel assignments to a significant degree, ending practices like multiple office–holding and lifetime tenure, and significantly reducing the importance of personal patronage and connections (*guanxi*), particularly at the lower levels of command. However, nearer the top, at and above the group-army level, Jonathan Pollack has pointed out, China's "military command arrangements still seem an uneasy mix of personalistic and professional considerations. The closer to the acme of the system, the less command derives from specified rules and norms."[80]

At the topmost level of military command—in the CMC, which is deeply divided on policy issues—we still find the elder generation of revolutionary leaders, the "PLA of the past." To label these leaders "military" or "civilian" is misleading. Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen, Chen Yun, et al. have been both military and civilian leaders most of their lives. They are revolutionaries, to whom such labels do not apply. The same is true of Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, who joined the Red Fourth Front Army at the age of 15 in 1929.[81]

At the next level down, the same can also be said of General Yang Baibing, the GPD director. He joined the Red Army in 1938 and served throughout the liberation war, and subsequently, as a political commissar.[82] On the other hand, Chief of the General Staff Chi Haotian and General Logistics Department Director Zhao Nanqi only distinguished themselves and began their rapid rise during the Korean War.[83] Members of the "Korean War generation" reached real prominence during the 1980's; they accounted for most of the service chiefs, regional commanders, and group army commanders in early 1989.

Of the 17 officers awarded the new rank of full general in September 1988, only Chi Haotian, Zhao Nanqi, and Air Force Commander Wang Hai are in their early 60's. The other 14 are now in their 70's.[84] As noted above, four or five of them (Liu Zhenhua, Li Yaowen, Li Desheng, Guo Linxiang, and possibly You Taizhong) retired in 1989–90. In the next few years, we can expect to see the retirement or deaths of others.

It is difficult to assess how (or if) the power struggle going on in the upper reaches of the party affects or is reflected within the PLA high command. We simply do not know which PLA generals can discuss possible political action with each other without fear of betrayal. Foreign observers have no choice but to guess at such

[77] *Wenhui bao* (Shanghai), May 21, 1989.

[78] Lucian W. Pye, "Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge," *Asian Survey*, April 1990, p. 338.

[79] On the Chinese aversion to *luan*, see Lucian W. Pye. *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*, Weston, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1981.

[80] Pollack, loc. cit., p. 29.

[81] Zhao Wei, "Qin Jiwei: Focal Person in the Chinese Military," *Chiushih Nientai* (Hong Kong), November 1989, pp. 59–61, trans. in *JPRS-CAR*, Jan. 22, 1990, pp. 77–81.

[82] Jin Bo, "All PLA Commanders-in-Chief Were Political Commissars; Enigma of Yang Baibing's Experience Revealed," *Kuang Chiao Ching* (Hong Kong), Sept. 16, 1989, pp. 88–89, trans. in *JPRS-CAR*, Jan. 22, 1990, pp. 82–84.

[83] Chao Wei, "Chinese Communist Chief of Staff Chi Haotian and the 27th Army," *Ming Bao Yue Kan*, October 1989, pp. 16–21, trans. in *JPRS-CAR*, Jan. 22, 1990, pp. 69–74.

[84] *Kuang Chiao Ching*, Oct. 16, 1989, pp. 22–23, trans. in *JPRS-CAR*, Jan. 22, 1990, pp. 68–69.

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things because the reforms of the 1980's led to the promotion into the high command of relatively young officers, about whom little is known. Simple logic, plus some anecdotal evidence, indicates, however, that Deng and the "gang of elders" are watching some senior officers closely, especially those known to be military reformers, and those in Beijing.

Another issue, of course, is which generals are allied with which members of the "gang of elders." Speculating on this topic, about which there is more available information, is a minor industry in Hong Kong and Taipei. This brings us to the widely discussed "Yang family gang." Clearly, President Yang Shangkun (also CMC first vice-chairman) and his half brother General Yang Baibing (GPD director and CMC secretary-general), are extremely powerful men, with extensive networks of supporters. Yang Baibing is in a particularly powerful position to control PLA personnel actions, and many of the reassignments made in 1990 further strengthened his hand. Contrary to speculation, however, the 27th Army probably is not commanded by a Yang relative, and the Yangs are not related to Chief of the General Staff Chi Haotian.[85] Chi, CMC Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing, and Defense Minister Qin Jiwei are widely regarded as "anti-Yangs."

Below the high command are field-grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, senior colonels, and the younger major generals) who entered the PLA in the 1950's and 1960's, and today command battalions, regiments, divisions, and some of the group armies. Because the reforms emphasized formal education, these mid-level officers are better-educated than their seniors. They also have been subjected to increased rotation and reassignment, which means they are less likely to have strong regional attachments.

In the 1980's, these officers generally supported Zhao Ziyang's view that the PLA would best serve the state (and the party) by disengaging from political infighting. Therefore, as their technical expertise increased, they took less interest in politics, both because they lacked the time and because it seemed safe to leave politics to civilians. Party and state leaders constantly assured them, as well as everybody else, that the reform policies were irreversible. Among these men, there was a significant increase, from 1978 to 1989, in the three key aspects of military professionalism identified by Samuel Huntington: professional expertise, a sense of professional responsibility to the state, and an increasing self-awareness of the officer corps as a corporate entity. Officer corps corporateness is identified by most observers as one of the critical aspects of civil-military relations.[86]

Many of these mid-level officers have been frustrated with the slow pace of modernization. In a remarkable article based on interviews, which appeared in the mainland magazine *New China Digest* in early 1990, almost a year after its first scheduled publication date, 20 young generals worried that combat capability was declining, and expressed anger and frustration with the elderly PLA leaders who were obstructing military modernization. Maj. Gen. He Daoquan (commander, 23rd Army), complained that top leaders showed a "noble disinterest in modern science and technology . . . because [it] will expose their meager knowledge and ignorance." Maj. Gen. Ma Chunwa (political commissar, Heilongjiang MD) complained of having to cater to some 700 retired senior cadres, who abused their power. Maj. Gen. Chen Xianhua (commander, 42nd Army) declared that because of "empty politics," opposition to modern management, and emphasis on tradition, PLA training was much inferior to that of the Pakistani army, which he had recently observed. Rear Admiral Li Guangxiang (Luda Garrison) pronounced the PLA backward professionally, psychologically, and socially.[87]

PLA mid-level officers by and large are disciplined and obedient, and want social stability; they have however, been deeply affected by the events of spring 1989. Now in their late 40's and early 50's, these officers, who were junior leaders during the Cultural Revolution, remember being pulled away from military duties and thrust into radical politics; they remember how the PLA was divided against itself and fell to fighting.[88] They are also frustrated by the PRC's persistent poverty and backwardness, and resent the pervasive corruption that led to last year's unrest. They are aware of the outside world, aware of China's backwardness, and aware that things can be better. Like most educated Chinese, they are indifferent or openly cynical about Marxist-Leninist ideology. While they do not sympa-

[85]At least three names have been rumored for the elusive "commander Yang" of 27th Army (Yang She, Yang Jianhua, and Yang Shaojun). I cannot confirm even the existence of any of them. The 27th Army was commanded by Qian Guoliang in September 1988. Chi Haotian has explicitly denied any family relationship with the Yangs. His wife is Jiang Qingping, a naval medical officer. See *PLA Literature* (Beijing), August 1988. I am grateful to Ellis L. Melvin for drawing this to my attention.

[86]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* New York, Vintage Press, 1957, p. 13; Perlmutter, op. cit., p. xv; Jacques Van Doorn, "Political Change and the Control of the Military," in Jacques Van Doorn, Ed. *The Military Profession and Military Regimes,* Paris and the Hague, Mouton, 1968, pp. 22–23.

[87]All quotations are third-hand from *Ming Pao,* which only summarized the article. See *Ming Pao,* Mar. 6, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Mar. 6, 1990, pp. 30–31. Somewhere in the writing, reporting, or translation process, Maj. Gen. Ma Chunwa was misread as Ma Chunxing. At this writing, I do not know how any of the interviewees have fared since June 1989.

[88]Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles,* Ch. 4.

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thize with taking protest to the streets, they understand what motivated the protesters.

Tiananmen and its aftermath have increased the dissatisfaction of these officers for several reasons. First, and perhaps most important, the prestige of the army was irreparably damaged by the massacre of citizens in the streets of Beijing. The special trust and empathy between the PLA and the people, which had survived decades of economic and political turmoil, is now gone, leaving the officers who must lead the PLA into the future resentful. These officers also resent the suspicion and paranoia their top leaders are directing at them. Further, they resent that after 10 years of promises, technical modernization has once again been delayed, this time by foreign sanctions and the shifting of limited resources to the police. They also feel threatened by the reorientation of the PLA toward internal-security roles.

The current campaigns to increase the politicization of the officer corps may well backfire. Officers who were once content to leave politics to the civilian party have shown signs of becoming increasingly restive and disillusioned. The efforts to strengthen PLA loyalty to "the party" are identified with the hard-liners in general, and with Yang Baibing in particular. As the perceived influence of the "Yang family gang" increases, classic balance-of-power dynamics will encourage the coalescence of resistance against them.[89] In June 1990, a Hong Kong magazine asserted that the high command was already divided between the Yangs and the "anti-Yangs."[90] If an extended period of intense "political work" takes place, the middle-level and even junior officers will be forced to choose sides; they are not likely to choose based upon ideological appeals from Beijing. Unfortunately, however, military professional values are likely to be discarded during the process in favor of *guanxi* and organizational interests. Thus, each passing month sees factionalism at the top further erode the nascent professionalism of the PLA officer corps.

The Future

1989 changed things profoundly. Many of the old verities about the PLA, and PRC politics in general, no longer apply. The CCP's legitimacy among urban intellectuals, workers, and entrepreneurs, as well as overseas Chinese groups is much diminished. It is probably premature to write the CCP off, however, because the rural masses seem to have been fairly indifferent toward the "democracy movement." Indeed, many peasants believe the official story of a "counterrevolutionary riot." The party's current themes of restoring order and suppressing chaos also have widespread appeal due to the deep-seated Chinese fear of *luan*. Still, one cannot discount the ability of the information revolution to penetrate official obfuscation of events, even in the countryside.

The aftermath of Tiananmen seems to have left the 8 million or so members of the CCP *nomenklatura* in some disarray. By contrast, the collective cohesion and discipline of the 1 million or so PLA officers remains solid. As Richard Latham argues, the officer corps "also has material resources, an organizational structure that does not atrophy, weapons, and unmatched technical capability for command."[91] By default, the officer corps is likely to determine China's future, because it is by far the most unified, disciplined, and authoritative national institution.

There is a widespread belief among informed Chinese, including PLA officers, that the party leadership is preoccupied with factional infighting. There is a consensus that the gang of elders overreacted to events in the streets of Beijing, and then to events in Romania. Such overreaction implies a sense of insecurity, as do the party's recent moves to strengthen internal repression, to shake up the CMC, to purge the PAP, to reshuffle PLA leaders, and to conduct political indoctrination campaigns.

As Deng Xiaoping and the gang of elders die off, the succession will be messy, if not chaotic. PLA commanders will strive to keep the army unified, and to avoid direct political intervention. However, in its role as "guardian," the military high command will insist that destabilizing policies be avoided. They stepped in and told Mao to stop the radical nonsense in 1967–68; in extremis, they might step in again.

In the most likely scenario, the PLA would act as kingmaker. One-party rule would continue, and the officer corps would throw its weight behind the civilian candidate for national leadership likely to ensure a peaceful succession. The candidate the PLA supported would have to have enough civilian support to be a viable leader and be at least minimally acceptable to military interests.

After the elders (especially Deng Xiaoping and Deng Yingzhao) are gone, Li Peng is not likely to survive,

[89]William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71,* New York, Praeger, 1973, p. 12.

[90]"Deng Xiaoping Gives Yang Baibing Military Power," loc. cit., pp. 14–17.

[91]Latham, loc. cit., p. 22. On the *nomenklatura,* see John P. Burns, *The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System,* New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1989.

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much less Jiang Zemin. A possible candidate is Zhao Ziyang. Were a few hard-liners to leave the scene, he might be positioned for a comeback. Zhao evidently won a measure of acceptance from the PLA high command in 1988–89, when he became directly involved with military planning issues.[92]

In the absence of consensus on a civilian leader, the officer corps might put forth one of its own to lead the country. Some senior officers have substantial support among civilian officials, and could sustain the appearance of the party's continued leadership of society.

Such speculation begs a crucial question: Who speaks for the officer corps? In the near term, it is the uniformed members of the CMC and the commanders of the general departments and service arms. All work in Beijing, and can consult frequently. As the gang of elders dies off, however, other military men will demand to be heard, including retired leaders and commanders of military regions and group armies. Moreover, decisions will have to be made about promoting new men into the Standing Committee of the CMC.

Much, of course, will depend on individuals and factions. Much depends, too, on the order in which the old men die. If hard-liners like Wang Zhen, Li Xiannian, and Chen Yun die first, Deng Xiaoping and Wan Li might take China in a fairly moderate direction. If Wang Zhen and Chen Yun are the last survivors, they might retreat into neo-Stalinist autarky.

Currently, retirement, selection, promotion, and assignments are controlled by the Secretariat of the CMC (which has only a very small staff)[93] and by the General Political Department. Yang Baibing directs both. Historically, however, the chief of the general staff has usually dominated the other general departments and their directors. The General Staff Department controls more material resources, and it heads up the operational chain of command, which may be more important than ever in an era of diminished party legitimacy. If intra-military conflict remains confined to bureaucratic infighting, Yang and the GPD have the advantage. If it comes down to moving forces and using troops, the General Staff and its chief probably have the edge.

If the domestic situation worsens, demanding more drastic measures, ever more widespread conflict would erupt within the officer corps over issues of policy and political power. Middle-grade officers, especially the frustrated modernizers, would make themselves heard. Mid-level officers might become restive enough to contemplate a coup d'état. They could try to pressure their generals into action, or act themselves. The danger of dissension within the officer corps would increase as the power-broker or kingmaker role evolved toward direct intervention.

In the absence of any viable civilian candidate or because of renewed social disorder, the officer corps would directly intervene—probably, but not necessarily, in the name of the Communist party. It could install a civilian figurehead, or a military leader who had formally retired from the army, as was done in Korea with Park Chung Hee (1961). Or, a uniformed officer might simply take over, as General Wojciech Jaruzelski did in Poland (1981). Such a government would probably be quite authoritarian initially, but moderate reformers might regain influence. This scenario would certainly involve factional conflict within the officer corps, with more and more factions, units, and regional commands demanding to participate in any consensus that purported to represent the military.

This scenario could also evolve toward an irreparable PLA split. A miscarried coup attempt could divide the officer corps and lead to intra-PLA fighting. Even more dangerous would be large-scale street demonstrations. If they were allowed to run their course, they would bring down the government, and draw the army into the political vacuum. If a factionally divided party leadership ordered the PLA to repeat the Tiananmen massacre, parts of the army would almost certainly revolt. If intra-PLA fighting spread beyond Beijing and lasted longer than a few days, the PLA itself could split up—probably along regional lines. This is an extreme, but still conceivable, scenario.

Thanks to the reforms of the 1980's, a regional breakup of the PLA is, however, less likely than it was during Mao's lifetime. The army is more resistant to regionalism than any other institution in China because of its command-control-communications, logistics, and educational systems, which are all national in scope. Moreover, the reforms of the 1980's, especially periodic officer reassignments, homogenized the PLA considerably, weakening its "independent kingdoms." Military power is much less tied up with regional political and economic power than it was at the end of the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, since 1987, PLA participation in business has led to the formation of new relationships with regional and local civilians. Engaging in business has clearly been corrosive to military professionalism and to the PLA's corporate identity as a national institution. One important reason for the increased military budget is to wean the PLA away from such activity.

If the officer corps splits up, it would split into regions, each dominated by a military commander. This could

[92]Pollack, loc. cit., p. 17.
[93]Ibid., p. 20.

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lead to civil war and a new version of warlordism. There might be an extended period of "one nation, many states." The various military-dominated regions might coexist uneasily, with each evolving its own economic, political, and social system. As during the warlord period (1916–27), one government in Beijing might continue to speak for China internationally.[94]

Recently, Arthur Waldron wrote that in the 1920's and 30's, Hu Shi argued that warlordism "was no more than a superficial manifestation of a deeper breakdown of civil society, a breakdown which could only be cured by causing political power to devolve to the local level."[95] Prominent Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi recently addressed himself to this issue:

There are people who predict civil war. I see this differently. I think that in China the development is directed at provinces, which are gradually becoming stronger and more independent. Such a development could counteract the great chaos during the stage of change.[96]

The degree to which civilian politicians can maintain and exercise institutional authority is the crucial civil-military issue for the People's Republic of China today. Even under the best of circumstances, that capacity is severely limited. In all probability, the PLA officer corps will act as the "guardian" and "kingmaker" as Deng Xiaoping and the other elders pass from the scene over the next decade. The unity of the People's Liberation Army seems the strongest, perhaps the only, factor holding the PRC together. If the officer corps splits, the country will split.

[94]My thoughts on "regional breakup" were first prompted by Roderick MacFarquhar's remarks at a conference sponsored by the World Affairs Council of Northern California, Asilomar, CA, April 28, 1990. I have since been struck by the frequency with which the subject arises in publications, correspondence, and conference discussions. I am especially grateful to Arthur Waldron, Allen Whiting, and the participants of the First Annual Staunton Hill Conference, Brookneal, VA, September 14–16, 1990.

[95]Waldron, loc. cit., pp. 121–22.

[96]Fang Lizhi interviewed by *Die Welt* (Hamburg), June 30, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 2, 1990, p. 9.

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Defense Reform in China: The PLA Air Force

Richard J. Latham and Kenneth W. Allen

Defense reform was a major issue on the agenda of Chinese reformers during the 1980's, although it never seemed to command the urgency that economic and political reforms did. As the case of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) demonstrates, however, China achieved considerable reforms of its military establishment during the decade. This can be ascertained from the wealth of new information on the Chinese military that became available during the decade; this information has enriched our understanding of the composition and internal dynamics of the PLAAF and of the process of reform in this and other services of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).[1]

Defense Reform in Context

Historians may well view the 1980's as one of the most important decades in modern Chinese history. As early as 1987, Chinese writers began to sum up the achievements and problems of what they call "the decade of reform."[2] However, even optimistic reformers acknowledged that they sometimes had been too naïve and had not recognized the complexity of the problems they set out to redress. In one sense, the relative eclipse of the post-Mao reformers in the spring and summer of 1989 was a case of reform fatigue. Although the Tiananmen Square events did not mark the cessation of reform, their outcome brought into tragic relief the waning of political stamina among reformists and

Richard J. Latham, Colonel, USAF, is the Total Quality Management Director for the Air Force District of Washington; he served as US Air Force Attaché in Hong Kong (1986–89) and was a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University (Washington, DC) in 1990. Kenneth W. Allen, Major, USAF, is an Instructor at the School of Attaché Training, Defense Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency; he was Assistant Air Attaché in Beijing (1987–89) and is preparing a comprehensive handbook on the PLAAF. *The authors thank Frederick Kiley, Paul Godwin, Ellis Joffe, David Y. L. Chu, Wendy Frieman, June Teufel Dreyer, Harlan Jencks, LTC John Corbett, and Mark Roth for suggestions on early drafts. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, or the Defense Intelligence Agency.*

[1]For the greater part of three decades, the Chinese military in general remained a "forbidden zone," off-limits to Western researchers. As far as the PLAAF was concerned, foreign analysts concentrated on air order of battle enumerations and predictions about equipment procurement. See, for example, Richard M. Bueschel, *Communist Chinese Air Power*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968; and A. James Gregor, "Modernization of the Air Force of the PRC and the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait," *Issues & Studies* (Taipei), October 1985, pp. 58–74.

Since the early 1980's, however, there has been a proliferation of published Chinese books about defense and security matters. With respect to the PLAAF, these include "China Today" Series Editorial Committee, *Dangdai zhongguo kongjun* (China Today: Air Force—hereafter, *DZK*), Beijing, China Social Science Press, 1989; and PLAAF Headquarters Education and Research Office, *Kongjun shi* (History of the Air Force), Beijing, PLA Press, November 1989. The trend toward greater openness also resulted in the unrestricted publication of some PLAAF technical journals, such as *Hangkong weixiu* (Aviation Maintenance), and the decision in 1988 to allow the general public access to *Zhongguo kongjun* (China's Air Force), which was first published in 1986.

There were also increased contacts with Westerners on the part of the PLA and Chinese civilian specialists on the military, particularly since the establishment of civilian think tanks and the "opening up" of the PLA's National Defense University, the Academy of Military Sciences, and the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). These contacts have afforded Western observers, both civilian and military, increased insight into the PLA and its components, including the PLAAF.

[2]See Xinhua News Agency Domestic Materials Office, Ed., *Shi nian gaige dashiji (1978–1987)* (Chronicle of the Ten Years of Reform [1978–1987]), Beijing, Xinhua Press, November 1988; and State Economic System Reform Commission, Ed., *Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige shi nian* (Ten Years of Economic Reform for China), Beijing, Economic Management Press and Reform Press, 1988.

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the growth of social and economic stress.

Although it is often argued that China's military establishment was a reluctant participant in reforms, the picture is more complex. The spectrum of reform programs was broad, and the attitudes and responses of military personnel and organizations varied according to the specific initiatives. On balance, defense reform seems to have had a surprising number of military supporters, and specific aspects of defense reform appeared to have provoked equally varied reactions among members of the military and civilians.

Defense reform in the decade was pursued under the doctrinal triad of the "three *hua*'s": "revolutionization" (*geminghua*), "modernization" (*xiandaihua*) and "regularization" (*zhengguihua*).[3] The exact meaning of revolutionization of the army remains debatable; in many ways, it is a catch-all phrase epitomizing the constant process of regenerating communist ideals and traditional PLA values. Modernization fundamentally applies to equipment; Chinese defense analysts rarely refer to "modernized" soldiers. Reform as regularization involves clarification of mission; coordination of organization, weapons procurement, training, and operations to meet that mission; and optimalization of management of personnel and resources.

As the PLAAF example demonstrates, the Chinese military has principally been involved in reform as "regularization" rather than reform as "modernization." Regularization is an internal activity of the military, something over which the PLA and its services have some control. Modernization is largely an external process involving research institutes and factories, or even foreign providers, that are not part of the PLA or subject to its control.

Progress in regularization has served, we believe, to reinforce the development of professionalism in the Chinese military, although this point is still debated.[4] As explored by Samuel Huntington, Bengt Abrahamsson, and others, professionalism relates to the development within a military of specialized knowledge, of a sense of corporateness, of noninvolvement in domestic political affairs, and of internal codes of conduct or ethics.[5] Although the term "professionalism" (*zhiye*) seldom appears in PLA defense literature and even though the military is still subject to extensive political pressures, professionalism exists. The highly developed infrastructure of Chinese military organizations provides an environment for corporateness and for acquiring specialized training and education.

Finally, we conclude that although one can discuss military professionalism and regularization without reference to the issue of equipment modernization, lack of progress on the latter front will eventually inhibit regularization. Gains in regularization may begin to atrophy over time if military training lacks the requisite modern equipment to effectively incorporate new strategies and tactics. An implicit premise of regularization is that equipment modernization will not lag too far behind, even though the frequent theme of "patience" (*naixin*) in PLA publications reflects a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for acquiring modern weapons.

The history of the PLAAF—like that of its parent organization, the PLA—has been one of repeated efforts to convert what began as disparate, ill-organized guerrilla forces into a conventional military force. In the early 1960's, this process encountered an unexpected new challenge—the Sino-Soviet rift—which created the need to develop "an army with Chinese characteristics" that would no longer be dependent on the Soviet Union for military equipment and know-how. And then, in 1966, came an even more severe shock—the Cultural Revolution, during which revolutionary spontaneity and disdain for convention and rules supplanted such normal virtues of military institutions as order and discipline. This outlook was epitomized in the abolition of military ranks. For China's military, the episode was demoralizing and destructive.

Since the mid-1970's, China's military establishment has been struggling back from the nadir it reached during the Cultural Revolution decade. A further impetus to reform was the troubling performance of the PLA in the border war with Vietnam in 1979–80. In addition, military reform in the 1980's has also mirrored broader social and economic reforms such as "youthification"

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[3]In a speech to the Central Military Commission on September 19, 1981, Deng Xiaoping called for a "powerful, modern and regular revolutionary army." As reform in general encountered increasing criticism in the late 1980's, the word order was changed and the slogan became "revolutionization, modernization, and regularization"; subsequently, increased emphasis was placed on "revolutionization." See "Major Achievement in Army-Building over the Past Eight Years," *Banyuetan* (Beijing), July 25, 1987, pp. 4–7, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Aug. 14, 1987, pp. K/2–3; and Chen Xianhua, "Follow Laws Governing the Running of Armed Forces, Give Regular Guidance," *Jiefangjun bao* (Beijing), Mar. 30, 1990, p. 3, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 20, 1990, pp. 39–41.

[4]Chong-pin Lin, "The Extramilitary Roles of the People's Liberation Army in Modernization: Limits of Professionalization," draft paper, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1990; Paul H. B. Godwin, "A Praetorian PLA: Party-Military Relations in China After Tiananmen," draft paper, National Defense University, Washington, DC, July 1990; and Richard J. Latham, "China's Party-Army Relations After June 1989: A Case for Miles' Law?" draft paper, National Defense University, Washington, DC, April 1990.

[5]See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1957; Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1972; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, New York, The Free Press, 1971; and Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.

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(*qingnianhua*), the raising of educational standards, the effort to introduce greater separation of party and administrative functions, the cutting of organizational rolls, and the introduction of systems to enforce greater oversight of planning and budgeting and more accountability. Reform in the PLAAF—as in the other services—has been a search for regularization or institutional normalcy: the establishment of clear rules and regulations; specified standards of performance; organizational structures that meet policy and mission objectives; standard means of evaluating and rewarding leadership; regular systems for managing material, budgets, personnel, and facilities; established rank structures and criteria for determining promotions, awards, and retirement; commonality in job descriptions and responsibilities; and rational coordination of strategy, force structure, and training.

As a process, defense regularization is most often incremental, effecting change at the margins. Indeed, some dismiss it as a low-cost substitute for "real" reform, by which is meant the acquisition of expensive new weapons. The targets often prove elusive, and the objects of reform, resistent. Reforms infrequently demonstrate clear success, even though they may be generating significant results.[6] To understand the reform process in the PLAAF during the last decade, it is important to understand the origins of this service and its early attempts at regularization.

PLAAF Expansion Years, 1949–57

In March 1949, the CCP's Military Commission transferred 64 personnel from the Northeast Old Aviation School to Beijing to form an Aviation Bureau (*hangkong ju*); by October, this unit had tripled in size as more Kuomintang (Nationalist) units surrendered with their equipment. In late summer, several ground forces units were transferred to Beijing to form the core of a new Air Force Headquarters (HqAF). On November 11, 1949, the PLAAF was formally established, and the Aviation Bureau was soon merged into the HqAF.[7] In the military regions (MR) then existing, rudimentary MR aviation offices (*junqu hangkong chu*) were founded; over time they were to evolve into the headquarters of military region air forces (MRAF—*junqu kongjun*).

At the outset, the HqAF was concerned not only with air-space control and air defense, but also with consolidating civilian aviation and salvaging the remnants of an aviation industry.[8] MRAF headquarters were thinly manned and concentrated on consolidating the aviation assets left by the Kuomintang military units and civil aviation companies and organizations. The Air Force essentially had no operational units (*budui*).

The PLAAF started with only 159 aircraft (these were of 21 different types—all foreign-made), 543 airfields, and only 202 pilots, 30 navigators, 2,373 mechanics, 3 engineers, and miscellaneous technical personnel. Airmen from the Communist movement constituted 88 percent of the pilots but only 15 percent of the mechanics. Personnel "accepted" from the Kuomintang forces represented 85 percent of the mechanics and an even higher percentage of technical personnel.[9] In addition, there were more than 100 Japanese pilots and technically trained ground personnel who had remained in Manchuria after 1945; they had formed part of the initial contingent of instructors at the Northeast Old Aviation School.[10]

A variety of issues dominated the PLA's aviation agenda in 1949. Some were resolved within several years, but many of them continued to influence the developmental course of the PLAAF, the defense aviation industry, and civil aviation for the next four decades.

Mission. One such issue was the mission to be assigned to the Air Force. Most immediately, there was the need to organize the air defense of Beijing and Shanghai. Kuomintang bombers attacked Shanghai in February 1949, killing 1,400, and raided Beijing on May 4, 1949.[11] Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) soon became occupied with what was to become the long-term objective of liberating Taiwan. Commander Liu Yalou used this goal to justify creation of an air force paratroop (*kongjiang bing*) unit within the PLAAF.[12] However, in acting to defend China's

[6]The process of Chinese reforms during the 1980's actually resembled the classical model of Western defense reform in terms of objectives and strategies. See, for example, Jack H. Knott and Gary J. Miller, *Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1987, pp. 101–02.

[7]*DZK,* pp. 5–27.

[8]One of the most detailed histories of Chinese aviation in English is found in Malcolm Rosholt, *Flight in the China Air Space, 1910–1950,* Rosholt, WI, Rosholt House, 1984.

[9]*DZK,* pp. 37, 89. The PLAAF repaired or expanded only 94 of the 543 airfields between 1949 and 1953; most of the dirt runways were simply reclaimed for agricultural use.

[10]Ibid., pp. 18–19. In April 1988, China sent an aviation delegation to Japan to commemorate the contributions of the Japanese airmen. See *Hangkong shibao* (Beijing), Nov. 24, 1988.

[11]*DZK,* p. 109.

[12]In July 1950, the CMC established the Air Force Marines First Brigade in Shanghai, using as its foundation the 89th division (30th army, 9th *bingtuan,* Third Field Army). Thereafter, the unit's designation changed several times (i.e., Air Force Marine First Division, Paratroops Division, the Airborne Division). It is now known as the PLAAF 15th Air Army (*kong 15 jun*). See ibid., pp. 83, 235.

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principal cities, the PLAAF had only its aircraft and a few radar units; the anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and most of the radar troops (which were also responsible for air defense of the large cities) belonged to the PLA Air Defense Force (*fangkongjun*). Only in 1957 did the PLAAF take over all the assets and responsibilities of the Air Defense Force,[13] forming in 1958 its own surface-to-air missile (SAM) branch.

The Air Force transferred most of its commercial aviation transport responsibilities to the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) in 1950. However, it retained operational control of all but a small fraction of Chinese air space, and continues to maintain that control today, even though it is comparatively easy (and normal practice in most countries) to separate control of commercial air travel from military operations and turn most air space over to the former.[14]

Equipment and facilities. PLA leaders faced serious problems regarding aviation equipment and issues of jurisdiction over aviation production and repair facilities. In addition to virtually all of the "left behind" equipment, ground facilities (airfields, hangars, factories, repair depots, fuel dumps) also were extensively influenced by foreign engineering. The residue of aviation equipment was so disparate that it would have been impossible to use it as a foundation for a new air force or aviation industry—even if communism had not been a factor discouraging Western cooperation.

As China began its long-term pursuit of a standardized, modern air force, as well as the indigenous capability to produce aircraft, it initially relied heavily on Soviet assistance. (Even before formation of the PLAAF, there were meetings in Moscow on this issue.) The consequence was the development of an integrated inventory of aircraft of Soviet origin. Soviet civilian aeronautical assistance eventually led to the formation—on the basis of a bureau of the Ministry of Heavy Industry—of the Third Ministry of Machine Industry (*sanjibu* or 3rd MMI),[15] whose primary task was the manufacture of military aircraft. PLAAF historians recall the period of Soviet cooperation with a certain degree of affection and appreciation.[16]

In 1949, the Chinese leadership faced the problem of what to do with its inherited 32 military aircraft maintenance facilities and 4,700 workers. The Air Force initially proposed transferring to the Ministry of Heavy Industry those factories that had a manufacturing capability. It soon became evident that repair and maintenance functions could not be separated from manufacturing. The PLAAF eventually also surrendered most of the repair factories with the understanding that it could take back some of them once the aviation industry began to develop. Never comfortable about relying on external maintenance for engines or airframes, the PLAAF resumed control of six repair factories between 1955 and 1957.[17] With regard to production of aircraft, the PLAAF long maintained a senior officer as deputy minister of the aviation industry. Only in March 1972 did the Central Military Commission abolish the "Air Force relationship with the aviation industry and restore [the latter's] direct subordination to the State Council."[18]

Human resources. Manpower was a central issue. At the top, the profile of the PLAAF's initial leadership indicated problems regarding service autonomy. Although the Air Force was described as a "new service" (*xin junzhong*), its roots and its future—PLAAF cadres were told—were to be the Liberation Army. Not only was there apprehension that Air Force personnel might call for some form of autonomy from the army, but there were also PLA personnel who, like some of their foreign counterparts, argued that there was no mission in the army for aviation.[19]

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[13]Formally established in 1950, the PLA Air Defense Force (ADF) became a service equivalent to the Air Force and Navy in 1955. When the PLAAF and ADF merged in May 1957, the ADF consisted of AAA troops, searchlight troops, aircraft reporting troops, eight schools, and 149,000 personnel. See ibid., pp. 218–37.

[14]There were efforts in the mid- to late 1980's to establish an independent, civilian air traffic control administration—the National Air Traffic Control Administration (NATCA). Despite the safety advantages of an integrated national air traffic control system, the PLAAF was unwilling to surrender its broad control of Chinese air space. (Similar disagreements existed in the United States between the Federal Aviation Administration and the United States Air Force during the early 1950's, but were resolved by 1958.)

The Chinese civil air corridors are quite narrow (eight kilometers). Civilian air traffic controllers must seek permission from the operations centers of the MRAF headquarters to circumvent storms or divert aircraft to unscheduled airfields. See Thomas P. Messier, James Etgen, and Edward Harris, "Improving China's Air Traffic Control," *The China Business Review* (Washington, DC), September-October 1987, pp. 26–31.

[15]The Third Ministry of Machine Industry was renamed the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAI) during the early economic reforms of the 1980's. The change reflected a shift from primarily producing military aircraft to a market-oriented interest in manufacturing civilian aircraft and products. In 1988, the ministerial headquarters of the MAI and the Ministry of Astronautics (formerly the Seventh Ministry of Machine Industry) were combined to form the Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAS).

[16]*DZK*, p. 57.

[17]Ibid., pp. 99–100, 440–41. The PLAAF built additional repair and overhaul factories in 1957. For an enumeration of the PLAAF's 21 repair and overhaul factories, see *Poly-Technologies Aircraft Support Division: An Introduction*, pamphlet in English and Chinese, Beijing, 1988.

In 1978, the Air Force founded its own Air Force Aviation Repair Research Institute (*Hangkong xiuli yanjiusuo*) in Nanjing. A separate PLAAF Aeronautical Engineering Maintenance Research Institute (*Hangkong gongcheng weixiu yanjiusuo*) is located in Beijing. *DZK*, pp. 440–41.

[18]"China Today: Aviation Industry" Editorial Department, *Dangdai zhongguode hangkong gongye* (China Today: Aviation Industry—hereafter, *DZHG*), Beijing, China Social Science Press, 1988, p. 85.

[19]*DZK*, p. 47.

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As a consequence, the PLAAF's first and most senior leaders were not drawn from the ranks of early Communist aviators. Liu Yalou, whose roots were in the 14th *bingtuan* (roughly equivalent to a US army corps) of the Fourth Field Army, was the first PLAAF commander; his political commissar, Xiao Hua, was from the 13th *bingtuan*.[20] (Two other senior leaders did have some aviation experience.)[21] In August and September 1949, 2,515 members of Liu Yalou's 14th *binqtuan* transferred from Wuhan to Beijing to form the core of the PLAAF headquarters.[22]

There were differences in the military experience of the combat-tested PLA ground forces officers initially put in charge of the PLAAF and the technically savvy graduates of the Northeast Old Aviation School, most of whom did not see much combat prior to the Korean War. There were even sharper differences between PLA soldiers and Kuomintang aviation personnel "accepted into the Air Force." Concern with political reliability contributed to the dominance of political commissar cadres in the PLAAF leadership for nearly three decades.

The differences involved not only politics, but fundamental attitudes toward technical training and skills. Given that an emphasis on technical competence was unavoidable in the Air Force, the red-versus-expert dichotomy was an issue from the beginning. The initial focus of PLAAF training was on filling a technical vacuum as well as diluting dependence on former Kuomintang personnel with questionable loyalties. Subsequently, the PLAAF mirrored developments in Western air forces when it divided its aviators or "operators" from its nontechnical support personnel (see below).

The Korean War provided an enormous impetus to the development of the PLAAF, playing for it the role played by World War II and the War of Liberation for the PLA's ground forces.[23] It brought a sense of combat maturation for the PLAAF's first generation of aviators—and, in the process, created a cohort of future commanders.

Notwithstanding the many difficulties the PLAAF faced at the outset, the service had reason to be heartened by its early growth. By 1954, it had acquired 3,000 aircraft, which were organized in 28 air divisions and 70 regiments. At least 12 academies or schools had been founded, and they had trained 5,945 pilots, 24,000 technicians, 396 cadres, 690 political cadres, and 310 logistics cadres. PLAAF histories are unclear, however, as to whether or not the service attained its goal of 290,000 airmen by that date.[24]

The commander of a Chinese Air Force unit trains a pilot in 1977.

—AP/Wide World.

Major Setbacks

Beginning in 1959, the PLAAF (not to mention the PLA as a whole) encountered a series of disruptions that sorely tested the capabilities of its leaders and their commitment to continued expansion and organizational regularization. These developments included the Sino-Soviet rift and the Cultural Revolution.

Sino-Soviet rift. The opening of a sharp political rift between Beijing and Moscow beginning in 1959 hit the

[20]Xiao later served as director of the PLA's General Political Department (1963–67). He was dismissed by Jiang Qing during the Cultural Revolution.

[21]These were Chang Qiankun, first deputy commander, and Wang Bi, the PLAAF's first deputy political commissar. Chang had attended Huangpu Military Academy in 1925 and in 1926 traveled to the Soviet Union to study flying and aeronautical engineering. He served in the military engineering schools of the Red Army's 18th Group Army (*jituan*); is the author of at least five books on aviation; and was head of the Military Commission's Aviation Bureau before the PLAAF was organized. Wang had studied aircraft engines and maintenance in the Soviet Union, and he headed the 18th *jituan*'s military engineering school. See *DZK*, p. 41.

[22]Ibid., p. 39.

[23]*Kongjun shi* (p. 2) claims that China shot down 330 aircraft and hit another 95 during the Korean conflict. There may be a degree of overstatement in these data. The Far East Air Force (FEAF) Command (which encompassed all UN forces) reported losing a total of 1,041 aircraft in the conflict, only 147 of them from air-to-air combat. See "The Statistical Summary of US Air Force Combat Operations in Korea 26 June 1950 to 27 July 1953," in *USAF Statistical Digest for 1954* (Washington, DC), AFR-5-24, US Air Force, 1964, p. 15. Given the uncertainties of air combat intelligence, it is hard to reconcile these discrepancies definitively.

[24]*DZK*, pp. 49–50, 53, 69, 88.

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PLAAF harder than the PLA ground forces because the efforts to modernize China's Air Force were especially dependent on Soviet technology. When Moscow cut off shipments of aviation equipment and parts, the impact was so great that the PLAAF had to adopt new flight-training measures. Under the slogan "Train harder on the ground; fly with precision through the air," flying hours were reduced by 41 percent in 1960 and remained low through at least 1963.[25] Moreover, after the Soviet pullout of technicians in 1960, quality control in the manufacture of aircraft became a serious problem.

The break with Moscow had a silver lining, however, in that it prompted an unanticipated institutional maturation for the PLAAF. Self-reliance became more than a political slogan, as Air Force leaders quickly recognized the need to address air power and the aviation industry in terms of China's independent defense needs rather than rely solely on the Soviet model.[26] China's newly established aviation industry set itself on a course that would bring it closer to world standards than it would be at any time in the next three decades.

PLAAF staffs began the lengthy and torturous process of compiling rational regulations, rules, manuals, and guidelines that reflected "Chinese needs." (There had existed some translations of Soviet regulations, but these were not necessarily geared to Chinese practices.) The education and training system was reformed, and there was a new emphasis on advanced scientific skills and education for PLAAF officers and technicians. The PLAAF's sudden, enforced, independence from direct Soviet influence came at a time when PLAAF personnel were still heady from their own combat experiences against the United States in the Korean War. There was an emergent atmosphere of professionalism—at least as understood in the West—that lasted until the mid-1960's.

For a brief spell, between 1963 and 1966, the PLAAF seemed to have absorbed the shock of the Sino-Soviet split and set itself on the road to full-scale regularization and modernization. These were years during which there were efforts to imbue all services with a sense of professionalism, refine the education curricula, improve the training schools, take advantage of the relatively modern aircraft that started to emerge from Chinese factories, and create an underpinning of doctrine and regulations that could give direction to the Air Force.

The Cultural Revolution. The "positive" impact of the Sino-Soviet rift on the PLAAF was, however, soon massively offset by the domestic political and economic tumult of the Cultural Revolution, itself in part a result of China's split from Soviet orthodoxy. From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 until the mid-1970's, the PLAAF stagnated in matters involving flight safety, education, training, strategy, and tactics.[27] Civilian groups, in the guise of "making revolution," occupied military bases (in many cases, this military property still had not been returned to its units by the late 1980's). Under the rubric "Stop classes, make revolution," the militants destroyed military school compounds and teaching materials, books, and equipment, and scattered instructors, researchers, and staff throughout China. In the worst cases, some of these cadres lost their lives.[28]

Ironically, the PLAAF was in this same period pressed to increase flight training as a result of the war in Vietnam and Marshal Lin Biao's fears of China's imminent involvement in a large war. Four flying schools were added in 1967 and 1968. Annual flying hours for flight schools increased dramatically: 1966 (180,000), 1968 (260,000), 1970 (310,000), and 1972 (400,000).[29] However, the training was haphazard, maintenance was poor, and the "serious accident rate" for aircraft soared to 0.6 per 10,000 sorties from 0.249 in 1964. Non-flight or ground training (*dimian xunlian*) virtually ceased (13 of approximately 16 technical schools and academies of the PLAAF were eliminated in November 1969; most of them did not reopen for nearly six years). Authorities of the PLAAF Second Aviation School claim that elimination of aviation theory courses between 1967 and June 1970 "resulted in an increase of aircraft accidents at the school and operational bases."[30]

There were also extensive difficulties in the aviation industry. Between 1969 and 1971, political disruptions led to severe quality-control problems. As a history of the industry notes, it was a time of "anarchy or semi-anarchy. . . . the whole industry was in the difficult position of trying to preserve order." According to industry spokesmen, in 1971 alone, PLAAF commander Wu Faxian and the "military" interfered directly in industry

[25]Ibid., pp. 251–56. Even in the 1980's, photographic stories in *China Pictorial* and PLAAF pictorial books often showed PLAAF pilots watching an instructor demonstrate an aircraft maneuver with a hand-held model airplane.

[26]Ibid., pp. 266–71.

[27]Ibid., pp. 480–91; and *Kongjun shi*, pp. 195–202.

[28]For example, the PLAAF Second Aviation School sent 1,669 of its staff to 11 provinces and 68 work units to carry out "three supports and two militaries" activities. In 1964, the school's total authorized staff had been 1,745. See *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun kongjun dier hangkong xuexiao jianshi* (Brief History of the PLAAF Second Aviation School), Chengdu, Air Force Second Aviation School, August 1982, pp. 15, 42.

[29]*DZK*, pp. 299–300.

[30]Ibid., pp. 271, 299, 510–14; and *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun kongjun dier hangkong xuexiao jianshi*, p. 7.

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affairs by demanding the development of 27 types of aircraft within two to three years, even though blueprints for them did not even exist.[31]

The PLAAF emerged from the Cultural Revolution as an empty organizational shell. Although the basic administrative infrastructure was still in place, the routine functions, operating procedures, training, education, tactical and strategic planning, and the corporate identity of the Air Force were nearly moribund. The operational forces were intact but their efficiency had been degraded. Discipline had been seriously eroded, and standards of competency (e.g., leadership, flying, technical support, administration) were also low.

Matters were complicated by the implication of Air Force Commander Wu Faxian in the 1971 Lin Biao Affair (Wu disappeared from the scene and finally, in 1981, was sentenced to 17 years in prison). For two years, the PLAAF was without a commander, and from 1973 to 1977, it was headed by a largely transitional figure, Ma Ning—a former deputy commander of the Lanzhou MRAF, who had been politically active in Jilin during the Cultural Revolution.

Resumed Reform

In the period 1975–1977, the critical groundwork for a resumption of reform in the PLA and PLAAF was being laid as Deng Xiaoping consolidated his political power and power over the military.[32] In 1976, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong passed from the scene, and the radical Gang of Four quickly fell from power. Amid these profound leadership changes, the PLAAF took its initial steps toward reform: Zhang Tingfa became the new PLAAF commander (1977–85); the PLAAF succeeded in establishing the Aeronautical Engineering Department in 1976 as a new first-level department to address aviation maintenance problems; and in 1977, all military services embarked on a five-year program to reestablish and regularize military training and education.[33]

No matter how operationally compelling regularization was for any of the PLA services, it was virtually impossible to initiate thoroughgoing reform without explicit support at the highest political level, in this case, Deng Xiaoping. Further, it required explicit political rejection of the existing structure of military strategy, philosophy, and doctrine. This was accomplished at the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Congress, in December 1978, where it was made clear that return to the status quo ante was not enough, that reform and "modernization" were expected and encouraged, not only in society at large, but also in the military.[34] Deng made explicit the reform triad on September 19, 1981, in a speech to the Central Military Commission, in which he called for a "powerful, modern and regular revolutionary army."[35]

With this imprimatur, the PLAAF embarked on numerous reforms and changes in its operating style. The first step was an overall reordering of organizations, practices, and procedures. Air Force leaders held numerous conferences where they addressed the need to improve maintenance standards and practices. PLAAF leaders began to focus more intensively on substantive issues such as specific missions for aircraft in the inventory, strategic research, and safety. A renewed emphasis was placed on drafting operating regulations. Air Force units also began to participate in joint-service exercises. (The Sino-Vietnamese war drew pointed attention to the need for coordinated joint operations.) Budget planning was put on a more orderly, three-year basis. The CMC authorized the restoration of flying grades and flight pay. Finally, PLAAF personnel began to attend international conferences. PLAAF Commander Zhang Tingfa alone made approximately 10 trips to foreign countries. Also, as PLAAF officers began traveling abroad, the Air Force became more transparent as a military service, affording analysts fresh insight into how elements of the PLA operate.

The July 31, 1985, appointment of Wang Hai as PLAAF commander lent new momentum to regularization in the Chinese Air Force. A Korean War hero, Wang was the first aviator to become commander of the PLAAF. In pushing for further reform, he and his senior staff emphasized aviation experience and technical expertise.

In the following sections, we shall explore PLAAF regularization in specific areas.

Organization. The decade of reform did not so much change the formal organization of the Headquarters Air

[31]*DZHG*, pp. 7, 83–84. The aviation industry cites December 1971, three months after the death of Lin Biao and the removal of Wu Faxian, as the point when its recovery from the Cultural Revolution began. It was then that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying called a conference on continuing problems with quality control in the industry. *DZHG*, pp. 83–84; and *DZK*, pp. 670–75.

[32]Dismissed in 1966, Deng returned in 1973 as a vice premier and party vice-chairman. He became PLA chief of staff in January 1975, but was dismissed from his positions in April 1976. Rehabilitated a second time at the Ninth CCP Congress in July 1977, he retained these three positions and also became a vice-chairman of the CCP's Central Military Commission. Yang Dezhi replaced Deng as chief of staff in 1980, and Deng became CMC chairman in 1981 (Deng subsequently stepped to the background, and the post was occupied by Zhao Ziyang and then by Jiang Zemin).

[33]*DZK*, pp. 237, 492.

[34]PLA sources consistently point to the December 1978 party plenum as the policy turning point. The same public sources provide few concrete details regarding the initial outline of defense reforms.

[35]Loc. cit.

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Chinese Air Force Commander Wang Hai tries out the pilot's seat of a US Air Force F–16 jet fighter.

—AP/Wide World.

Force and its major components and subordinate organizations as it breathed new life into these institutions and afforded improved perspective on the internal dynamics of the PLAAF and its relations with the larger military and political order.[36]

HqAF is headed by a commander (with the rank of general), a political commissar (lieutenant general), four deputy commanders (lieutenant generals), two deputy political commissars (lieutenant generals), and the heads (major generals) of the "big four departments"—Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and, since 1976, Aeronautical Engineering. Together, these 12 officers comprise the Air Force's Party Standing Committee; these plus the commanders and political commissars of the seven military region Air Force headquarters (MRAF's) comprise the service's Party Committee.

Although the general organization of HqAF is reasonably defined, the command relationship between the functional offices and senior leaders is unclear. The four deputy commanders are not concurrently directors of the four first-level departments; each has responsibility for one of four permanent areas of oversight —training, operations, air defense, and logistics/equipment/research and development. Only the logistics oversight area appears to coincide with a first-level de-

[36]The decade of reform led to unprecedented Western contacts with PLA officers. In this analysis, we rely on interviews with PLA and PLAAF officers, on histories (Chinese), and the wealth of data appearing in China's new "defense literature." See Richard J. Latham, *Selected Bibliography of PRC National Defense Literature, 1980–1991*, forthcoming.

The term "interview" as used in this study includes official, unclassified briefings, conversations during meetings, and other discussions. For obvious reasons we do not identify individuals, specific dates, or occasions.

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partment. Additionally, the deputy commanders have secondary oversight responsibility for other second-level functional areas. The chief of staff does not coordinate the "big four" departments, but merely directs the Headquarters Department. His four deputy chiefs of staff oversee clusters of second-level departments within the Headquarters Department, but they have no lateral responsibilities in the other three first-level departments.

The organizations in HqAF interact with diverse departments within the three major elements of the People's Liberation Army—the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department. All PLAAF procurement programs, budgets, capital construction plans, manpower issues, and training programs are coordinated with or determined by the relevant second-level organizations of those three organizations. The Air Force and the Navy have personnel serving in the three general departments, but during such assignments, the officers wear army uniforms. There are jointly-staffed offices as well as specialized offices staffed exclusively by individual services; for example, there is a distinct Air Force office (*kongjunchu*) both in the Operations Department and in the Equipment Department of the General Staff Department. Political officers often switch back and forth between the General Political Department and the PLAAF Political Department.

The PLAAF's internal operational chain of command is fairly straightforward. Below the Headquarters are the MRAF's; next come diverse command posts (*zhihuisuo*) and air corps (*kongjun jun*); and at the bottom are operations units, which may be directly subordinate to an organization located on any one of the top three levels.

There are currently seven PLA military regions (MR)—Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Jinan, and Chengdu. The number of MRAF headquarters has changed several times since 1949. Recent changes have mirrored changes in military region boundaries, but air regions were not always coterminous with the military regions. Originally related to the CCP's field armies in the war against Japanese and Kuomintang forces, the military regions now are viewed as theaters or distinct campaign areas (see below). MRAF headquarters may have some operational units directly assigned to them, but most such units are separate from the headquarters, which generally is an administrative echelon. Each MRAF headquarters does, however, have an operations center that is part of the Air Force's overall operational chain of command, and the MRAF commander is the military region commander's adviser regarding aviation matters.

The MRAF headquarters commander literally "wears two hats" or, in the Chinese case, two uniforms. When General Larry Welch, a former chief of staff of the United States Air Force, visited the Guangzhou MR in April 1989, PLAAF Lieutenant General Liu Heqiao met the Welch delegation wearing a green PLA uniform, in his capacity as a Guangzhou MR deputy commander. At a dinner hosted by the PLAAF, however, Liu wore the blue PLAAF uniform of the MRAF commander.

The PLAAF currently has eight command posts and four air corps. These intermediate-level elements are responsible for the air defense of specific cities. Practically speaking, there are no functional differences between the two organizations, although an air corps is viewed as having slightly less stature than a command post. The number of command posts and air corps has changed frequently over the years, with the trend being for the former to replace the latter.[37]

At the lowest echelon are the functional, nonadministrative units (*budui*). These may be fighter divisions, radar units, combined brigades, or research institutes, hospitals, sanitoriums, transportation units, and logistics organizations. The term "*budui*" usually is not applied to administrative headquarters (*jiguan*) or a political/party element of the military. The administrative elements within a headquarters are also referred to as "units" (*danwei*).

The internal Air Force chain of command is reasonably clear in terms of policy, military operations, and mission. However, decision-making regarding many operational matters is decentralized. Local commanders have latitude to make on-the-spot decisions when circumstances require an immediate response, even though other decisions related to operations are made as high as the Central Military Commission.[38] Also, the chain of command does not preclude an MRAF commander's directly calling the PLAAF commander.[39]

[37]The four active air corps are the First (Changchun), Seventh (Nanning), Eighth (Fuzhou), and Tenth (Datong). The eight command posts are Dalian (former 3rd Air Corps), Tangshan (former 6th Air Corps), Xian (former 11th Air Corps), Wulumuqi (former 9th Air Corps), Shanghai (former 4th Air Corps), Wuhan (former Wuhan MRAF Hq), Kunming (former Kunming MRAF Command Post), and Lhasa.

Although these organizations are primarily responsible for defending major cities, the 7th Air Corps became the PLAAF's "forward command post" during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict. It was responsible for virtually all Air Force units in the operational area.

[38]On October 5, 1987, a PLAAF SAM unit shot down a Vietnamese MiG–21 that had entered Chinese air space. Given the wartime conditions along the Sino-Vietnamese border and the nature of the air-space penetration, the local commander was authorized to make the decision to shoot down the intruder. In routine matters, information is transmitted through a semi-automatic command-and-control system that links "operations centers" at each higher echelon. From an interview.

[39]Several PLAAF officers made this point during discussions with the authors.

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Some PLAAF officers further claim that directors of first-level departments do not necessarily have to go through deputy commanders or deputy commissars before reporting to the Air Force commander or political commissar. Notwithstanding the formal chain of command, such departures from routinized hierarchical control are often a signal of implicit recognition of dysfunctionality in the existing formal procedures.

Budget matters. A decade of reform has seen the institution of more regularized, long-term budgeting for Air Force expenditures, although the process remains rather primitive. Moreover, the increasing resort to commercial activity by local units as a means of supplementing lean budgets has introduced new challenges for centralized oversight and control.

Since 1986, Air Force budgets have been based on five-year plans and annual budget submissions (from 1978 to 1986, the PLAAF had worked with three-year budget plans).[40] Although there is a central Air Force budget, PLAAF officers often imply that the budget process is not rigidly fixed. The Air Force Finance Department (*caiwubu*), a second-level department within the HqAF Logistics Department, is responsible for both budget and finance matters; however, it did not have its own financial accounting system until mid-1989.[41] Once the General Staff Department of the PLA establishes its total budget requirements, centralized funding for the PLAAF comes from the State Council through the Finance Department of the PLA General Logistics Department.

In general, the PLAAF receives three kinds of central budgetary allocations. The first is "fenced" or specifically-earmarked money (e.g., to buy a specific number of aircraft). The second consists of "constrained funds" —earmarked by categories, but allowing the PLAAF some latitude in how it spends them. The third is discretionary funds, which have no strings attached. Based upon the allocation constraints, these funds trickle down to the basic-level units of the PLAAF according to budgets and plans.[42]

There is a second source of funds, not centrally controlled. Consisting of revenues from commercial enterprises, hotels, hospitals, factories, farms, mines, and even airline services, it amounts to an off-budget source of income for all four PLAAF administrative levels. Unlike centrally apportioned funds that trickle down, the profits of military enterprises are carefully husbanded, although there is theoretically supposed to be a "trickle up" of such monies to the next-higher administrative level for distribution back down to poorer units.[43]

The net effect is that HqAF has budgetary control for big-ticket items, major capital construction, and expenditure categories that central government planners endeavor to control through the state budget allocation process. It has much less control over the daily operating expenses of the local units—housing, care of dependents, welfare, and recreation activities—which are often funded out of the proceeds of the units' local economic operations. A variety of regulations have been introduced in the attempt to improve the efficiency of such operations and to prevent the misuse of government property and the commission of economic crimes. It is not clear whether these regulations have been effective.

Defining the PLAAF's mission. A critical issue in regularization is to arrive at a clear definition of the responsibilities of the Air Force. In the early 1980's, the PLAAF took up this task of mission definition. Beyond the strictly military aspect of this development, military mission statements were the PLA's equivalent of the written responsibility codes or contracts that reformers began to promote in the civilian sector. In addition, PLA ground forces had began to acquire their own air assets,[44] which introduced new competition over turf within China's defense establishment, and in this setting, mission statements were needed to define responsibilities and justify resources.[45] Third, the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese

[40]*DZK*, pp. 489, 491.

[41]*China Daily* (Beijing), Aug. 16, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 21, 1989, p. 39.

[42]"The Military Budget System in the PRC," *China Tech* (Hong Kong), June 10, 1985, pp. 1–2. Another Hong Kong publication identifies the following breakdown of the PLA budget: development or procurement (30 percent), maintenance (33 percent), and living expenses (36 percent). This source claims the military budget consists of two broad parts: "the overall national defense budget and the combat readiness budget." In peacetime, the latter is only about 10 percent of the total military budget. See Wan Li-hsing, "China's Military Expenditure to Increase Drastically in 1990," *Tang Tai* (Hong Kong), Mar. 31, 1990, pp. 17–18, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 23, 1990, pp. 46–49.

[43]The PLAAF has not stated how many enterprises are run by its *budui*. In 1989, however, it reported that more than 100 PLAAF enterprises each earned profits in excess of RMB $50,000, while several earned more than RMB $1 million (*Jiefangjun bao*, Oct. 1, 1989). Like other military services, the PLAAF has held conferences to stress strict management of military enterprises. Presumably, the managers of these activities are no less creative than their civilian counterparts in devising accounting methods to retain more money for the use of the enterprise or parent *budui*.

[44]"China Sets Up Army Air Arm to Increase Modernized Combat Effectiveness," *Hsin Wan Pao* (Hong Kong), Apr. 18, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 26, 1989, p. 40.

[45]Turf battles, of course, are not a unique phenomenon within the PLA or PLAAF. Normally, these disagreements are not publicly aired. A recent but still opaque question of turf involved the transfer of PLAAF tactical airlift helicopters to the ground force's Army Aviation Corps (*lujun hangkong bing* or *luhang*) in the late 1980's. It is unclear whether the PLAAF wanted to retain the tactical airlift mission—which involved the small but modern fleet of Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters—or give it away. It is equally unclear whether PLA ground forces commanders felt they could do a better job satisfying tactical airlift requirement than the PLAAF or were forced to accept the mission.

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border conflict compelled PLA and PLAAF commanders to address questions regarding joint operations and the appropriate role of air power. Finally, during the 1980's, China's military faced unprecedented economic constraints. This situation resulted not so much from unanticipated budget shortages as from conscious CCP policy decisions. Initial PLA efforts to develop the equivalent of a planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) visibly reinforced the effort to link strategy, resources, and mission.[46]

Even today, the PLAAF is remarkably terse about its mission, which it describes as the "air and land defense of China."[47] While this in part reflects the "forbidden zone" mentality ("It's classified"), it also reflects the yet nascent nature of Chinese air power doctrine and concepts. There was, after all, little in Mao's doctrine of People's War that compelled serious consideration of the uses of air power. Moreover, until recently, the PLAAF encountered no competitors for air-related resources or missions. Its broad "air-defense" charter permitted it to expand the scope of its functions into areas not universally associated with air power.

However, with the abandonment of the "imminent war" doctrine and its eventual replacement with a doctrine of "extended peace,"[48] China was able to look for new defense strategies. In the absence of broader Air Force statements about the PLAAF's missions, the only real clue to the range of Air Force responsibilities must be deduced from the functions of its five operational branches (*bingzhong*): aviation, anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, radar, and communications. Although the air-defense mission of the PLAAF has since 1957 included ground-based as well as aerial components, its mandate still does not extend to ground-based strategic missiles with nuclear warheads. These were assigned to an independent fourth service—the Second Artillery (at least one early PLAAF deputy commander became minister of the former 7th MMI, which produced China's strategic missiles [it is now a commercial corporation]).[49]

The aviation branch, which includes fighters, ground attack aircraft, bombers, transports, and reconnaissance aircraft, is the Air Force's main arm. As noted above, the PLAAF also has airborne troops (such forces in many Western militaries are treated as part of the ground forces since they rely on the air force only for transportation). It also has logistics units, research institutes, hospitals, and sanitoriums. The Air Force's Logistics Department has its own water transport craft to ship fuel to units along the Yangzi River and the seacoast. Published PLAAF sources also refer to informal, secondary Air Force missions such as assisting "socialist construction" (participating in civilian economic projects), providing air services for disaster relief and air rescues, and artificial rainmaking to assist agriculture.

The PLAAF is also silent about the different ways air power can be employed within the framework of China's strategy of active defense (*jiji fangyu*). Until quite recently, the PLAAF did not have specific mission statements regarding different air combat missions (i.e., strategic air defense, close air support, interdiction, strategic bombing, tactical or strategic airlift). It was not until 1982 that the PLAAF provided a written doctrine regarding the Air Force's ground-support role. As late as 1988, there still was no formal doctrine for strategic air defense.[50] Additionally, regulations about army-wide airlift support and practices were not introduced until mid-1989.[51]

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[46]See Liu Dajun and Wang Zumin, Eds., *Zhongguo shehuizhuyi guofang jingjixue* (Chinese Socialist Defense Economics), Beijing, PLA Press, 1987, p. 126; Wang Baocun and Dong Haiyan, "The Successes and Failures of the McNamara Military Reforms," in Yang Dezhi, Huan Xiang, et al., Eds., *Guofang fazhan zhanlue sikao* (Thought on Strategies of Defense Development), Beijing, PLA Press, 1987, pp. 239–51; Wang Shouyun "A Strategic Study of the Development of Defense S&T, Weapons, and Equipment in the New Period," in Zong Canmoubu Junxunbu, Ed., *Guofang xiandaihua fazhan zhanlue yanjiu* (A Study of Development Strategy for Defense Modernization), Beijing, Military Translation Press, 1987, p. 233.

[47]Interview.

[48]In reviewing the manuscript, Paul Godwin pointed out that the transition between the doctrines of imminent war and of extended peace is not particularly clear. He notes, for example, that debates about the imminent war doctrine continued from 1973 until the Third Plenum in December 1978. The doctrine of extended peace did not become dominant until 1985.

[49]Personnel in the PLAAF routinely refer to anti-aircraft artillery as *yi pao* (first artillery) and surface-to-air missile units as *er pao* (second artillery). The PLAAF's SAM Academy (*Gaopao xueyuan*) is still informally referred to as the *Er pao xueyuan*, which has led to some confusion with the Second Artillery's own academy. In September 1958, the Special Weapons School (*Tezhong wuqi xuexiao*) was organized in Baoding. It was called the 15th Aviation School. This school was responsible for training personnel from all services to do maintenance work on surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and shore-to-ship missiles. In 1963, this school became primarily responsible for training only SAM maintenance and construction personnel and commanders.

[50]Interview. An analyst for the PLAAF's AAA Applied Research Center wrote at the time: "To date, the PLAAF's theoretical research has not yet formulated an air-defense strategy. Therefore, as air-defense modernization develops, research must be done on an air-defense strategy that consists of three aspects: deterrence, resisting an attack, and a timely counterattack. The Air Force's air-defense systems currently provide deterrence against an enemy air attack. However, if deterrence fails and the enemy does attack by air, then surface-to-air missiles are the best air defense weapons to use. Finally, defensive air strikes against enemy airfields are an important part of an air-defense strategy. Although China does not have the capability to conduct large-scale counterattacks against enemy airfields, the Air Force can organize timely small-scale counterattack operations." See *Hangkong shibao*, Oct. 15, 1988.

The transfer of some AAA assets to PLA ground forces complicates the task of defining an air-defense strategy, since the mission is now shared among PLAAF, PLA Navy, and PLA ground-force units.

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Personnel issues. Three major PLA-wide structural changes had serious impact on the personnel structure of the Air Force after 1985. These were the CMC's mandated reduction of total PLA personnel by 1 million persons beginning in 1985; the introduction of a military civil service system in August 1988; and the reinstitution of military ranks in October 1988.

By late 1989, the PLAAF had reduced its total active duty force by one-fourth, to approximately 500,000.[52] In this process, the Air Force concentrated its efforts on eliminating organizational fat and nonessential levels of administration. Additionally, it transferred some missions to ground-force units. It sought to avoid emasculating operational units. However, with the threat assessment revised, program and manpower directors were effectively allowed to propose cuts in the operational force structure rather than simply trim staff organizations. Although the Chinese debate on defense strategy has not ended, the beginning of a shift in strategy nonetheless allowed force planners to look at new ways to organize the PLA and its services.

Some of the largest reductions in the PLAAF were realized by a personnel slight-of-hand. For the first time, the Chinese armed forces created a civilian support bureaucracy. Large numbers of officers from the support units—especially schools, academies, hospitals, research institutes, and service units—were required to become civilian defense employees (*wenzhiyuan*). An implicit objective was to lower the ratio of officers from 1 for every 2.4 conscripts to 1 for every 3.3 conscripts.

For the PLAAF, the greatest impact was felt in the Logistics Department, which controlled the largest number of support organizations. Approximately 20 percent of personnel at HqAF became civil servants. Most instructors in the Air Force schools and academies also became civilians. The change provoked concerns about the emergence of a "second-class" corps of officers. Apologists for the change stressed that it gave these officers stability and opportunities that otherwise were often unavailable due to operational military requirements. One clear advantage for officers who became civil servants was that they were not subject to the mandatory retirement ages for military officers. For example, a military officer serving at a research institute who is not promoted beyond the equivalent of regiment commander by age 45 must retire and leave the institute; as a civil servant, however, he may retain his post.

A Chinese Air Force officer in uniform.

—Eastfoto.

The new rank system was both welcomed and feared. After more than 20 years without ranks, it was difficult to establish criteria that took into account seniority, different job responsibilities, and rational organizational structures. Within the Air Force, rank determinations were easiest to make in operational units. Problems arose, however, when assigning appropriate ranks to people working in technical, administration, and political fields. Consistency among the military services was an additional concern. The solution in part was to create a dual-track officer corps: command personnel (i.e., line officers or "operators"), and technical personnel (*jishuyuan*) in support positions.[53]

Additionally, the PLA has married the newly intro-

[51]According to one Chinese defense analyst, until recently, China's military transport departments had concentrated on railway and water transport. The issue of air transport was first addressed in a report to the director of the PLA's General Logistics Department in early 1985. Regulations were not put into effect until March 1989. Prior to that time, "the military used civil transport planes to carry out its air transport tasks. It lacked unified rules and regulations and was characterized by considerable arbitrariness in such areas as working out transport plans and time limits." Significantly, even this account made no reference to a specific doctrine for tactical or strategic airlift. See Hong Baocai, "The Development of China's Military Air Transport," *Liaowang Overseas* (Hong Kong), July 24, 1989, pp. 6–7, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1989, pp. 41–43.

[52]A figure of 470,000 is given in International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 1989–1990*, Oxford, Nuffeld Press, 1989, p. 149.

[53]Both wear the same ranks, but have different collar insignia.

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duced rank (*junxian*) categories with the grade or duty (*zhiwu dengji*) classifications that were used exclusively between 1965 and 1988. Because the grade classifications were based on army organizational command or staff positions, we have called them "army equivalent positions" (AEP). The two classification systems currently exist simultaneously. Foreign analysts miss important individual and organizational differences by focusing only on rank differentials. From the standpoint of the Chinese, AEP is a more accurate reflection of authority and responsibility across service, branch, and organizational lines. Thus, in one grade category there may be a range of three different ranks.[54]

AEP also reflects asymmetries of authority among organizations and individuals who otherwise appear to be equal in terms of rank. The PLAAF commander and political commissar have different *ranks*, but they have the same *grade*—each has the AEP of an MR commander (a more striking case is found in the Navy, where the commander has a lower rank than the political commissar, although each has the same grade or AEP). The relative importance of PLAAF departments cannot necessarily be determined by whether they are of first- or second-level status, or by the rank of their directors. The directors and political commissars of the Political and Logistics departments, and the chief of staff all have the AEP of an MR deputy commander; by contrast, the director of the Aero-Engineering Department only has the AEP of an army (*jun*) commander—the same as the deputy chief of staff and the deputy directors in the other "big four" departments.

The net result of all these changes has not been much relief to the PLAAF in financial terms. Despite the appearance of a smaller uniformed force, the total number of Air Force personnel (military and civilian) has not changed dramatically. Even reductions resulting from retirement still represent a financial cost due to pension obligations.[55]

Assignments within the PLAAF continued to come under the purview of two HqAF elements: the Political Department's Cadre Department (*ganbubu*), which deals with officer assignments, and the Headquarters Department's Military Affairs Department (*junwubu*), which determines manning requirements for all PLAAF organizations.[56] As late as 1988, the system was not computerized. Moreover, appointments to senior posts (at the equivalent of the army or air corps) require Central Military Commission approval. Officers in this tier have "fast track" potential and may have general-officer mentors. Moreover, some of these officers have exceptional educational qualifications (technical training, foreign-language skills, advanced degrees).

Personnel matters at the MRAF and below tend to be less centralized. The majority of PLAAF personnel—officers, NCO's, and conscripts—serve their entire careers in the same military region and perhaps even in their native province. There is no assurance that this decentralized approach will always satisfy regional manpower requirements, especially in times of war. As Chinese defense planners give more attention to problems of war mobilization, they are discovering that some local urban-rural population distributions may not be adequate to cover the requirements of the armed forces and civilian industries for technically trained manpower in a war setting. Also, some defense analysts in China believe that as the PLA in general begins to rely on more sophisticated weaponry, it will have to turn to better-educated urban youths rather than to rural youths.[57] This already has been the case for the PLAAF.

Force structure and joint operations. The PLAAF has made significant changes in some operational units and in the ways that units are to be deployed in case of combat. For example, the Air Force has begun in recent years to restructure its AAA and SAM forces by abolishing the division (*shi*) level and turning over most of its lower-caliber (37mm and 57mm) AAA units to the PLA ground forces. Of the AAA forces still under PLAAF control, the Air Force has linked many of them with SAM regiments to form "combined brigades" (*huncheng lu*). The Air Force has eliminated the regiment level completely within the combined brigades, thereby effecting a direct chain of command between brigades and the battalion. Each combined brigade has five to six battalions consisting of two to three AAA and two to three

[54]Xun Zhenying, *Jundui ganbu guanlixue* (Military Cadre Management), Beijing, National Defense University Press, 1989, pp. 61, 262–63, 343–44.

[55]In the main, the retirement costs of volunteers and NCO's are handled by the local governments in the areas where they retire. Officer or cadre retirement procedures are more complex and are handled by two offices under a new Retired Cadre Bureau (*lao ganbu ju*) of Headquarters Air Force. The offices deal respectively with retirees who entered military service prior to (*lixiu* status) or after (*tuixiu* status), October 1, 1949. The former receive 100 percent of their active-duty salary and are entitled to live in a retired cadre sanitorium (*ganxiusuo*). The latter receive 80–90 percent of their active-duty salary, but are not entitled to live in a sanitorium; in this case, the office helps retirees find housing and possibly other employment. One PLAAF commander commented that in his region as much as 20 percent of his budget was used to support retired Air Force personnel. See Gu Ling and Li Ling, Eds., *Tuiwu junren zhishi shouce* (Handbook for Retired Military Personnel), Beijing, PLA Press, 1986.

[56]In practice, organizations and commanders often work around their manning authorizations. It is not uncommon in Beijing for an officer working in one organization to be on the manning roster of another unit.

[57]See Wu Jingting, *Zhanzheng dongyuan* (War Mobilization), Beijing, PLA Press, 1986.

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SAM battalions. As of late 1990, the Jinan MRAF was the only MRAF that had not announced any combined brigades.

Changes in these ground air-defense units had not been completed as of early 1991, and there are a variety of exceptions to the pattern. For example, some SAM brigades have been formed without any AAA battalions. Still other SAM and AAA regiments have not been combined into brigades. Some AAA units that have not been combined with SAM regiments or turned over to PLA ground forces may possibly be used for deployment purposes.

A dominant objective of regularization throughout the PLA has been a greater emphasis on the development of combined and joint forces, born of the lesson of the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam as spelled out in doctrine on Air Force support of defensive campaigns by group armies (*jituanjun*). Under this concept, the CMC and the PLAAF are responsible for establishing a unified and comprehensive air-defense plan for China's strategic points.[58] By 1986, the PLA began referring to the military regions as war or campaign zones. At the military region level, the MR commander or Front Army (*fangmian*) commander, who exercises unified control, is responsible for directing group armies and the PLAAF to prepare a coordinated action plan. It logically followed in 1987 that MRAF commanders also became MR deputy commanders. The PLAAF assigns an operations team (*zuozhan xiaozu*) to each group army to coordinate requests for aerial support. At the lowest levels, the Air Force assigns target-control teams (*mubiao yindao zu*)—much like ground-based forward air controllers—who control air attacks in conjunction with ground-force divisions.

Chinese sources have not clarified how regional PLAAF assets are assigned to specific group armies. The focus seems to be tactical. There is no published analysis on how the PLA proposes to control the employment of air power at the theater or campaign level (i.e., the military region). At the theater level, the pressing question is how theater commanders broker competing demands for limited air assets.

Training. In response to these new operational concepts, the senior PLAAF leadership joined other services in placing a greater emphasis on officer training and education, what the Chinese call "knowledgefication" (*zhishihua*). Qualitative improvements were introduced for academic education, flight training, and joint-exercise training. Academic excellence was stressed in the PLAAF as it was throughout the military. The Air Force closed some schools in order to consolidate resources and upgrade others to academies.

Training and education in the PLAAF is currently based on the "5-3" tier system. This includes five tiers of specialized/technical training and education for officers: secondary specialized; specialized college or equivalent; university or equivalent; masters degree program; and doctorate program. There is also a three-tier system of professional military education for officers—primary command/leadership, intermediate command/leadership, and higher command education. Conscripts and volunteers are assigned to training units. For the first time, new pilots are expected to graduate from PLAAF academies with college degrees. Seven PLAAF academies also began in 1985 to confer masters degrees in technical fields.[59]

Important changes have been introduced in pilot training. Fighter and ground-attack pilot training was traditionally a three-phase process: basic flight school (20 months), flying academy (28 months), and operational unit training (4–5 years). Beginning in 1986, the PLAAF began to experiment with an additional fourth phase. For graduates of fighter and ground-attack flying programs, phase three became a one-year aircraft "conversion program" at newly organized "transition training bases" (*gaizhuang xunlian jidi*). Phase four, or proficiency development, became a slightly truncated version of the old operational training in units (now 3–4 years). The program was formalized in July 1988 when the CMC authorized each MRAF to establish a transition training base. The goal is the eventual elimination of the need for operational fighter divisions to dedicate one of their three regiments to training.[60] This measure also fosters greater standardization of advanced flying skills. Regularization of flight training allowed the PLAAF to further abolish three flight training schools after July 1986.

[58]The PLA reorganized its ground forces in 1985 from an infantry–heavy field army (*yezhanjun*) structure to corps-size units called "group armies" (*jituanjun*). The latter combine several infantry divisions with armor divisions or brigades, as well as artillery, engineering, anti-aircraft, communications, and other specialty forces into an integrated, combined arms fighting force. Although the first references to a group army were not seen until 1983 (supplied by Paul Godwin), the concept was actually finalized in 1982, spurred by the 1979 Sino-Vietnam border conflict.

[59]The Surface-to-Air Missile, Weather, Political, Radar, and Communications Engineering academies, as well as the Engineering and Air Force Command colleges, have begun awarding masters degrees.

[60]Graduates of a flying academy receive a degree in military science and are commissioned second lieutenants; they are also given the army equivalent grade of a deputy company commander (*fulianji*). Training at the "transition training bases" lasts for one year (100–120 flying hours). The pilots begin flying the F–5 for basic airmanship, then move to the F–6 or F–7. Upon graduation, the pilots are expected to be capable of flying in "three weather conditions" (i.e., day and night visual flight rules/VFR, and day instrument flight rules/IFR). *DZK*, pp. 503–04.

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The increasing emphasis on joint and combined operations led to additional training changes. (Although reference to "mixed" or "combined" military actions appeared as early as the 1950's, these most likely involved only training of several branches within a given service.) One initiative was the creation of greater combat reality in flight training. Since 1982, each MRAF has formed one to three "blue force units" (*lanjun fendui*) that serve as "enemy" or "aggressor" squadrons. The PLAAF Flight Test and Training Center, located in Cangzhou, Hebei province, also formed a blue force unit to fly as "enemy" aircraft during air-defense exercises. Some MRAF's and Air Corps have formed joint tactical training areas in conjunction with military region ground forces.

Building esprit de corps. As an extension of regularization and recovery from the Cultural Revolution, the PLAAF has, like other PLA services, sought to rebuild pride and what we in the West would call military professionalism. Among measures in this direction were the upgrading of officer education—the acquisition of college and advanced degrees provided officers with additional social status.[61]

The reintroduction of ranks likewise provided easily discernible signs of status, achievement, and responsibility. And the creation of stylish new uniforms with service insignia went far in portraying service members as competent and polished specialists rather than rural rustics. Further, professional communication was reestablished through aviation journals, publications, and books.

An additional step in fostering pride among PLAAF pilots and air crews was the institution of four aeronautical ratings to all aircraft crew members in 1986. Among the PLAAF's 10,000 pilots, only 7 percent received the highest or "special grade" award.[62]

Political commissar system. During the 1980's, some party reformists argued strongly for a clearer separation of party policy functions and the routine operations of organizations (e.g., factories, government offices, schools, local governments). The proposal spilled over into the military, although conservative critics tried to discount the phenomenon by alleging that "foreign militaries," under the guise of promoting "peaceful evolution," were trying to influence PLA officers regarding the separation of army and party.[63]

The PLA's political commissar system has always been a puzzling institution to foreigners. Chinese analysis of the functions of CCP organizations within the PLA are also far from clear. Recent PLA publications, for example, do little to clarify the relationships among the military's "party committee system" (*dangwei zhidu*), its "system of division of leadership responsibility" (*shouzhang fengonq fuze zhidu*), and the political commissar system (*zhengzhi weiyuan zhidu*).[64] Although in theory there is only one party system within the PLA, which foreign analysis often refers to collectively as the "political commissar system," there appears to exist considerable redundancy, which helps explain Chinese references to different systems.

The commissar system per se exists at the regiment level and above, and is clearly intended to be an instrument of party control over the military. The system of primary party committees is actually a membership infrastructure. Thus, even though there could be considerable atrophy of party organizational life within the PLA—especially below the regiment level—the commissar system could continue to flourish. The two systems ostensibly converge when political commissars lead local party committees as well as provide political oversight.[65]

In the early professional contacts between representatives of the US Air Force and the PLAAF, both sides grappled awkwardly with the existence or absence of

[61]Graduation from a military school or academy with a college degree is not that common in the world. In many advanced, Western countries, military academy graduates and pilots still do not enjoy the same educational status as graduates of civilian colleges or universities.

[62]Some 15–20 percent of fighter pilots received the "special grade" award. The grades are assigned to pilots, navigators, communications personnel, gunnery personnel, and instructor pilots. The criteria for acquiring these grades include time on station, flying hours, special missions, and ability to "fly in four weather conditions" (i.e., day and night visual flight regulations/VFR, and day and night instrument flight regulations/IFR).

The PLAAF established age limits for its pilots in the 1980's: fighter and ground attack pilots (43–45 years); bomber pilots (48–50); transport pilots (55); helicopter pilots (47–50); and female pilots (48). The average age of fighter and ground attack pilots is 28 years. *DZK*, p. 507.

[63]See, for example, Rui Bian, "The Strategic Goals of the West in Promoting 'Peaceful Evolution'," *Banyuetan*, Oct. 10, 1989, pp. 56–59, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *JPRS Report: China* (Washington, DC), JPRS-CAR, Nov. 22, 1989, pp. 1–3; Liu Guohua, "At an All-Army Political Work Meeting Yang Baibing Explains 'Several Questions on Strengthening and Improving Army Political Work in the New Situation'," *Jiefangjun bao*, Dec. 19, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 26, 1990, Supplement, pp. 32–34; and Qiu Jichen, "Protect the Army's Purity As We Do Our Eyes," *Jiefangjun bao*, Mar. 30, 1990.

The peaceful evolution theme came into its own after June 1989. There were obscure references to it at least as early as July 1988, when Chinese writers claimed to detect peaceful but subversive Western initiatives in Eastern Europe. See *JPRS Report: China*, JPRS-039-88, July 22, 1988, p. 5.

[64]*Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo fence* (Chinese People's Liberation Army Political Work Volume) in Vol. 8 of *Zhongguo dabaike quanshu—Junshi* (Great Chinese Encyclopedia—Military), Beijing, Military Science Press, 1987, pp. 46–49, 53–55; Haijun beihai jiandui—hangkongbingbu zhengzhibu, Ed., *Jundui jiceng zhenggong shiyong shouce* (Practical Handbook of Military Grassroots Political Work), Beijing, Navy Press, 1987, pp. 1–34.

[65]See fn. 64.

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this "system" in the other's service. Western analysis tends to regard it as a Leninist artifact that is intrusive and obstructs the pursuit of military efficiency. The attitudes of PLA officers were opaque, the commissar system apparently remaining a "forbidden zone."

Nevertheless, it was possible to deduce certain general attitudes. First, officers, who are all party members, seem to want to be seen as apolitical but ardently patriotic. Second, they are keenly attuned to and philosophically uncritical of policy. It is important to them to know what the *correct* policy position is. They appear to be "good soldiers who will do what they are told" and to regard "those issues [i.e., policy matters] as being well above their pay grades." Third, because political policymaking is not within their sphere of responsibility, they do not seem to be outwardly concerned about how policy is made at the highest level. Finally, among officers there does not seem to be an uneasiness about the party-military relationship. There is, however, a muted feeling that political oversight of routine personnel actions is unnecessary.[66] Thus, what appears to outsiders as needless redundancy in the political apparatus may in fact be a source of irritation within the PLA.

On the other hand, senior military officials stated on several occasions that developing a sense of patriotism among airmen was a primary objective of the politcal commissar system, and asked American officers how patriotism is taught in the US military. Further discussions indicated that PLA and PLAAF leaders feel that conscripts and cadets are proud to be Chinese, but have difficulty identifying with the larger, abstract concepts of the Chinese state and national objectives.

Apart from the strictly political dimension of the commissar system, it is also responsible for a variety of services that are mostly nonpolitical in nature. These include routine personnel administration, education, security, information dissemination, welfare and recreation activities, cultural events, counseling of soldiers and dependents, and maintaining the general morale of soldiers. In foreign militaries many of these missions fall within the purview of personnel affairs or a chaplain's office.

Six percent of the PLAAF—about 30,000 individuals serve within the military political system. Given the relatively small number of PLAAF personnel overall at the MRAF level or above, it is clear that most of the Air Force's full-time political workers are in operational units and support organizations. At levels below the regiment, there are "political instructors" who interact with servicemen—both party and nonparty. Virtually all new Air Force political officers receive training at the PLAAF Political Academy in Shanghai. Political commissars receive mid-level training at the Air Force Command College in Beijing.

At each level of the Air Force, major military issues are decided by the party committee, although there is a division of responsibilities. If an issue concerns military affairs, the commander or line military officer carries out the decision. If the issue concerns political matters, political officers are responsible. For example, a commander decides how many sorties will be flown on a given day, but the political commissar participates in deciding who flies those sorties, because that decision involves both military and political matters (i.e., reliability, attitude).[67] In a commander's absence, the political commissar is responsible for carrying out the unit's mission in conjunction with the deputy commanders. In theory, a commander and political commissar are coequal; in practice, the relationship varies widely with personality and leadership style, not to mention the state of politics in China as a whole.

An important consequence of the PLA's policy of "opening up to the outside" is that even the political commissars have been directly exposed to foreign cultures and military systems. In October 1988, for example, the director of HqAF's Political Department, Major General Ding Wenchang, accompanied the director of the PLA General Political Department, General Yang Baibing, on a visit to Eastern Europe. Soon thereafter, the PLAAF Political Commissar, Lieutenant General Zhu Guang, visited the United States as a guest of the Secretary of the Air Force.

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[66]The tone of this paragraph should not be construed to mean that the political commissar system is accepted uncritically. The consistent unwillingness of officers to talk about the system in any detail underscores the existence of a host of sensitivities. There appears to be a dichotomy of attitudes among some officers. Officers are generally comfortable with party control. Concurrently, some officers (read party members) are not always comfortable with the commissar system as a component of routine military affairs. Their reasons are unclear, but in many instances they may not have much to do with basic party principles or policies.

[67]When explaining this practice to Western air force officers, PLAAF officials were routinely vague about how command jurisdictions are resolved when the distinction between a military and political issue is unclear. A synthesis of various explanations is that through years of experience, line and political officers have acquired an unwritten understanding or tolerance of the recurrent differences. Understanding the distinctions has become part of the Air Force's culture and a necessary staff skill. Additionally, commissars and commanders frequently work together at different organizational levels, where they may develop personalized working relationships. (Five of the seven MRAF political commissars in 1990 had previously held HqAF or MRAF command staff positions. The Shenyang and Beijing MRAF commanders and political commissars worked together for several years.) Disagreements or conflicts are normally viewed as more matters of personality than of jurisdiction. The rationality of the explanation collapses when political struggles within the party lead to politicization of even the most routine operational matters—as frequently happened during the Cultural Revolution.

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Weapons procurement and modernization. As noted above, both the relationship between the PLAAF and the aviation industry and China's course toward creation of a modern air arm have been troubled.[68] When Wang Hai became PLAAF commander in 1985, the aviation industry still had not solved its aircraft development problems. Virtually every aircraft in the inventory was still based on 1950's Soviet technology. There were no mobile SAM's and—more important—no new weapon systems ready for deployment in the near future.[69] Equally important, virtually all of China's neighbors were upgrading their forces with the latest Soviet or Western equipment. The PLAAF was impatient. In its turn, the aviation industry, with some justice, placed a fair portion of the blame for the technical backwardness of the Air Force on the service's meddling in the industry during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

To understand China's limited options regarding aviation inventory today, it is useful to trace events of earlier years in brief detail. Following the Soviet cessation of technical assistance in 1960, the Chinese aviation industry proceeded along two tracks. First, it copied and modified various Soviet aircraft, such as the MiG–19 and MiG–21 fighters, the Tu–16 bomber, and the Mi–4 helicopter.[70] Second, it began to develop indigenous aircraft, such as the A–5 ground-attack aircraft and F–12 light interceptor at Nanchang, the F–8 interceptor at Shenyang, and the F–9 interceptor at Chengdu.[71]

The Cultural Revolution seriously impeded the progress of these and other programs. For example, quality control measures for the F–6–III, the Zhi–5 helicopter, and the A–5 completely broke down during their development. Numerous quality-control problems forced the CMC to order factory recalls for all of these aircraft in November 1975.[72] Even in the early 1980's, PLAAF A–5, F–6, and F–7 aircraft continued to have serious problems with hydraulic-system contamination. This problem alone contributed to approximately 30–40 percent of all aircraft malfunctions. It was as high as 70 percent in one F–7 unit.[73]

The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation's F–8 and F–8 II interceptor development programs were among China's most ambitious. The F–8, whose development lasted from 1964 to 1979, was first flight-tested in June 1969. Although the PLAAF began deploying the F–8 in the early 1980's, it was dissatisfied with the aircraft. Already in 1980, the PLAAF established requirements to create the F–8 II, a modified version of the F–8. The requirements given to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry emphasized two primary needs: a new fire-control system—including a larger radar antenna for an increased search-and-track capability—and a more powerful engine. The first F–8 II prototype flew in June 1984; design flight-testing of the aircraft was completed in October 1987.[74]

China's aviation industry was still unable to fully satisfy the PLAAF's requirements. What ensued was a remarkable breakthrough in cooperation involving the United States government, the PLAAF, and the Chinese Ministry of the Aviation Industry. After long negotiations, the parties concluded a foreign military sales agreement to upgrade the F–8 II's fire-control system.[75] However, following the June 1989 events in Tiananmen Square, the United States suspended arms sales to China. Chinese technicians were allowed to resume work on the program a few months later, but Beijing decided in May 1990 not to proceed beyond the development stage.[76] Instead, Chinese aviation industry officials have continued development of their F–8 II

[68]Bueschel, op. cit., p. 53. Histories of the PLAAF and of the Ministry of Aviation Industry underscore how seriously modernization was undermined in 1968 and 1969.

[69]China began copying the Soviet SA–2 SAM in 1959 and called it the Hongqi–1 (HQ–1/CSA–1). The PLAAF received its first missiles in 1965. The Hongqi–2 (HQ–2/CSA–2), which is a modified HQ–1, entered the inventory in 1966. A mobile SAM, the Hongqi–61 (HQ–61), has been under development for several years, but it seems plagued with problems.

[70]Once they were modified, the MiG–19, MiG–21, Tu–16 and Mi–4 became the F–6 (Jian–6/J–6), F–7 (Jian–7/J–7), B–6 (Hong–6/H–6), and Zhi–5 (Z–5).

[71]The Nanchang A–5 (Qiang–5/Q–5) was derived from the MiG–19. It was originally called the Xiongying 302 (Western writers initially called it the Shenyang F–9 or F–6bis). A delta-wing intercepter known as the F–9 was under development at the Chengdu Aircraft Company during the 1960's, but the project was canceled in 1969—as were many projects at that time—in favor of the F–8 under development at the Shenyang Aircraft Company.

[72]*DZK*, p. 545.

[73]*Hangkong weixiu*, September 1988. This entire issue of the journal deals with the problem of malfunctions in aircraft hydraulic systems.

[74]According to various articles in *Hangkong shibao*, from 1986 to 1989 the F–8 II incorporated 157 new or modified pieces of F–8 equipment, which amounted to about one-third of all the F–8's equipment. Some of these modifications include the WP–13 engine, the FDSX–02 and FDSX–03 electronic anti-skid brake system, the KJ–12 autopilot, the use of titanium alloy in 64 load-bearing areas, and a new radome. During the development process, 94 primary experiments were performed.

[75]Donald E. Fink and Paul Proctor, "Shenyang Focuses on Commercial Projects As Military Aircraft Requirements Shrink," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (New York), Dec. 11, 1989, p. 70. From 1985 to May 1990, the Chinese F–8 II development project actually consisted of two programs. One program was the integration of an American fire-control system acquired through the "Peace Pearl" program. Peace Pearl was a US$502 million project funded solely by the PLAAF through a United States foreign military sales (FMS) program. The PRC-US program originally called for modernizing 50 basic F–8 II aircraft with a modified Westinghouse AN/APG 66 radar and fire-control computer, a Litton LN–39 inertial navigation system, and a head-up display. The second program involved the installation of a Chinese fire-control system.

[76]Jim Mann, "China Cancels US Deal for Modernizing F–8 Jet," *Los Angeles Times*, May 15, 1990.

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

A Chinese F–8 II fighter.

—LI Yonghong/Eastfoto.

variant with a new domestically produced fire-control system. PLAAF and PLA naval aviation maintenance personnel conducted three month's training on the F–8 II at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation from April to June 1990. The visit of CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin to the F–8 II production facility in late October 1990 virtually confirms that the aircraft is destined to become part of the Navy and Air Force inventories in the near future.[77]

The PLAAF thus continues to struggle with the problem of aircraft modernization. The solutions are not simple. China's aviation industry is determined to establish its own production base by acquiring foreign technology. This will be a long-term process. There is a lack of hard currency to purchase large numbers of foreign-made military aircraft.[78] Even were the currency available to the PLAAF, this course of action is opposed by China's aviation industry. Additionally, domestic critics in China stress the dangers of dependence on foreign suppliers for defense equipment—a concern that is expressed in many Western nations as well. The events of June 1989 and the US reaction lent support to these critics' views. Finally, radical changes in the Soviet Union's military posture vis-à-vis Europe, the United States, Japan, and China have eliminated many of the threat justifications for large investments in new high-technology aircraft.

There are frequent rumors that China's aviation industry is developing new fighter aircraft.[79] It is unlikely, however, that any of these aircraft can be ready for de-

[77]Zhu Yaping, photo caption in *Zhongguo hangkong hangtian bao* (Beijing), June 7, 1990; *Jiefangjun bao,* Nov. 15, 1990.

[78]Although the Chinese aviation industry has produced for export the F–7M and A–5M with Western avionics, the PLAAF has not been interested in purchasing large numbers of these aircraft. One major reason is that the Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAS) requires the Air Force to pay hard currency for the foreign equipment on the aircraft. This requirement substantially increases the unit cost of each aircraft. The PLAAF receives *renminbi* procurement funds from the General Staff Department, but the foreign-currency costs must be made up by the Air Force. The PLAAF naturally wants to pay for the entire aircraft in *renminbi,* which would mean a net loss for MAS factories.

[79]See, for example, Richard G. O'Lone, "Chinese Air Force Developing Few New Aircraft Designs," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* Dec. 7, 1987, pp. 55–56; and idem, "China Modernizes Military Aircraft in Atmosphere of Fiscal Austerity," ibid., Dec. 11, 1989, pp. 55–59.

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ployment during the 1990's: the development time for new aircraft is simply too long.[80]

The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1980's, symbolized by Mikhail Gorbachev's May 1989 visit to Beijing has revived the "Soviet option" in PLAAF planning. The Chinese Air Force is desperately in search of a means to hasten the updating of operational inventory, and the Soviet Union is looking for markets to sustain its defense industry, although—like Western suppliers—it is not anxious to sell technology that would create a new competitor. In July 1990, CMC Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing led a delegation to Moscow to discuss the possible purchase of MiG–29 interceptors and Su–27 light bombers. The delegation, which included Minister Lin Zongtang of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry visited a MiG–29 production facility.[81]

Following a Soviet air show in Beijing in March 1991, there were conflicting stories out of China and the USSR about whether Beijing had already signed a contract with Moscow for 24 Su–27's at US$30 million a copy. In addition, a high-level Chinese delegation visited Tehran in late March to discuss acquiring Soviet-made Iraqi aircraft that were flown to Iran during the Gulf War. These aircraft, including Su–22 and MiG–29 fighters, as well as the Su–24 and Su–25 ground-attack aircraft, would be purchased in small numbers for research and development purposes and not for deployment with the PLAAF or Naval Aviation. In exchange, China would provide other military equipment to Iran.[82]

The final decision to sign a contract for the Su–27's may not take place at all, given the high cost, the lack of a threat to justify the acquisition, and the Ministry of Aerospace Industry's wish to acquire aircraft for research and development (especially given the possible opportunity to purchase the Iraqi aircraft currently in Iran). Even if the contract is signed, some of the aircraft will probably go to the MAS, leaving the PLAAF with only about 20 aircraft. Thus, if the sale is made, it will be more for political than for operational or industrial development reasons.

In another development, the Chinese Air Force has reportedly equipped four of its combat aircraft for the first time with air refuelling kits purchased from Iran, but is still looking for a suitable tanker.[83] It is not clear, however, what kind of aircraft were equipped; whether it is an MAS, PLAAF, or Naval Aviation program; or whether the aircraft were new production models or modifications of existing aircraft.

As the PLAAF looks toward the year 2000 and surveys the modern aircraft and related weapons possessed by Japan, the two Koreas, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, and India, there is bound to be mounting frustration. China's defense-reform literature characterizes regularization as the necessary prelude to equipment modernization. The underlying assumption of China's political leaders seems to be that the process of regularization gives the government time to modernize the economy, or as some analysts put it, that quality training can "make up for the lack of modernity of . . . weaponry."[84] Over time, it is expected that a developed economy can support the cost of equipment modernization. It is doubtful that the PLAAF is totally satisfied with this propsect.

The most disturbing question for the Air Force is how long regularization can be meaningfully sustained without modernized equipment. The problem for the PLAAF, as for the PLA in general, is that training, equipment, strategy, and tactics are all interlinked in complex ways. Regularization leads to greater efficiency; equipment modernization leads to greater military effectiveness. China's military cannot train effectively unless it trains with the weaponry it is expected to use in future wars. Strategy and tactics cannot solidify unless there is equipment that meets the requirements of new strategic and tactical concepts. For example, if the PLA justifies a smaller force structure by developing mobile deployment units, it needs an expanded airlift capability, better communications, and lighter equipment. Without the equipment with which to train, this would be a hollow strategy.[85]

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[80]The design phase takes at least 4–5 years; the test phase, another 4–5 years; training of pilots and maintenance personnel, 6–12 months; and production of enough units to equip an initial receiving squadron, 6–12 months. In addition, according to *Jiefangjun bao*, Oct. 7, 1988, it took one PLAAF unit three years to become operational after the initial fighters began to arrive. Of the four factories that currently produce combat aircraft (Shenyang/F–8, Chengdu/F–7, Nanchang/A–5 and Xi'an/B–6 and B–7/FB–7), the only real design competition exists between Shenyang and Chengdu. Besides the F–8 II, the only new combat aircraft undergoing flight testing is the B–7/FB–7 (Hong–7/Qianhong–7) ground-attack aircraft at Xi'an. Comparing the time it has taken to complete development of past aircraft—including the F–8 and F–8 II—it appears that the B–7/FB–7 will not be ready for deployment until at least the late 1990's—and even then only in small numbers. If other aircraft are being designed, past experience suggests it will be well into the 2000's before they are ready for deployment.

[81]Tai Ming Cheung, "Comrades in Arms: China Signals Willingness to Resume Soviet Ties," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter, *FEER*), July 19, 1990, p. 30; and *FEER*, Feb. 14, 1991, pp. 8–9.

[82]Tai Ming Cheung, "More Punch for PLA: Fighter Jet Deal Boosts Sino-Soviet Military Ties," *FEER*, Apr. 11, 1991, p. 18.

[83]"Fuelling Speculation," *FEER*, Feb. 21, 1991, p. 9.

[84]See, for example, Zhang Shuyun, "Enhance Awareness of the Quality of Military Training," *Jiefangjun bao*, Dec. 14, 1990, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 4, 1991, p. 38.

[85]An excellent example of the equipment modernization problem is seen in the performance of PLA and Public Security forces during June 1989. The units performed traditional missions with traditional equipment. The problem was that they faced a nontraditional situation. PLA officials later noted that they lacked modern crowd-control equipment. In the absence of the equipment, the soldiers had obviously been unable to train for such contingencies.

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Leadership in the 1990's. PLAAF leadership appears to have become more stable and predictable. There is considerable reason to conclude that Wang Hai and Zhu Guang have been successful in mapping out a long-term plan for a regularized transition to the next generation of Air Force leaders. Although the CMC and the three PLA general departments must approve all senior-level PLAAF personnel changes, the PLAAF did not appear to suffer from any internal party or PLA fallout in the aftermath of the Tiananmen turmoil. None of the officers that Wang and Zhu were grooming (well before June 1989) to be the Air Force's next generation of senior leaders appear to have suffered professionally from the Tiananmen episode. In other words, despite an upsurge in political themes and rhetoric on the part of the PLA General Political Department, regularization in the PLAAF has led to stability and predictability in the promotion of senior leaders. Perhaps equally important, this condition is a result of senior PLAAF leaders' having paid attention to professional military responsibilities rather than political agendas. In the spring of 1989, the PLAAF complied with military directives: it provided airlift support for troop movements and mobilized its airborne forces for employment in Beijing.

A number of career and experience factors will likely bear on PLAAF promotion in the future. Following the important breakthrough by Wang Hai, future PLAAF commanders will likely be aviators. Second, future commander and deputy commanders of the Air Force will likely have had experience as an MRAF deputy commander and commander (Wang Hai had been the Guangzhou MRAF commander and PLAAF deputy commander). Career progression to the political commissar position may involve variations: Zhu Guang, whose previous Air Force command experience was as the Shenyang MRAF deputy political commissar, came directly to HqAF from jobs in the PLA General Political Department and the CMC. Third, in the near term, Korean War experience will be important: three of the current HqAF deputy commanders, three of the seven MRAF commanders, and at least two MRAF deputy commanders in 1990 were officers who flew with Wang Hai during the Korean War.[86]

Finally, Wang Hai and Zhu Guang have moved a number of younger officers into key HqAF and MRAF command positions. The reinstitution of ranks in October 1988 made this task easier to carry out. It became possible, for example, to assign to command and staff positions talented younger officers with lower ranks than their older deputies. This reflected the interaction of rank and grade in the "one grade, three rank" (*yizhi sanxian*) system—i.e., it was grade or AEP that was the real reflection of responsibility.[87] The impact was softened by increasing the status of older, less qualified officers. Overall, the officers being moved into positions of responsibility are better-educated than their predecessors. Many of them have been given the opportunity to travel abroad with Wang Hai or in other PLAAF and PLA delegations.

Wang Hai's heir-apparent is PLAAF Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Yu Zhenwu. Although Yu is the youngest of the four deputy commanders, he is first in the protocol order. He also is an alternate member of the 13th Party Congress Central Committee. Yu, who has a strong background in research and development, training, and command, has traveled to several countries. He initially made his mark in the Air Force when he conducted the first flight in 1958 of China's indigenously-developed (but never produced) FT–1 trainer. From the position of director of HqAF's Training Department, he replaced Wang Hai as the Guangzhou MRAF commander in 1982. When Wang Hai became PLAAF commander in 1985, Yu transferred to Beijing to become a deputy commander.

The most likely prospects to become the next deputy commanders are four post–Korean War airmen who currently command MRAF's: Lieutenant Generals Cao Shuangming (Shenyang), Jiang Yutian (Nanjing), Lin Jigui (Jinan) and Liu Heqiao (Guangzhou). The first three are also members of the 11th National People's Congress. They are all young, respected pilots and have previously served as MRAF deputy commanders.

Even younger PLAAF officers are already being prepared to assume command responsibility further out. One of them is Lieutenant General Peng Gongge. He is the commander of the 7th Air Corps in Nanning and an alternate member of the 13th Party Congress. Peng followed Yu as director of HqAF's Training Department. He also accompanied Wang Hai, Cao Shuangming, and Jiang Yutian to the United States in 1986.

Conclusion

The history of the PLAAF is marked by recurrent efforts to regularize its personnel, procedures, missions, and institutions and by continuous efforts to acquire

[86]The current HqAF deputy commanders who are Korean War veterans are Lin Hu, Li Yongtai and Liu Zhitian. The MRAF commanders are Liu Yudi (Beijing), Sun Jinghua (Lanzhou) and Hou Shujun (Chengdu). The MRAF deputy commanders are Yao Xian (Beijing) and Han Decai (Nanjing).

[87]Xun Zhenying, op. cit., pp. 268–72. There are still several cases in which deputy unit commanders outrank their commanders because they have more time in service. It will therefore take several years for the oldest officers to reach retirement age and for the rank structure to become fully rational.

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modern aircraft and weapons. It would be misleading to conclude that the various efforts to regularize the Air Force were failures. There were indeed incremental improvements and changes—indeed, if there is a persistent lesson in Western literature on organizational theory, it is that incremental changes are about all any organization can realistically expect. What is most difficult for foreign analysts to conceive, however, is the extent to which Chinese political struggles and issues —which were largely unrelated to the Air Force—were able to disrupt and erode prior achievements so thoroughly in the past.

What is significant about China's recent decade of reform—particularly the pursuit of military regularization after 1985—has been the breadth and depth of initiatives. The extent to which the PLAAF was able to implement many of its reforms has been impressive.

The resurgence in the 1980's of Western analytical interest in PLA professionalism may have overlooked the relevance of regularization to professionalism. The debate about professionalism invariably has hinged on the political roles of the PLA. It is commonly argued that a politicized army cannot be a professional army. This study of PLAAF regularization and reforms concludes that China's Air Force has indeed become a professional military service, however unwelcome this foreign label may seem to the PLAAF.[88]

PLAAF regularization and reform have contributed to the development of professionalism in at least three important ways. First, a sense of Air Force corporateness has been fostered through the reestablishment of PLAAF organizations; the compilation of rules, regulations and directives; a rationalization of the manpower structure through retirement directives; the introduction of ranks; the creation of a corps of civil servants; the establishment of an NCO corps; the clarification of regular promotion paths within the organizational hierarchy; and the articulation of Air Force mission statements.

Second, various measures have also contributed to the development of a set of ethics or values. The PLAAF has embraced the spectrum of values found in the oft-cited corpus of military values—"the PLA's fine traditions."

Additionally, the clarification of rules and regulations has sharpened a sense of what is expected of Air Force personnel. A renewed concentration on defining air power doctrine and missions has compelled airmen to think more seriously about what the PLAAF contributes relative to national defense.

Finally, and perhaps most convincing, regularization has pointedly drawn attention to job skills, education, and training. PLAAF schools have been reopened and upgraded. New training methods and specialized joint training bases have been developed to reflect the changes in military strategy.

What remains to be seen is whether or not China has successfully moved beyond the enervating political and social disruptions that in times past not only arrested the processes of regularization but actually turned back the clock. The political shocks resulting from the June 1989 disturbances initially portended a recurrence of politically induced oscillations. Two years later, however, the PLAAF does not seem to have departed perceptibly from its intended course of regularization. The long-term vitality of regularization may depend more on the outcome of the unresolved issue of equipment modernization than on party discomfort with professionally-oriented commanders.

[88]Although we do not contend the PLAAF has been totally depoliticized (all militaries have a political dimension), we believe the evidence supports the view that the PLAAF has been generally successful in insulating itself from politics. In early 1990, one Chinese official with close ties to the PLA stated that "less than 10 PLA generals are political animals with political ambitions." He observed that senior PLA officers are sensitive to the prevailing political issues but are basically uninterested in parochial party politics. Interview.

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The Soviet Military: *Glasnost'* Against Secrecy

Mikhail Tsypkin

The Soviet military has cloaked itself in extreme secrecy for decades. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, this secrecy has been challenged by military *glasnost'*—namely, acceptance by the Soviet Union of confidence-building measures and verification of agreements on arms control through on-site inspections, the publication of the Soviet military budget, and an open debate on various aspects of military policy. Soviet military officials themselves are beginning to talk about *glasnost'* and even "transparency" as major instruments of the security policy of their country.[1] The United States and NATO have concluded a number of arms-control agreements with the Soviets.

However, the recent Soviet record of lack of compliance and openness has raised serious concerns. In particular, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's acknowledgment, after the USSR's denials, that the USSR's large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk was a direct and major violation of the ABM Treaty[2] has acquired symbolic importance for both American proponents and skeptics of arms control. The issue is larger than compliance with arms-control agreements. Secrecy and deception breed international instability in this era of infinitely destructive weapons with a global reach. Nikita Khrushchev's partially successful (thanks to secrecy) missile bluff in the late 1950's led to the crash American ICBM program designed to meet an as yet nonexistent threat. Secrecy was also at the heart of the Cuban missile crisis.

Mikhail Tsypkin is Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs and Coordinator of Soviet and East European Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA). *The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of either the Department of the Navy or the US government. The author would like to thank Dr. Robert Bathurst for his useful comments.*

Military *glasnost'* will significantly enhance international stability if it ensures compliance with arms-control agreements and provides a reasonably accurate picture of future weapons-acquisition efforts. We cannot tell whether military *glasnost'* will be up to these tasks in the future simply by compiling a litany of past Soviet transgressions or by assuming that now even greater openness is inevitable. This is not a useful approach, in view of the pace and scope of political change in the USSR. Instead, we must arrive at an answer from a reading of the broad political context of military *glasnost'*, which has been brought about by recent political changes and is directly affected by the volatile political climate in the Soviet Union.

The Political Context

The political mentality behind secrecy and deception in Soviet politics stems from the Marxist-Leninist belief in the inevitable and all-encompassing conflict between the capitalist and socialist systems and the certain victory of Soviet communism. This ideology long had a firm hold on the minds of many party officials. Some of them are convinced of the eventual world-wide triumph of communism and their need "to be prepared to assume positions of responsibility in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America!"[3] Even Yuriy Andropov is reported to have viewed the situation in Afghanistan in 1979 through a 40-year-old prism of the confrontation be-

[1] Army General Yazov, "A New Security Model and the Armed Forces," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 18, December 1989, p. 68; and Colonel V. A. Chirvin, "Defense Sufficiency and the Problems of the Prevention of War," *Voyennaya Mysl'* (Moscow), No. 7, 1990, p. 11.

[2] E. A. Shevardnadze, "Foreign Policy and *Perestroyka*," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 24, 1989.

[3] Vladimir Bukhonin, first secretary of the Sheksna District Party Committee of the Vologda Province, "Is Chichikov Alive?" *Yunost'* (Moscow), No. 10, 1989, p. 35.

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tween communism and fascism in the Spanish Civil War.[4] For those who accepted Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Soviet Union was not part of a larger world, but rather a separate world, not bound to the "other" world by any common interests or values. Therefore, the Soviet elite acted in the belief that deceiving that "other" world contradicted neither Soviet values nor Soviet interests.

This world view has been challenged under Gorbachev. The systemic obsession with secrecy that is endemic to it has also been criticized as an obstacle to progress. The Chernobyl' nuclear disaster in 1986 marked a turning point; the regime's clumsy silence and disinformation damaged Soviet international standing and Gorbachev's personal prestige, and further undermined public confidence in the government. In response, in July 1988, the Politburo adopted a special resolution calling for the creation of an "information society" in the Soviet Union in order to reverse the Soviet Union's growing lag in information technology.[5]

The reformers' views on secrecy can be summed up as follows:

- excessive secrecy increasingly contradicts new political and economic realities and further undermines the public's trust in the government;
- secrecy serves as a prop for a bureaucratic regime unchecked by democratic institutions;
- secrecy has a legitimate role in protecting state interests, but the system of secrecy should be significantly modified;
- lack of information on the Soviet military encourages foreign "opponents" of disarmament to use disinformation as a means to speed up the arms race;
- reduction of secrecy will result in intensified scientific and technological progress and thereby enhance Soviet military capabilities.[6]

An intragovernmental study commission on secrecy and classification regulations was formed in 1988.[7] This commission found that secrets are protected by the KGB, but decisions on classification are made by branch ministries usually based on recommendations from lower management levels. There is no single body or person responsible for an all-Union policy on state secrets, and while rules for declassifying information as it becomes dated exist, the branch ministries ignore them most of the time.[8]

The commission had to confront the enormous dimensions of the problem. Up to 70 percent of the so-called "normative acts" (decrees) that regulate most socio-economic activities in the Soviet Union frequently disregard or directly contravene published laws. The research commission's report contains concrete proposals on such diverse subjects as a law on state secrets, the regulation of secrecy in industry, the need to train personnel for enforcing the new secrecy regulations, and the relationship between secrecy and international cooperation and competition in science and technology. The commission has proposed several laudable principles to regulate state secrets: the "presumption of non-secrecy of information," "equal openness and equal secrecy in international relations," the "priority of international law" over domestic laws in matters of state secrets, and declassification of information where the likelihood of keeping it secret is relatively low.

But a law on state secrets has not been passed, making the introduction of a new system for protecting and declassifying secrets impossible.[9] The declarations of sovereignty by most of the union republics, which establish the priority of republican laws over the Union laws, cast doubt on the effectiveness of a future USSR law on state secrets. Thus, *glasnost'* still remains without a firm legal foundation.

Secrecy and Soviet Political Culture

Soviet political culture, expressed in the attitudes, decision-making patterns, and habits of thought of the Soviet elite, plays a significant role in determining the parameters of military *glasnost'*. According to one Soviet scholar, the political culture of the Soviet elite has been shaped by the elite's "usurpation" of political power from the "masses," with the result that the former find it necessary to monopolize all channels of information. Keeping the "masses" uninformed is "a crucial condition for the covert realization of [the elite's] political interests." But not only the elite has been affected. Stalinism made secrecy into a general obsession in So-

[4]Artem Borovik, "The Hidden War," *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 46, November 1989, p. 19.

[5]Victor Yasman, "*Glasnost'* versus Freedom of Information: Political and Ideological Aspects," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), July 21, 1989, pp. 2, 4.

[6]V. Rubanov, "From the Cult of Secrecy—Toward the Information Culture," *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1988, pp. 24–36.

[7]V. Rubanov, "Democracy and the Security of the Country," ibid., No. 11, July 1989, p. 55. Represented on this commission were the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Council of Ministers (the top coordinating body for the defense industry), the Institute of State and Law and other institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN), the KGB, "and other agencies."

[8]V. Zakhar'ko, "The 'Secret' Stamp in the Era of *Glasnost'*," *Izvestiya*, Apr. 28, 1989.

[9]Petr Nikulin, "The Conversion of Secrecy: An Incomprehensible Insufficiency," *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1990, pp. 70, 76, 77, 79.

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viet society. There is considerable resistance below the elite level to attempts to reduce secrecy.[10]

The Soviet bureaucratic elite does not hold a monopoly on deception. But what makes the Soviet case different is the arrogance of the elite when it comes to handling information, combined with the absence of a tradition of the rule of law and of a government accountable to the public.[11] A Soviet legal correspondent characterized the attitude of average Soviet officials toward the law: "In their consciousness, there is neither the slightest concept of law, nor understanding of it, nor fear of it. . . ."[12]

Having no respect for the rule of law, various bureaucratic interests practice deception both against the public and against the central government, which, in turn, conceals the truth. The handling of the Chernobyl' nuclear accident is instructive. After the reactor explosion, local officials produced rosy assessments for their superiors until the arrival of a high-level investigating commission from Moscow.[13] Although this commission quickly established the facts for the Soviet leadership, the latter attempted to hide the reality from the public, a policy that backfired embarrassingly because of modern space-based and other information-gathering systems—a graphic proof, if the Soviet leaders needed one, of how dated their policy on secrecy was.

But it was only after the dimensions of the disaster were supposedly acknowledged that the real deception of the public began. For three years, dangerous radiation levels in Belorussia, Ukraine, and the Bryansk oblast of the Russian republic were concealed. Indeed, the deception was perpetrated primarily by agencies responsible for health care and the environment! Decisions were made to classify information about higher-than-acceptable radiation levels in populated areas, and the health problems of personnel involved in emergency work at Chernobyl'. Only if a patient had suffered an acute case of radiation poisoning were military physicians allowed to enter into a patient's chart the information that he had worked on the Chernobyl' cleanup. Orders classifying radiation data were issued as late as 1989.[14]

Will Soviet officialdom, barely able to distinguish between legality and illegality, comply with complex and not always easily verifiable arms-control agreements? The problem is compounded, moreover, by the fact that in the Soviet Union, general contempt for the rule of law is joined to the treatment of national security as an extralegal matter.

Secrecy in the Soviet Military

From time to time, and due mainly to pragmatic considerations, periods in Russian history characterized by extreme military secrecy gave way to partial openness. The Bolshevik Revolution did not immediately result in extreme isolation and secrecy in military matters. Until the mid-1930's, Soviet military publications discussed matters of military art and technology in a reasonably forthright manner. Until 1933, Soviet-German military-industrial cooperation exposed numerous German officers and engineers to the USSR's armed forces and defense industry.[15] Military secrecy tightened only in the late 1930's.

The now familiar patterns of secrecy and deception developed during World War II and afterwards. In military operations, the Soviet high command emphasized deception, which was impossible without the strictest secrecy. For instance, the Soviets view the 1945 Manchurian campaign against Japan as the highest achievement of their military art in World War II. In preparation for it, the Soviets "undertook a major transfer of forces from the western to the eastern part of the USSR under the full cover of a strategic deception plan."[16]

Pervasive secrecy grew further as a result of Stalin's decision to conceal from the outside world Soviet postwar weakness and his postwar campaign of xenophobia and spy mania. Military and related scientific and technological activities were particularly affected by this general trend; extraordinary secrecy surrounded work on nuclear weapons and rockets.[17]

[10]Rubanov, "Democracy and the Security of the Country," loc. cit., p. 45; and Rubanov, "The Cult of Secrecy—Toward the Information Culture," loc. cit., p. 26. Rubanov was fired from his job as a department head at the KGB Research Institute after publicly calling for reduction of secrecy—a fine illustration of the importance of secrecy in the political culture of the elite! See Natal'ya Gevorkyan, "Openness is Possible: But Only after the Door Is Closed Behind You," *Moskovskiye Novosti* (Moscow), June 24, 1990.

[11]On the lack of legal tradition in prerevolutionary Russia, see Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime,* New York, Scribner and Sons, 1974, p. 289.

[12]Ol'ga Chaykovskaya, "Resistance," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Nov. 26, 1986. A respected Soviet legal affairs correspondent recently remarked that in his country there "has not been a state of law even for one day." See Arkadiy Vaksberg in "What Should a State of Law Look Like?" ibid., June 8, 1988.

[13]G. Medvedev, "Incompetence," *Kommunist,* No. 4, March 1989, pp. 98–103.

[14]Yevgeniya Al'bats, "A Big Lie," *Moskovskiye Novosti,* Oct. 15, 1989.

[15]John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command,* London, St. Martin's Press, 1962, pp. 247–282; and Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Origins of the Soviet Military Research and Development System, 1917–1941," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1985, pp. 135–36.

[16]Notra Trulock III, "The Role of Deception in Soviet Military Planning," in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Eds., *Soviet Strategic Deception,* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1987, p. 283.

[17]See Leonard Nikishin, "Those Who Invoked the Genie," *Moskvoskiye Novosti,* Oct. 8, 1989; and Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs,* New York, Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1990, p. 80.

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In addition, the memories of the Red Army purge in the late 1930's, when tens of thousands of officers were accused of espionage for foreign powers, caused knee-jerk reactions among successive generations of officers to disclosing any information. Stalin isolated the officer corps from the West—during World War II, there was very little contact between Soviet military officers and their counterparts in the Alliance. Later, there were only minimal contacts between Soviet and NATO officers.

Soviet experiences in 1941 and the advent of nuclear weapons led to a further emphasis on secrecy and strategic deception, two closely related categories in Soviet military art.[18] The Soviets reasoned that if a Germany armed with conventional weapons nearly defeated the Soviet Union in the "initial period of war" partially thanks to surprise, then a surprise attack with nuclear weapons could certainly defeat a superpower! The use of new conventional weapons, if kept secret, could also help decide a war early on.

Cloaking the military in secrecy also served an important political purpose. Soviet military power has helped convey to the populace the idea of the overwhelming might of the Soviet regime.[19] The power mystique was maintained for the military (as well as for the Communist party and KGB) by shrouding it in secrecy, with its might occasionally and ritualistically displayed at giant military parades. Mikhail Gorbachev's insistence on going ahead with the unpopular military parade on the November 7, 1990, anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was a testimony both to the past importance of this political tool and to the perception that the military was losing its mystique, due to a considerable degree to *glasnost'*.

Finally, secrecy has been prompted by the military's self-interest. Mismanagement has created many problems for the military. There are great and unjustified disparities in the standard of living between the high command and the majority of officers. There is lack of fairness and favoritism in the promotion system. All of this was conveniently hidden by military secrecy.

Glasnost' in the Military

In order to shake up the bureaucracy and facilitate reform, Gorbachev encouraged political *glasnost'*—public criticism of various institutions and agencies, including the armed forces.[20] The Soviets have also recognized that excessive secrecy is a poor public-relations practice at a time when economic realities are demanding improved relations and arms-control agreements with the West.

Application of *glasnost'* to the Soviet military establishment has followed two tracks which are different but which frequently cross. One track is new policies in arms control, which reflect "new thinking" in foreign affairs. The September 1986 "Final Document" of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contains numerous provisions for "opening up" various military activities of European countries, East and West. The December 1987 INF Treaty has unprecedented provisions for the on-site inspection of military and military-industrial installations. These steps significantly contributed to a dramatic improvement in East-West relations. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also supported in general terms President George Bush's proposal for "open skies" to increase international trust and stability.[21] In addition, the Soviets have published some data on their military spending and some accurate maps. Numerous Western visitors have been granted selective access to closely guarded military facilities.

The second track of military *glasnost'* is the public airing of problems in the Soviet military, such as poor living conditions, poor technical skills of officers and enlisted men, poor morale, hazing of conscripts, and others. This track is very much a part of the *glasnost'* campaign on the domestic scene.

[18]See Army General S. P. Ivanov, *Nachal'nyy period voyny* (The Initial Period of War), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, passim; Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984, 3rd edition, p. 41; Marshal V. Sokolovskiy, Ed., *Voyennaya strategiya* (Military Strategy), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968, 3rd edition, p. 247; M. M. Kir'yan, *Problemy voyennoy teorii v sovetskikh nauchno-spravochnykh izdaniyakh* (Problems of Military Theory in Soviet Scientific-Reference Publications), Moscow, Nauka, 1985, p. 124; and Lt. Gen. A. Yevseyev, "On Several Tendencies in the Change of the Contents and Character of the Initial Period of War," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), November 1985, p. 17. Strategic deception is "carried out following decisions of the Supreme Command and includes a set of measures aimed at protecting the secrecy of strategic operations and campaigns, as well as disorienting the enemy in regard to the true intentions and actions of the armed forces." See *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (The Soviet Military Encyclopediya), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976–1980, Vol. 5, p. 175.

[19]Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1981, p. 11.

[20]*Glasnost'* is part of the Russian military tradition. After Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1855, the reformers of the Russian military establishment, led by the War Minister Dmitriy Milyutin, intended to use *glasnost'* to improve the conditions of the Russian military. They understood *glasnost'* as the right to discuss various problems of the military and to volunteer unorthodox opinions, especially by junior officers, to benefit the overburdened high command. This is close to the Soviet high command's view of military *glasnost'*. At the same time, the 19th-century Russian military reformers were worried, just as are their counterparts today, that "incompetent" civilians would "abuse" *glasnost'* by meddling in the affairs of the military. See A. Senin, "On the Use of *Glasnost'*," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal,* April 1989, pp. 63–65.

[21]E. A. Shevardnadze, "The General Plan—Peace, Security, and Harmony of Interests," *Izvestiya,* Sept. 27, 1989.

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Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell (right) escorts Soviet General Mikhail Moiseyev at the Pentagon.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

Military *glasnost'* has great public-relations value in the West because it looks so favorable compared to past Soviet practices. But much evidence supports the proposition that obsessive secrecy has by no means been purged from the Soviet military. For example, a handbook on rules of personal conduct for cadets in officer schools suggests that when on liberty they "should not speak with strangers," "should not discuss matters of life and work in the school" with civilians, and if they find themselves in trouble, should "ask for help only from officials."[22] In addition, publishing accurate maps is still a problem. The military opposes declassifying topographic maps of scale 1:100,000 and larger because satellite reconnaissance does not permit determining the exact location of objects photographed without such maps. General Aleksey Losev, the chief of the Military Topography Department of the General Staff, also defended continuing the classification of maps from the 18th century and even earlier on military grounds![23] In this context, efforts in the realm of military *glasnost'* do seem truly earth-shaking.

One factor hindering *glasnost'* in the military is that the system of military secrecy is still very much in place. Military censorship continues to function as a department of the General Staff. (Not surprisingly, it is located in the same building as the editorial offices of Soviet military journals.) Until the passage of the new Law on the Press on August 1, 1990, the Soviet official press could not publish anything about the military without the prior approval of military censorship. Now, military censors are to review published materials, act through law-enforcement agencies to prosecute the mass media for disclosing military secrets, and "develop a standard document on the protection of secrets in the mass media."[24] In short, they will issue the kind of regulations (unpublicized) that until now have contributed greatly to maintenance of excessive secrecy and the concealment of information.

A list of data "not subject for publication," which was circulated by the newly established Main Administration for Protection of State Secrets, includes various types of military statistics, such as those on disciplinary

[22]S. Taranov, "Wash Your Hands, Cadet!" *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1989.
[23]V. Zyubin, "We Will Show Our Cards," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), July 22, 1989.

[24]V. Litovkin, "The Military Censor: What Is Possible and What Is Forbidden," *Izvestiya,* Nov. 26, 1989; and Maj. Gen. S. Filimonov, "Will the Censors Become Unemployed?" *Krasnaya Zvezda,* July 12, 1990.

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actions, self-inflicted injuries, suicides, desertion, accidental deaths, theft of weapons, and mutinies. Such data have nothing in common with legitimate military secrets (operational plans, weapons capabilities), but they do reveal the quality of conditions in the armed forces. Therefore, Soviet journalists have concluded that the military is simply continuing to use secrecy to protect its corporate interests from public scrutiny. The sentence for divulging state secrets in the press has been set at five to eight years of imprisonment.[25]

Nevertheless, *glasnost'* has apparently disoriented military censorship. For example, in an interview, with *Pravda,* Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin made reference to the new *Tbilisi* "aircraft carrier" now being outfitted in the Black Sea. *Pravda* published this information despite the likelihood of its causing diplomatic and military difficulties, for the Montreaux Convention bans passage of aircraft carriers through the Black Sea Straits. Three days later, *Pravda* published a lame "correction," calling the *Tbilisi* "a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser."[26]

A Soviet journal was able to publish an article suggesting that the mysterious outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 resulted from an accident in a biological weapons-research facility—something that was vehemently denied by the Soviets at the time. Chief of the General Staff, General Mikhail Moiseyev, referred to the article as "slanderous and attempted to stop its publication."[27]

Another factor hindering military *glasnost'* is the military's suspicions about the technology used to verify arms-control agreements. The deputy chairman of the USSR State Technical Commission, Lt. Gen. Nikolay Brusnitsin, has expressed concern that US national technical means (NTM) of verification might be used for espionage purposes. On-site inspections and contacts between Soviet citizens and Western visitors cause even greater alarm in military circles. Brusnitsin has accused US personnel present in the USSR to verify Soviet observance of the INF Treaty of espionage; he has also warned that joint ventures employing foreigners, as well as cooperatives linked with the defense industry, have heightened the risk of military secrets being revealed. Brusnitsin has charged that US scientists who participated in a 1989 Black Sea experiment for verification of sea-based nuclear weapons demonstrated an open desire to obtain data on armaments unrelated to the project.[28] Similarly, an article in *Krasnaya Zvezda,* the Ministry of Defense newspaper, entitled "*Perestroyka, Glasnost' . . .* Espionage," expresses concern about an alleged American emphasis on human intelligence, because of the role it plays in assessing such factors as personnel quality and morale, as well as weapons still on the drawing board.[29]

The *Krasnaya Zvezda* article also reflects Soviet concern about "excessive *glasnost*'" in professional contacts between Soviet and American scientists. It discusses the former allegedly disclosing information deemed to be "highly useful for an expert specialist." Thus, the article broadens the definition of what is secret instead of narrowing it down, and reverts to the typical Soviet axiom of "whatever is not expressly permitted is forbidden." Another military author has recently attacked each and every activity that might give the West access to truthful information—from Western visits to Soviet military facilities, to publication of articles on military morale in Soviet newspapers, to frank discussions of the MIKE-class submarine disaster in the mass media, to greater freedom of travel and emigration.[30] The relaxation of military secrecy, especially for "open skies," has also drawn the ire of Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko, one of the "black colonels" in the Supreme Soviet who gained their fame by attacking Shevardnadze (of which the latter complained in his resignation speech) and demanding that Gorbachev conduct a more conservative policy.[31]

It appears that a conservative political agenda of limiting contacts with the West, rather than concerns that *glasnost'* might endanger Soviet security is, at least in part, motivating the military. Many of the military's security concerns appear unjustified. The Soviets have recently given Western officials, specialists, and journalists access to Soviet military facilities without asking for reciprocity from Western countries. For example, in July 1989, a group of US congressmen and "independent scientists" were allowed to visit the Sary Shagan ballistic missile defense (BMD) proving ground. There, they saw a Soviet laser, which was described by the visitors as being incapable of damaging US satellites, outdated, and relatively primitive (contrary to what had been suggested by several previous editions of the US Department of Defense's *Soviet Military Power*). One of

[25]A. Illesh and V. Rudnev, "Censorship Has Been Abolished, the Censors Remain," *Izvestiya,* Oct. 9, 1990.

[26]V. N. Chernavin, "Commentary of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin," *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 19, 1989; for the "correction," see ibid., Oct. 22, 1989.

[27]"A Chronicle of an Unannounced Death," *Rodina* (Moscow), No. 5, 1990.

[28]Lt. Gen. Nikolay Brusnitsin, *Openness and Espionage,* Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1990, pp. 10–12, 30.

[29]V. Doronin in *Krasnaya Zvezda,* May 11, 1989.

[30]Colonel V. Nikolayev, "*Glasnost'* and Secrecy," *Morskoy Sbornik* (Moscow), No. 7, 1990, pp. 8–10.

[31]"We Cannot Consider This To Be an Achievement of Our Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Nov. 12, 1990.

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the visiting scientists said that the same laser had primitive computers and was so crude that "a two-year college in the United States could produce the same in one of its laboratories."[32] But one should be well advised not to draw conclusions about Soviet weapons capabilities solely on the basis of their shoddy looks and somewhat dated components—making capable systems from inferior components has been a trademark of the Soviet military R&D system for decades. Indeed, there is evidence that the laser might not be as primitive as supposed: Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov said that it was of the same type as the one recently used by the US Air Force to track space objects, and was used by the Soviets for that purpose in 1989.[33]

The American visitors did not get answers to any of their specific questions: When exactly was the laser designed and built? And how could the Soviets support their claim that it is to be used only for satellite tracking? Moreover, the Americans were not allowed to visit any other installations in the area and did not obtain answers to their questions about such installations.

American specialists who in 1989 visited a classified facility for the research and development of gas lasers at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy concluded that the Soviet laser, which blasted a sheet of metal in their presence, had an impressive power level but little direct military significance. This observation also supports statements made nearly five years ago by the US Department of Defense, which credited the Soviet gas laser with "impressive" output power, but dated possible deployment of laser weapons not earlier than the late 1990's–early 2000's. The implication was that currently available Soviet gas lasers have no direct military significance. Soviet scientists at the facility said that the visit was arranged to reassure the West that the Soviets were interested in the peaceful uses of gas lasers rather than their military applications. However, the gas laser was in fact paid for by the Ministry of Defense. In addition, although the scientists at the Kurchatov Institute were skeptical about the military utility of the gas laser, the military itself did not accept the scientists' judgments.

These claims by Soviet scientists might be true, but they might equally be false. Does a branch of the Kurchatov Institute build lasers only to prove to the military that they are poor weapons? Is that what the military is paying for? Will the laser laboratory continue to accept military contracts despite the scientists' skepticism? What is happening in a lab next door? Indeed, the Soviet scientists "did not discuss in detail their work on chemical or free-electron lasers. . . ."[34]

Since such questions were not answered, the visit to the laser lab at the Kurchatov Institute did not resolve concerns about the Soviet military laser program, although it did confirm conclusions reached by US intelligence. It should also be noted that the American request to visit a very large Soviet laser facility near the city of Dushanbe in Central Asia, which has been suspected of being used for BMD research, was rejected, a curious fact inasmuch as the Soviets have insisted that this facility is designed for peaceful purposes only.[35] Confirming assessments based on NTM data has been undoubtedly useful, but both visits have apparently done little to increase our understanding of the direction of Soviet BMD research and development.

A 1989 visit of a group of Americans to a command center for aging SS–11 missiles, which are being retired, revealed less information than might have been apparent at the time. The Soviets probably believed that the group's main discovery—that the command center was only 20 feet underground—was no longer a secret. After all, it was only a year earlier that the US Department of Defense provided detailed descriptions of Soviet facilities for the command and control of nuclear war, descriptions that included information about the depth of these facilities.[36] After that, could the Soviets really doubt that the depth of their outdated SS–11 command center was a secret?

The 1987 visit by an American congressional delegation to the Krasnoyarsk radar site was similarly unrevealing of new information. Some visitors reportedly concluded that the radar did not look hardened for battle-management and noticed that the workmanship looked shoddy. This, however, was irrelevant to the central question: was the radar a violation of the ABM Treaty? Those American visitors who left believing (correctly, as the Soviets now agree) that the radar was a violation, did so because of the northeastern orientation of the radar and its location deep inside Soviet territory, which made it unsuitable for anything but an ABM mission.[37] Such information, however, had been provided years earlier by American satellite intelligence.

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[32]R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Laser Said to Pose No Threat," *The Washington Post*, July 9, 1989.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Michael E. Gordon, "US Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing," *The New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1989; and *Soviet Strategic Defense Programs*, US Department of Defense, Washington, DC, October 1985, pp. 13, 14.

[35]Michael E. Gordon, "Congressional Visitors Learn Limits on *Glasnost'*," *The New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1989. On the laser facility near Dushanbe, see William J. Broad, "New Clues on a Soviet Laser Complex," ibid., Oct. 23, 1987.

[36]Gordon, "US Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing," loc. cit.; *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat. 1988*, Washington, DC, US GPO, n.d., pp. 59–62.

[37]William J. Broad, "Inside a Key Russian Radar Site: Tour Raises Questions on Treaty," *The New York Times*, Sept. 7, 1987; William J. Broad, "Soviet Radar on Display," ibid., Sept. 9, 1987; and David K. Shipler, "Americans Who Saw Soviet Radar Unsure If It Violates Pact," ibid., Sept. 9, 1987.

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The Krasnoyarsk radar installation.

—V. Medvedev/TASS from Sovfoto.

The Soviets' desire to reap public-relations benefits from military *glasnost'* while minimizing foreigners' access to sensitive information is natural. There is no evidence of strategic deception (that is, a deception program designed to improve significantly Soviet military might while keeping adversaries in the dark) conducted under the guise of *glasnost'*. The strategic deception program of building the ABM radar near Krasnoyarsk was a failure, for it resulted in the mobilization of support in the US for the Strategic Defense Initiative. This failure is likely to discourage, for the time being, new strategic deception programs. Equally important, to conduct strategic deception, one needs a strategy, which the Soviets lack in today's whirlwind of political change. However, in a political culture that places such great stress on secrecy, at least some efforts at military deception will no doubt continue.

Glasnost' and Deception

Given the realities of Soviet political culture, it is not surprising that, *glasnost'* or not, the Soviet military tends to provide the Soviet public, foreign governments, and international organizations with patently false information. For example, the statement of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers disclosing the strength of Warsaw Pact forces excluded civilian employees on the grounds that they do not undergo military training.[38] Civilian employees of the Western Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, when signing their contracts, are not told that they will have to participate in military training. Upon arrival in East Germany, however, they discover that:

We must all without exception, in addition to our full-time jobs, participate in military training—even women who are exempt from military service. We have to get up [at night] for combat alerts, we have to wear military uniforms, we have to take part in small-arms drills and other types of military training.

When a group of civilians complained about this training, a commanding officer told them that "*perestroyka* has not reached here and never will."[39] One does not know what is more disturbing in this case: the contempt for legality and Soviet international obligations or the useless, knee-jerk character of this lie, because the civilians' military training contributes nothing to the Soviet defense capability in Germany.

The Soviet military has recently exhibited a tendency to misinform its own government. According to then Foreign Minister and Politburo member Shevardnadze, high-ranking military officers consistently misled him about the methods they used for crowd control, and especially about their employment of toxic substances during the massacre of peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989.[40] Shevardnadze also accused the military of misleading the political leadership about the nature of the Krasnoyarsk radar. This accusation rings true, given that the military has yet to acknowledge that the siting of this radar violates the ABM treaty.[41]

Before the ink dried on the November 19, 1990, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the veracity of Soviet data and the Kremlin's willingness to implement the agreement came into doubt. Instead of destroying a substantial number of weapons, as called for by the

[38]"Statement of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense," *Pravda*, Jan. 30, 1989.

[39]"Women on the Military Parade-Ground," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 24, 1989.

[40]Leonid Pleshakov, "To Convince with the Truth," *Ogonek*, No. 11, March 1990.

[41]E. A. Shevardnadze, "Foreign Policy and *Perestroyka*," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 24, 1989. For the Soviet military's attitude, see John W. R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Early-Warning Radars Debated," *Report on the USSR*, Aug. 17, 1990, pp. 14,15.

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treaty, the Soviets allegedly transferred them east of the Urals. They also mislabeled other weapons in order to avoid destroying them. Instead of disbanding three motorized rifle divisions, the Soviets have redesignated them as naval infantry, which is not subject to the CFE Treaty provisions.[42]

In 1989, the troops of the KGB and MVD (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) were officially removed from the composition of the Soviet Armed Forces.[43] Now, allegations are being made in the Soviet Union that this reorganization is being used to put some military forces (a paratroop division based in Vitebsk has been named) under the control of the KGB.[44] In the Soviets' view, this move will likely enable them to claim that these troops are no longer subject to CFE Treaty provisions. This is, however, a deception, especially since the Soviets have traditionally given heavy armaments (tanks and armored fighting vehicles) and combat training to their internal-security troops.[45]

Many in the Soviet Union distrust the figures in the "real" Soviet defense budget first released in 1989.[46] Academician V. Avduyevskiy, a top space scientist, said the sum is unrealistically low. Major V. Lopatin, a radical USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, has quoted an unnamed Ministry of Defense official as saying the real defense budget was 120 billion rubles. Captain 3rd Rank A. Antoshkin, a student at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, has compared contradictory statements of Soviet military officials on the subject and concluded that the announced defense budget numbers are meaningless.[47] Indeed, it follows from a statement by a department head in the Directorate of Administrative Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, S. Guchmazov, that the announced defense budget did not include all direct and indirect expenditures a state makes in order to provide for the possibility of its stable functioning in emergency situations, including war.[48] Among such expenditures Guchmazov lists the ineffective but omnipresent pre-draft military training, partially financed through involuntary membership dues; reserve officer training of students, which is carried out in most Soviet higher educational institutions, with each having a military department staffed with officers up to the rank of general; and the accumulation of state and mobilizational reserves.[49]

There is also the Soviet military's propensity to stage *pokazukha* (Potemkin villages) in response to inspections. Military bases are routinely prepared for important visitors by painting grass (in lieu of real lawns), removing soldiers to different quarters (so that they do not soil the cleaned barracks), and turning the mess halls into something akin to real restaurants. In 1988, the Ministry of Defense began mass construction of "show military settlements" (*pokaznyye voyennyye gorodki*) specially designed to impress visiting Soviet officials. Considerable effort and resources were devoted to building expensively furnished barracks, gyms, and other facilities, while the real needs of the servicemen were ignored.[50] Although this is a case of deception directed against the Soviet authorities themselves, it is a good illustration of an institutional culture prone to cheating in general. If inspectors from the Ministry of Defense can be deceived, why not the arms-control inspectors from NATO?

How Much Should the Public Know

We can be assured of Soviet military intentions and capabilities only if the Soviet people are granted the right to know about their country's military affairs. Defense Minister Yazov has recently proclaimed that openness about military activities will become "a virtual guarantee" of international security, because it allows the "popular masses," who are interested in the preservation of peace, to participate actively in military affairs.[51] But the Soviet military has been very uneasy over the principle of public accountability.

The furious domestic debate about the condition of the Soviet Armed Forces is more threatening to the military establishment than the most intrusive arms-control verification measures. *Glasnost'* has opened up for dis-

[42]R. Jeffrey Smith, "US, Soviets Dispute Arms-Cut Provisions," *The Herald* (Monterey), Dec. 17, 1990.

[43]"On the Confirmation of Decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Introduction of Changes and Additions to Legislative Acts of the USSR," *Izvestiya*, Aug. 5, 1989.

[44]A. Krayniy, "'Unpeeled Potatoes?" *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 15, 1990.

[45]*Military Balance 1989–1990*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 42; and William C. Fuller, Jr., "The Internal Troops of the MVD SSSR," College Station, TX, Texas A&M University System, Center for Strategic Technologies, College Station Papers 6, 1983, pp. 35, 36.

[46]N. I. Ryzhkov, "On the Program of Future Activities of the USSR Government," *Izvestiya*, June 8, 1989.

[47]B. Konovalov, "The Defeat of the Militarized Economy," *Izvestiya*, Feb. 7, 1990; S. Aleksandrov, "Military Reform," *Nedelya* (Moscow), No. 22, 1990; and A. Antoshkin, "A Volunteer Army: More Costly or Less Costly?" *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 9, 1990, p. 39.

[48]A. Lopukhin, "The Dividends of Peace and Conversion," *Pravda*, July 30, 1990.

[49]Ibid. For details on the Soviet system of reserve officer training, see Mikhail Tsypkin, *The Soviet Reserve Officer Training System: An Assessment*, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988, NPS-56-88-017.

[50]Danuta Junavičienė, "The Soviet Army—A Theater of the Absurd," *Kauno Aidas* (Kaunas), Sept. 21, 1989; and letter from political officer G. Grozmani, in *Ogonek*, No. 50, December 1989.

[51]Yazov, loc. cit., p. 68.

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cussion the abysmal condition of conscripts, the necessity of conscription itself, the size of the military budget, and the military's role in internal-security operations, among other issues. These discussions continue even though the CPSU Central Committee issued two memoranda in 1989 demanding that the mass media limit their negative coverage of the military.[52]

Many high-ranking officers have been incensed by civilian specialists' criticisms of various aspects of the Soviet force posture, from "tankomania" to the blue-water navy. The civilian specialists are also clamoring for declassification of information in order to facilitate their analyses, which have been mainly critical. The military responded by accusing these specialists of incompetence and irresponsibility, and labeling the debates conducted by non-military analysts as "harmful" for the "unprepared" public.[53]

Hopes for greater public accountability are primarily placed on the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security—the KOGB. However, it has done little to increase public participation in setting military policy, and appears incapable of lifting the veil of military secrecy. The KOGB is dominated by high-ranking military officers (including Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev and the chief of armaments, Army General Vitaliy Shabanov), defense-industry executives (including the leaders of the *Sukhoy* and *Ilyushin* aircraft design bureaus), and officials of the Communist party.[54] Its first chairman was Vladimir Lapygin, a specialist in missile guidance and general designer for the onboard control system of the Soviet space shuttle Buran. Lapygin's views were generally close to those of the military high command. He opposed "unilateral disarmament" and excessive zeal in the conversion of defense industry to civilian needs and was suspicious of the Baltic popular fronts. He regarded the professional competence (in the areas of defense industry, the military, or state security) of deputies in the KOGB as essential —thus drawing an implicit comparison between the "competence" of officials from these spheres and the "incompetence" of their civilian critics. Lapygin criticized abuses of secrecy prompted by "primitive spy mania" (such as making secret "the location of large defense enterprises and military bases") and the desire to hide arms-control violations. Nevertheless, he strongly defended secrecy in his own field of activity—research and development of new weapons. Criticized for his cozy relationship with the military and for attention to his professional activities at the expense of work in the KOGB, Lapygin recently resigned from his post. He was replaced by another trusted insider, Leonid Shárin, a party official. Not surprisingly, Dr. Georgiy Arbatov has criticized the KOGB for "having a strange membership and working in a strange fashion," and doing nothing to reduce military secrecy.[55]

The KOGB has been meeting in secret, without even maintaining a classified stenographic record. An item that would be routinely made public in the West, such as General Yazov's report to the KOGB on the global military-political situation, was not disclosed. Only a meeting on defense-industry conversion (a topic with obvious propaganda appeal) was conducted in the presence of representatives from the media. The KOGB's criticisms of the government's defense programs for fiscal year 1990 have been released through a newspaper in a most guarded form.[56]

The Ministry of Defense tried to keep the KOGB members in the dark on crucial matters. According to KOGB member Nikolay Tutov, the defense budget was initially disclosed to committee members in a generalized form (under such categories as operations and maintenance, weapons acquisition, R&D, construction, pensions, and miscellaneous), while details concerning concrete programs were withheld.

When the Soviets did disclose more details, it was in a standard form submitted to the United Nations in October 1990. Despite many significant omissions and evasions, this document provides more detailed information than was furnished to the Soviet legislature. For example, it includes data on budget shares of the services in general and in various categories (R&D, weapons acquisition, construction, and others).[57] The data, however, were published in the Soviet Union only after the UN obtained them. The submission of the document to the UN is encouraging, for it seems to indicate that the Soviets have come to understand the importance of military *glasnost'* for international security. It is

[52]"On the Central Press's Interpretation of the Life and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 6, 1989; and "On the Course of the Implementation of the Resolutions of the CC CPSU of April 29, 1989, 'On the Central Press's Interpretation of the Life and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces'," *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* (Moscow), No. 1, 1990, pp. 14, 15.

[53]Lt. Gen. Ye. Volkov, "Don't Explain, but Obfuscate," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 28, 1989. See also Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?" *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1989, pp. 31–44; and Maj. Gen. Yu. Lyubimov, "On Defense Sufficiency and the Shortage of Competency," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 16, 1989, pp. 21–26.

[54]For details, see Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Report on the USSR*, May 11, 1990, pp. 8–11.

[55]"The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies: Stenographic Report," *Izvestiya*, Dec. 19, 1989.

[56]V. Kosarev, "Searches for the Optimal Solution," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Oct. 13, 1989.

[57]"The Military Budget in the Light of *Glasnost'*," *Pravitel'stvennyy Vestnik* (Moscow), No. 45, November 1990.

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US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney addresses members of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security.

—Reuters/Bettmann.

discouraging, however, that the government releases important information as a foreign policy gesture, rather than as something due the Soviet parliament or public. What is worse, this document contains no information about future plans. Even when the KOGB began to debate the military budget for 1991, there was no one to testify on future defense plans.[58] Indeed, Dr. Arbatov has alleged that most KOGB members had no knowledge of the Soviet program for modernization of strategic forces or the volume of Soviet weapons production until a speech to their committee by US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney.[59]

To counteract the Ministry of Defense's stonewalling, the minority of more reform-minded KOGB members are coming to rely on individuals they euphemistically refer to as "consultants"—disgruntled defense-industry specialists, and military and KGB officers. Despite threats of retribution, these individuals have provided KOGB members with information that their agencies have tried to conceal.[60] There is no indication, however, that such disclosures have resulted in any action.

Intrusions into the national security field by people's deputies who are members of the parliamentary opposition or who are not beholden to the military-industrial complex are discouraged. According to Radio Liberty analyst Alexander Rahr, a subcommission under the chairmanship of Yuriy Ryzhov, a member of the Interregional Group of Deputies, which had been assigned the task of working out alternative concepts for national security, existed for only 40 days before being dissolved by Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Luk'yanov.[61]

Scenarios of Future Behavior

The future balance between *glasnost'* and secrecy in the military will be directly affected by the course of political developments in the Soviet Union. Traditional sources of authority are crumbling, but new ones have

[58]V. Urban, "The Military Budget: Preliminary Discussion," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 13, 1990.

[59]A. Podvez'ko, "In the Secret Committee," *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn), Jan. 28, 1990; Georgiy Arbatov, "Thank You Mister Cheney," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 10, 1990.

[60]Podvez'ko, loc. cit.

[61]Alexander Rahr, "Inside the Interregional Group," *Report on the USSR*, Oct. 26, 1990, p. 3.

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not yet been established. Soviet society has become a seething ocean of volatile, unstructured political and popular national movements that clash with each other and the government. Some of these conflicts have already resulted in substantial casualties. In the language of political science, this is a classic situation of high social mobilization with low political institutionalization, a recipe for instability and violence.[62] Several scenarios of political development are possible in this uncertain situation.

Scenario one: modernization muddles through. If Gorbachev's regime survives, it will mean further efforts to modernize the Soviet Union and integrate it into the world community. This approach generally favors military *glasnost'*. But this also means years of political instability. While the policies of democratization, even though partially reversed in the last several months, are pointing toward some "demilitarization" of Soviet state and society, "the future development of these processes," as David Holloway has observed, "remains uncertain, and the danger exists that the military might be a willing instrument in bringing them to an end."[63]

Such an "end" could easily come if (some might say, when) Gorbachev is compelled to use the military to impose martial law to suppress independence movements or labor strikes. Actually, the military (usually the paratroopers) have already supplemented the internal-security troops' "law and order" operations in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Moldavia, and Lithuania. The military now openly recognizes its role as the ultimate guarantor of the stability of the Soviet empire. Lt. Gen. O. Zinchenko, commander of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District, has described the Soviet military as "the main obstacle to a restoration of bourgeois [political] structures. . . ." General V. Achalov, a former commander of the paratroops, has referred to the military as the most "internationalist" body in the Soviet Union.[64] Indeed, in late 1990, 11 cities or regions of the Soviet Union were under what amounts to martial law.[65]

Greater reliance on the military for maintaining regime stability will have a negative impact on military *glasnost'*. The more Soviet territory under martial law (or its equivalent), the greater the reluctance of the military and politicians to lift the veil of secrecy from military operations. The fear of embarrassment and concern for operations security both act as constraints. The initial reaction of the Kremlin to the proclamation of Lithuanian independence was the use of the military to intimidate the independence movement and the closure of Lithuania to foreigners.

The negative impact on *glasnost'* of the militarization of politics was demonstrated on September 9–13, 1990, when several regiments of paratroopers were sent in great secrecy on unscheduled exercises around Moscow. Several people's deputies, disturbed by rumors of a coup, were refused access to the areas where the paratroopers were deployed. When pressed for an explanation, the Ministry of Defense provided sketchy and contradictory information, which only increased suspicions about the military's intentions.[66]

The attempted military crackdown in Lithuania on January 11–13, 1991, is a perfect case study of the relationship between the military's role in political repression, secrecy, deception, and suppression of *glasnost'*. As additional detachments of paratroopers were moving into Lithuania, a General Staff spokesman denied that they were to be used for a crackdown rather than for the announced goal of enforcing the military draft. The first target of the attempted coup was an embodiment of *glasnost'*—the television studio in Vilnius. Indeed, Gorbachev tried to justify the attack by invoking, among other factors, the independent nature of Lithuanian television broadcasts. Apparently, it was planned to transfer power in Lithuania to an illegal Committee of National Salvation, whose membership was a secret. The responsibility for the failed coup has been laid on a relatively low-ranking commander of the Vilnius garrison, while the actions of his superior chain of command, from Gorbachev on down, have been kept secret. The coverage of the situation in Lithuania by Moscow television has been largely a throwback to the pre-*glasnost'* era—the news broadcasts have been obviously slanted to support the Kremlin's policy and whitewash the military.[67]

There are plans for the military's involvement in internal-security operations on an even broader scale. A de-

[62]Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 8–47.

[63]David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1989–90, p. 24.

[64]V. Zyubin, "On Democracy and Order," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Aug. 8, 1990; and Lt. Gen. O. Zinchenko, "We Serve in the Baltic," ibid., Dec. 20, 1989.

[65]*Radio Liberty Daily Report* (Munich), Nov. 29, 1990; they include four areas of Azerbaijan (including Baku, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh); three areas of Armenia (including Yerevan); Georgia (Abkhazia); Uzbekistan (Fergana); Kirgizia (Osh oblast); and Moldavia (five areas inhabited by the Gagauz).

[66]N. Krivonmazov, "How the Paratroopers Came to Moscow," *Pravda,* Sept. 19, 1990; A. Pankratov, "And Somebody Thought—Exercises Are Going On," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda,* Sept. 26, 1990; V. Urban, "The Lie about the 'Military Coup'," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Sept. 27, 1990; N. Velan, "For the Sake of Noise . . . ," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Sept. 29, 1990; and Major M. Pustobayev, "What They Write to Us from the Army," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda,* Oct. 12, 1990.

[67]Riina Kionka, "The Baltic Notebook," *Report on the USSR,* Jan. 18, 1991, p. 24; Dzintra Bungs, "Baltic Notebook," ibid., Jan. 25, 1991, pp. 8, 9; Saulius Girnius, "Lithuania's National Salvation Committee," ibid., pp. 6–8; and Vera Tolz, "Recent Attempts to Curb *Glasnost'*," ibid., Mar. 1, 1991, p. 3.

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cree signed by Minister of Defense Yazov and Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo on December 29, 1990, but kept secret for a month afterwards, authorized joint military-police patrols throughout the USSR.[68] The greater the armed forces' internal-security responsibilities are at the time of extraordinary political tensions, the greater will be the obstacles to military *glasnost'*: (1) because *glasnost'* is inimical to extra-legal security operations; and (2) because of the power of the senior military officers to resist *glasnost'*, which they view as something imposed upon them, associated with the loss of war in Afghanistan, the decline in the military's prestige and budget, the unceremonious discharge of tens of thousands of officers into an uncertain future, vigorous public criticism of the military, doubts about the need for military force in a new international environment, etc. Although quite a few junior officers have become politically radicalized and do not share anti-*glasnost'* sentiments, there is little doubt that the senior officer corps would use the first opportunity presented by an improvement of the military's political fortunes in the course of a military crackdown to curtail *glasnost'*. The damage to *glasnost'* from imposition of martial law in the destabilized Soviet empire would be severe.

Gorbachev's inclination to listen to more conservative critics, which began in the fall of 1990, has been accompanied by attempts to stifle *glasnost'* in general. These attempts were quite successful at Central Television, where the main news program *Vremya* again became a mouthpiece of the regime and most of the radical shows were banned. The anti-*glasnost'* campaign has been obviously spurred on by loud complaints from senior military officers about the hostility of the mass media to the armed forces. But muzzling the printed media has been much more difficult, as the multitude of newspapers and journals are less subject to centralized controls.[69] The criticism of the military in the printed media has generally continued unabated. Nothing short of an outright crackdown will completely stifle *glasnost'*.

Scenario two: a counterreformist takeover. The search for an ideology and the building of a political movement supporting counterreform are already taking place, and the Soviet military is taking an active part in these efforts. The ideology is broadly characterized by hostility toward the nationalists in the union republics, an extreme anxiety about the stability of the Soviet empire, an emphasis on Russia's unique place among nations and its glorious past and national pride, strong opposition to Western influences and democratic ideas, and strong support for the military as the foundation of Russian statehood.

Col. Gen. Al'bert Makashov, commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, being interviewed by newsmen at the 28th Congress of the CPSU in July 1990.

—S. Malsterman/TASS from Sovfoto.

The military establishment has been openly sympathetic to the counterreform movement, and has opened the pages of its press to some of its more prominent figures, notably Nina Andreyeva (whose "letter," promoted by anti-Gorbachev elements in the Communist party in 1988, became the manifesto of conservative resistance); Aleksandr Prokhanov, a pro-military writer and now one of the leaders of the "United Council of Russia," a Russian conservative nationalist organization; and Karem Rash, a previously unknown school teacher, whose writings glorify the past, present, and future of the Soviet Armed Forces.[70]

Some military officers have been making public statements reflecting this nascent ideology. An unprecedentedly vicious attack on *perestroyka* and "new thinking" in foreign policy was made by General Al'bert Ma-

[68]Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev and El'tsin in a Deadlock," ibid., Feb. 15, 1991, p. 4.

[69]Tolz, loc. cit., pp. 1–6.

[70]N. A. Andreyeva, "Historical Fantasies," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal,* June 1990, pp. 10–16; S. Pashayev, "Aleksandr Prokhanov: Our Association Calls for Agreement," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Oct. 24, 1989; Colonel Yu. Vashkevich, "Honor," ibid., Nov. 10, 1989; and Karem Rash, "The Army and Culture," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal,* February 1989, pp. 3–15; March 1989, pp. 3–10; April 1989, pp. 3–13; May 1989, pp. 3–11; July 1989, pp. 3–13; August 1989, pp. 3–13; and September 1989, pp. 3–14. On Karem Rash, see also Holloway, loc. cit., pp. 22, 23; and Mikhail Tsypkin, "Karem Rash: An Ideologue of Military Power, *Report on the USSR,* Aug. 3, 1991, pp. 8–11.

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kashov, the commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, at the first congress of the Communist Party of Russia in June 1990. To the applause of this predominantly conservative gathering, Makashov described as "learned turkeys" the "new thinkers" who deny the existence of an immediate threat of attack on the Soviet Union, and made thinly veiled threats of a military coup. According to former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, who has joined the democratic opposition, in his speech, Makashov revealed "the position of many high-ranking military and KGB officers." Similar statements have been made by General Igor' Rodionov, the commandant of the General Staff Academy.[71]

*Two colonels, Viktor Alksnis and Nikolay Petru*shenko, have assumed leading roles in the *Soyuz,* a bloc of conservative members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They sharply criticized Gorbachev's reformist domestic and foreign policies, and on November 16, 1990, Alksnis demanded that Gorbachev reestablish "order," or resign within 30 days. According to Stanislav Shatalin, the former economic adviser to the President, Gorbachev "capitulated" to this attack and turned to more conservative politics. Although there is no direct evidence that Alksnis and Petrushenko acted on orders of their superiors, the contrast between the Ministry of Defense's treatment of officers such as Major Lopatin, who is active in democratic politics and was forced out of the armed forces, and Alksnis and Petrushenko, who continue on active duty, is quite telling. According to Alksnis, after his ultimatum to Gorbachev, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, General Yazov, simply advised him to be more "flexible."[72]

It is difficult to assess the popularity of conservative views among the officer corps. An analysis of the voting patterns of military officer-members of the Russian republic's Congress of People's Deputies shows that only 16 percent of the votes of top military officers were cast for proposals sponsored by the democratic bloc, compared with 82 percent against, whereas among the middle-level army officers the figure was 63 percent for (37 percent against), and among junior officers—73 percent for (22 percent against). At the same time, according to Major V. Lopatin, a reform-minded people's deputy, the failure of new representative bodies to concern themselves with the rapidly deteriorating social conditions of the officer corps is making junior officers increasingly subject to manipulation by their conservative superiors.[73]

The election platform of the conservative "Bloc of Social-Patriotic Movements of Russia" for the 1990 elections in the Russian republic describes "reasonable defense sufficiency" as "naïve." During a "working meeting" in December 1989, the group of conservative Russian nationalist people's deputies criticized "euphoria" from "growing foreign policy contacts," which allegedly "conceal" the continuing hostility of the West.[74]

The conservative Russian nationalists have sharply criticized "new thinking" in foreign policy. Beginning with Prokhanov's early 1990 attack against the Kremlin for "losing" Eastern Europe, such criticisms have spread to cover the whole range of Soviet national security, from the terms of military withdrawal from Eastern Europe, to the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, to the cooperation with the US during the Persian Gulf crisis, and to the view of the free-market democracies as potential partners of the Soviet Union.[75]

Conservative Russian nationalism emphasizes Russian "uniqueness," and thus opposes the current trend to integrate the Soviet Union with the rest of the world.[76] The less the Soviet Union is integrated into the world community, the greater the likelihood of political tensions in the future, and consequently the greater the justification for military secrecy. Conservative Russian nationalists fervently believe that Russia has always been victimized by foreigners and has been too accommodating to them. They maintain that Russia was destroyed by Marxism, which was imported from the West, and that it is being threatened anew by the mind-

[71]Col. Gen. A. Makashov, "We Are Not Going to Surrender," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* June 21, 1990; and Col. Gen. I. Rodionov, "When Will They Stop Mocking the Army and the State?" *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Moscow), No. 9, 1990, pp. 3–10.

[72]*Radio Liberty Daily Report,* Nov. 23, 1990; V. Litvin, "To Return from a Knockdown," *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* Nov. 21, 1990; S. Shatalin, "It Is Impermissible to Resist Evil with the Help of Evil," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda,* Jan. 22, 1991; *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 52, December 1990; and Elizabeth Shogan, "Kremlin's Rightist Tilt Can Be Linked to *Soyuz*," *The Los Angeles Times,* Feb. 26, 1991.

[73]Julia Wishnevsky, "The Two Sides of the Barricades in Russian Politics Today," *Report on the USSR,* Aug. 24, 1990, p. 17; and Sergey Leskov, "The Red Army Is the Strongest in the World," *Nachalo* (Moscow), July 1990.

[74]For a Policy of National Agreement and Russian Rebirth," *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* Dec. 29, 1989; and "It Was Endured by Life Itself," ibid., Dec. 14, 1989.

[75]Aleksandr Prokhanov, "The Tragedy of Centralism Is the Tragedy of Spilled Blood," *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* Jan. 5, 1990; Suzanne Crow, "Germany: The 'Second Crisis' of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Report on the USSR,* Mar. 15, 1991, pp. 9–12; Yuriy Katasonov, "The Army and the Demagogues," *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* Apr. 27, 1990; Aleksandr Prokhanov, "The Army: Thoughts of a Civilian," *Syn Otechestva* (Moscow), Aug. 17, 1990; "We Cannot Ascribe It to the Achievements of Our Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* Nov. 12, 1990; and Eduard Volodin, "For What?" ibid., Dec. 7, 1990.

[76]This view characterizes the extremists of *Pamyat'* as well as such intellectual Russian nationalists as Dr. Igor' Shafarevich. See, for instance, I. Shafarevich, "Two Paths to the Same Precipice," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), July 1989.

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less importation of Western ideas and culture. The emphasis on the state as the guarantor of stability; the distrust of society, which is implicit in conservative ideology; and the special role this ideology accords to the military as an institution of nearly mystical importance for the development of the national character are not conducive to military *glasnost'*.

Some prominent counterreformers, such as Nina Andreyeva and General Rodionov, have objected to military *glasnost'*. Hostility against military *glasnost'* has also been voiced by USSR People's Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan. (He operates within the loose alliance of party conservatives, Russian nationalists, and anti-reformist workers' fronts.) Kogan accused one unnamed people's deputy of participating in flights of "foreign agents" over Soviet "military facilities"—obviously a reference to one of the recent gestures to military *glasnost'*.[77]

A political leadership inspired by such an ideology would be more likely than a modernizing regime to use force against ethnic and labor unrest. Such a policy would also spell the end of military *glasnost'*.

Scenario three: radical democratic reform. The radical democrats[78] clearly favor further integration of the Soviet Union into the world community, are committed to openness in government, and regard the Soviet military as a burden on the country's economy rather than a pillar of the state. They have clashed repeatedly with the military over budget, secrecy, conscription, and other issues. They would be inclined to broaden the limits of military *glasnost'* far enough to reassure the West about Soviet intentions.

But will democratic reformers ever be in a position to implement their policies vis-à-vis the military? A government of democratic reformers could ill afford to antagonize the military. In this difficult and hazardous transition, micro-managing military *glasnost'* (which is necessary given the military's lukewarm feelings about it) might be impossible. If the military feels itself challenged by the civilian authority of Gorbachev, its resistance to intrusion by a government of democrats unsure of its own power (and loathed by top Soviet military officers) is likely to be much stronger. And no change in regime will immediately expunge the negative characteristics of the Russian/Soviet bureaucratic political culture.

Furthermore, will the policies on arms control and military *glasnost'* pursued by a democratic government in Moscow be at all relevant? Such a government will likely preside over the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a national security entity. Much of the arms-control baggage of the present and immediate future will be irrelevant if the Soviet Union is replaced by several successor-states. This is especially true of any agreements reducing conventional forces. Many of the union republics are already demanding military formations of their own. If they become completely independent or independent within a loose confederation, they will likely acquire their own conventional forces, and will not be bound by previous agreements concluded by the Kremlin.

Even though the advocates of the union republics' right to independence generally agree that the best way for handling the Soviet nuclear arsenal will be to leave it under the control of some type of a federal military command in Moscow (some union republics, like Ukraine, have already declared their intention to be non-nuclear),[79] the reality might turn out to be different. If the Soviet strategic arsenal is split among several successor-states, they might refuse to carry out some or all of the provisions of arms-control agreements signed earlier by Moscow. Such agreements and their verification provisions might have to be renegotiated with the Soviet successor-states. The more hostile the future relations among the successor-states (or between successor-states and today's neighbors of the USSR), the lower the likelihood of their observing and successfully renegotiating existing arms-control and confidence-building agreements.

Still, the fact that a government of radical reformers would be seeking a long-term accommodation with the West on the basis of common political values would by itself reduce the justification for military secrecy. A government of this type in Moscow would at least have some chance of managing a reasonably amicable dissolution of the Soviet monolith, unlike either the muddling-through Gorbachevian modernizers or the outright counterreformers.

Scenario four: disintegration of the Soviet Union. Disintegration of the Soviet Union could result from any of the three scenarios described above. The muddling modernization (scenario one) may fail and result in chaos. Gorbachev's muddling modernizers could be replaced by the counterreformers (scenario two), who are likely to increase hostility in the union republics because they lack the ability or the desire to understand

[77]Nina Andreyeva, "*Glasnost'* Obligates," *Molodaya Gvardiya*, No. 7, 1989, p. 274; Rodionov, loc. cit., p. 8; and statement by People's Deputy Ye. Kogan in "The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies," loc. cit.

[78]I use this umbrella term to describe a loose coalition of politicians, who include Boris Yel'tsin, Gavriil Papov, Anatoliy Sobchak, Nikolay Travkin, and others. This group is not bound together in any formal party, but they are close ideologically.

[79]Viktor Altayev, "The Armed Forces of the USSR: At the End of the Road," *Vek XX i Mir* (Moscow), No. 6, 1990, p. 30.

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the problems of minority nations in the Soviet Union, or are outright hostile to them and ready to use force to save the Russian/Soviet empire. The result could be an outbreak of anti-Russian resistance in the union republics, and ultimately civil war. The radical democrats (scenario three) might be unable to prevent disintegration or thwart a coup by the counterreformers, and the country would again confront chaos.

In this case, *glasnost'* will suffer because the military will be involved in internal operations. This would be particularly true of conventional forces attempting to restore order, to put down independence movements, and so on. Verification of compliance with arms-control agreements would be impeded.

The fate of *glasnost'* concerning Soviet strategic forces would be of immense concern in this case. We can only hope that even under this scenario the Soviet military would comply with at least the most important provisions of nuclear arms-control agreements and maintain a degree of openness about their nuclear forces and operations necessary for reassuring the United States about Soviet compliance, capabilities, and intentions in the realm of strategic weapons.

Conclusions

The steps undertaken by the Soviets to implement military *glasnost'* are beneficial to Western security interests. Unfortunately, such benefits have been limited so far, and might remain so in the future. These limitations stem from the transitional character of military *glasnost'*: born, together with other Gorbachev's other innovations out of a profound crisis of the Soviet system, it leads an uneasy existence as it confronts the Russian/Soviet tradition of secrecy, the bureaucratic self-interest of the military, and an increasing uncertainty about the future of reform. It has not become entrenched in Soviet political and military institutions, and can be reduced or overturned by a new course of political events.

As stated in the beginning of this article, military *glasnost'* should contribute to international security by ensuring verification of arms-control and confidence-building agreements, and by reassuring other nations regarding future weapons R&D and acquisition programs. Soviet performance here is likely to be uneven at best. Verification of and compliance with agreements involving conventional forces will be complicated by their probable use in massive internal-security operations. The breakup of the Soviet Union might make verification impossible. Western security would be affected, and the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe would feel less secure. Stability and security would also suffer in regions contiguous to Soviet Central Asia and the Far East.

The problems of *glasnost'* as they relate to strategic nuclear systems are likely to be different. Since strategic weapons cannot be used for internal-security operations, and since the international consequences of violating strategic arms-control agreements would have a direct impact on Western security and thus be likely to call forth a strong response, even an anti-Western, pro-military regime would probably attempt to maintain the minimum level of *glasnost'* needed for verification. The situation would deteriorate if the strategic arsenal were to be broken up as a result of the dissolution of the USSR, unless new arms-control instruments could be quickly devised.[80]

The military-industrial complex uses secrecy in the battle for the biggest slice of state budget. *Glasnost'* concerning future weapons (another significant factor for international security) would be advanced if the influence of the military-industrial complex were reduced. Two factors would facilitate such a reduction: relative domestic stability and transition to a free-market economy.

Any regime in Moscow (Gorbachev's, counterreformist, or democratic) will find it difficult to maintain and further military *glasnost'*. Ethnic and economic conflicts, the residual strength of the old power structures welded to imperial thinking and the command economy, the weakness of nascent democratic political parties—all of these factors conspire against stability and therefore against military *glasnost*.

[80]The Soviets understand Western concerns on this account, and might use them to justify harsh actions against the independence movements; Minister of Defense Yazov has threatened restive union republics with reprisals for their anti-military stance. Although no popular front now in power in the union republics has asked for a share of the Soviet nuclear "inheritance," Yazov chose to accuse them of nuclear ambitions. See Bill Keller, "Soviet Army Told to Use Force to Defend Itself in the Republics," *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1990.

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Polish-Lithuanian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Stephen R. Burant

Since Lithuania declared its independence on March 11, 1990, relations between Poland and Lithuania, which had lain dormant for 50 years, again became part of the foreign policy agendas of the two countries. Relations between Poles and Lithuanians have a long, checkered history. For more than 400 years, the two peoples were part of the same state. In the 19th century, Poles and Lithuanians joined together in two uprisings against Russian rule. But thereafter their two paths diverged. Conflict broke out between the two nations in the late 19th century, and carried on with even greater intensity into the interwar period. The two nations have very different attitudes toward their common past, but Polish and Lithuanian leaders now claim a common adherence to democratic values. These shared principles give grounds for optimism regarding the future of relations between Poland and Lithuania.

Poland's ties to Lithuania form an inseparable part of Polish history. Indeed, Adam Mickiewicz, Poland's greatest poet, begins his epic *Pan Tadeusz* with words that have come to symbolize the role Lithuania has played in Polish culture: "*Litwo! Ojczyzno moja*!" (Lithuania! My fatherland!). Poles retain a sentimental attachment to Lithuania. When Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union, Poles greeted the news with enthusiasm and joy.

Stephen R. Burant is Managing Editor of Problems of Communism *(Washington, DC).* *The author would like to thank Saulius Suziedelis for providing some of the sources used in this article, and Sonia Sluzar, Victor Nakas, James P. McGregor, Kasys Almenas, and Rosemary Lark for their comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the US Information Agency or the US government.*

But more than memories of a common past inspire Polish support for the Lithuanian cause. Poles perceive an ideological kinship between Solidarity and *Sąjūdis*, the movement that is leading Lithuania on its quest for independence. Both Solidarity and *Sąjūdis* embody national revolutions against communist regimes imposed on their countries by the Soviet Union. Arguably, it is in Poland's national interest that *Sąjūdis* succeed in its effort to establish an independent and democratic Lithuania.

Poland's relations with Lithuania, however, are complicated by distrust for Poland and the Poles on the part of Lithuanians. In the late 19th century, the Lithuanian national movement arose in opposition to the Polish culture that had grown ever more dominant in Lithuania in the preceding centuries. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the two nations fought over Vilnius (which was part of Poland in the interwar period), and the two countries did not have diplomatic relations until 1938. Today, a Polish minority in Lithuania that did not back the drive for independence and lingering concerns over the permanence of the border between the two countries evoke memories in Lithuania of conflicts between the two peoples and of the humiliation Lithuania suffered at the hands of Poland in the early 20th century.

Lithuanian historical memories of the common Polish-Lithuanian past are not as favorable as those of the Poles. Consequently, Lithuanian government officials and *Sąjūdis* activists do not look to this past as a foundation upon which to construct relations in the present. Lithuanians refer to common democratic aims and principles as a basis upon which to build present-day ties. Polish government officials, parliamentarians, and political activists also refer to such democratic principles in reaching out to the Lithuanians, but, in contrast to the Lithuanians, positive memories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lead Poles to regard the shared history of the two peoples as an additional basis upon which to build relations today.

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Contacts between the two countries have quickened since Lithuania's declaration of independence. Although Poland has not formally recognized Lithuania, in order not to antagonize Mikhail Gorbachev, it has lent Lithuania considerable moral and political support. Poland has gradually increased this support, which was especially forthcoming during the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania in mid-January 1991. The steps it has taken on behalf of Lithuania clearly show that Warsaw recognizes Lithuania as being in the process of becoming a sovereign state.

In analyzing contemporary Polish-Lithuanian relations, this article will consider several topics. I begin with a sketch of the history of relations between Poland and Lithuania in an effort to show how perceptions of the past shape each nation's present attitudes toward the other. A discussion of bilateral relations between Poland and Lithuania against the backdrop of each country's relations with the Soviet Union follows. I then conclude with an analysis of two prominent issues in Polish-Lithuanian relations—the circumstances of the ethnic Polish minority in Lithuania and concern in Lithuania over possible territorial claims by Poland.

History and Contemporary Attitudes

The connection between Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania began with the marriage of Lithuania's Grand Duke Jogaila (Jagiełło) to Poland's Queen Jadwiga on February 18, 1386. As a condition of the marriage, Jagiełło agreed to become Roman Catholic. Thus, Catholicism was introduced in Lithuania via the Polish connection. Very quickly, the personal union became a confederation.[1] A combined Lithuanian-Polish army defeated the Teutonic knights at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, a victory that further strengthened the bonds between the two nations.

Polish culture and language steadily penetrated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which included Belorussia and most of Ukraine, with the result that the nobility became Polonized. But it was Muscovy's growing expansionism that forced the Lithuanians to enter into even closer relations with Poland. In 1569, when it was apparent that the Jagiellonian dynasty was coming to an end, the Treaty of Lublin was concluded and thus the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth came into being. The treaty merged the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into one "common republic"—the *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*—under a single elected ruler and established one parliament for the entire realm.

The Commonwealth disappeared from the European map in 1795 as a consequence of its third and final partition among Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Most of Lithuania fell to the Russian empire as did the largest part of Poland. Lithuanians of all social classes and strata joined with Poles to fight Russian rule in the November Uprising of 1830 and the January Uprising of 1863. In partisan units in the latter insurrection, both the Polish and Lithuanian languages were used; in some units, Lithuanian predominated.[2]

A cultural renaissance had begun among ethnic Lithuanian noblemen in the early 19th century.[3] But it was the tsar's emancipation of the serfs that set the stage for the emergence of a national movement dedicated to obtaining Lithuania's independence. After the emancipation, the offspring of Lithuanian-speaking peasants began to enter educational institutions, with the result that a Lithuanian intelligentsia came into its own. The root of its Lithuanian identity was its attachment to the Lithuanian language. The Lithuanian national movement quickly came into conflict with ethnic Poles living in Lithuania, as well as with Poles living in Poland. Poles, referring to historical memories of the Commonwealth, continued to regard ethnic Lithuanians as members of the Polish political nation. The intelligentsia-led Lithuanian national movement, by contrast, adopted the ethnic principle in determining who was a Lithuanian.

By the end of World War I, with empires crumbling in Eastern Europe, the Lithuanians staked their claim to independent statehood. At this point, a conflict that had been fought on the pages of newspapers, journals, and books became a violent one for control over ethnically mixed territories—especially the ancient capital of Lithuania, Vilnius (Wilno), and its surrounding districts.

Polish and Lithuanian armies fought over Vilnius in the immediate postwar period. The Poles, threatened by the Red Army, signed an armistice with the Lithuanians on October 7, 1920, according to which Vilnius

[1]Oscar Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization*, New York, Ronald Press, 1952, p. 120.

[2]Piotr Łossowski, *Po tej i tamtej stronie Niemna: Stosunki polsko-litewskie 1883–1939* (On Both Banks of the Niemen: Polish-Lithuanian Relations 1883–1939), Warsaw, Czytelnik, 1985, pp. 3–4. The historical sketch of Polish-Lithuanian relations offered here relies mainly on this work. For another relatively recent work by a Polish specialist covering much of the same ground, see Henryk Wisner, *Wojna nie wojna: Szkice z przeszłości polsko-litewskiej* (War No War: Sketches from the Polish-Lithuanian Past), Warsaw, Książka i Wiedza, 1978. For the "official" Soviet Lithuanian view of relations between Poland and Lithuania in the interwar period, see R. Žepkaitė, *Diplomatija imperializmo tarnyboje: Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykiai 1919–1939 m.* (Diplomacy in the Service of Imperialism: Lithuanian-Polish Relations 1919–1939), Vilnius, Mokslas, 1980.

[3]Constantine Jurgėla, *History of the Lithuanian Nation*, New York, Lithuanian Cultural Institute, 1948, pp. 401–06.

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was left on the Lithuanian side of the line. However, Polish forces in the region led by General Lucjan Żeligowski (who acted with the support of Polish leader Józef Piłsudski) occupied Vilnius two days later and proclaimed a new state called "Central Lithuania" (*Litwa Środkowa*). In February 1922, the diet of this nominally independent state voted for incorporation into Poland. In March 1923, the Great Powers ratified Poland's eastern frontiers, and Vilnius, together with Central Lithuania, remained in Poland.

In the 1920's and throughout most of the 1930's, both Poland and Lithuania used all means short of war to harm each other. The Polish side sought to break Lithuania's resistance and force it to accept normalization of relations on the basis of the existing status quo—meaning Kaunas's recognition of Poland's sovereignty over Vilnius. In March 1938, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck, using as a pretext the fatal shooting of a Polish border guard by the Lithuanians, served up an ultimatum to Kaunas demanding an immediate normalization of relations between Poland and Lithuania. The Lithuanians acceded to Beck's ultimatum. Despite the diplomatic and political strife between the two countries, however, the struggle with Lithuania aroused little hatred among Poles for the Lithuanians.

In Lithuania, regaining Vilnius became a national obsession, which was realized in 1939, when Joseph Stalin awarded this city to Lithuania following Poland's "fourth partition." Equally important, the Lithuanian government undertook an uninterrupted war against Polish culture in an effort to eradicate all Polish influences from the Lithuanian language, literature, and education.[4] Poland's union with Lithuania was seen as having deprived Lithuania of its own state, subordinated the latter, and denationalized the Lithuanian people, as Lithuania's elites adopted Polish customs and the Polish language, and took pride in Polish cultural achievements, art, and literature.[5]

In the postwar period, relations between Poland and Lithuania were strictly controlled by Moscow. Poland's foreign policy followed Soviet dictates. Lithuania, as a Soviet republic, had no foreign policy of its own. What relations were allowed to take place between the two countries involved cultural exchanges, lower-level party and government contacts, and limited economic cooperation.[6]

In the late 1980's, however, Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and a relaxation of political pressure in Poland permitted members of the opposition in Lithuania and Poland to cultivate direct ties with each other. In November 1989, a letter "To Our Friends the Lithuanians," signed by such prominent Polish opposition activists as Bronisław Geremek, Adam Michnik, Henryk Wujec, and Ryszard Reiff (all of whom had been elected to parliament in June of that year) concluded by saying that "the common values that apply to all of Europe . . . freedom and democracy" ought to become the principles that underlie relations between Poles and Lithuanians today.[7] In looking at *Sąjūdis*, Poles saw the Lithuanian version of Solidarity. Poles have long recognized that Lithuanians were fighting the same struggle that they fought—although against a much more powerful enemy and against incomparably greater odds.

However, in addition to the common ideals that are perceived to bind Poles and Lithuanians today, for the Poles, their positive perception of the historic relations between Poland and Lithuania also shape their attitudes toward their neighbor. Stanisław Stomma has written that sympathy for Lithuania has become part of Polish culture. Poles associate Lithuania with the golden age of Polish history—the Jagiellonian period—and with the "super-poet" Adam Mickiewicz.[8] Poles have come to recognize that the Lithuanians are also the heirs of these achievements, and this too binds Poles to Lithuanians.

On numerous occasions after Lithuania's declaration of independence, Polish government officials and parliamentarians have referred to the common past of Poles and Lithuanians to explain their stance toward Lithuania's independence declaration and justify their support. On March 12, 1990, the day after the independence declaration, Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated that "what happens in Lithuania is relevant to us . . . . We have historic relations with Lithuania. We have a long [common] past. This is not insignificant . . . ."[9] Adam Michnik argued that these historic ties place special obligations on Poland "to respond to

[4]V. Stanley Vardys, "The Development of the Republic of Lithuania," in Boris Meissner, Ed., *Die Baltischen Nationen* (The Baltic Nations), Cologne, Markus Verlag, 1990, p. 76.

[5]Łossowski, op. cit., pp. 198, 236–37. Despite the tensions between the two countries, many older and middle-aged Lithuanian intellectuals retained an active, though concealed, interest in Poland. Intellectuals from Poland and Lithuania maintained contacts during this period, and many worked for understanding between the two peoples.

[6]Romuald J. Misunias and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940–1980*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983, pp. 148, 173–74; and V. Stanley Vardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1983, p. 25.

[7]*Gazeta Wyborcza* (Warsaw), Nov. 16, 1989. Published along with this letter was a letter "To Our Friends the Poles," signed by Juozas Urbšys, the former foreign minister of independent Lithuania, as well as by such prominent *Sąjūdis* activists as Vytautas Landsbergis and Virgilius Čepaitis.

[8]See Stanisław Stomma, "A New Neighborhood," *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Kraków), Dec. 9, 1990; and idem, "With Feeling, but Prudently," ibid., May 28, 1989.

[9]"Skubiszewski Desires 'Good Relations'," Warsaw Television Service, Mar. 12, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Mar. 13, 1990, p. 44.

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the aspirations of the Lithuanian nation with particular sensitivity."[10]

In the weeks following Lithuania's independence declaration, Poland's "special obligations" toward the Lithuanians came into play. On March 27, three days after Soviet military vehicles began rolling into Vilnius as part of the Kremlin's effort to force Lithuania to back down, a ten-person delegation from the Citizen's Parliamentary Caucus (*Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny*—OKP) traveled to Lithuania. The highlight of the visit was a stirring speech by OKP Chairman Geremek to Lithuania's Supreme Council. The conclusion of the speech appealed to the memory of the two nations' common past:

I would like to say that for Lithuania, a country for which Poland has much affection and with which it is linked by such a long period of history, we wish to bring the message of solidarity both with the Poles [living in Lithuania] and with the Lithuanians, who live and will live in freedom on this land. We also believe that with our message for Lithuania, for Lithuanians, and for Poles, that today, precisely today, we are with you.[11]

Similarly, in January 1991, after Soviet troops assaulted the Lithuanian television studios and left 15 dead and more than 100 wounded, numerous Polish parliamentarians traveled to Vilnius to lend their support. Adam Michnik, speaking before the Supreme Council in his capacity as a Sejm deputy, evoked memories of the two nations' common history to link their fate in the present:

In this dramatic moment for Lithuania, and for all of Europe, I bring you words of solidarity, fraternity, and admiration from Warsaw. . . . For many years, history bound together the fates of our two peoples. . . . In the name of that community, I want to assure you that Poland will grant all possible assistance to your brave and heroic struggle, which is a struggle for us all.[12]

Lithuanians generally do not express such sentiments. Their national traditions diverge from and are in large measure opposed to the *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*. The humiliation that Lithuania suffered at the hands of its stronger neighbor during the interwar period remains alive in the nation's memory. Polish intellectuals meeting with their Lithuanian counterparts remark on the difficulty of finding a common language. Lithuanians, wrote one Pole, continue to fear the loss of their identity in contacts with Poles, and Poles tend not to appreciate this Lithuanian concern.[13]

For their part, Lithuanian leaders minimize their country's historic connection to Poland. President Vytautas Landsbergis, having traveled to Poland to participate in ceremonies commemorating the 580th anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald—a setting that begged for positive references to the historic ties between Lithuania and Poland—chose not to mention the Polish-Lithuanian alliance in his speech at the festivities. Rather, for Landsbergis, Grunwald was a symbol of the courage and resistance of the Lithuanian people. Lithuanians, said their president, defended themselves at Grunwald just as they are defending their sovereignty today.[14]

When they do refer to the history of Polish-Lithuanian relations, Lithuanian leaders describe them in restrained terms. For example, the letter "To Our Friends the Poles" said only that "Lithuania knows what it has received over the centuries from Poland, as Poland knows what it has received from Lithuania."[15] Likewise, on her visit to Poland on June 21, 1990, Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskienė rather cryptically remarked that "several centuries of common history cannot be erased."[16]

On the other hand, in contrast to the interwar period, Lithuanians no longer isolate themselves from things Polish. The Polish language and culture were a window to Central Europe and the West during some of the darkest days of Soviet rule over Lithuania. Polish publications were available in Lithuania, and two-thirds of the country could watch Polish television, which became very popular.[17] Landsbergis speaks excellent

[10]Adam Michnik, "Lithuania Reborn," *Gazeta International* (Warsaw), Mar. 15, 1990.

[11]Cited in "Who Is Giving the Orders," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Mar. 28, 1990.

[12]Cited in "Michnik in the Lithuanian Parliament," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Jan. 15, 1991.

[13]Andrzej Grzegorczyk, "The Difficult Lithuanian Friendship," *Polityka* (Warsaw), Nov. 4, 1989; see also Stomma, "With Feeling, but Prudently," loc. cit.; Marek J. Karp, Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, and Elżbieta Sawicka, "From Lithuania," *Res Publica* (Warsaw), February 1990, pp. 90, 92; and Tomasz Jastrun, "From Lithuania," ibid., April 1990, p. 84.

[14]"The 580th Anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald," *Życie Warszawy* (Warsaw), July 16, 1990. Despite a shortage of newsprint and paper, Lithuanian newspapers devoted quite a bit of space to Grunwald. According to historian A. Nikžentaitis, "With the annihilation of the Teutonic Order, Lithuania destroyed the principal threat on the road to Europe, in whose civilization it was included . . . and it was therefore preserved as a nation." Cited in "The Battle of Grunwald: To Be or Not To Be," *Lietuvos Rytas* (Vilnius), July 13, 1990. Similarly, "Grunwald recalls to us the difficult struggle for the existence of the nation and the state. Its undying glory inspires us even today." "The Battle That Changed Europe," *Tiesa* (Vilnius), July 14, 1990.

[15]Loc. cit.

[16]"The Prime Minister of Lithuania's Working Visit to Poland," *Ekho Litvy* (Vilnius), June 23, 1990.

[17]Misiunas and Taagepera, op. cit., pp. 173–74.

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

Ceremonies commemorating the 580th anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald on July 15, 1990.

—Rozmysłowicz/CAF.

Polish and knows Polish literature as well as any Polish intellectual. Virgilius Čepaitis, another *Sąjūdis* leader, has translated works of Sławomir Mrożek, Stanisław Lem, and Witold Gombrowicz into Lithuanian.[18]

As important, Lithuanian leaders now wish to establish close relations with Poland. Thus, a telegram sent by *Sąjūdis* to Tadeusz Mazowiecki upon his government's coming to power stated that "the experience of Solidarity's heroic struggle is creating among [Poland's] neighbors an understandable urge toward freedom and independence." *Sąjūdis* hoped to induce Solidarity and the new Polish government to help the Lithuanians by arguing that the Poles had a moral responsibility to support the right of nations to self-determination.[19] In the letter "To Our Friends the Poles" mentioned above, Lithuanian leaders stressed that "a free and democratic Lithuania will cooperate in a friendly manner with a free and democratic Poland."[20] Additionally, in an interview while he was in Poland for the commemoration of the Battle of Grunwald, President Landsbergis suggested that common interests formed the basis for present-day Polish-Lithuanian cooperation, calling specifically for a Polish role in building an alliance of small states, which, he claimed, "understand each other better than the [great] powers," and for economic ties between Poland and Lithuania.[21]

In general, since Lithuania's independence declaration, its leaders have eagerly sought Poland's support for their country's struggle against the Kremlin, and such support has been provided. Yet, in assisting Lithuania, Poland's leaders have been careful to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union. I now turn to an examination of relations among Poland, Lithuania, and the Soviet Union since March 11, 1990.

Warsaw-Vilnius-Moscow

Relations between Poland and Lithuania are dependent on the state of relations between each country and

[18]On Landsbergis's knowledge of Polish, see Jastrun, loc. cit., p. 90. On Čepaitis, see "The Baltic Plague," *Res Publica*, September-October 1989, pp. 34–39; and "I Do Not Rule Out a Return. Tomas Venclova's Interview with Jerzy Snopek," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, May 20, 1990.

[19]"From the Lithuanian Freedom Movement," *Rzeczpospolita*, Aug. 30, 1989, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 5, 1989, p. 33.

[20]Loc. cit.

[21]"The Solidarity of Smaller States," *Życie Warszawy*, July 24, 1990.

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the Kremlin. Stated briefly, Moscow considers Lithuania to be a constituent Soviet republic, and therefore it regards Lithuania's desire for independence as a threat to the integrity of the Soviet Union. The Polish heart might plead for support for Lithuania's aspirations to independent statehood, perhaps even for formal diplomatic recognition of Lithuania. But the Polish head would caution that because Moscow remains the dominant military and political power in Eastern and Central Europe and because several important issues remain to be resolved between Poland and the Soviet Union, Poland must exercise restraint on the issue of Lithuanian independence.

The following are the outstanding political, economic, and military issues remaining to be resolved between Poland and the Soviet Union:

- Warsaw has sought Moscow's assurances that it would foster improvement of educational and cultural opportunities for Poles in the USSR.
- Poland remains dependent on the Soviet Union for critical raw materials. Poland receives all of its natural gas, 95 percent of its iron ore, and most of its crude oil from the Soviet Union.[22]
- Approximately 50,000 Soviet troops remain in Poland, and the Polish government is seeking their quickest possible withdrawal. The Soviets claim that these troops cannot leave before 1993. The two governments are also engaged in sensitive negotiations over the transfer of Soviet troops from Germany to the Soviet Union via Poland.

Another crucial issue in Polish-Soviet relations was resolved in 1990. For much of that year, Warsaw needed Soviet support in its effort to secure Germany's recognition of the permanence of its postwar border with Poland. Poland's success at the "two-plus-four" talks —leading to a treaty between Germany and the allies, in which Germany's postwar borders were confirmed, plus the German-Polish border treaty of November 1990, by which Germany promised to respect its postwar border with Poland—allayed Polish fears regarding real or alleged German territorial claims. The resolution of this problem reduced Warsaw's dependence on Soviet goodwill and allowed Poland to take a bolder stance on issues on which Warsaw and Moscow do not agree. After Bonn recognized the postwar border, Poland increased its support for Lithuania.

While taking Moscow's interests into account, Poland, as a country in the process of transition to democracy, has an interest in doing what it can to promote the same kind of transition in neighboring countries. In the case of the Soviet Union, this interest dictates support for democratic movements in the republics—especially those bordering on Poland—whose peoples also share hundreds of years of common history with the Poles. Added to this, as I have argued, is the Poles' sentimental attachment to Lithuania and its people. Poland's efforts on behalf of Lithuania in 1990–91 are the consequence of both its interests and its sentiments.

The independence declaration. Polish government officials, parliamentarians, political parties, and ordinary citizens welcomed Lithuania's independence declaration. The Council of Ministers, read a Polish government statement, "takes cognizance of the fact" of the Lithuanian declaration and "supports the self-determination of nations [including] self-determination leading to the attainment of separate statehood."[23] After the Lithuanian parliament's declaration of independence, the first foreign guest to whom President Landsbergis gave the rostrum was Polish Senator Tadeusz Kłopotowski, who, together with Sejm Deputy Henryk Wujec, had come from Warsaw for the event. Senator Kłopotowski relayed congratulations and expressions of admiration for the Lithuanian nation.[24] The Polish Sejm and the Senate each adopted resolutions welcoming Lithuania back into the family of independent nations, and expressed the hope that Lithuania would be allowed to achieve its aims quickly and peacefully.[25]

A Lithuanian journalist, Edita Degutienė, who traveled in Eastern Europe in the months following the independence declaration, wrote that no other nation was as unshakable in its sympathy for Lithuania as the Poles.[26] There is much evidence to support Degutienė's impressions. The March 12, 1990, *Gazeta Wyborcza*—at the time a Solidarity newspaper—gave the Lithuanian declaration lead coverage on the front page. The story, written by Chief Editor Adam Michnik, began: "Joy—that is the first feeling that comes over us after the declaration of the Lithuanian parliament." It ended by offering a toast to the Lithuanian people: "To

[22]Krzysztof Leski, "Polish-Soviet Negotiations," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Nov. 23, 1989.

[23]Cited in W. K., "Poland and Independent Lithuania," ibid., Mar. 13, 1990.

[24]"Polish Parliamentarians Congratulate Lithuania," PAP (Warsaw), Mar. 11, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 13, 1990, p. 104; and "The Declaration of Polish Parliamentarians," *Tiesa*, Mar. 22, 1990.

[25]"Senate Resolution Welcomes Independent Lithuania," Warsaw Domestic Service, Mar. 16, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 19, 1990, p. 64; and "Sejm Resolution on Lithuania," PAP, Mar. 22, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 23, 1990, p. 65.

[26]Edita Degutienė, "To Poland . . . on the [CPSU] Platform," *Lietuvos Rytas*, June 22, 1990.

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your health, my Lithuanian brothers."[27] The reactions of Solidarity itself were no less favorable. Lech Wałęsa sent Mikhail Gorbachev a letter in which he stated that Soviet pressure on Lithuania "arouses the greatest disquiet in me," and that infringing "on the sovereignty of Lithuania is an action directed against the process of constructing a new democratic order in Europe."[28] Numerous political parties and movements supported Lithuania's aspirations with demonstrations, appeals to the Polish government for recognition of Lithuania, and calls for economic assistance to the Lithuanian people.

Soviet pressure and Polish support. In the days and weeks after the independence declaration, Moscow put tremendous political, military, and economic pressure on Lithuania. One week after the declaration—on March 18—Soviet military forces began maneuvers in Lithuania. Soviet military vehicles entered Vilnius six days later, and on March 27, Soviet troops seized several hospitals in an effort to locate Lithuanian deserters from the Soviet army. In mid-April, the Kremlin announced what amounted to an economic blockade of Lithuania. Oil, gas, and coal supplies were cut. Food rationing began on May 1. The blockade significantly damaged the Lithuanian economy.

In this period of intense Soviet pressure, the Polish government took several actions in support of Lithuania. Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki offered to mediate the dispute between Moscow and Vilnius,[29] thereby implying that the conflict was not the USSR's internal affair but a subject of international concern and that Lithuania was a negotiating partner with some international standing. Warsaw also formally protested the Soviets' unilateral closing of the border crossing at Ogrodniki-Lazdijai (the only land link between Lithuania and a country not currently part of the Soviet Union).

The Polish parliament showed its support by inviting a Lithuanian parliamentary delegation to Warsaw on March 23. There was also the above-mentioned visit of the OKP delegation to Vilnius on March 27, which Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh criticized as an interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.[30]

On April 9, the Polish government's spokeswoman, Małgorzata Niezabitowska, revealed that a foreign minister from Lithuania (she did not mention his name) had visited Warsaw a few days before. She only said that the visit was unexpected and that the foreign minister held talks with Polish parliamentarians. Niezabitowska did not discuss the contents of the talks.[31] Later, Polish officials gave more information about the meeting. In an interview published in the May 11, 1990, edition of *The Independent,* Skubiszewski said that he had received Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas (this time mentioned by name) in his official capacity as foreign minister, not as a private citizen. Subsequently, Niezabitowska stated that when Saudargas was in Poland, the two sides discussed Poland's participation in relaying humanitarian aid from the West to Lithuania, opening a new railroad line between the two countries, and other issues related to the opening of a Polish mission in Vilnius.[32]

The symbolic importance of holding these talks with the Lithuanian foreign minister on an official level outweighed the substantive import of the talks. By receiving the Lithuanian foreign minister, Poland accorded a greater degree of recognition to independent Lithuania than any other government had shown up to that time.

Poland and Lithuania also took other steps that might be seen as reflections of Lithuania's changed status in Polish eyes. The Polish Press Agency and the Lithuanian Telegraph Agency signed an agreement calling for cooperation in the exchange of information between the two agencies and for an exchange of journalists and special bulletins.[33] On May 30, the two countries concluded an economic agreement.[34] The two agreements also assumed a political importance that exceeded in value their relatively limited substance. Poland concluded these agreements with Lithuania at a time when Moscow was attempting to isolate the Vilnius government from the outside world. By entering into agreements with Lithuania without soliciting Moscow's advice or assistance, Poland helped Lithuania lay the diplomatic foundations for its independence.

The high point in Polish-Lithuanian relations during the blockade was Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskienė's visit to Warsaw on June 21, during which she met with Mazowiecki, Skubiszewski, and parliamentary

[27]The story was reprinted in *Gazeta International,* Mar. 15, 1990.

[28]"Who Is Giving the Orders," loc. cit. See also "Wałęsa Appeals for Negotiations in Lithuania," AFP (Paris), Mar. 27, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* Mar. 27, 1990, p. 36.

[29]"Mazowiecki Agrees to Mediate for Lithuania," Vilnius Domestic Service, Mar. 28, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Mar. 28, 1990, p. 78.

[30]"Lithuanian Delegation Arrives in Warsaw," PAP, Mar. 23, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* Mar. 26, 1990, p. 39; "Who Is Giving the Orders," loc. cit.; Józefa Hennelowa, "From Midnight to Midnight," *Tygodnik Powszechny,* Apr. 8, 1990, and "Geremek Responds to Gremitskikh Criticism," PAP, Apr. 5, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* Apr. 6, 1990, p. 4.

[31]"Spokeswoman Niezabitowska on International Issues," PAP, Apr. 9, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* Apr. 9, 1990, p. 48.

[32]"Niezabitowska News Conference," PAP, May 23, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* May 24, 1990, pp. 59–60.

[33]"Cooperation Between PAP and ELTA," *Tiesa,* May 11, 1990.

[34]"Lithuania to Import Goods from Poland," Vilnius International Service, May 30, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV,* May 31, 1990, p. 71.

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Lithuania's Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskienė meets with Poland's Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki on June 21, 1990.

—Rozmysłowicz/CAF.

leaders. At least one Lithuanian source described the trip as a "working visit" for Prunskienė,[35] thus indicating that she was received in her official capacity as prime minister. Prunskienė came, she said, to discuss common issues faced by Poland and Lithuania.[36] The talks with Mazowiecki dealt with the conflict between Vilnius and Moscow, the border question, and the problem of the Polish ethnic minority in Lithuania. Prunskienė said later that she left Warsaw with very good impressions, and felt that she and her Polish interlocutors had identical views. She reported that Polish leaders were very receptive to the possibility of opening a mission in Lithuania, but she received no concrete promises in that regard. Prunskienė was assured, however, that this question would remain under active consideration by the Polish government.[37]

New opportunities. On June 26, five days after Prunskienė's visit to Poland, the Lithuanian Supreme Council began debate over a moratorium on Lithuania's independence declaration. On June 30, the parliament voted to impose a moratorium on the declaration of independence that was to last 100 days from the start of formal negotiations between Lithuania and the USSR. Moscow lifted the blockade shortly thereafter.

Polish and Lithuanian policy-makers used the opportunity afforded by the lifting of the blockade to broaden and deepen their relations. As noted earlier, President Landsbergis traveled to Poland to participate in the festivities marking the Battle of Grunwald. Landsbergis's visit was unofficial, but while in Poland, he held talks with Polish leaders. Both Polish and Lithuanian officials gave only vague indications of the contents of the talks, although Landsbergis did suggest that they could serve as the basis for more concrete undertakings between Warsaw and Vilnius.[38]

Toward the end of 1990, Poland and Lithuania concluded several new agreements.[39] But the most important among the steps Poland took on behalf of Lithuania up to this time was the Polish government's advocacy of observer status for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At a CSCE meeting in October, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski tried, in his words, "to find a way to involve the nations of the Baltic—Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians—in the work of the CSCE."[40] Poland joined the Scandinavian countries and Czechoslovakia in supporting this status for the Baltic countries. Observer status would have enhanced the international standing of the Baltic states and provided them with the opportunity to speak with their own, rather than Moscow's, voice.[41]

Lithuania's changed status in Polish eyes can also be gauged by a brief examination of Warsaw's relations with the Russian republic, Ukraine, and Belorussia. These republics, in which Poland also has a deep interest, declared their sovereignty within the Soviet federation earlier in 1990: Russia on June 12, Ukraine on July 16, and Belorussia on July 27. The Polish government took the opportunity offered by these sovereignty declarations to begin implementing a two-track policy that

[35]"The Prime Minister of Lithuania's Working Visit to Poland," loc. cit. For other Lithuanian accounts of the visit, see "K. Prunskienė's Visit," *Tiesa*, June 23, 1990; and "Lithuanian Government Leaders Return from Abroad," *Lietuvos Rytas*, June 23, 1990.

[36]Maja Narbutt, "Intention and Reality," *Rzeczpospolita*, June 22, 1990.

[37]Elżbieta Sawicka and Marek J. Karp, "Agreement Is Necessary. An Interview with Kazimiera Prunskienė, Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania," ibid., June 23–24, 1990.

[38]Wojciech Krawczyk, "Memory and Diplomacy," ibid., July 16, 1990.

[39]In October, a delegation of the General Procuracy of Lithuania, headed by Procurator General Arturas Paulauskas, visited Poland. The Republic of Poland's General Procuracy and the Lithuanian delegation agreed to establish closer cooperation in carrying out the tracking of criminals. "Lithuanian General Procuracy Group Visits Poland," Vilnius Domestic Service, Oct. 15, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1990, p. 65. The next month, the Operational Investigative Bureau of the Main Police Command established contacts with the criminal investigative services of the Republic of Lithuania to cooperate in the pursuit of criminals. In addition, during a three-day visit of a delegation from Lithuania's Ministry of Internal Affairs, Polish officials offered to accept Lithuanian police for training. "Poland and Lithuania against the Mafia," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Nov. 24–25, 1990.

[40]Quoted in Ludwik Lewin, "The Balts Are Asked to Leave," *Życie Warsawy*, Nov. 20, 1990.

[41]Riina Kionka, "The CSCE and the Baltic States," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Nov. 23, 1990, pp. 17–19.

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involved continued pursuit of relations with the Soviet government and the development of relations with the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian republics. In October 1990, Skubiszewski traveled to the Soviet Union. During his trip, he met not only with Soviet leaders but also with the leaders of the Russian republic, Ukraine, and Belorussia. Poland signed agreements of friendship and good-neighborly cooperation with Ukraine and the Russian republic on October 13 and October 16 respectively.[42] The two declarations pledged each side to recognize existing borders, refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs, and strengthen economic and cultural relations.

Skubiszewski did not visit Lithuania on this trip. Such a visit did not enter into consideration, he said, "because we treat Lithuania differently."[43] A visit to Lithuania on this trip might have sent a signal that Poland equated Lithuania's efforts toward independence with the efforts of other Soviet republics to establish their sovereignty. Because Lithuania has gone much farther down the road of independence, it merited Skubiszewski's exclusive attention—or at least a visit made in conjunction with visits to Latvia and Estonia.

The Soviet crackdown. After a period of about four months in which Lithuania enjoyed a relative letup in Soviet pressure, the Kremlin again began to turn up the heat in mid-November. Over the next two months, Lithuania was subjected to a series of warnings, ultimatums, and military actions designed to force it to withdraw its independence declaration.[44] The culmination was the Soviet army's assault on the Lithuanian state television studio. Moscow's actions prompted a wave of Polish moral, political, and material support for the Lithuanian cause. Actions by all parties—government, parliament, and society—were bolder and undertaken on a wider variety of fronts than were those in the spring.

Lithuanian Deputy Czesław Okińczyc at a plenary session of the Polish parliament on January 11, 1991.

—Kwiatkowski/CAF.

Perhaps one reason why Polish actions were bolder was that Poland had a new president—Lech Wałęsa, elected on December 9—who had long been sympathetic to Lithuanian aspirations and had expressed his feelings on this matter to Gorbachev personally. In his inauguration speech, Wałęsa stated that "we want to be a good neighbor. We are linked to Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania by centuries of common history." Wałęsa also said that he wanted to cultivate good relations with the Russian republic.[45] Such sentiments portended a more energetic policy toward Lithuania, and, by omitting mention of the Soviet Union in his speech, Wałęsa suggested that Poland would pursue policies in the east with less regard for the Kremlin's sensibilities than Mazowiecki's government had shown. Moreover, as mentioned above, Poland no longer needed Soviet backing for its western borders. Finally, the crackdown in Lithuania struck a raw nerve in Poland because it recalled the martial-law period there. Concern for Lithuania came into play in Poland in a much stronger manner than even during the blockade.

[42]For the agreements, see *Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 13, 1990. No declaration was signed with Belorussia, whose government objected to the alleged mistreatment of Belorussians in Poland and demanded the inclusion in the agreement of a phrase referring specifically to the Polish-Soviet border treaty of 1945, to which Belorussia had not been a party.

[43]"It Is Possible to Disagree about the Scale of Success," *Tygodnik Solidarność* (Warsaw), Nov. 23, 1990.

[44]For details on the Kremlin's effort, see Bill Keller, "The Crushing of Lithuania's Independence Drive," *The New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1991; and Saulius Girnius, "Lithuania's Struggle with the USSR," *Report on the USSR*, Feb. 1, 1991, pp. 1–3. Jeri Laber dates the beginning of the hard line on Lithuania to the end of August. Laber describes a Communist-party memorandum dated August 29, 1990 (published in the January 29, 1991, edition of the independent Moscow newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*), that set out plans for a crackdown in Lithuania. The plan was drafted by CPSU Politburo member Oleg Shenin and Deputy General Secretary Volodymyr Ivashko. See "The Baltic Revolt," *The New York Review of Books*, Mar. 28, 1991, p. 60.

[45]"Wałęsa Delivers Inauguration Speech to Assembly," Warsaw Domestic Service, Dec. 22, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 24, 1990, pp. 28–29. Wałęsa did not mention the need to cultivate good relations with the Soviet Union. He was taken to task by *Izvestiya* commentator Stanislav Kondrashov for having "apparently forgotten about the Soviet Union—the Soviet Union of which Ukraine, Belorussia, and, for the time being, even Lithuania are parts." "Coachman, Do Not Drive the Horses Too Fast," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 3, 1991.

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Two days before the January 13 massacre at the television studio, Czesław Okińczyc, an ethnic Pole who is vice-chairman of the foreign affairs commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, spoke before the Senate and pleaded for official Polish recognition of Lithuania.[46] That same day, although the Sejm and Senate did not go as far as Okińczyc had wanted, the two chambers of the Polish parliament did issue a statement that "expressed the gravest disquiet [at] the news flowing in from Vilnius about the development of the situation in Lithuania . . . . In this situation, we declare the readiness to grant Lithuania all humanitarian aid."[47]

The government also took action. The foreign ministry issued a statement in which it noted that Poland was following with concern the development of events in Lithuania. It said that the Polish government continues to support the aspirations of the Lithuanian people and called for a resolution of outstanding issues between Vilnius and Moscow by means of negotiations. In addition, the Soviet chargé d'affaires was summoned to the foreign ministry to discuss events in Lithuania.[48]

The massacre in Vilnius called forth strong protests from the Polish government. The following day, the Council of Ministers issued a statement that read in part: "The use of force, together with the use of the army, against civilians and institutions in Lithuania . . . . meet with condemnation and objections by Poles, who express their solidarity with the Lithuanian people." The government resolved to maintain existing relations with the legally elected organs of the Republic of Lithuania, ordered the recall of the Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union for consultations, instructed the administrative organs of the government to support all forms of humanitarian aid for the people of Lithuania, and created an interdepartmental working group to analyze the situation and formulate proposals for government action. The government also announced that it would make Lithuanians staying in Poland eligible for refugee status.[49]

Poland also participated in two multilateral actions in support of Lithuania. On January 17, Austria, on behalf of Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, called for a meeting of the CSCE to discuss the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania as well as in the other two Baltic countries. The Soviet Union blocked the meeting, calling it an interference in its internal affairs.[50] In addition, the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian foreign ministers, meeting in Budapest in preparation for a summit of the leaders of their countries, issued a statement supporting the independence aspirations of the Baltic peoples and condemning intervention in their internal affairs. They emphasized that the attempt to reverse the transition to legal statehood through the use of force endangered all of Central and Eastern Europe.[51] Jiři Dienstbier, the Czechoslovak foreign minister, had originally advocated that the three countries accelerate their withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in response to the military action in Lithuania. Skubiszewski, mindful of Poland's negotiations with Moscow over the removal of Soviet troops from Poland and the transit of Soviet troops from Germany through Poland, argued that the issues of the Warsaw Pact and Lithuania should be discussed separately.[52]

The foreign ministers' joint statement was perhaps the most important official Polish response to the massacre. Alone, Poland—or Czechoslovakia or Hungary for that matter—could not hope to exert much influence on Soviet internal policy. Acting together, these countries were in a much more favorable position to demonstrate their concern to the Soviet leadership. In addition, coming from nations that had freed themselves from Soviet domination and are presently making the transition from communism to democracy—precisely the kind of transition the Lithuanians want to make—a coordinated Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian response to events in Lithuania might be expected to carry weight with both Western governments and opinion-makers. The foreign ministers underscored that the Soviet actions posed a threat to Central and Eastern Europe and, by implication, to the democratic transition under way there.

Numerous parliamentarians from Poland traveled to Vilnius after the events of January 13. Equally important, the Sejm and Senate announced that the Polish parliament would open its own missions in the Baltic states. The nature and mechanics of opening the missions, however, remained to be worked out.[53]

[46] *Życie Warszawy*, Jan. 12–13, 1991.

[47] "Joint Sejm-Senate Statement," Warsaw Domestic Service, Jan. 11, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 14, 1991, p. 34.

[48] "Foreign Ministry Makes Statement," PAP, Jan. 11, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 14, 1991, pp. 34–35; and "Soviet Envoy 'Summoned' to Foreign Ministry," PAP, Jan. 11, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 14, 1991, p. 37.

[49] "Poland-Lithuania," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Jan. 15, 1991; "Declaration on the Issue of Lithuania," *Życie Warszawy*, Jan. 15, 1991; and "Lithuanians in Country Allowed Refugee Status," PAP, Jan. 13, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 14, 1991, p. 38.

[50] David Remnick, "Former Gorbachev Advisers Condemn Leadership as 'Criminal'," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1991.

[51] "Hungarian, Polish, CSFR Ministers Meet," Budapest Domestic Service, Jan. 21, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 25, 1991, pp. 1–2; and "View Baltics, Gulf, Pact," Budapest Domestic Service, Jan. 21, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 25, 1991, p. 2.

[52] Jan Obrman, "Czechoslovakia Reacts to Crackdown in the Baltic Republics," Radio Free Europe, *Report on Eastern Europe* (Munich), Feb. 8, 1991, p. 27.

[53] "Landsbergis Receives Polish Deputies in Vilnius," PAP, Jan. 14, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1991, p. 60; "Support for Lithuania," *Rzeczpospolita*, Jan. 16, 1991; "The OKP Delegation in Lithuania," ibid., Jan. 22, 1991; and "Polish Missions in the Baltic Republics," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Jan. 25, 1991.

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Polish society responded to the crackdown with declarations in support of Lithuania, with demonstrations, and with a massive relief effort. Many declarations and protest demonstrations called upon the government to recognize the Baltic states and immediately withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.[54] Even *Polska Zbrojna*—the Polish military's newspaper—condemned the violence in Lithuania.[55] One public opinion poll revealed that 62 percent of the Polish people believed that Poland should treat Lithuania as an independent state.[56]

The relief effort on behalf of Lithuania was perhaps the greatest ever undertaken in Poland. As noted above, the Council of Ministers instructed government agencies to assist this effort in all possible ways. Most of the effort was directed by the Polish Red Cross, but some of it was also undertaken by Solidarity. Drugs, medicine, clothing, food, bandages, and surgical gloves were donated. Collections were taken up in cities all across Poland. At one demonstration in Warsaw, 21 million złoty were collected; Varsovians in other parts of the city also took up their own collections. The Red Cross in Łódź sent a seven-ton supply of bandages, with another 20-ton supply to follow. From Katowice, Solidarity sent 24 tons of goods worth 120 million złoty. Committees for aid to Lithuania sprang up in Poznań, Lublin, Słupsk, Kielce, and Białystok. Help was offered from private sources, pharmacies, truck and car rental companies, and even the military.[57]

Poland's response to the crackdown in Lithuania was multifaceted, and pursued through a variety of channels by the government, parliament, and public. If the government could not take all the actions that society wanted it to, society itself could take some matters into its own hands. It did so by generating a relief effort on behalf of the Lithuanians. Yet, despite the actions of so many Poles in support of Lithuania, the events in that country, wrote one Polish observer, only confirmed in Poles a sense of their powerlessness. Their inability to change for the better the fate of the Lithuanians caused feelings of outrage, which were expressed at numerous demonstrations, and feelings of depression, when contemplating the tragic circumstances of a people to which the Poles feel close.[58]

Algirdas Saudargas, Lithuania's minister of foreign affairs, at a press conference in Warsaw on January 14, 1991.

—Radklewicz/CAF.

The issue of recognition. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Saudargas (who was in Poland during the massacre and its immediate aftermath) expressed his gratitude to the Polish people and government for their aid. He also took the opportunity to express his hope that Poland would soon formally recognize Lithuania.[59] This was not the first request from the Lithuanian government for recognition. At an April 20, 1990, news conference, government spokeswoman Niezabitowska stated that Prime Minister Mazowiecki had received a letter from President Landsbergis containing a proposal to recognize Lithuania.[60]

Indeed, the question arises—why does Poland not recognize Lithuania? Most Poles favor recognition. Adam Michnik promised in his speech to the Supreme

[54]"Lithuanians—We Are with You!" *Życie Warszawy,* Jan. 13, 1991; "Against Intervention in Lithuania," *Rzeczpospolita,* Jan. 15, 1991; "Support for Lithuania," ibid., Jan. 16, 1991; and "Solidarity Urges World Support," PAP, Jan. 15, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU,* Jan. 17, 1991, p. 27.

[55]" 'Policy of Suppression' Emerging in Baltics," *Polska Zbrojna* (Warsaw), Jan. 22, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU,* Jan. 25, 1991, pp. 43–44.

[56]"Poll Shows Response to 'Intervention' in Lithuania," PAP, Jan. 17, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU,* Jan. 22, 1991, p. 29.

[57]"Lithuanians—We Are with You!" loc. cit.; "Poland-Lithuania," loc. cit.; "Aid through the Polish Red Cross," *Rzeczpospolita,* Jan. 15, 1991; "Help for Lithuania," ibid., Jan. 19–20, 1991; "Fraternal Help for Lithuania," *Życie Warszawy,* Jan. 19–20, 1991; "Help for Lithuania," ibid., Jan. 22, 1991; and "The Shipment of Polish Benefactors to Panevėžys," *Tiesa,* Feb. 1, 1991.

[58]Janusz Tycner, "Fearful Glances at the Baltic," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Jan. 25, 1991.

[59]Stanisław Grzymski, " 'Stalinism Still Lives'," *Rzeczpospolita,* Jan. 14, 1991.

[60]PAP, Apr. 20, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* Apr. 24, 1990, pp. 45–46. Niezabitowska reported that a similar letter was sent to the heads of government of 30 other countries.

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Council that "Poland will grant all possible assistance" to Lithuania. Polish officials react very defensively when the subject of recognition comes up. At a January 1991 session of the Sejm Committee for Foreign Affairs and Relations with Poles Abroad, Skubiszewski said that Poland had done all it could for Lithuania.[61] When an interviewer from *Der Spiegel* asked new Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki why Poland did not recognize Lithuania, Bielecki retorted: "Why should we be the first?"[62] When a Hungarian interviewer opined that Warsaw's foreign policy was becoming "increasingly prudent" as far as Lithuania was concerned, foreign ministry spokesman Władysław Kłaczyński replied that Poland offered help quicker and did more for Lithuania than many other states.[63]

The answer to the question, of course, lies in Poland's fear of Moscow's reaction. Moscow responded angrily when Iceland announced its intention to recognize Lithuania,[64] and Poland has much more to lose by angering the Soviet Union than has Iceland. Polish officials continue to stress that the Soviet Union remains their country's neighbor, that Poland remains economically dependent on the Soviet Union, that Poland's security requires good relations with the Soviet Union, and that although the Soviet Union may be a sick bear, a sick bear can still use its paws.

Skubiszewski bases his rationale for nonrecognition on international law. He has said that diplomatic relations with "a territorial corporation" can only be undertaken if that state has effective control over its territory. Otherwise, permission to enter that country would have to be sought from an alien state that controls the borders of the country to which a prospective ambassador is requesting access.[65] It is not enough that Lithuanians have expressed an overwhelming desire for independence; as long as they do not have control over their territory, diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania could not be implemented in practice.

Polish officials have also used other arguments to justify Poland's stance. First, Skubiszewski has said that Poland could not recognize Lithuania unless other states also did so. Certainly, recognizing Lithuania at a time when Western countries were unwilling to take that step would have left Poland out on a limb. Such an action would have created doubts in the West about Warsaw's prudence in foreign affairs. Second, Polish officials have maintained that because recognition could not be implemented, the act of recognition would remain an empty gesture, and empty gestures would be of no help to Lithuania. Finally, Polish officials have noted that independent Poland never recognized the annexation of Lithuania by the Soviet Union.

Responding to domestic political pressure to recognize Lithuania, the Polish government has agreed in principle to the establishment of information bureaus from each of the three Baltic countries in Warsaw. In return, the Baltic states are to allow the establishment of Polish bureaus in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn. In time, said Skubiszewski, it would be possible to progress "to a higher level of [diplomatic] relations."[66] On March 7, 1991, the Lithuanian government delivered to the Polish government a series of proposals for agreements on economic cooperation, the establishment of information bureaus in each country's capital, treatment of national minorities, and a declaration on Polish-Lithuanian relations. The Polish government was to have responded to these proposals by March 25.[67] As of late April, Warsaw had not replied. One can only speculate on the reasons for the delay. The proposed agreements concern numerous complex issues, and Warsaw might simply need more time to deal with them. Or, the Polish government might want to use an agreement recently signed with Latvia to test the Kremlin's reaction and provide a precedent for even more far-reaching agreements with Lithuania.[68] Finally, it might also be the case that Warsaw seriously disagrees with Vilnius's proposals, and that the two sides will need more time to iron out their differences.

Issues in Polish-Lithuanian Relations

The efforts of the Polish and Lithuanian governments, and of ordinary Poles and Lithuanians, since March 11, 1990, have been geared toward overcoming mistrust

[61]"Skubiszewski on Relations with Lithuania," PAP, Jan. 16, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 17, 1991, p. 27.

[62]"Wałęsa Has the Last Word," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Jan. 28, 1991, p. 168.

[63]"Government Spokesman on Lithuania, Soviet Trains," *Népszabadság* (Budapest), Feb. 7, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 11, 1991, p. 38.

[64]"Landsbergis Reports Recognition," Radio Vilnius, Feb. 12, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, 1991, p. 74. Moscow reacted by criticizing Iceland's interference in the USSR's internal affairs and recalling its ambassador to Iceland back to the Soviet Union for consultations. "Note of the USSR Foreign Ministry," *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 15, 1991.

[65]"Skubiszewski Addresses Sejm on Security Issues," Warsaw Domestic Service, Feb. 14, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 15, 1991, p. 38.

[66]Quoted in Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Polish Reactions to the Lithuanian Crisis," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Feb. 8, 1991, p. 33; see also "Polish Missions in the Baltic Republics," loc. cit.

[67]"Lithuanian Proposals for Agreements with Poland," *Życie Warszawy*, Mar. 8, 1991.

[68]On March 26, Poland and Latvia signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation. "Latvia, Poland Sign Cooperation Agreement," PAP, Mar. 26, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 27, 1991, p. 47. See also "Latvia, Poland Preparing for Diplomatic Ties," DPA (Hamburg), Apr. 24, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 26, 1991, p. 38.

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between the two peoples. Representatives of both governments have tried to put their bilateral relations on a new foundation, and these efforts signify both a level of confidence in each other and a level of mutual recognition of the legitimacy of both Polish and Lithuanian aspirations that did not obtain in the interwar period—the last time the two peoples had the opportunity to carry on independent relations with each other.

It is a truism, however, that no nation can escape its history, and Poles and Lithuanians cannot escape theirs. Issues left over from the past remain to be resolved, and once Lithuania obtains its independence, if not before, they will have to be dealt with. The issues are the Polish minority in Lithuania and the recognition of the postwar border between the two countries. I will consider each in turn.

The Polish minority in Lithuania. Poles make up approximately 7 percent of Lithuania's population.[69] Ethnic Poles live mainly in the countryside surrounding Vilnius, with 67 percent of the population of the Vilnius district (which does not include the city of Vilnius) and 82 percent of the population of Šalčininkai district being ethnic Poles. Poles also make up almost 24 percent of the population of Trakai and almost 29 percent of the population of Švenčionys.[70]

Poles in Lithuania have felt discriminated against by the Lithuanians, particularly since the upsurge of national sentiment in the country associated with the rise of *Sąjūdis*. Too often, Poles believe, *Sąjūdis* or elements connected with *Sąjūdis*, have labeled them as simply Polonized Lithuanians who need to be "re-Lithuanianized."[71] Some Lithuanians simply refer to the Poles as *tutejsi* (*tuteišiai* in Lithuanian—"the locals"), people who have a regional as opposed to national identity and who therefore could be transformed into Lithuanians.[72]

But as in many other cases of national conflict, perceived ethnic inequalities with regard to access to and possession of economic and social resources are at the heart of the matter.[73] Poles in Lithuania are six times less likely to enter higher educational institutions than are Lithuanians.[74] A letter from an ethnic Pole from Lithuania to *Gazeta Wyborcza* claimed that predominantly Polish regions receive 50 percent less funding from the Vilnius government than the Lithuanian ones.[75] Elżbieta Sawicka, a Polish observer sympathetic to the Lithuanians, contrasted the cleaner, wealthier, more cultivated "Kaunas Lithuania" with the Vilnius region, where she found "a certain sadness—neglect, oblivion, poverty."[76] Ethnic Poles claim that their region has the lowest per capita number of doctors, hospitals, schools, and telephones in Lithuania. For their part, Lithuanians resent the "privileges" that Poles are said to enjoy—for example, their own schools, religious services in Polish, and their own newspapers.[77]

The two communities lack the crosscutting cleavages that could dilute ethnic conflict. Poles are mainly peasants and workers; there is no significant ethnically Polish intelligentsia that might act as interlocutors for the Polish community with the Lithuanian leadership. In addition, Poles in Lithuania have an aversion to things Lithuanian. They have been reluctant to learn the Lithuanian language; those who did make it into higher educational institutions learned Russian, which is both etymologically closer to Polish and, until recently, could be expected to be more valuable than Lithuanian in helping the Poles to better their life chances within the Soviet system. Not even the common Roman Catholic religion of Poles and Lithuanians has been able to mitigate the ethnic conflict. Indeed, the two sides fight over religious issues. After the Vilnius Cathedral was given back to the Lithuanian Catholic Church in 1988, Poles requested that some masses be conducted in Polish. The Lithuanian hierarchy refused.[78]

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[69]Saulius Girnius, "Migration to and from Lithuania," *Report on the USSR*, Sept. 14, 1990, p. 25.

[70]Yu. Stroganov, "Are They Playing the 'Polish Card'?" *Pravda*, Nov. 11, 1990; and Karen Lemiski, "Polish Political Activism in the USSR," *Report on the USSR*, Sept. 7, 1990, p. 15.

[71]Elżbieta Sawicka, "Šalčininkai," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Dec. 24–31, 1989; and "To Forget about Ancient Sins," ibid.

[72]Józefa Hennelowa, "In the Shadow of Rossa, in the Aura of the Ostra Brama," ibid., Dec. 4, 1988. The term "*tutejsi*" was first used by census officials in the Piłsudski regime as a category embracing Belorussians. See Andrejus Stepanovas, "Who Are the *Tutejsi*?" *Atgimimas* (Vilnius), Jan. 20, 1989.

[73]See Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics, a Conceptual Framework*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 39.

[74]Saulius Girnius and Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Current Issues in Polish-Lithuanian Relations," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Jan. 12, 1990, p. 41.

[75]"A Letter of a Pole from Lithuania," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Sept. 25, 1989.

[76]Sawicka, "Šalčininkai," loc. cit.; see also idem, "500 Kilometers from Vilnius," *Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 9, 1990.

[77]Alfred Erich Senn, *Lithuania Awakening*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1990, p. 99.

[78]Hennelowa, "In the Shadow of Rossa, in the Aura of the Ostra Brama," loc. cit.; "The Baltic Plague," loc. cit., p. 38; and Jastrun, loc. cit., p. 89. Lithuanians claimed that because Poles did not cooperate with them to pressure the communist government to return the cathedral to the Lithuanian church, they had no right to masses conducted in Polish.

To an outsider, some of the accusations leveled by each national group against the other look rather puerile. Lithuanians complained because Poles had their own half-hour program on Lithuanian television, because the Polish word Wilno rather than the Lithuanian word Vilnius was used on that program, and because Polish artisans from Poland hired to restore old buildings in Vilnius were not doing justice to Lithuanian architecture. Poles were upset about the Lithuanian tendency to Lithuanianize Polish names (Mickiewicz/Mickievičius; Orzeszkowa/Ožeškienė). Anna Nasiłkowska,"From Lithuania," *Res Publica*, April 1990, p. 80. See also Hennelowa, "In the Shadow of Rossa, in the Aura of the Ostra Brama," loc. cit.; Jastrun, loc. cit., p. 89; and Helena Gładkowska, "Will the Polish Restorers Leave Us?" *Kurier Wileński* (Vilnius), Sept. 12, 1990.

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Because relatively few Poles had ever chosen to learn Lithuanian, the Lithuanian language law passed on November 18, 1988, and follow-up legislation passed on January 25, 1989,[79] provoked strong resistance from the Polish community. The language law established Lithuanian as the official state language, and the follow-up legislation required all state officials to acquire at least a rudimentary knowledge of Lithuanian by January 21, 1991.[80] Poles believed that these measures did not take their concerns into account. They sought a longer transition period to put the language legislation into effect, and they also complained because the legislation accorded no official standing to the Polish language in those districts where Poles make up an overwhelming majority.

With so many grievances perceived as being met by stonewalling from the Lithuanian leadership, Poles took matters into their own hands. In mid-1989, some village soviets in the Vilnius and Šalčininkai districts proclaimed the establishment of Polish "national-territorial" units. The Lithuanian parliament asked the Poles to withdraw this legislation.[81] On September 7, 1989, at an extraordinary session of the Šalčininkai district soviet, the deputies proclaimed Šalčininkai a Polish national district. On September 16, deputies from the Vilnius district took a similar action. Five days later, the Lithuanian parliament annulled these decisions.[82] On May 23, 1990, the Šalčininkai district proclaimed itself a Polish National-Territorial District, where the constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was to remain in force. The Lithuanian Supreme Council quickly declared this decision invalid.[83] Finally, on October 7, 1990, in the most serious challenge to date, delegates from the Vilnius, Šalčininkai, Trakai, and Švenčionys districts met to proclaim a Polish National-Territorial District within the Republic of Lithuania.[84]

Not surprisingly, Lithuanian officials responded very negatively to this action. Virgilius Čepaitis called it one of a series of attempts to test the staying power of the Lithuanian people and offered no concessions.[85] The Lithuanian leadership, including Landsbergis and Prunskienė, tended to argue that such actions taken by the Poles were the result of machinations by *nomenklatura* elements still loyal to Moscow and did not reflect the true desires of people living in the region.[86]

The Lithuanian government used the stick and the carrot to answer that challenge. On December 27, 1990, the Supreme Council passed a law "On Administrative Rule in Separate Regions of Lithuania," which was meant to be applied to areas inhabited by Poles. It provided for the dissolution of local governing bodies, the suspension of laws on self-government, and the appointment of a commissioner by Vilnius to administer these areas directly in the event that they continued to resist the policies of the Lithuanian government.[87]

The Lithuanian government also made some concessions. First, Romualdas Ozolas, deputy prime minister and chairman of a commission set up to examine the problems of eastern Lithuania, recommended that implementation of the language law be postponed until 1995.[88] Second, on January 30, 1991, the Supreme Council gave the government until May 30 to prepare a plan for a new administrative-territorial district to be created out of the existing Vilnius and Šalčininkai districts. This district would unite most Poles in Lithuania within one administrative jurisdiction, and, on the basis of a minority-language law passed at about the same time, the Polish language would be guaranteed coequal official status in this jurisdiction along with Lithuanian. Third, the language law guaranteed minorities the right to instruction in their native language through the establishment of children's pre-school institutions, classes, and general-education schools, and required the establishment of faculties and branches in higher educational institutions for the training of teachers and other special-

[79]V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1989, p. 67; and Riina Kionka, "Are the Baltic Laws Discriminatory?" *Report on the USSR*, Apr. 12, 1991, p. 21.

[80]Sawicka, "Šalčininkai," loc. cit.

[81]N. Lashkevich, "In Lithuania: An Autonomous Polish District," *Izvestiya*, Oct. 10, 1990; and Vardys, "Lithuanian National Politics," loc. cit., p. 60.

[82]Sawicka, "Šalčininkai," loc. cit.; "Is This a Polish Holiday?" *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Sept. 11, 1989; Girnius and Sabbat-Swidlicka, loc. cit., p. 43; and "Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Passes Resolution," Radio Vilnius, Sept. 21, 1989, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 22, 1989, p. 69.

[83]"Residents of Polish District Issue Declaration," Moscow Domestic Service, May 23, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, May 24, 1990, p. 93; "Council Declares Šalčininkai Decision 'Invalid'," TASS (Moscow), May 24, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, May 25, 1990, pp. 86–87; and the interview with Chairman of the Vilnius district soviet and USSR People's Deputy Anicet Brodawski, "The Mechanism of Leaving . . . the Poles," *Lietuvos Rytas*, June 14, 1990.

[84]Elżbieta Sawicka, "District Proclaimed in Eišiškės," *Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 20–21, 1990.

[85]Ibid.

[86]"Lithuanian Prime Minister Views Polish Ties," PAP, Mar. 28, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 28, 1990, p. 97; "Landsbergis on Soviet Talks, Polish Autonomy," Vilnius International Service, Sept. 13, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 14, 1990, p. 60; and "Lithuanians Condemn CPSU-Backed 'Incitement'," Vilnius International Service, Oct. 4, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 5, 1990, p. 69.

Evidence for the ties of ethnic Polish officials to Moscow may be found in Sawicka, "Šalčininkai," loc. cit.; Karp, Nowakowski, and Sawicka, loc. cit., p. 80; Elżbieta Sawicka and Marek J. Karp, "Lithuania: Toward Independence," ibid., Mar. 25, 1990; Mirosław Ikonowicz, "Cold War from Lithuania," *Polityka*, Apr. 7, 1990; and Jacek Borkowicz, "Between a Gesture and a Provocation," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Oct. 5, 1990.

[87]"Dissatisfaction of Poles Is Growing in Lithuania," *Życie Warszawy*, Dec. 29, 1990.

[88]"Polish Autonomy Move Viewed," Vilnius Domestic Service, Oct. 4, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 9, 1990, p. 86.

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ists necessary to satisfy the needs of ethnic minorities.[89]

These actions promised to ease relations between Poles and Lithuanians in Lithuania. In addition, the Soviet crackdown in mid-January prompted Poles and Lithuanians to begin to reconcile their differences. In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, one public opinion poll showed that 66 percent of ethnic Poles supported Lithuania's independence.[90] Leaders of the Union of Poles in Lithuania (*Związek Polaków na Litwie*) called upon Poles to vote in favor of independence in the government's February 9 plebiscite on this issue. But most Poles did not heed the call of their leaders and boycotted the vote, in which 90.5 percent of those who participated opted for independence.[91] Moreover, although results were not tabulated according to ethnic background, there was a heavy turn-out in Šalčininkai for the USSR government's March 17, 1991, referendum on the future of the Union. Those who voted in this district strongly favored retention of the Union and, by implication, Lithuania's presence in it.[92] The results of the plebiscite and the referendum show that despite the Vilnius government's recent concessions, ethnic Polish distrust of Lithuanians and the Vilnius government will not be easily overcome.

Although Poland's leaders have not taken an official position on the various autonomy declarations issued by ethnic Poles in Lithuania, unofficially they have tried to discourage such actions. For example, an article about Skubiszewski in *Polityka* reported that he did not support the ethnic Poles' drive to establish an autonomous jurisdiction in Lithuania.[93] Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, an adviser to the Sejm on Poland's eastern policy, contended that Poles should openly express their disagreement with some of the statements and actions of Poles in Lithuania.[94]

The Polish government has not backed the various autonomy declarations of ethnic Poles in Lithuania for fear of jeopardizing its relations with the Lithuanian government by engaging in actions that would certainly be deemed by Vilnius as interference in its internal affairs. In addition, any support for the autonomy declarations would have raised concerns about Polish revanchism, since they were perceived by the Lithuanians as a threat to the territorial integrity of their country. Indeed, some Lithuanians regarded the autonomy declarations as a step on the road to the creation of a Polish republic in eastern Lithuania, either as part of the USSR or, in the event of a breakup of the Soviet Union, as separate from Lithuania.[95] Against this backdrop, Polish support for the autonomy declarations would have created fears in Belorussia and Ukraine about Polish territorial claims against these two Soviet republics as well, both of which have substantial populations of ethnic Poles and now occupy territories that were part of Poland in the interwar period. Finally, inasmuch as the actions of ethnic Poles were believed to have been a consequence of manipulations by Moscow, the Polish government did not wish to be perceived in Lithuania as cooperating with elements loyal to Moscow against the *Sąjūdis* government.

At the same time, the Polish government and opinion-makers in Poland are concerned about the Polish minority in Lithuania, and they have tried several approaches to improve the lot of their co-nationals. One answer to the question of what to do about this minority without interfering in Lithuania's internal affairs has been to establish ties with moderate Polish leaders in that country—Czesław Okińczyc being the best example. However, this attempt will not be easy. Until recently, Poles were unable to establish *any* meaningful contacts with their co-nationals in Lithuania. The Soviet government and the government of communist Poland discouraged such relations. In addition, Poles traveling to Lithuania in recent years all but neglected the Polish population in Lithuania in favor of contacts with Lithuanians. These Poles (some of whom are now in the government or in the parliament) were almost exclusively intellectuals, and it was natural for them to try to cultivate relations with their Lithuanian counterparts, with whom they share common interests. Finally, leaders of the Polish community in Lithuania until recently were Communist-party officials—not the kind of people with whom independent-minded Polish intellectuals, either privately or as members of the Solidarity government, would want to establish close ties.

For its part, the Polish community in Lithuania has felt betrayed by the Polish government and especially by Solidarity. One ethnic Pole from Lithuania bitterly complained that when Solidarity delegations came to Lithu-

[89]N. Lashkevich and A. Protsenko, "The Vilnius District in Lithuania," *Izvestiya*, Jan. 30, 1991. For the law on minority languages, see "Law of the Republic of Lithuania. On the Introduction of Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on National Minorities," *Ekho Litvy*, Feb. 1, 1991.

[90]"Poll Shows 'Almost 93 Percent' Favor Independence," TASS, Jan. 22, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 23, 1991, p. 71.

[91]Andrzej Gelberg, "The Lithuanians Said YES," *Tygodnik Solidarność*, Feb. 15, 1991.

[92]Olena Skwiecińska, "Lithuania: Poles for the USSR," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Mar. 20, 1991. There were irregularities in the voting. According to Ryszard Maciejkaniec, chief of the Polish faction in the Supreme Council and a leader of the Union of Poles in Lithuania, the turn-out would have been lower had not officials gone door-to-door collecting votes.

[93]"So That We Are Not Forgotten by Destiny," *Polityka*, Oct. 27, 1990.

[94]Lemiski, loc. cit., pp. 16–17.

[95]For Lithuanians, the autonomy declarations inevitably recalled the state of Central Lithuania, proclaimed after General Żeligowski's action in 1920.

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ania, they talked only to *Sąjūdis* leaders, not to ethnic Poles.[96] Another ethnic Pole accused Poland of "butchering" the Polish community in Lithuania, of cooperating with *Sąjūdis* to "finish off" the Poles living in Lithuania.[97] Thus, there is an enormous amount of distrust on both sides.

Polish government officials have, nevertheless, found some ethnic Polish leaders with whom to cooperate. I have already mentioned Okińczyc. Two other deputies to the Supreme Council from the city of Vilnius—Dr. Medard Czobot, director of the Vilnius Institute of Experimental Medicine, and Zygmunt Balcewicz, editor of the newspaper *Kurier Wileński*—also fall into this category.[98] Government officials and parliamentarians have also invited Polish leaders from the Vilnius district and Šalčininkai to Warsaw. There, they have attempted to persuade these people to moderate their demands vis-à-vis the Lithuanian government in exchange for assurances that Poland would attempt to persuade the Lithuanian government to make some concessions.[99] On their recent visits to Lithuania, Polish parliamentarians have no doubt talked with ethnic Polish leaders as well, many of whom are deputies to the Supreme Council.[100]

Polish government officials and parliamentarians have stressed to the Lithuanians the importance of solving the problems of the Polish minority in their country. The letter "To Our Friends the Lithuanians" of November 1989 asked for tolerance on the part of Lithuanians toward the Polish minority. During the March 1990 visit of the OKP delegation to Lithuania, its members pressed for concessions to ethnic Poles living there.[101] Foreign Minister Skubiszewski has spoken of this problem several times and took it up in a personal meeting with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Saudargas.[102] Recently, Skubiszewski complained in a speech to the Sejm about the treatment accorded to the Polish minority, although he later praised the Lithuanian government for the laws on minority rights it passed in late January, ascribing them in part to pressure exerted by the Polish government and parliament.[103]

Perhaps the most efficacious way of persuading the Lithuanian government to improve the lot of Lithuania's Poles would be to implement a consistent and effective policy to do the same for ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland. During the communist period, the Polish constitution ignored the existence of national minorities in the country.[104] Not surprisingly, the Lithuanian minority, which is estimated to number anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000 people, remained all but neglected by the communist regime. Virgilius Čepaitis has said that Lithuanians in Poland enjoy fewer rights than do Poles in Lithuania.[105] No Lithuanian-language books were printed in Poland; no teachers of Lithuanian were trained in Poland; and very few resources were given to the Lithuanian community to fund its educational and cultural endeavors. Mazowiecki promised to improve conditions for Poland's Lithuanians, and there has been some progress of late. One request—that the Lithuanian Social and Cultural Society's quarterly journal *Aušra* be allowed to become a monthly—has been granted. In addition, the Polish government has given 1 billion złoty for the construction of a Lithuanian cultural center in Puńsk. (In an example of the kind of quid pro quo that might be generated by actions of this kind, the Lithuanian government has promised to support the construction of a Polish cultural center in Eišiškės.)[106]

As long as Lithuania's struggle for independence continues, the Polish government will not place great pressure on the Lithuanian government to resolve the problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania for fear of playing into Moscow's hands and weakening the ability of the Lithuanian regime to resist Moscow. Once Lithuania gains its independence, and if the problems encountered by the Polish and Lithuanian ethnic minorities are not resolved, this issue will come to the forefront. Recent events have shown that in Southeastern and Central Europe, treatment of ethnic minorities has become a problem in state-to-state relations between various countries. Witness the Hungarian-Romanian dispute over the treatment of Hungarians in Transylva-

[96]Nasiłkowska, loc. cit., p. 80.

[97]Karp, Nowakowski, and Sawicka, loc. cit., p. 91.

[98]Sawicka and Karp, loc. cit.

[99]In addition to Okińczyc, Czobot, and Balcewicz, ethnic Polish leaders known to have been in Warsaw over the past year include Anicet Brodawski, and the following deputies to the Lithuanian Supreme Council: Walentyna Subocz, Leon Jankielewicz, Edward Tomaszewicz, Ryszard Maciejkaniec, and Stanisław Pieszko. "Poles in Lithuania," *Rzeczpospolita*, Sept. 7, 1990; " 'The Polish-Lithuanian Border Is What It Is'," *Kurier Wileński*, Sept. 12, 1990; and "It Is Easier for Poles in Lithuania," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Feb. 5, 1991.

[100]During the OKP delegation's visit to Vilnius on March 27, 1990, its members met with ethnic Polish leaders Pieszko, Jankielewicz, and Tomaszewicz, all described as "pro-Soviet" by Józefa Hennelowa. "From Midnight to Midnight," loc. cit.

[101]Ibid.

[102]"It Is Possible to Disagree about the Scale of Success," loc. cit.

[103]For Skubiszewski's complaints, see "Nothing about Poland without Poland," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Jan. 24, 1990. For his praise of the Lithuanians, see "Skubiszewski Addresses Sejm on Security Issues," loc. cit., p. 37.

[104]Georg Brunner, et al., *Before Reforms: Human Rights in the Warsaw Pact States, 1972–1988*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 364.

[105]Sawicka, "District Proclaimed in Eišiškės," loc. cit.

[106]Girnius and Sabbat-Swidlicka, loc. cit., p. 40; "Jagiełło Talks with the Lithuanians," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Oct. 8, 1990; "Trust Is Necessary," *Życie Warszawy*, Nov. 28, 1990; and "Jagiełło Comes to an Agreement with the Lithuanians," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Dec. 8–9, 1990.

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nia, and Hungary's dispute with Slovakia over the conditions of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Slovak minority in Hungary. Addressing the respective problems of the Polish and Lithuanian ethnic minorities, therefore, will be crucial to the future of state-to-state relations between Poland and Lithuania.

Resolving this problem will also be crucial to Vilnius's relations with Moscow. Most obviously, elements loyal to Moscow cannot exploit the problems of Lithuania's Polish minority for their own ends if those problems have been resolved. Certainly, a complete resolution of the problems of the Polish minority is too much to expect, at least in the short term. But Poland could play a potentially significant role. If Polish government officials and parliamentarians continue their effort to persuade the Lithuanian government to do what it can to ease conditions for the Polish minority and if Poles in Lithuania perceive that effort to be consistent and efficacious, they may come to regard Warsaw, not Moscow, as their advocate. Moscow would thereby be deprived of one of the instruments it has used to obstruct Lithuania's independence drive.

The border. As a consequence of the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and related agreements, Lithuania gained territories that had belonged to Poland in the interwar period. According to the secret protocols of the Pact, Lithuania and eastern Poland were to fall within the Soviet sphere of influence. After the Soviet Union's conquest of eastern Poland in September 1939, Stalin gave Vilnius to Lithuania. In the fall of 1940, after Lithuania was annexed by the Soviet Union, Lithuania received additional Polish territories that Stalin had originally given to Belorussia. The postwar Polish-Soviet border, which was imposed on Poland by Stalin, was confirmed in an August 16, 1945, Polish-Soviet treaty.[107] In declaring their independence, the Lithuanians repudiated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact once and for all, but they do not reject the territorial changes brought about by the Pact—border changes that redounded to Lithuania's advantage. Moreover, the Polish-Soviet treaty of 1945 was concluded "over the heads" of the Lithuanians, so to speak, and thus they fear that its terms would no longer apply to the Polish-Lithuanian border in the event that Lithuania gained its independence from the USSR or the USSR itself disintegrated.

The Lithuanians fear that Poland might in the future attempt to reclaim territories—especially Vilnius—that have a profound cultural and historical significance for their nation.[108] Landsbergis himself voiced this concern when he called upon Poland to "give Lithuania a guarantee of the inviolability of its eastern border. Only in this way," he said, "can new areas of tension and political speculation be avoided."[109] The number of times this subject has come up in talks or meetings between Polish and Lithuanian leaders is also evidence of its importance. The first sentence of the letter "To Our Friends the Lithuanians" reads: "We believe the time has come to say outright that no one in Poland has any territorial pretensions with regard to lands that belonged to Poland in the interwar period."[110] The communiqué issued by the two sides during the visit of the OKP delegation to Vilnius assured the Lithuanians that the border between Poland and Lithuania would be recognized by the Poles as permanent.[111] The border was also a subject of discussion between Prime Ministers Mazowiecki and Prunskienė in their meeting on June 21, 1990.

Poland is unlikely to make border claims against its eastern neighbors; Polish demands on Lithuania, Belorussia, or Ukraine would encourage German groups, if not the German government itself, to call for the reassessment of the November 1990 German-Polish treaty confirming Poland's postwar western border. Moreover, any territorial claims by Warsaw would impede Poland's progress on its "road to Europe."

Apart from statements made in conjunction with Lithuanian leaders, Polish leaders have given other oral assurances that their country will make no territorial claims on Lithuania. In May 1990, Skubiszewski affirmed that "Poland has no territorial pretensions to [its] former eastern lands" and that "Vilnius is no longer a Polish city but a Lithuanian city." He restated that position in September 1990.[112] Most recently, President Wałęsa, when asked whether Poland might claim its former eastern territories, retorted: "Sir, we are talking about a piece of land on the moon."[113]

Just as oral assurances by German leaders on the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line were not sufficient for Poles, so Polish oral assurances on the Polish-Lithuanian border will not be sufficient to still Lithuanian concerns. A Polish-Lithuanian border treaty similar to the

[107]See Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1982, Vol. 2, p. 509. In return for ceding its former eastern territories to the Soviet Union, Poland received territorial compensation in the west.

[108]Stomma, "A New Neighborhood," loc. cit.

[109]"Landsbergis Discusses Ties with Germany," ADN International Service (East Berlin), Sept. 30, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV,* Oct. 1, 1990, p. 71.

[110]Loc. cit.

[111]"Who Is Giving the Orders," loc. cit.

[112]"The Lack of a Security System," *Rzeczpospolita,* May 15, 1990; and Jerzy Stankiewicz, "Poland and the East," ibid., Sept. 8–9, 1990.

[113]"President Wałęsa Interviewed on Phone-in Program," Warsaw Domestic Service, Feb. 14, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU,* Feb. 5, 1991, p. 33.

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German-Polish border treaty is out of the question at this time because such a treaty can only be concluded between independent states and Poland has not formally recognized that Lithuania is independent. However, as I have noted above, Poland has signed cooperation and friendship agreements with Russia and Ukraine, and these agreements contain clauses that obligate each party to recognize existing borders. Something similar will probably be included in one or more of the Polish-Lithuanian agreements now under discussion. These agreements would remain in force until Lithuania gains its independence. Once Lithuania does become independent, it is certain that Poland and Lithuania will conclude a border treaty establishing the postwar border between the two countries as permanent. Until then, the Lithuanians will continue to be concerned about possible Polish claims.

Conclusion

During the period covered by this article, relations between Warsaw and Vilnius have been dependent on relations between Vilnius and Moscow and between Warsaw and Moscow. While acting prudently to avoid repercussions with the Soviet Union, numerous Polish actions in support of Lithuania have been responses to the Kremlin's actions against that country. Moscow's stance has determined the limits of the possible in Polish-Lithuanian relations.

Much of the future of Polish-Lithuanian relations also rests on Moscow's stance. If the Soviet Union resorts to direct presidential rule or martial law in Lithuania, Polish-Lithuanian relations will be frozen until something resembling the status quo ante is restored. The Polish government would protest the action to the Soviet government directly and would coordinate its protest with other East-Central European states. The government would probably do what it could to offer Lithuanians political asylum. Parliament and society would also voice their concerns. But there would be little Poles could do to undo martial law in Lithuania.

If Vilnius-Moscow relations remain in the pattern they have been in since March 1990—with negotiations promised by Moscow but never brought to any consequence, with positive and negative signals emanating from Moscow depending on political circumstances there, and with the threat of further violence hanging like a sword over Lithuania—official relations between Poland and Lithuania will not progress beyond the level of interest bureaus. However, it is unlikely that this course of events would last for long, without being resolved either by presidential rule or by a breakthrough toward independence.

Most difficult to predict will be the course of Polish-Lithuanian relations in the event that Lithuania does achieve its independence. So much will depend on whether this independence is achieved as a result of a civil war and the collapse of the Soviet Union or peacefully, as the result of a negotiated settlement. If the process is violent, it is best not to make any predictions about the future. After a peaceful process of emancipation, however, Poland will be among the first states to offer Lithuania diplomatic recognition. From then on, relations will in large measure depend on whether both countries are democracies and on the treatment accorded to the Lithuanian minority in Poland and to the Polish minority in Lithuania. Minority rights, like the border between the two countries, will probably be regulated by treaty. Poland could also be a bridge to Europe for the Lithuanians. For example, Poland could ease Lithuania's way into regional cooperation arrangements now taking shape in Central Europe.

State-to-state relations are only one aspect of the relations between Poland and Lithuania. Undergirding these relations are the attitudes held by each nation toward the other. In the future, much will depend on these attitudes as well. In all probability, Poles will continue to feel a historical and cultural attachment to Lithuania and be positively disposed toward its people. But if Lithuanians continue to view contemporary Poles through the prism of negative historical experiences with Poland, and if they continue to believe that Poles harbor revanchist aims with regard to Lithuanian territory, they will be unable to reciprocate Polish feelings. On the other hand, if Lithuanians come to see their past connections with Poland in a more favorable light and if Lithuanians are able to build on recent positive relations with Poland, then the chances for trust and understanding will improve considerably.

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Eastern Europe and the "Energy Shock" of 1990–91

John M. Kramer

The "energy shock" of 1990–91, brought about by the USSR's substantial reductions in the volume of, and increases in the price for, its energy exports, constitutes one of the preeminent challenges facing the postcommunist regimes of Eastern Europe.[1] A Polish source claims that these exports are so vital to Poland that even during the Brezhnev years, Poles were "less fearful of tanks" than the possibility that the USSR would "shut off the oil pipeline to us."[2] President Václav Havel of Czechoslovakia argues that the current "energy shock" represents both a political and economic problem for his country: "The oil problem is not only a matter of business and dollars, but of the stability of a country."[3] The Prime Minister of Bulgaria bluntly declared that in 1991 "we will face hellish difficulties in anything related to oil supply."[4]

Several variables will determine whether these constitute realistic or hyperbolic assessments. Most fundamentally, how much energy, and at what terms of trade, will Eastern Europe import from the USSR and the international market? Second, what will be the magnitude of assistance that Western states—both bilaterally and multilaterally through organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Economic Community (EEC)—extend to Eastern Europe to mitigate the impact of the "energy shock" and revitalize economies in the region? Third, can East European regimes muster the requisite political will and economic resources to reduce substantially their now absurdly excessive consumption of energy? Answers to these questions undoubtedly will vary in each East European state, given their political, economic, and geographical diversity. Overall, the available evidence indicates that the "energy shock" has generated considerable short-run dislocations but that Eastern Europe has the potential to mitigate them over the longer run.

All East European countries, except Poland, have an energy gap—their primary energy consumption exceeds primary energy production. East European countries have closed their energy gaps since the late 1960's primarily through importation from the USSR. The construction of crude-oil and natural-gas pipelines and a uniform electric-power grid in the 1960's considerably augmented the capacity of the Soviet Union to export energy to Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe has imported almost all of its natural gas, 80 percent of its imports of crude oil and petroleum products, and more than 70 percent of its imports of hard coal from the Soviet Union. In 1985, all East European countries except Romania obtained more than 75 percent of their total imports of energy from the Soviet Union. The figure for Romania—reflecting its pursuit of independence from Moscow during the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu—was 19 percent.[5]

These imports were essential to the Stalinist model of

John M. Kramer is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Mary Washington College (Fredericksburg, VA). He has authored The Energy Gap in Eastern Europe *(1990) and numerous articles in professional journals on political life in Eastern Europe.*

[1] I use the term Eastern Europe to refer to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. East Germany is not considered because of its unification with West Germany.

[2] *Słowo Polskie* (Wrocław), Aug. 7, 1990, in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *JPRS-EER*), Sept. 24, 1990, p. 13.

[3] ČTK (Prague), Oct. 7, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Oct. 11, 1990, p. 15.

[4] *Duma* (Sofia), Dec. 16, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 24, 1990, p. 9.

[5] For a detailed analysis of these issues, see John M. Kramer, *The Energy Gap in Eastern Europe*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1990.

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economic development that the Soviet Union imposed on Eastern Europe after World War II. This model pursued economic development primarily through extensive growth (quantitative increases in factor inputs) rather than intensive growth (qualitative increases in factor productivity). It stressed the forced-draft development of energy-intensive industries, including steel, chemicals, and mining. Energy resources became a principal sinew of the new industrial infrastructure. That the East European countries consume from 30 to 50 percent more energy than do industrialized capitalist countries to produce similar units of national income largely derives from this circumstance.[6]

The Soviet–East European energy relationship has been characterized by considerable tension from the start. By the late 1960's, the USSR was already arguing that its energy reserves were insufficient to satisfy internal demand, earn requisite hard currency through export to the international market, and close Eastern Europe's energy gap.[7] The USSR complained that Eastern Europe paid for Soviet energy (which was readily tradeable on international markets) primarily with "soft goods," whose quality was far below prevailing world standards. Further, the price Eastern Europe paid for Soviet oil and other energy resources after 1973 (when world-market prices—"WMP's"—began escalating dramatically) lagged far behind comparable WMP's for these commodities.[8] Hungarian economists estimated that in 1984, the actual price paid by East Europeans for Soviet oil was approximately 60 percent below the prevailing WMP.[9] The USSR stressed the opportunity costs it suffered by exporting energy to Eastern Europe rather than to the international market. Energy exports account for upwards of 80 percent of the hard currency the USSR earns annually.[10]

In response, the East European countries contended (with considerable justification) that several factors made the actual price of Soviet energy to them far higher than these data indicate. For example, the USSR forced East European countries to purchase Soviet "soft goods" at inflated prices as compensation for its alleged losses from energy sales. East European countries were forced to extend substantially undervalued credits to the Soviet Union to assist it in exploiting indigenous energy reserves. Finally, the Soviets demanded that Eastern Europe pay for a portion of its energy in convertible currency and high-quality ("hard") goods.[11]

Whatever the respective merits of these contending arguments,[12] Soviet energy exports to Eastern Europe continued to expand rapidly throughout the 1970's. Then, suddenly, in 1982 the USSR announced that it would reduce by about 10 percent its planned deliveries of oil to the region between 1982 and 1985.[13] Economic considerations apparently prompted this action. The USSR sought to divert oil exports from Eastern Europe to the world market to forestall losses in hard-currency earnings it would otherwise have incurred from the then rapidly declining WMP's for oil.[14] In subsequent years, the Soviets again increased their oil exports to Eastern Europe. The overall volume of these exports in 1987 exceeded the volume for 1981, with only Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia importing less than in 1981.[15] Most important, "oil for 'soft goods' " continued to predominate in this exchange. East Europe's communist regimes adroitly managed to increase Soviet deliveries by exploiting Soviet fears that drastic alterations in this trade could engender political turmoil in the region:

All a leader from one of the fraternal countries had to do was to bamboozle one of the higher representatives of the Soviet leadership . . . with the possibility of instability in the particular "link of the socialist community" headed by him, and, when he implied there was a prospect of geostrategic instability in this connection, he then could boldly appeal for . . . Soviet petrodollars.[16]

The "energy shock" of 1990–91 represents an end to the era of cheap and plentiful energy from the USSR. As

[6]*New Times* (Moscow), Jan. 12, 1987, p. 32.

[7]See, for example, *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), December 1971.

[8]This circumstance derived from the fact that prices for individual commodities in Soviet–East European trade were adjusted annually based on the average WMP for that commodity in the preceding five years. Hence, the Soviet price for oil continued to lag behind the comparable WMP so long as the latter price continued to increase. Kramer, op. cit., p. 26, discusses this issue in detail.

[9]Cited in Radio Free Europe, *Background Report (Economics)* (Munich), No. 155, Aug. 24, 1984.

[10]*Arguments and Facts International* (London), Nos. 7–9, 1990, p. 48.

[11]Kramer, op. cit., p. 28, elaborates upon these points.

[12]For discussions by Western scholars of these issues, see Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe—A Comment*, Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983; Josef Brada, "Soviet Subsidization of Eastern Europe: The Primacy of Economics Over Politics?" *Journal of Comparative Economics* (Lake Forest, IL), No. 9, 1985; and Kazimierz Poznański, "Opportunity Cost in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe: Discussion of Methodology and New Evidence," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1988.

[13]The Soviet action appeared to surprise East European leaders. For example, a year earlier, Erich Honecker, the East German party leader, speaking at the party's congress in April 1981, had asserted that annual deliveries of oil from the USSR "have been securely agreed upon on a long-term basis." *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Apr. 12, 1981.

[14]As one Western analyst observes, the Soviet Union responded to declining prices by "frantically trying to remain in the market, even at the expense of its allies." *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Mar. 16, 1983.

[15]Data for 1981 compiled from *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), Feb. 1, 1984; *Svět Hospodářství* (Prague), Oct. 1, 1985; and *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Mar. 13. 1984. Data for 1987 from *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1987* (The USSR's Foreign Trade in 1987), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1988, Table 17.

[16]*Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 23, 1990.

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Table 1: East European Imports of Crude Oil from the USSR, 1989–91 (millions of metric tons)

	1989 (Actual)	1990 (Estimated)	Percent change (1989-1990)	1991 (Estimated)[2]	Percent change (1989-1991)
Bulgaria	11.46	7.80[1]	-31.9	6.5 (5.0)[2]	-43.3
Czechoslovakia	16.60	11.50[1]	-30.7	10.5 (7.5)[2]	-36.7
Hungary	6.32	5.09	-19.5	3.5 (1.0)[2]	-44.6
Poland	13.03	9.12	-30.0	6.0 (4.5)[2]	-54.0
Romania	3.94	3.40	-13.7	NA	NA
Eastern Europe	52.35	36.91	-29.5	26.5	-49.4[3]

[1]Actual.
[2]"Guaranteed" deliveries in parentheses.
[3]Estimate excludes Romania.

SOURCES: *Vneshniye ekonomicheskiye svyazi SSSR v 1989 g.* (The USSR's Foreign Economic Relations in 1989), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1990; *Duma* (Sofia), Feb. 15, 1991, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Feb. 21, 1991, p. 17; ČTK (Prague), Feb. 13, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 15, 1991, p. 14; *Hospodářské Noviny* (Prague), Feb. 7, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 13, 1990, p. 27; MTI (Budapest), Sept. 3, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 4, 1990, p. 25; MTI, Nov. 24, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 26, 1990, p. 37; *Der Standard* (Vienna), Sept. 13, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 14, 1990, p. 1; PAP (Warsaw), Dec. 22, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 24, 1990, p. 111; *Gazeta International* (Warsaw), No. 44, 1990; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 22, 1990.

one Soviet source colorfully phrases it, the Soviet Union is forcing Eastern Europe to go "cold turkey" by ending the "oil fix" to it.[17] What this circumstance portends for the future welfare of the East European polities constitutes the focus of this article.

The "Energy Shock" of 1990–91

As late as mid-1990, the USSR agreed, reportedly after acrimonious negotiations, to maintain its then current level of oil exports to Eastern Europe through 1995.[18] The USSR also agreed to consider the export of more natural gas than had been contracted for between 1991–95.[19]

The Soviet Union will not meet these commitments. First, in 1990, the USSR failed to meet its planned deliveries of crude oil to Eastern Europe. Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov announced at the 28th CPSU Congress in June that shortages of fuel on the domestic market compelled the USSR to reduce its exports of crude oil, including those to Eastern Europe, by 7 million metric tons (MMT). A Soviet source subsequently reported that "all the signs" indicated that in 1990 the USSR would export to Eastern Europe approximately 20 percent less crude than it did in 1989.[20] Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe actually declined by 30 percent rather than the estimated 20 percent. Table 1 indicates that in 1991 East European states could experience further decreases in Soviet oil deliveries compared to 1990 unless they manage to conclude bilateral contracts for this commodity with individual Soviet union republics.

For several reasons, these estimates are highly tentative. First, the USSR could again renege on its "guaranteed" oil commitments to Eastern Europe. Second, the East Europeans—presumably acting upon information received from the USSR—have repeatedly revised their estimates of the volume of crude oil they would receive from the Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991. For example, Deputy Premier Vladimir Dlouhý of Czechoslovakia estimated in July 1990 that his country would receive 14.07 MMT of crude from the USSR in 1990. In October, Czechoslovakia's deputy minister of foreign trade provided an estimate of 12.6 MMT. Shortly thereafter, the press secretary for Czechoslovak President

[17]Ibid.

[18]For the Soviet pledges to Czechoslovakia and Poland to maintain existing ratios in exports of energy to these two countries, see, respectively, Prague Television Service, July 17, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 18, 1990, p. 15; and *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Sept. 14, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 24, 1990, p. 56. Prime Minister Károly Grósz of Hungary reported in 1988 that the USSR was "ready to maintain existing ratios" in exports of energy to Hungary through 1995. *Népszabadság* (Budapest), July 9, 1988. A Polish source reports that the projected volume of Soviet oil deliveries to Poland in 1991–95 was so contentious that it could be resolved only by the respective prime ministers of the two countries. *Tygodnik Kulturalny* (Warsaw), Sept. 4, 1988, in *JPRS-EER*, Nov. 23, 1988, p. 2.

[19]For example, when Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki journeyed to Moscow in November 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov reportedly "agreed to analyze the possibilities" of meeting Mazowiecki's request for increased deliveries of natural gas to Poland in 1991–95. Warsaw Television Service, Dec. 5, 1989, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 7, 1989, p. 85. For the pledge to increase Soviet deliveries of natural gas to Bulgaria in 1990, see *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Apr. 17, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Apr. 26, 1990, p. 2.

[20]See Moscow Television Service, July 7, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV* (Supplement), July 9, 1990, p. 36; and *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 29, 1990.

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Václav Havel stated that Czechoslovakia might receive barely 9 MMT of crude from the USSR in 1990.[21] Poland provides another example. Jerzy Osiatyński, chief of the Office of Central Planning, contends that the USSR officially informed Poland in August 1990 that in 1991 deliveries of crude oil would "amount to zero." Poland's vice-minister for foreign economic cooperation subsequently indicated that the Soviet Union would deliver 8 MMT of crude oil to Poland in 1991.[22] One Hungarian official informs that in "preliminary talks," the USSR offered to supply Hungary with 4 MMT of crude in 1991.[23] However, the 1991 bilateral trade pacts with Poland and Hungary specify that this year the USSR will deliver to them 4.5 MMT and 1 MMT of crude respectively.[24]

Yet the tumultuous—and rapidly evolving—political relationship in the USSR between the central political authorities and the union republics could drastically alter these estimates. Reportedly, Czechoslovakia has devised three scenarios for this relationship and the consequences thereof for exports of energy and raw materials.[25] The first, the so-called "Gorbachev" scenario, assumes that the center will retain primary control over the volume and terms of trade for energy exports. The second scenario envisions these matters devolving largely to the union republics. The third scenario foresees individual regions and enterprises controlling a "certain proportion" of the energy they extract. In the last scenario, Czechoslovakia would "throw in its lot with Tyumen' oblast [in the Russian republic]," which extracts approximately two-thirds of Soviet oil annually.

Elements of the second and third scenarios are emerging. In 1990, Czechoslovakia concluded a bilateral contract with an oil production firm in Tyumen' oblast to purchase 500,000 tons of crude oil. Czechoslovakia will pay for the oil with goods, including trucks, buses, bulldozers, and a "large batch" of consumer goods.[26] The 1991 trade protocols concluded between the USSR and East European countries permit the latter to deal directly with individual Soviet union republics for energy and raw materials. Reportedly, the USSR has "not ruled out" the possibility that in addition to the 5 MMT of crude oil "guaranteed" in the trade protocol, such deals could bring Bulgaria an additional 1.5 MMT of oil in 1991. Hungary "can hope" in 1991 to receive an additional 1–2 MMT of crude oil in the same manner. Czechoslovakia is negotiating directly with the Russian republic for upwards of 3 MMT of crude oil annually. The agreements could entail direct Czechoslovak participation in the exploitation of energy reserves located in the Russian republic.[27] Yet Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Václav Vales asserts that concluding and honoring such agreements will prove "very difficult."[28] For one thing, Soviet producers can only honor such agreements with whatever energy reserves remain after fulfilling their obligatory state orders. It is also unclear whether such agreements would actually result in a net increase in oil imports from the USSR. Prime Minister Čalfa reports that in 1990 Moscow reduced its "guaranteed" deliveries of crude by an amount equal to the volume of oil Czechoslovakia received directly from the union republics.[29]

The future status of exports of natural gas and electricity from the USSR is also uncertain. Eastern Europe receives most of its gas from the USSR as repayment for credits it extended to exploit gas deposits in the Soviet Union. However, there do not exist agreed-upon terms of trade to purchase natural gas from the USSR after the Soviet Union completes repayment of outstanding credits. Hungary, which held the "impression" that it would double Soviet natural gas imports by the year 2000, has begun "urgent negotiations" with

[21]Deputy Premier Dlouhý's estimate is carried by Prague Television Service, July 17, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 18, 1990, p. 15. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade's estimate was reported by *Svobodné Slovo* (Prague), Oct. 2, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 9, 1990, p. 10. ČTK, Oct. 9, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 12, 1990, p. 22, reports the estimate of oil deliveries in 1990 by President Havel's press secretary.

[22]Osiatyński contends that a Soviet delegation, "acting on the instructions of its government," informed Poland of the termination of oil exports during talks in Moscow from Aug. 28–31, 1990. *Rzeczpospolita*, Sept. 14, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 24, 1990, pp. 55–56. The Soviet ambassador to Poland dismisses as "rumors" that are "completely untrue" the intention of the USSR to end its oil exports to Poland. *Trybuna* (Warsaw), Sept. 13, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 20, 1990, p. 28. See also PAP (Warsaw), Oct. 17, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 18, 1990, p. 28.

[23]MTI (Budapest), Sept. 11, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 13, 1990, p. 29; and MTI, Sept. 5, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 6, 1990. Another source quotes Hungarian experts as stating that it is "*almost* impossible" to believe that the USSR would terminate oil exports to Eastern Europe in 1991. MTI, Sept. 11, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 13, 1990, p. 29 (emphasis added).

[24]PAP (Warsaw), Dec. 22, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 24, 1990, p. 11; and MTI, Dec. 12, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 13, 1990, p. 17.

[25]*Hospodářské Noviny* (Prague), Dec. 18, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 26, 1990, p. 16.

[26]TASS (Moscow), Oct. 12, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 15, 1990, p. 20, reports on the deal for oil between Czechoslovakia and Tyumen' oblast in 1990. Another source reports that Czechoslovakia will pay for 10 percent of this oil in hard currency and obtain the rest for barter. *Zemědělské Noviny* (Prague), Oct. 6, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 15, 1990, p. 26.

[27]Data for Bulgaria from TASS, Jan. 4, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 7, 1991, p. 15; for Hungary, from *Népszabadság*, Dec. 6, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 11, 1990, p. 19; for Czechoslovakia, from ČTK, Sept. 19, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 20, 1990, p. 11. See fn. 24 for respective citations to the trade protocols with Poland and Hungary.

[28]Prague Domestic Service, Dec. 18, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 19, 1990, p. 22.

[29]Material on procedures for fulfilling bilateral contracts concluded by union republics and producers from *Mladezh* (Sofia), Jan. 17, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 24, 1991, p. 16. *Hospodářské Noviny*, Dec. 11, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 19, 1990, p. 25, carries Prime Minister Čalfa's remarks.

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the USSR to clarify these terms.[30] The USSR may already be reducing its gas deliveries to Eastern Europe. In 1991, the USSR will deliver approximately 35 percent less gas to Poland than the latter "assumed" it would receive.[31] Romanian sources report that the results of negotiations to import natural gas from the USSR in 1991 were "less than modest, not to say catastrophic": planned deliveries will be approximately 60 percent below the volume sought by Romania.[32] Finally, a Soviet source claims that electricity exports to Eastern Europe have "no future," in part because the growth in indigenous consumption of energy outstrips the commissioning of new power-generating capacities. The problematic status of nuclear power exacerbates this circumstance.[33] The USSR has either closed or canceled the construction of 15 nuclear power stations (NPS) since the disaster at Chernobyl' in 1986. The Ukrainian SSR (where 40 percent of Soviet nuclear capacity is located) recently declared a two-year moratorium on the construction of new NPS's in the republic. Hungary, which obtains almost 30 percent of its electricity from the USSR, is the East European state most dependent upon Soviet electricity. Hungary's minister of industry and trade reported that in 1991 the USSR will supply Hungary with electricity at "high prices" and in quantities lagging "far behind" the requisite volume.[34]

Another factor complicating trade with the Soviet Union is that since January 1, 1991, the USSR is supposed to use WMP's calculated in dollars to conduct its trade with Eastern Europe.[35] This system replaces the transferable ruble (TR), an accounting device previously used to value goods in this trade. In the past, East European sources persistently criticized the TR and the attendant system of barter trade. Hungarian economists had long advocated the new Soviet policy as a means of stimulating economic efficiency and trade among the then-socialist states.[36]

[30]MTI, Feb. 13, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 14, 1990, p. 42. On this subject, see also MTI, June 8, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 11, 1990, p. 59.

[31]*Głos Szczeciński* (Szczecin), Nov. 12, 1990, in *JPRS-EER*, Jan. 16, 1991, p. 37.

[32]ROMPRES (Bucharest), Jan. 10, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 11, 1991, p. 34.

[33]*Pravda*, Mar. 16, 1990. For an overview of the cutbacks in the Soviet nuclear program, see *Eastern Europe Newsletter* (London), Sept. 24, 1990, pp. 3–4.

[34]For data on Soviet electricity exports to Eastern Europe, see *Pravda*, Mar. 16, 1990. The comments of the minister of industry and trade were reported in MTI, Nov. 26, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 27, 1990, p. 30.

[35]The provision is contained in a presidential decree on foreign trade. For details of the decree, see Moscow Domestic Service, July 24, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 30, 1990, p. 35.

[36]See, for example, *Külgazdaság* (Budapest), January 1984, in *JPRS-EER Industrial Affairs*, Mar. 13, 1984, p. 13; and *Külpolitika* (Budapest), No. 3, 1985, in *JPRS-EER Industrial Affairs*, Aug. 30, 1985, p. 15.

Table 2: Eastern Europe: Cost of Importing Crude Oil from the USSR at Selected WMP's, 1991[1]

	At a WMP of US$20 per barrel (billions of dollars)	At a WMP of US$30 per barrel (billions of dollars)
Bulgaria	0.975	1.462
Czechoslovakia	1.575	2.362
Hungary	0.425	0.787
Poland	0.930	1.350
Romania	NA	NA

[1]Based on estimated volume of crude oil deliveries for 1991 contained in Table 1.

Ironically, however, the discredited system of barter trade now looks more attractive to many East Europeans as they contemplate the economic consequences of the new terms of trade. Table 2 indicates the increase in the economic burden to Eastern Europe if the new terms of trade are implemented completely. Calculations of the total economic impact of the new policy must also consider that new terms of trade apply to all Soviet exports to Eastern Europe (which comprise mainly raw materials considered "hard goods" in international trade) and not just oil. By contrast, East European exports of manufactures to the USSR would suffer disproportionately under the new policy because they consist primarily of "soft goods" that are less competitive on world markets. A Soviet source estimates—although Western analysts dispute this—that Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) prices for machinery and equipment have been roughly 50 percent higher than comparable WMP's.[37]

The East Europeans have sought to mitigate the adverse consequences of the new terms of trade. First, they have appealed to Western governments for financial aid to cushion their impact. Reportedly, officials of the EEC "responded favorably" to the request of Prime Minister József Antall of Hungary to establish a special reserve fund of credits that East European countries could draw upon to ease the transition to hard-currency trading with the USSR.[38] Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria illustrate how much aid might be necessary, although the volatility of the international energy markets neces-

[37]The Soviet estimate on prices for machinery in CEMA trade is from *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 8, 1990. A recent Western study, drawing on calculations by Hungarian economists, finds that "there is little basis for assuming" that exports of machinery and equipment are now overpriced in CEMA trade, although they may have been overpriced in the 1960's. Poznański, loc. cit., p. 292.

[38]*Eastern Europe Newsletter*, Sept. 24, 1990, p. 5, provides the assessment of the European Community's response to Prime Minister Antall's proposal.

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sarily makes these judgments tentative. A commission of specialists has concluded that Czechoslovakia will need upwards of US$1 billion in aid to balance its payments in 1991. Czechoslovakia also will use approximately one-half of a recently approved $1.8 billion loan from the IMF to solve "problems connected with oil" and establish a contingency reserve in case WMP's for oil exceed expected levels.[39] Similarly, the IMF has guaranteed Bulgaria approximately $87 million "to make up for the expected rise in its oil import spending" and Bulgaria could receive an additional $47 million for the same purpose if it enacts requisite changes in its power industry.[40]

Second, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have pressed the USSR to convert its ruble debt to them into dollars that could then be used, inter alia, to purchase Soviet energy. The USSR has converted its ruble debt to Hungary into a credit of $1.1–1.2 billion, but the schedule for repayment requires "further consultation."[41] Similar negotiations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia and the USSR and Poland are at an impasse.[42] These three East European countries are now considering a "joint" demarche toward the USSR to resolve the conflict.[43]

Third, the East Europeans have lobbied vigorously for a "phased" introduction of the new terms of trade, with barter trade in raw materials continuing in the interval. The 1991 bilateral trade pacts between the USSR and individual East European countries permit such trade.[44] East Europeans contend that such an arrangement is necessary to mitigate the substantial decline in trade turnover now occurring between the USSR and Eastern Europe. Petr Pithart, premier of the Czech republic, argues that in 1991, Soviet-Czechoslovak trade has "almost ceased to exist."[45] If this situation continues, total trade turnover between the two countries in 1991 could decline by 80 percent compared to 1990. Pithart stated in a personal meeting with Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov in March 1991 that a "shortage of Soviet orders" could soon lead to the unemployment of more than 400,000 workers in Czechoslovak industrial enterprises. "It would be dogmatic to apply the principle everything for dollars and through dollars in mutual trade," Pithart told the Soviet Prime Minister.

A similar situation is developing in Polish-Soviet trade, where Polish exports to the USSR have been "disastrously low" in 1991. "The situation is paradoxical," a Polish source explains, "Poland wants to export goods to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union wants to buy them but is not able to pay for them, and barter trade has been banned by Moscow."[46] Soviet Prime Minister Pavlov and Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki recently issued a joint statement agreeing that the "switch to hard currency payments in bilateral trade was too hasty."[47]

We can only provide tentative answers to what is new about a policy that probably will continue barter trade for the overwhelming share of Soviet exports to Eastern Europe. Prevailing WMP's (expressed in dollars) will be used to value bartered goods, thereby eliminating the discrepancy between WMP's and the prices used in Soviet–East European trade. The actual state of the international energy market will decisively determine how the utilization of WMP's will affect Soviet–East European trade. An estimate in July 1990 (when WMP's for oil were around $18 per barrel) calculated that WMP's would make Soviet oil 3.5–4 times more expensive for Hungary.[48] A similar estimate made by a Polish source in October 1990 (when WMP's for oil had escalated dramatically as a result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf) calculated that utilizing WMP's would increase tenfold the price of Soviet oil to Poland.[49] Bulgaria reports that so far in 1991 it is paying approximately 23 percent more for a ton of Soviet oil than it did in 1990.[50] Of course, these changing terms of trade only bring Eastern Europe into the "real world" of international trade from which it was long absent.

Another indicator of the new policy is that the USSR is increasing the volume of its energy exports that it will sell to Eastern Europe only in exchange for hard currency or hard goods. For example, Czechoslovakia and

[39]ČTK, Dec. 6, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 14, 1990, p. 27; and *Národná Obroda* (Bratislava), Jan. 11, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 18, 1991, p. 18.

[40]BTA (Sofia), Feb. 26, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 27, 1991, p. 20.

[41]MTI, Mar. 7, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 8, 1991, p. 32.

[42]ČTK, Oct. 4, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 9, 1990, p. 2.

[43]Ibid. Reportedly, the USSR is indebted to Czechoslovakia for approximately 3 billion rubles. *Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1991. The USSR and Poland are locked in contentious debate over whether any debt exists between the two sides. The USSR contends that Poland owes it some 5.2 billion rubles (including interest). Poland responds that this amount is effectively cancelled out by the unjustified undervaluation of credits that Poland extended in joint projects to exploit natural resources in the USSR. For a discussion of these respective positions, see Roman Stefanowski, "Polish-Soviet Trade Relations," Radio Free Europe, *Report on Eastern Europe* (Munich), May 18, 1990, pp. 32–33.

[44]See, for example, the details of the 1991 Soviet-Czechoslovak trade protocol reported by Prague Domestic Service, Dec. 18, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 19, 1990, p. 22.

[45]All materials on Pithart's comments in this paragraph from ČTK, Mar. 7, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 11, 1991, pp. 78–79; and Moscow World Service, Mar. 7, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 11, 1991, p. 79.

[46]PAP, Apr. 11, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 12, 1991, p. 20.

[47]TASS, Apr. 4, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 5, 1991, p. 15.

[48]See MTI, July 26, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 27, 1990, p. 16, for the estimate that Soviet oil will be 3.5–4 times more expensive for Hungary beginning in 1991.

[49]*Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 3, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 10, 1990, p. 30.

[50]*Duma*, Feb. 15, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 21, 1991, p. 17.

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Poland each paid in hard currency or goods, rather than with traditional soft goods, for 1 MMT of Soviet crude in 1990.[51] The 1991 trade protocols that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (and, presumably, other East European countries) concluded with the USSR obligate them to purchase a substantial portion of Soviet crude oil with goods that can only be acquired in the West.[52] This circumstance has sparked bitter political controversy in Bulgaria, where the noncommunist opposition insists that the protocol be published. It accuses the former communist government of Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov of failing to protect Bulgaria's economic interests when it concluded the trade pact. The opposition charges that the USSR now refuses to accept the products of technologically backward industrial branches, "whose development was imposed by the Soviet Union itself."[53]

Finally, the new trade policy permits participants to reject low-quality goods offered in barter trade. Since this provision would apply primarily to East European manufactures rather than Soviet raw materials, it could eventually lead to an increase in the overall quality of East European exports to the USSR.[54] Doing so would reverse the long-standing practice whereby Eastern Europe paid only lip service to Soviet demands for higher-quality goods in barter trade. The Soviet Union may be far less tolerant of such lip service emanating from noncommunist regimes than from their communist predecessors.

Soviet Motivations

That Eastern Europe will soon be paying more (whether in convertible currency or commodities) to receive a smaller volume of energy from the USSR constitutes the preeminent fact in the evolving Soviet energy export policy toward Eastern Europe. A complex of factors provides the rationale for this policy.

First, the professed reason for reducing oil exports—shortages of fuel on the USSR's domestic market—at best explains the timing of the announced cutbacks. "Unjustifiably high" energy exports to Eastern Europe are one reason the Soviet economy experiences "energy hunger and equipment stands idle," a prominent academic critic of these exports contends.[55] Shortages of gasoline and diesel fuel are said to have seriously hampered the gathering of the harvest of 1990.[56] Indeed, in 1990, the USSR imported 500,000 tons of gasoline at a cost of $200 million—the first time in 45 years it had imported this fuel.[57]

Yet, these shortages (no matter how disruptive in the short run) are only symptomatic of deep-seated problems besetting the Soviet energy sector. Prospects for petroleum production are especially worrisome. The USSR extracted 570 MMT of crude oil (including oil condensate) in 1990—a volume equal to that extracted in 1978 and 6 percent less than the volume extracted in 1989. Extraction in the key oil-producing region of Tyumen' oblast declined by 30 MMT in 1990 compared to 1989 and could fall by another 40–50 MMT in 1991.[58] Overall, the USSR produced 2 percent less energy in 1990 than in 1989.[59] These circumstances suggest that Soviet predictions about an "energy disaster" confronting the country in the "immediate future" are not necessarily hyperbolic. Another official predicts that the USSR—now one of the world's leading exporters of oil—could even become a net importer of crude as early as 1993.[60]

Second, these difficulties exist against the backdrop of declining hard-currency earnings from exports of energy. As noted, the USSR derives the overwhelming share of its hard currency from these exports. In both 1986 and 1987, the USSR established records for volume of energy exports to nonsocialist states, but earned only $13.5 billion and $16 billion, respectively, from these exports (compared to $23.6 billion in 1983) due to declining WMP's for energy.[61] The USSR exported approximately 20 MMT less crude oil and petroleum products in 1989 as compared to 1988 and earned only $10.5 billion from these exports to the West.[62] One Soviet expert predicts that the volume of oil exports in

[51] *Pravda* (Bratislava), Sept. 5, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 13, 1990, p. 13; and *Trybuna*, Sept. 13, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 20, 1990, p. 28. *Eastern Europe Newsletter*, Oct. 8, 1990, p. 3, estimates that in 1991 Czechoslovakia will pay with hard currency for approximately one-half of the oil that it imports from the USSR.

[52] Materials for Bulgaria from TASS, Jan. 4, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 7, 1991, p. 5; for Czechoslovakia, from *Hospodářské Noviny*, Dec. 18, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 26, 1990, p. 16.

[53] BTA (Sofia), Jan. 21, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 25, 1991, p. 17. The government has officially denied these accusations and says it is prepared to submit the relevant documents on the subject to the appropriate parliamentary committees. BTA, Jan. 22, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 25, 1991, p. 18.

[54] As USSR Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Konstantin Katushev observed, this provision will "pressure" the East Europeans to improve the quality of their exports to the Soviet Union. Moscow Television Service, July 26, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 27, 1990, p. 50.

[55] *Trud* (Moscow), Mar. 12, 1990. The critic is V. Voloshin.

[56] For a commentary detailing these problems, see *Pravda*, June 27, 1990.

[57] Moscow World Service, Oct. 29, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 30, 1990, p. 37.

[58] Data on overall production in 1990 are found in *Ekonomika i Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 5, January 1991. Data on production from Tyumen' oblast are found in *Pravda*, Jan. 23, 1991.

[59] *Ekonomika i Zhizn'*, No. 5, January 1991.

[60] *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1991.

[61] *PlanEcon Report* (Washington, DC), Jan. 15, 1988, p. 4.

[62] Data on earnings from oil sales in 1990 from *Arguments and Facts International*, Nos. 7–9, 1990, p. 48.

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1991 could be 40 percent less than the respective figure for 1989.[63] In these circumstances, continuing the "petrodollar rain," whose "mighty torrents" have until now irrigated the East European economies, holds little economic attraction.[64]

Third, the demise of communist regimes undermined the political rationale for propping up East European economies with huge amounts of energy sold at subsidized prices. This rationale, a Soviet source candidly admits, entailed using energy exports to help Eastern Europe "build socialism Stalinist-style."[65] The new regimes of Eastern Europe cannot credibly argue, as did their communist predecessors, that the USSR has vital ideological and political interests in their survival which justify incurring substantial economic losses in energy trade. Sound commercial relations in the best traditions of capitalism must become the leitmotif of the new energy policy toward Eastern Europe, Soviet officials no doubt reason. This reasoning applies especially to the lucrative hard-currency trade Eastern Europe conducted by reexporting imported Soviet crude oil in refined form. Facilitating such trade makes little economic or political sense when individual East European states announce they are leaving the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and wish to enter the EC or even NATO.[66]

Finally, the USSR is permitting some barter in its energy trade with Eastern Europe. This circumstance suggests that the USSR retains important political and economic interests in the region that militate against a complete break in trade with its former satellites. Politically, it would be absurd to argue that the demise of East European communist regimes makes the USSR indifferent to political developments in the region. States that remain dependent upon the USSR for vital supplies of energy—even if they pay higher prices and provide better-quality goods for reduced volumes of these supplies—are less likely to pursue actions inimical to Soviet interests. Hence, the USSR—despite repeated Soviet protestations to the contrary—may be utilizing threatened cutbacks in energy supplies to warn Eastern Europe against pursuing anti-Soviet policies.[67] But, ironically, the USSR could become the victim of its own "energy card." President Havel has explicitly raised the possibility of political retaliation if the USSR reneges on its energy commitments to Czechoslovakia. In this situation, Havel asserts, Czechoslovakia would not display "excessive consideration" for Soviet interests regarding the emerging security order in Europe.[68] Reportedly, Havel's statement is "being discussed" among Soviet leaders.[69]

Economically, the USSR has made clear its interest in continued trade with Eastern Europe if it can use this trade to increase the importation of foodstuffs and better-quality consumer goods.[70] This circumstance suggests that pressuring Eastern Europe to supply it with higher-quality goods provides the USSR with another rationale to threaten the region with draconian measures. Eastern Europe also retains a vested economic interest in importing Soviet energy even at WMP's in hard currency. For example, such importation through the present system of oil- and natural-gas pipelines entails substantially lower costs in transportation and infrastructural facilities for Eastern Europe than similar purchases from distant suppliers in the Middle East and Latin America.[71]

And yet the USSR does export one commodity to Eastern Europe—oil—which it also sells readily on the international market. The USSR possesses an economic incentive to export more oil to the latter market whatever the status of WMP's for crude. For example, spiraling WMP's for oil precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait represented an economic windfall for the USSR. The USSR may have earned an additional $1.5 billion from oil exports in 1990 solely through higher WMP's for oil. The USSR gained these earnings by slightly increasing the volume of oil exports to member-states of

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[63]*Moscow News*, No. 43, 1990.

[64]*Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1990.

[65]*Trud*, Mar. 12, 1990.

[66]One Soviet critic chastised the East Europeans for holding a "parasitical attitude toward the Soviet Union" by engaging in such trade. See ibid. For a discussion of the complex and often imaginative ways that East European states participated in the reexport trade, see Kramer, op. cit., pp. 104–05.

[67]For Soviet denials of such a motivation, see, inter alia, BTA, July 30, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 31, 1990, p. 8; and Prague Television Service, July 19, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 23, 1990, p. 29. East European sources concurring with this assessment include *Zemědělské Noviny*, July 20, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 26, 1990, p. 11; ČTK, July 19, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 19, 1990, p. 12; and *Rudé Právo* (Prague), July 19, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 26, 1990, p. 13.

[68]ČTK, Oct. 7, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 11, 1990, p. 15.

[69]ČTK, Oct. 29, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 30, 1990, p. 17. This information comes from a spokesman for President Gorbachev.

[70]For example, responding to entreaties from Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov of Bulgaria that the USSR fulfill its oil contract with that country, Soviet Premier Ryzhkov "made it clear that the problem was related to Bulgaria's deliveries to the USSR. He pointed out that there were products of technical designation the USSR could not do without. He laid stress on Soviet requirements of foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods. He reminded him of the cigarette shortage crisis of the last months, hinting that it had been aggravated not only by the failures of the local producers, but also by 'our friends failing to effect deliveries'." BTA, Sept. 25, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 27, 1990, p. 29.

[71]Premier Čalfa of Czechoslovkia estimates that these factors make oil imported from the Middle East upwards of 30 percent more expensive than oil imported from the USSR. *Mlada Frontă Dnes* (Prague), Oct. 8, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 15, 1990, p. 25. Similarly, a Bulgarian source argues: "The transportation expenditures have a big impact on the final value of the supplies. Last year, the Soviet Black Sea ports' fee was about 3.5 rubles per ton; in Libya, $6.88; in the Red Sea, $12.63; and in the Persian Gulf, $15.65. Those fees . . . must be taken into consideration when the final price is concluded." *Duma*, Feb. 15, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 21, 1991, p. 17.

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the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—in dramatic contrast to its export policy toward Eastern Europe.[72]

Ironically, declining WMP's for oil attendant upon Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait could lead to less Soviet oil for Eastern Europe. In this situation, the USSR could react as it did in 1982, when it compensated for declining hard-currency revenues by diverting oil from Eastern Europe to the world market. The potential for diversion refutes analysts who contend there is no way the USSR can increase oil exports to the world market.[73] Of course, the incentive for diversion diminishes commensurate with increases in Eastern Europe's capacity to pay for Soviet energy either with foreign convertible currencies or, as Poland is doing now, by making their own currencies convertible.

East European Responses

The "energy shock" of 1990–91 presents Eastern Europe with options similar to those confronting the ancient mariners of Greek mythology who braved the twin dangers of Scylla and Charybdis: all alternatives contain danger, engender costs, and provide no assurance of rescue from their peril.

To date, Eastern Europe has responded to the energy shock primarily by seeking new sources of supply on the international market. In this context, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the ensuing trade embargo imposed by the United Nations on Iraq, and the spiraling WMP's for oil engendered by the Gulf crisis represented serious blows for Eastern Europe. As Václav Klaus, Czechoslovakia's minister of finance, told officials from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund assembled to discuss the Gulf crisis, "my English does not offer me adjectives for describing the problem now."[74]

Prior to these events, Iraq appeared the most likely source to compensate Eastern Europe for the shortfall in Soviet deliveries. This was so because Iraq intended to pay off its considerable debt to East European states mostly with oil.[75] This led to "oil-for-debt" deals with Bulgaria (4.75 MMT in 1990–94), Poland (2–3 MMT in 1990–91), Hungary (210,000 tons in 1990), and Czechoslovakia (for an amount "to cover the deficit in deliveries from the Soviet Union").[76] Eastern Europe was also involved in a complex three-way "oil-for-debt" deal according to which Iraq would export 10.7 MMT of crude in 1990 to the USSR, which would then reexport this oil to Eastern Europe.[77]

The embargo against Iraq forced Eastern Europe to seek alternative sources of oil. Italy and Venezuela have indicated their willingness to sell oil to Eastern Europe, but will sell it only for hard currency.[78] For a country such as Bulgaria—which has suspended both principal and interest payments on its hard-currency debt—this is a prohibitive condition. Hungary, with one of the highest per capita foreign debts in the world, paid $400 million in 1990 for 1.5 MMT of crude oil bought on the international market.[79]

The shortage of hard currency that to varying degrees East European countries continue to experience makes it imperative that they obtain much of their oil from the international market in barter trade. Iran appears particularly willing to conclude such deals. Iran recently agreed to supply Bulgaria with 1 MMT of crude oil and 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 1991 in exchange for Bulgarian machine tools, trucks, cigarettes, electrical equipment, and refrigerator compressors. Reportedly, Iran is also willing to supply Czechoslovakia on a long-term basis with 3–6 MMT (another source provides a figure of 5–10 MMT) of crude oil and 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually in exchange for goods. Iran accepted payment in barter for the 400,000 tons of oil it exported to Czechoslovakia in 1990. Poland purchased 500,000 tons of crude oil from Iran in 1990 and could receive as much as 2.5–3 MMT in 1991, although terms of trade have not been announced. Iran has said "it would be prepared" to export 2–2.5 MMT of crude oil annually to Hungary with pay-

[72]Data on earnings from oil sales in 1990 from *The Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1990. For data on the estimated volume of Soviet oil exports to the West in 1990, see AFP (Moscow), Nov. 27, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1990, p. 50.

[73]Quoted in AFP, Nov. 27, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1990, p. 50. For a Soviet source that shares this assessment, see *Rabochaya Tribuna* (Moscow), Aug. 12, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 20, 1990, p. 66. By contrast, officials in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland fear that the USSR might silently sell for hard currency "on the international market oil intended for them." Reportedly, these states may seek to pressure industrial nations against purchasing this oil, "although room for maneuver in this respect is rather narrow." *Hospodářské Noviny*, Oct. 4, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 9, 1990, p. 2.

[74]*The Washington Post*, Sept. 28, 1990.

[75]Overall, Iraq owes an estimated $4 billion to Eastern Europe. Estimated debt to individual states: Romania ($1.7 billion), Bulgaria ($1.2 billion), Czechoslovakia and Poland (each $500 million), and Hungary ($145 million). Vladimir V. Kusin, "Iraq, Kuwait, and Eastern Europe," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Aug. 24, 1990, p. 42.

[76]Data for Bulgaria from BTA, Aug. 11, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 13, 1990, p. 2; for Poland, from PAP, Aug. 23, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 24, 1990, p. 18; for Hungary, from MTI, Aug. 6, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 7, 1990, p. 13; for Czechoslovakia, from *Verejnosť* (Bratislava), Aug. 9, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 13, 1990, p. 3.

[77]Moscow World Service, Aug. 28, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 29, 1990, p. 4.

[78]Information on Italy and Venezuela from, respectively, ČTK, Oct. 5, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 6, 1990, p. 18; and *Hospodářské Noviny*, Sept. 28, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 4, 1990, p. 13.

[79]MTI, Dec. 22, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 24, 1990, p. 25.

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ment on "favorable terms." Finally, Iran has offered Romania upwards of 5 MMT of oil annually and the two sides are considering a joint venture to process Iranian crude in Romanian refineries for reexport.[80] A commission of experts recently recommended that the EC aid in the modernization of oil refineries in Eastern Europe to make them capable of processing oil from sources other than the USSR.[81]

Kuwait represents another potentially important source of supply for oil—assuming, of course, that the destruction it suffered under the Iraqi occupation does not prevent it permanently from resuming its previous level of oil exportation. Kuwait recently formed a joint venture with Hungary to operate 17 gasoline stations in the latter country. The joint venture is considering building its own oil refinery or modernizing existing ones in Hungary. Kuwait would then supply these refineries on "preferential terms" with oil, which Hungary would consume domestically and reexport throughout Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and even the USSR. These arrangements could meet upwards of 50 percent of Hungary's annual need for imported oil and supply Eastern Europe with approximately 10 percent of the total volume of oil Kuwait exports to the international market.[82]

Eastern Europe is also seeking energy from Western countries. Austria, Germany, and Italy have supplied (or offered to supply) selected East European countries with emergency energy supplies on preferential terms.[83] Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia are pursuing a "common course of action" through their *Pentagonale* arrangement to secure long-term supplies of natural gas for the member-states.[84] One proposed project involves the construction of a natural-gas pipeline to bring supplies from Norway. The participants would also receive Soviet natural gas through the same pipeline, as it would be linked in Czechoslovakia with an existing line from the USSR.[85] Austria and Czechoslovakia are discussing bilateral cooperation in the energy sphere. Austria has agreed to build and supply its own network of gasoline stations in Slovakia.[86] The two sides are also exploring the possibility of a joint venture to construct an oil pipeline linking the Slovnaft refinery near Bratislava with an existing refinery in Austria. The joint venture would acquire its own oil for refining under the auspices of the Austrian participants in the project.[87]

As noted above, Eastern Europe possesses only limited options to increase indigenous supplies of energy. Brown coal and lignite of low caloric content are the only fossil-fuel reserves found abundantly in the region.[88] Only Poland possesses substantial reserves of hard coal.

Eastern Europe sought strenuously to increase production of coal after the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Despite these efforts, production of hard coal rose only 8.5 percent and soft coal 27 percent in the ten-year period between 1975 and 1985. In 1986–90, most states planned minimal, if any, increases in production. Czechoslovakia even planned to reduce reliance on coal to mitigate the massive degradation of the environment attendant upon its use. This latter circumstance represents a preeminent obstacle to coal becoming the panacea to close the energy gap.[89] Liquid fuel reserves in the region (except in Romania and, to a lesser extent, Hungary) are so scarce as to provide even less potential to increase supplies of energy.[90]

The future status of nuclear power is one of the most contentious issues of public policy in the new Eastern Europe.[91] At present, NPS's with 8,040 MW of installed capacity are operating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Poland and Romania have been unable to make operational NPS's whose construction was begun more than a decade ago. Czechoslovakia likely will complete two 1000 MW reactors now under construction at Temelín, and Bulgaria will probably bring on stream another 1000 MW reactor at its Kozloduy NPS. Romania claims that in 1994—after 17 years of construction—it will finally bring on stream the first of its

[80]Data for Bulgaria from *Duma*, Nov. 9, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 14, 1990, p. 8; for Czechoslovakia, from Prague Television Service, Oct. 12, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 15, 1990, p. 25 and *Rudé Právo*, Feb. 1, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 8, 1991, p. 15; for Poland, from PAP, Oct. 4, 1990 in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 5, 1990, p. 35; for Hungary, from MTI, Jan. 30, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 31, 1991, p. 20; and for Romania, from *Report on Eastern Europe*, Mar. 1, 1991, p. 46.

[81]BTA, Oct. 23, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 24, 1990, p. 5. Romania, which has been buying oil on the world market for years, already has the capacity to refine non-Soviet oil.

[82]All material in this paragraph is drawn from *The Washington Post*, Jan. 9, 1991. For a Hungarian commentary on a possible energy relationship with Kuwait, see Budapest Domestic Service, Jan. 8, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 10, 1991, p. 24.

[83]For information on this aid, see, inter alia, Budapest Domestic Service, Oct. 28, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 29, 1990, p. 43; and Budapest Domestic Service, Nov. 1, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 2, 1990, p. 31.

[84]According to *Hospodářské Noviny*, Sept. 25, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 30, 1990, p. 20.

[85]Ibid. Reportedly, Poland would also participate in this venture.

[86]*Rudé Právo*, Aug. 23, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 4, 1990, p. 20.

[87]*Národná Obroda*, Aug. 24, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 4, 1990, pp. 20–21.

[88]All information on coal, unless otherwise noted, is drawn from Kramer, op. cit., pp. 68–84.

[89]For a detailed analysis of this subject, see John M. Kramer, "Energy and the Environment in Eastern Europe," in Joan DeBardeleben, Ed., *Environmental Problems and Policies in Eastern Europe*, forthcoming.

[90]See Kramer, op. cit., pp. 87–88, for an elaboration of this circumstance.

[91]All data on nuclear power, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from ibid., pp. 39–68.

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Canadian-designed and built 660 MW reactors at the Cernavoda NPS.[92] If other, previously announced plans for nuclear power are completed, then Eastern Europe could have upwards of 20,000 MW of installed capacity by the year 2000.

However, this projection seems unrealistic. Proponents of nuclear power are now on the defensive in Eastern Europe. The explosion at the Chernobyl' NPS in Soviet Ukraine in April 1986 (which contaminated large parts of Eastern Europe) precipitated a wide-ranging public debate that threatens the future of nuclear power in the region.[93] Critics charge that concerns over safety, cost, and impact on the environment of nuclear power should preclude its development. Western critics have especially expressed concern with the reliability of the technologically backward, Soviet-designed reactors operating or under construction in the region. For example, Austria's minister for the environment has labeled one such plant in nearby Czechoslovakia a "Chernobyl' at Vienna's gates."[94] Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary recently have scaled back, and Poland has abandoned, plans for nuclear power.[95]

The limited opportunities to increase the supply of energy may finally compel Eastern Europe to enact decisive steps to conserve energy. As noted, all East European states consume between 30 and 50 percent more energy than do industrialized capitalist states to produce any given product. A Soviet source identifies how the USSR contributed to this circumstance:

For many years, the East European countries' energy supply problem was solved mainly by deliveries of cheap Soviet fuel. In these conditions, the policy of energy conservation was only proclaimed, but . . . never carried out. Today these countries are having to pay for this.[96]

An effective program of energy conservation must include wholesale and retail energy prices that reflect marginal cost. For several reasons—the Marxist law of value, which considers natural resources "free goods," a desire to encourage the production of energy-intensive commodities, and a concern to avoid political unrest among the population—communist regimes traditionally attached prices to energy resources that were too low to encourage conservation. Indeed, the Stalinist economies of Eastern Europe, with their pursuit of extensive growth, were largely devoid of any economic stimuli to use energy and other resources efficiently.

East European regimes already have responded to the "energy shock" of 1990–91 by substantially increasing prices of energy resources.[97] Czechoslovakia has announced—albeit several times postponed at the insistence of domestic critics—one of the most far-reaching price increases. As of May 1, 1991, Czechoslovakia means to abolish subsidies on sundry energy resources by enacting the following increases in retail prices: brown coal, 234 percent; coke, 246 percent; natural gas, 134 percent; and town gas, 64 percent. These increases seek between now and the year 2005 to reduce the consumption of energy by 25 percent in the production sector while holding the increase in consumption in the household sector to 12 percent. Czechoslovakia has pledged to enact the price increases as part of the deal it has negotiated with the IMF that calls for the extension of the aforementioned loan of $1.8 billion to Czechoslovakia. This arrangement provides a good example of how Western states can utilize aid as a lever to encourage the enactment of efficacious measures to mitigate the "energy shock."[98]

Prospects

Observers both East and West have come up with chilling and seemingly hyperbolic scenarios about the devastating impact of the "energy shock." For example, a Western source warns that Eastern Europe risks "collapsing into destitution" from the "energy shock" it is now experiencing. This collapse would have profound political implications:

Governments will be hard-pressed to maintain order; national rivalry between the Czechs and Slovaks, between the Romanians and Transylvanian Magyars, and between the Bulgarians and Bulgar Turks,

[92]ROMPRES, Aug. 14, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 15, 1990, p. 32. The minister making this announcement admitted—in a gross understatement—that until now work at Cernavoda had proceeded in a "chaotic manner." Ibid. For a detailed examination of the saga of the Cernavoda NPS, see Mihai Carp, "The Future of the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Aug. 31, 1990, pp. 33–36.

[93]I have elaborated upon this debate in "Chernobyl' and the Nuclear 'Debate' in Eastern Europe: The Role of Public Opinion," testimony prepared for United States Congress, Commission on Cooperation and Security in Europe, Washington, DC, 1988.

[94]Quoted in *Report on Eastern Europe*, July 27, 1990, p. 60. The plant referred to is the Jaslovské Bohunice NPS located near the frontier with Austria. The Austrian government has officially demanded that Czechoslovakia close the plant for safety reasons. For an explanation of why Czechoslovakia has not met the Austrian demand, see the interview with Czechoslovak Prime Minister Čalfa carried by ORF Television Network (Vienna), Jan. 11, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 14, 1991, p. 24.

[95]For the announcement that Poland will discontinue construction of the Żarnowiec NPS, see PAP, Dec. 23, 1989, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 3, 1990, p. 64.

[96]*Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, Aug. 29, 1990.

[97]For a discussion of these measures by a Soviet source, see ibid.

[98]All materials in this paragraph are drawn from *Hospodářské Noviny*, Mar. 19, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 19, 1991, p. 16; and Prague Domestic Service, Feb. 25, 1991, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 27, 1991, p. 25.

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for instance, would probably explode.[99]

Václav Klaus of Czechoslovakia envisions the "imposition of a war economy" in Czechoslovakia if oil imports from the USSR drop below 10 MMT in 1991. This circumstance, says Klaus, would require rationing of all basic commodities, including energy, and the cessation of economic and political reform.[100]

The available evidence suggests that the impact of the "energy shock" may be more deleterious over the short term than over the medium or long term. Current cutbacks in Soviet energy deliveries are disrupting production in key industries (e.g., petrochemicals), exacerbating economic decline in the region, and generating political turmoil in some countries as angry consumers vehemently protest higher prices for fuels and electricity designed to pay for, and conserve, more expensive imported energy.[101]

Clearly, Eastern Europe will soon be forced to devote a greater share of its national wealth to pay for imported energy, which (all things being equal) will constrain its capacity to pursue other investment opportunities, including those intended to promote consumer welfare and the technological modernization of its obsolete industrial infrastructure. This latter circumstance could create a "Catch-22" situation wherein Eastern Europe limits its capacity to reduce energy consumption through technological modernization and, concomitantly, to produce the very hard goods the USSR so desires. Further, the USSR especially wants Eastern Europe to supply it with precisely those commodities—high-quality consumer goods and foodstuffs—most desired by East European populations, who are increasingly impatient for the "good life."

The long-term prospects will be brighter if East European regimes manage to undertake decisive measures to reduce their prodigious consumption of energy. This will entail, as we have already noted, instituting prices for energy resources that reflect their marginal cost. In turn, higher energy prices will foster many other positive ends in addition to their primary goal of reducing energy consumption. They will promote technological modernization by making it economically more rational to utilize advanced energy-saving technologies when producing and consuming energy. They will free desperately needed monies for other investment objectives by reducing the disproportionate share of investment resources in industry (40–45 percent throughout Eastern Europe) now devoted to produce energy.[102] They will mitigate the intensive pollution of the environment in Eastern Europe —perhaps the preeminent social pathology in the region—by promoting technological modernization and providing an economic incentive to conserve resources now emitted as pollutants. Finally, they will spur the overall marketization of the economies being pursued with varying degrees of enthusiasm by governments in the region. Marketization constitutes a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition to enhance economic efficiency and consumer welfare in Eastern Europe.

Realizing these latter ends will become imperative as the crisis in Soviet–East European energy relations undermines the latter's links with the technologically backward Soviet market and concomitantly spurs its links with the technologically advanced Western market. Coping successfully with this imperative will intensify economic and political interaction between Eastern Europe and Western countries. Only these latter states possess the requisite capacities to assist Eastern Europe in shedding the legacy of technological obsolescence inherited from the USSR.

Ironically, then, the "energy shock" of 1990–91 may in the long run impel Eastern Europe toward greater technological modernization, international competitiveness, and economic and political rapprochement with the West. These manifest benefits will not, however, come without considerable economic and political costs. The new Soviet energy policy toward Eastern Europe may offer the fledgling postcommunist regimes in the region no choice but to endure these costs. Eastern Europe may eventually thank the USSR for forcing it to go "cold turkey" and end its addiction to Soviet energy.

[99] *Eastern Europe Newsletter,* Oct. 8, 1990, p. 1.

[100] As quoted and summarized in ibid., Dec. 17, 1990, p. 5. Klaus has also devised a "moderate" scenario predicated upon the importation of 11–13 MT of crude from the USSR in 1991. This scenario would entail substantial cuts in production and exports of key commodities (e.g., a 50-percent reduction in output of the chemical industry and the cessation of exports of refined petroleum products and plastics), and an overall drop of 10 percent in Gross National Product.

[101] Reports detailing the deleterious consequences of the decline in Soviet oil deliveries include BTA, July 11, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* July 12, 1990; Warsaw Domestic Service, July 14, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* July 16, 1990; and *Pravda,* Sept. 5, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* Sept. 13, 1990, p. 14. Hungary has experienced the most strident public protests against recently enacted increases in prices for fuels and power. Protesting against higher prices for gasoline, taxi drivers in Budapest and several other cities paralyzed traffic by blockading bridges and other heavily traveled arteries. For details of these protests, see Budapest Domestic Service, Oct. 26, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* Oct. 26, 1990, p. 25. An "explosive" situation also arose in Czechoslovakia when the government enacted price increases for energy to compensate for reduced deliveries of Soviet oil. ČTK, July 19, 1990, in *FBIS-EEU,* July 20, 1990, p. 13.

[102] *Heti Világgazdaság* (Budapest), Oct. 11, 1986, in *JPRS-EER,* Mar. 6, 1987, p. 3.

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Third World Decollectivization: Guyana, Nicaragua, and Vietnam

Frederic L. Pryor

Decollectivization—the process of converting state and collective farms into either private (individual or corporate) farms or genuine producer cooperatives—has taken diverse forms in various Third World states either currently or formerly ruled by Marxist-Leninist regimes. The process differs not only among these countries; it also tends to be distinct from decollectivization in Eastern Europe, for a variety of reasons. Most important, the political forces in agriculture are different: many Third World socialist countries began collectivization without a previous land reform, which increases the difficulties of returning to the status quo ante, and their governments often lack the administrative capacity to implement ancillary measures to facilitate decollectivization and the development of private agriculture. Moreover, state farms are often difficult to break up since they were organized on the basis of former private plantations, and there is considerable economic pressure to retain the unity of the operation when reverting to private ownership.

Greater insight into these differences can be gained by examining the experience of one nation with a large state-farm sector (Guyana), of another with a large collective-farm sector (Vietnam), and of a third with a relatively equal mix of state and collective farms (Nicaragua). After a brief description of politics, economics, and agricultural reform in the three countries, I examine more closely three aspects of decollectivization: changes in land ownership; changes in farm size and management; and implementation of measures complementary to decollectivization.

The Three Countries

Party politics greatly influence the process of decollectivization. Vietnam has a single party, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), which currently has no intention of allowing a multiparty system or private land ownership; the country is also not racked by the political and/or racial polarization that characterizes the other two countries. Nicaragua has a multiparty system, with the government headed by the fragile UNO (National Opposition Union) coalition. Although the Sandinista National Liberation Front was defeated in the elections of February 1990, it remains the strongest single political party in the country and, because the UNO is split, has an effective veto over important economic legislation. Guyana also has a multiparty system, but the People's National Congress (PNC) has remained in power for three decades on the basis of elections considered by most observers as fraudulent. Although originally a heterodox Marxist party, the PNC has lost its ideological fervor. In forthcoming elections, it is confronting a difficult

Frederic L. Pryor is Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College (Swarthmore, PA). *The research for this essay, as well as a study-trip to Nicaragua and Guyana, was financed by the US National Science Foundation and by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace as part of a larger project that will be published in a forthcoming book,* The Red and the Green: The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist Regimes. *Neither institution is responsible for the content or any of the author's conclusions. The author thanks Linda Baez, Hans Binswanger, Arturo Cornejo, and Katherine Simonds for helping establish contacts with government officials and experts in Nicaragua and Guyana; the several dozen people who gave him their time for interviews; and Zora Pryor and Jozef van Brabant for comments on earlier drafts of the article. Full source references can be obtained from the author.*

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struggle, especially against an orthodox Marxist-Leninist group, the People's Progressive Party (PPP).

In some ways, the policy problems in the three countries are similar. For instance, all three face raging inflation. But the three countries are also quite different. Between 1979 and 1988, gross agricultural production decreased at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent in Guyana and 3.0 percent in Nicaragua; by contrast, in Vietnam, gross agricultural production appeared to have increased at a rate faster than population growth.[1] Indeed, Vietnam became an important exporter of rice in 1989, and agricultural production there appears to have achieved another significant increase in 1990. Nevertheless, nutritional standards remained low there in comparison to those of most other Asian nations.

With these general comments in mind, I turn to a more detailed examination of the three countries.

Guyana. In Guyana, sugar and related products account for roughly 40 percent of exports. The government nationalized all of the sugar estates in the mid-1970's and converted them into state farms. Although nationalization did not occur in other sectors, rice (the nation's food staple) as well as cattle products were until recently marketed exclusively through a government purchasing agency. Some nominal collective farms produced other crops, but by 1990, they were operating as private farms.

Although the country's long-time president, Forbes Burnham, died in 1985, economic reform under his successor, Desmond Hoyte, did not begin in earnest until 1988, when the government began to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund. The three-year "Economic Recovery Programme" announced in 1989 was aimed on the macroeconomic level at reducing the deficit of the governmental budget, achieving balance-of-payments stability, and refinancing the external debt so as to become eligible for new loans from the World Bank and other international organizations. At the microeconomic level, the program outlined an ambitious drive to privatize and marketize.

Politics and economics in Guyana are dominated by a crucial racial/political factor. Most of the entrepreneurs in the city, as well as most of the sugar and rice farmers, are descendants of emigrants from the Indian subcontinent. The Indo-Guyanese constitute a bare majority of the entire population and have been the power base of the PPP. For more than three decades, however, political power has been held by the PNC, which has its power base among the Afro-Guyanese concentrated in the urban areas and in the bauxite mining regions. Amer-Indians constitute less than 5 percent of the population and have little political or economic significance.

The dominance of the PNC has had a number of economic consequences, but perhaps the two most important have been the general neglect of agricultural production, especially sugar and rice, and the government's aggressive use of patronage privileges to strengthen its political support. For instance, the 1980 census reported that roughly 20 percent of the labor force was employed directly in the government sector.

Steps such as privatization, improvement in the economic status of the agricultural sector through greater investment, devaluation to encourage exports, reduction in the size of the government, or the holding of a completely free and fair election would greatly change the relative economic and political positions of the Indo- and Afro-Guyanese communities, as well as the fortunes of the PPP. This racial/political factor may be an important reason why the government has fallen behind its timetable for liberalizing foreign trade and instituting other reform measures benefiting agriculture. It may also explain why the election, constitutionally mandated for 1990, has been postponed until "sometime" in 1991.

Nicaragua. Before the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, Nicaragua exported a variety of crops. Although a considerable share of these exports were produced by large estates, middle- and small-size producers also contributed an appreciable share, especially in coffee exports.

With the expropriation of the estates of the Somoza family and his close associates shortly after the success of the Sandinista revolution in 1979, about 20 percent of the agricultural land came under state control. More than three-quarters of this land was converted into state farms, and the remainder was turned over to cooperatives and "pre-cooperatives" (where farmers only carry out certain functions in common). Later, the Sandinista government confiscated many of the remaining large private estates and a number of middle-sized private farms, bringing to 28 percent the proportion of total farm land under public ownership.

[1]For all three countries, I draw upon the data bank of the Food and Agricultural Organization; these data underlie FAO publications such as *Production Yearbook*. For Vietnam, FAO data suggest that gross agricultural production increased in the period at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent at a time when population was increasing at a rate slightly higher than 2 percent. The production results are quite similar to those published by United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *World Indices of Agricultural and Food Production, 1977–86,* Statistical Bulletin 759, Washington, DC, 1988. Both data series for Vietnam build upon official Vietnam data series for individual crops; as a consequence they may be overstated.

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Originally, the government planned to expand greatly the state farm sector, since it believed this was the simplest way to increase agricultural exports. The peasants resisted this approach, having taken seriously the earlier Sandinista promise of land for all. Bowing to these political demands, as well as to the necessity of obtaining peasant loyalty in the regime's struggle against the resistance fighters, the Sandinistas began, after 1985, to give land titles to individual peasants and either to privatize or to convert into cooperatives a number of state farms producing crops suitable for smallholders.

When the UNO coalition, headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, took over the government in April 1990, it originally intended to return all lands confiscated by the Sandinistas to their original owners, except for Somoza lands expropriated in 1979. In the summer, however, two major strikes of government workers, instigated by Sandinista-dominated unions, forced the government to reverse its planned removal of Sandinista officials. Then, a series of land takeovers by different groups began. The former resistance fighters, who did not receive the land promised by the UNO government, began to take over some of the cooperatives.[2] Members of the Agricultural Workers' Union (ATC) also began to take over not only some of the state farms to prevent their return to the former owners, but also some farms that the Sandinistas had never nationalized. Finally, workers on still other farms that were returned to the previous owners refused to leave or to pay rent. It proved difficult to dislodge these groups without the active assistance of the Ministry of Defense, which is headed by Humberto Ortega Saavedra, a leading Sandinista and a brother of former President Daniel Ortega Saavedra. In October 1990, in what is known as the "concertación process," the government reached a political compromise on the land issue with all major political forces in the country with the exception of COSEP, the interest group of the private entrepreneurs. I discuss details of this compromise below.

The inability of the government to enforce ownership claims has discouraged new investment, its attempts to curb inflation have reduced the availability of credit to agriculture, and its focus on certain illusory monetary measures—such as introduction of the gold cordoba in May 1990—diverted attention from the real economic problems during a critical period. After a year in office, the UNO government is only beginning to attack the economic situation in a serious fashion.

[2]Although tendentiously written, a detailed and useful account of such a struggle in one Nicaraguan town can be found in "Waslala: Anatomy of a Conflict," *Envio* (Managua), No. 112, 1990, pp. 11–15.

Vietnam. Vietnam differs from the other two countries under study because land reform and redistribution of ownership had taken place in both North and South prior to collectivization. Land reform occurred in the North between 1945 and 1956, followed by collectivization, which was essentially completed by 1960. However, some three-quarters of the cooperatives formed in this process were cooperatives in name only—that is, critical production decisions were made by small groups within the cooperative, rather than by the unit as a whole. In the South, the noncommunist government carried out a thorough land reform between 1970 and 1973.[3] The Communist government started to collectivize there shortly after the takeover of the South in 1975, and the process was said to be about three-quarters complete by 1986, although most of these "collectives" were really pre-cooperatives resembling the mutual-aid teams in China of the early 1950's.

In 1979, the Sixth Plenum of the VCP Central Committee planted the seeds of reform by approving stable long-term production quotas and granting permission to farmers to sell above-plan produce on the market. The basic elements of a "contract system" were thus introduced. Essentially, the cooperative would carry out such farming functions as seed preparation, plowing, fertilizing, irrigation, and pest control, and would contract with the household or small group for transplanting, weeding, and harvesting. A two-to-three-year contract would specify the inputs to be provided by and the outputs to be delivered to the cooperative; all production above the contracted quantities could be consumed by the household or sold, although limitations were placed on the private sale of grain and pork. Farm prices were allowed to rise relative to other prices. In many ways, this contract system, which was not implemented on a large scale until 1981–82, differed from the "responsibility system" in China and must be considered more as a piecework incentive program. The top leadership was quite split on matters of farm organization and was not yet ready for radical change.

At the Sixth VCP Congress in 1986, further changes in the agricultural system were introduced, agriculture was given the highest investment priority, and collectivization of the southern provinces was deemphasized. By 1988, the cooperatives had lost their direct role in production and were leasing their lands to households.

[3]Adam Fforde, *The Agrarian Question in North Vietnam, 1974–1979*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1989, has a first-rate discussion of the collectives in the North. Melanie Beresford, *National Unification and Economic Development*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989, discusses the land reforms in the South and has a graph (p. 101) showing the marked equalization in land holdings that had occurred among South Vietnamese farmers.

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Other significant changes occurred to move the system toward a market system composed of smallholders. Of these, the most important was the dropping of compulsory production quotas.

This Vietnamese version of *perestroyka,* which was labeled *doi moi,* was implemented carefully under the eyes of a basically conservative Communist leadership. Political controls ebbed and flowed over the decade of the 1980's, depending upon internal political factors, but the results did not seem auspicious for democracy. In 1990, the economic reform program had stalled, in part because of the difficulties the government had in coping with the decline in economic aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[4]

Changes in Land Ownership

Decollectivization involves the resolution of land ownership claims of five groups: the previous owners, the current workers on the land, the citizenry as a whole, the large farms as corporate entities, and the government. Obviously, resolution of these conflicting interests is an intensely political process, whose outcome varied in the three countries under review, depending upon the particular constellation of political forces. For a variety of reasons, none of these countries seemed prepared to give the confiscated land back to the former owners as is currently under way in the former East Germany and in Czechoslovakia.

Land ownership in Nicaragua. Not only would returning the land confiscated by the Sandinistas to its previous owners result in a highly unequal division of land, but it also would be an impossible course of action for the UNO government to carry out, because of the land takeovers. In the "concertación agreement" of October 1990, the UNO government pledged to recognize all land titles granted by the Sandinista government, including those given to the collective farms as entities. Since the government did not recognize land claims of the Somoza family or the Somozas' close associates, this meant that only part of the land in the state farms —amounting to roughly 4 to 5 percent of total farm land—was under physical dispute. National Agrarian Commissions, composed of representatives of the major political groups, were set up in each region to attempt to resolve the conflicting claims on a case-by-case basis to prevent additional land takeovers. Those previous owners of confiscated land who could not receive back their land were promised either equivalent land elsewhere or compensation. Today, given the lack of government funds for these compensation payments and the land hunger of the returning resistance fighters, returning Nicaraguan refugees, and other landless —who together amount to roughly 20 percent of the farm population—neither alternative appears feasible. As of early 1991, no resolution of this problem was in sight.

According to current plans, the state farms not returned to the previous owners will somehow be divided among the workers, either in the form of cooperatives or as private farms. The land in existing producer cooperatives belongs to all the members as a corporate body, and these farms will continue to function as they always have, albeit without the subsidies they previously enjoyed. It seems likely, however, that the government will take measures to allow members wishing to leave the cooperative to take their share of the land. It may also take steps to facilitate the voluntary dissolution of the cooperatives.

Thus, in Nicaragua, decollectivization has mainly meant privatization of the state farms into individual or cooperative farms and a formalization of land claims by smallholders. Against its original instincts, the UNO government is, in effect, carrying out a land redistribution based on smallholders and small cooperatives, which the Sandinistas, in their desire to follow a state-farm strategy, never quite managed to accomplish.

Land ownership in Guyana. In Guyana, the socialist government's approach to collectivization was focused completely on the sugar estates. Moreover, the government did not need to worry about the claims of previous owners since the nationalization of the estates was not confiscatory and compensation was relatively fair.

Decollectivization in this country has meant the privatization of the state farms by selling them to any company with managerial expertise that is willing to invest in them. In the fall of 1990, as a first step toward privatization, the government signed a two-year management contract with the English firm Booker Tate. A part of this firm, Booker McConnell, had owned most of the Guyanese estates before nationalization and produced about 80 percent of Guyana's sugar exports; moreover, the government still owed the company about 5 million pounds sterling in compensation payments incurred during the nationalization.

[4]Useful recent discussions about the Vietnamese economic reforms include: Charles Joiner, "The Vietnam Communist Party Strives to Remain the Only Force," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), November 1990, pp. 1053–66; Steven Erlanger, "Its Gains Dissipated, Vietnam Tries to Salvage its Economy," *The New York Times,* Feb. 18, 1991; and Jozef Van Brabant, "Reforming a Socialist Developing Country—The Case of Vietnam," *Economics of Planning* (Birmingham, United Kingdom), No. 14, 1990, pp. 209–29.

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The new management contract gives Booker Tate a chance to evaluate the government's seriousness in pursuing a reform program, in actually implementing a liberal exchange-rate and tax regime, and in attracting capital from other governments and from international organizations. If taken, these steps would, of course, reduce the company's risks in making future investments in the operation.

Those acquainted with the heated criticism leveled against the foreign estates prior to their nationalization in the mid-1970's might be astonished at the current equanimity of the Guyanese regarding the return of the British raj. The government appears to view the contract with Booker Tate as an opportunity to obtain managerial expertise, as a source of funds for rehabilitation of an industry that could serve as a useful source of tax revenues in the future, and also, in a peculiar fashion, as a more effective voice of agricultural interests in the political process than the previous state-owned company controlling the state farms. Unlike in Nicaragua, workers do not seem immediately interested in gaining ownership of the estates, although they have shown interest in holding ownership shares if a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out. The major agricultural labor union, dominated by the PPP, appears to believe that in the short run, sale of the sugar estates to foreign owners is the only way to raise the wages of sugar workers. The workers had been impoverished by the policies directed against the agricultural sector by the PNC government in the past decade, especially the institution of an overvalued exchange rate that eliminated profits of the estates. They see Booker Tate as a defender of their interests against the Afro-Guyanese. In short, "dependencia theory" has been turned inside out by the various Marxist factions in Guyana.

Land ownership in Vietnam. In Vietnam's North, the land was expropriated and nationalized several decades ago. Now, even if the government wanted to return land titles, it would find the land registries inadequate, making it difficult to determine and trace ownership claims. The government, however, wants to retain the cooperatives on the land as an economic unit performing primarily a service role, an idea that has its roots in Lenin's "cooperative program" of 1923.[5] Decollectivization has meant the leasing of land for a period of 10 to 15 years to peasant households in quantities proportional to the number of workers within the household. The contract period seems too short to encourage much individual investment in the land, and Vietnam appears to be following the lead of China in progressively lengthening the duration of the contract by permitting longer-term leases that are tradable and inheritable but that cannot be subleased.

In the South, where collectivization was halted, the remaining private owners were apparently allowed to continue to use their property, although technically it belonged to the state. Where collectivization did occur, the use of land was either returned to the original owner or divided among the households farming it, in proportion to the number of workers. Returning to the status quo ante most frequently occurred in the pre-cooperatives or nominal cooperatives; since the land was relatively equally distributed before collectivization, this did not entail great inequalities.

Nevertheless, enormous land disputes have broken out in the South,[6] not just because of these ambiguities of division but also because it was the state and party cadre in the cooperatives who divided the land and, undoubtedly, they used the opportunity to further their own interests just as their Chinese counterparts did. The disputes will likely continue well into the 1990's.

General considerations. Several generalizations can be readily drawn. For one, the countries under study have shown little interest in the voucher schemes to distribute state-owned assets that have attracted such attention in Eastern Europe and Mongolia.[7] Except in Guyana, the interests of the former owners with claims on the land also do not seem well served. This is so because the government is still controlled by a Marxist-Leninist party (Vietnam); or is too weak to enforce these rights (Nicaragua).

The idea of returning all land to the former owners and then taxing absentee owners—a measure under serious discussion in Czechoslovakia—has attracted little attention in the countries under investigation, mainly because their ability to implement a careful tax arrangement is limited. The idea discussed of turning some of the large farms into corporations, with the workers holding individual shares, which has been discussed in Eastern Europe, also seems to have little appeal. For most peasants of these Third World countries, a land title offers considerably more economic security

[5]Near his death, Lenin wrote several brief articles urging the creation of service cooperatives in agriculture, while letting the peasants farm the land individually. Stalin's collectivization represented a direct repudiation of Lenin's ideas. See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960–71, Vol. 33, pp. 467–79,

[6]Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Indochina, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia* (London), No. 1, 1989.

[7]Under the voucher systems, each adult citizen would be given vouchers that could be used to bid for and buy state assets such as apartments, equipment, enterprise shares, and land.

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than a percentage share of some abstract entity whose management may be entirely beyond effective control by the putative owners of the land.

Asset-stripping by party or state cadres is an ever-present danger in the decollectivization process. It occurred in Nicaragua in the form of the "*piñata Sandinista,*" in which, before the newly elected UNO government took power, the Sandinista government assigned land, houses, automobiles, and retail establishments to the most faithful party cadres (and raided the treasury for all but US$3 million). All of these illegal transfers were confirmed in the "concertación agreement." Some transfers of wealth appear to have occurred in Vietnam in the second half of the 1980's, when party and state cadres distributed the lands to individual households. Asset-stripping does not appear, however, to have occurred in Guyana, because both the government and Booker Tate have good reasons to prevent such theft.

Farm Size and Management

Farm size is influenced by the technology employed, the economies of scale of production associated with that technology, and coordination problems between producers and processors. For instance, if cattle are raised primarily in barns, economies of scale are much greater than if the cattle are primarily raised on ranges with no investment in barns, as in Nicaragua. In the case of sugar, which is grown in all three countries, economies of scale are not important in production per se, but coordination of the harvest with the mills is crucial since if the cane is not processed within three days after cutting, it begins to lose its sugar content. Although sugar has been successfully grown by smallholders, the coordination problems are sufficiently complex that sugar growing is generally found on large estates that have an important ownership interest in a mill.

These considerations mean that the ease of breaking up large collective or state farms depends very much on their major product and their technology. Additional problems of farm dissolution arise if the farms are highly capital-intensive, since this requires either more capital equipment for the individual farms or else sharing arrangements. Since the level of mechanization in state and collective farms is considerably lower in the Third World than in Eastern Europe, this problem is less severe. If, however, the periods for planting or harvesting are short (as in Guyana, because of the rainfall pattern), equipment-sharing necessitates risk-sharing arrangements as well, which are often costly to set up and administer.

With regard to the management of the farms, the problems of decollectivization are much simpler than in Eastern Europe. In Guyana and Nicaragua, the central planning apparatus never did extend to the farm level, and both the state and collective farms had considerable decision-making independence in the area of production; however, they were constrained by a variety of regulations regarding prices, wages, and investment. This means that changes in farm management are less a matter of thrusting new decision-making powers on the current managers than a matter of removing the indirect measures that constrained their choices in the past. In Vietnam, as in Eastern Europe, central production controls extended to the farm level, but they were relatively simple and were dismantled in 1988 without great problems.

Management issues in Guyana. A top manager of Booker Tate indicated that although the question is under review, he foresees no dramatic reduction in the sizes of the individual estates, except for the selling off of land used in an ill-fated crop diversification program initiated by the state-farm management. This is not only because sugar is a traditional large-estate product but also because of the complex and interrelated irrigation system, which requires constant maintenance on a large scale.

Although the new managers in the sugar estates hope to be more effective than their state-appointed predecessors, they do not foresee making any drastic changes in management procedures. The former state-appointed managers themselves had not greatly changed the management system from that of the successful private companies except to take into account the declining funds available for investment and the loss of skilled personnel.[8] It is, therefore, government policies rather than the management system that the potential private owners will seek to change. It will be interesting to see how any new private owners will prevent a repetition of past government mistakes, particularly those relating to exchange rates.

Management issues in Vietnam. Vietnam represents the opposite extreme. In the late 1980's, the government began to break up the largest state and collective farms. Furthermore, as noted above, the extension of the contract system after 1986 led to the division of the existing collective farms into small leaseholds, each managed by a single household. In 1987, private plots

[8]Based on an interview with a high functionary of the central office who had experienced the changeover from private to state ownership.

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associated with the collective farms were also enlarged, and in the next year, compulsory delivery quotas were dropped. Given the labor-intensive methods used in Vietnamese agriculture, most of the crops—especially rice—do not exhibit important economies of scale, so large-scale farming has few credible economic justifications, in contrast to the situation in Guyana.

The cooperatives were thus transforming themselves from a production to a service unit with important technical, marketing, input-supply, and tax-collection functions; and the peasants could also choose to obtain inputs either from the cooperative or from other sources. These alternative private services and inputs were more readily available in the South than the North. After paying their rent, which represented from 10 to 20 percent of gross production, the individual farmers had a greatly expanded range of choice about what to produce and whether to sell their produce to the government or to private buyers.

Other private economic activities in the rural areas were also encouraged. By the end of the decade, the cooperatives were leasing out considerable equipment to private entrepreneurs, as well as allowing individual households to own livestock and equipment; indeed, the cooperatives had sold off most of their livestock to individuals or households. During these changes, allegedly 50 percent of the agricultural cadres lost their managerial positions.

The government continues to draw up projections for production of various foodstuffs, but it directly intervenes in decision-making only on the state farms, which in 1986, accounted for roughly 9 percent of total farm land. In many cases, these farms focus on specialized agricultural products for export, such as rubber.

Management issues in Nicaragua. Nicaragua presents a mixed picture. Some crops, such as sugar or cotton, appear suitable for large-scale production, while coffee and range cattle seem suitable for smallholders. Although many of the state farms are large, most of the producer cooperatives are relatively small and average only about 20 members and roughly 550 hectares of total land.[9] Former Sandinista officials who administered the program to privatize some of the state farms in the late 1980's told me that their major criterion in deciding which farms to privatize was the type of crop grown on the farm, rather than whether it was losing money or not. Coffee and cattle farms appeared to them most suitable for such farm breakups.

The UNO government is not breaking up any of the producer cooperatives, but many of these organizations are dissolving of their own accord. At the beginning of 1991, the government appeared to have no policy about dividing up those state farms turned over to the workers; this allowed them to make their own decisions about the matter as owners of the land. Farm breakups might also occur if only part of the state farm was given to the workers by the National Agrarian Commission.

Since the Sandinista government did not intervene greatly in the production decisions on individual state or collective farms, farm managers were constrained only by the availability of credit, foreign exchange, and inputs. The budget constraints seemed soft, and most state farms lost money. A similar situation arose in the cooperative sector, since many of these farms received loans that were later forgiven. Undoubtedly, the management systems on the remaining state and cooperative farms will change as fewer subsidies are provided by the government and their own budget constraints become harder. These changes represent an adaptation from below, rather than the result of any directive from above.

General issues. In some East European countries, many members of the collective farms did not want to break up farms and return to individual farming. By contrast, in Vietnam, there is no evidence suggesting that collective farm members were reluctant to return to household farming. The situation in Nicaragua seems more complex. On some farms I visited, the peasants were reluctant to break up the cooperative for three major reasons. First, on some farms, the land in particular places is usable only for particular crops, so that the cooperative allows risk-sharing among the members. Second, some farms are so mechanized that it would be difficult to devise methods of individual farming, given that sharing the machinery or renting it from a service unit is risky and inconvenient. Third, collective farming offers companionship in work that is not available on individual farms. On the other hand, I also found collective farms where people wanted to leave but could not obtain their share of the land, or where the bylaws (which vary considerably from farm to farm) were written in a manner to exclude dissolution.

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[9]These data are for 1988 and were calculated from CIERA (Centro De Investigación y Éstudios de la Reforma Agraria), *La Reforma Agraria en Nicaragua, 1979–1989* (Agrarian Reform in Nicaragua, 1979–1989), Managua, DTGA, 1989, Vol. 8. This volume presents two sets of data on the land of the producer cooperatives (CAS or Sandinista Agrarian Cooperatives). I am using the larger figure, which apparently covers all land, including range land.

Between 1986 and 1988, producer cooperatives increased their share of total farm land only 0.3 percent, which means that the net effect of these changes was that 90 percent of the reduction in state-farm land was accounted for by an increase in private farms.

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Complementary Policies

Decollectivization can only result in a more productive agricultural sector if a series of complementary policies are pursued. These policies relate to both the macro- and microeconomic levels.

Macroeconomic policies. My argument regarding the first set of policies is very simple: for decollectivization to succeed in Third World countries for which agricultural exports are important, macroeconomic stability is essential. If this is not achieved, then agriculture is not able to develop economically and decollectivization is imperiled.

The critical economic problem is inflation.[10] For instance, in the four years from 1987 through 1991, the consumer price index rose at an average annual rate of roughly 5,240 percent in Nicaragua, 162 percent in Vietnam, and "only" 75 percent in Guyana. During the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, some important sources of government revenues are lost while, at the same time, the rising unemployment that accompanies such a transition places additional demands on government expenditures. In all three countries, the government has had to finance its expenditures by issuing more currency, either directly or through the central bank, so that inflation has been inevitable.

Urban interests can more easily than rural groups mobilize political support of large masses of people to prevent cuts in particular governmental programs affecting them; as a consequence, expenditures for such programs as agricultural extension work or rural infrastructure development are more likely to be cut back or eliminated. This has occurred in both Guyana and Nicaragua.

Although it might seem logical that the rural sector would profit from inflation—after all, everyone in the nation must eat, so foodstuffs should fetch relatively high prices—a number of offsetting factors must be noted. If prices for agricultural produce are officially set or there is a fixed exchange rate, prices for foodstuffs inevitably lag behind the inflation rate. Thus, real prices paid to farmers for agricultural exports cannot keep pace. This is most dramatically seen in Guyana, where the prices of foodstuffs sold on the free market outpaced inflation, while for many years the producer prices paid for agricultural exports lagged behind inflation as the exchange rate became increasingly overvalued. From data I saw for Nicaragua, a similar phenomenon occurred there.

Although the lagging exchange-rate changes lead to lower prices (in domestic currency) for imported agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, and spare parts, such imports must compete with demands from other sectors for inexpensive imports. Since the agricultural sector seldom is given the highest priority for scarce foreign exchange, the volume of imported agricultural inputs either falls or is allocated to those rural groups with the greatest political influence, namely the state farms. In this scramble for scarce imported agricultural inputs, it should not be surprising that the private farmers are usually at the end of the queue, either because they are unorganized or because their interest groups are weak.

In the governments' fight against inflation, credit controls are an important weapon. Given that there are longer production lags in agriculture than in most other sectors, these controls hit the agricultural sector relatively harder than other sectors. Since credit scarcity also encourages private investments with very high yields and rapid payoffs, the share of agriculture in total investment may also decline at a time when decollectivization requires additional agricultural investments. Furthermore, in any situation where some agricultural prices are controlled while others are not, the resulting price distortions also lead to inefficient allocation of investment resources.

In all three countries under review, the governments have attempted to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium by raising taxes, cutting government expenditures, limiting credit, and raising real interest rates. These are difficult and politically painful tasks, particularly for governments without effective tax-collection agencies. By the beginning of 1991, none of the governments of the three countries had yet reined in inflation. In Vietnam, policy problems have been made grimmer by the reduction in credits from the Soviet Union, the fall in world prices of some important exports, and unemployment arising not just from soldiers returning from Cambodia but also from workers released from enterprises struggling to become profitable in the new era of hard budget constraints.[11]

Microeconomic policies: On the microeconomic level, the key issue is creation of a competitive agricultural

[10]For Guyana, I draw upon data presented by Bank of Guyana, *Statistical Bulletin* (Georgetown), June 1990. Unfortunately, when inflation accelerated in late 1989, the government stopped collecting price statistics; for developments since then, I have used, as a proxy for domestic price increases, the rise in the free-market exchange rate. For Nicaragua, I draw upon data presented in International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, DC), No. 44, January 1991. For Vietnam, the data come in large part from Van Brabant, loc. cit., and Erlanger, loc. cit.

[11]Erlanger, loc. cit.

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sector. By this, I mean establishment of a situation in which farmers can decide to whom they want to sell their production and from whom they wish to buy their inputs. During most of the 1980's in all three countries, farmers had to sell their most important products, particularly export crops, to a monopsonistic state purchasing agency and purchase their important farm inputs from a monopolistic state selling agency. In small countries, the role of foreign trade is a much more important element in the formation of a competitive agricultural sector than it is in large countries. And in the countries under study, agriculture has also played an important role in total foreign trade. In Guyana and Nicaragua, a high percentage of agricultural inputs are imported; this is less the case in Vietnam. If the agricultural sector is to become competitive, as top policymakers in all three countries have declared, these monopolies and monopsonies must be eliminated, domestic price controls must be removed, and the exchange rate must be set at a realistic level. Let me add that an assessment of domestic competitive conditions in any of these countries is difficult because of the lack of systematic information.

The situation in Guyana. Since the early 1980's, Guyana has moved a long way toward competitive domestic trade in agricultural products. By mid-1990, domestic price controls existed only for sugar, rice, powdered milk, margarine, and salt, and in early 1991, the list was even shorter. The government role in food processing and crop purchasing has been declining: although the sugar estates and mills remain a state-owned monopoly, for other crops, the situation has been changing rapidly. For example, a high official of the Guyana Rice Marketing Board told me that whereas in 1988, about 70 percent of the rice milling capacity of Guyana was state-owned, by the beginning of 1991, the figure had fallen to 20 percent. Some of the government mills were sold off, primarily to foreign consortia, while some small private mills were expanded so as to reach the level of operations where average costs level off. The scope of private exporting of rice was also greatly expanded.

Under the prodding of the International Monetary Fund, the Guyanese government in March 1990 legalized a free market in foreign exchange (the "cambio system"), which allows those wishing to import farm inputs to obtain the necessary foreign exchange. Private traders soon began to import agricultural inputs, especially small items such as spare parts. The major function of one of the two ministers at the Ministry of Agriculture (a bizarre administrative arrangement) is to facilitate the import of needed agricultural inputs.

In the last few years, the Guyanese currency has been massively devalued so that the foreign price for exports is now much higher in domestic currency units. An important result is that in 1989, the sugar estates showed a significant profit for the first time in a decade while, at the same time, government revenues from sugar export taxes increased almost tenfold.[12] At the beginning of 1991, the official exchange rate was roughly 50 percent of the free-market rate, and the key exports (rice, sugar, and bauxite) were still carried out at this official rate, with the exporters retaining a relatively small share of the foreign-exchange receipts. Again with the prodding of the International Monetary Fund, in March 1991, the government finally tied the official exchange rate to the free-market rate so that now all exports and imports are carried out at a relatively realistic exchange rate. Under current tax arrangements, this will probably mean the end of domestic price controls on sugar and rice, since exports will serve as an alternative market if the domestic price is lower than the foreign price; this linkage could, however, be cut by the imposition of variable export taxes.

Whether or not exchange rates will continue to move freely remains to be seen. Top government officials dealing with foreign exchange are worried that fluctuations in the exchange rate will discourage export trade and that the repeated devaluations will serve as an independent source of inflation. However, since these same officials have proven themselves unable to manage the exchange rate without adverse economic effects, the country may have no other choice but to let the exchange rate float.

The situation in Nicaragua. By January 1991, Nicaragua had no price controls in the domestic trade of agricultural commodities, except for milk. Domestic trade in foodstuffs had already been diversified under the Sandinista government, so that government, cooperative, and private companies competed against each other. For both exports and imports, however, the situation was different. At the beginning of 1991, most export trade of agricultural outputs was still conducted by state monopsonies paying fixed prices, and most agricultural imports were channeled through state monopolies, although plans were under way to break these monopolies. Two excuses were given for the delay in breaking up these organizations: the Nicaraguan constitution (written by the Sandinista government) for-

[12]Curiously, this cannot be seen in the official statistics on taxes (e.g., Bank of Guyana, op. cit.), but can only be determined from the footnotes of Guyana Sugar Corporation, *Annual Report and Accounts, 1989*, Georgetown, 1990.

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bade private foreign trade in important exports and imports; and the state companies had also signed supply and purchase contracts with foreign buyers and sellers for a year in advance.

I was told in early 1991 that plans to open both export and import trade would not be fully implemented until the end of the year. A number of private traders, as well as two service cooperatives (one sponsored by the Sandinistas, the other by the large private producers) are making plans to conduct export and import operations and to establish or to rehabilitate buying and selling centers in the countryside.

Despite massive devaluations, hyper-inflation has outrun the fall in the exchange rate. At the beginning of 1991, the situation was particularly confusing because the country had two official currencies and at least three exchange rates. The black market in foreign exchange was not legal, but it was tolerated. For the regular cordoba, the official exchange rate was changed weekly; however, it lagged behind the black-market rate. The gold cordoba, introduced in May 1990, was tied 1 to the dollar. Most contracts were supposed to be written in gold cordobas, and it was supposed to supplant the regular cordoba. Unfortunately, it was not freely convertible into dollars; indeed, given the trade deficit, it was hard to understand how the government expected convertibility to be maintained. In early March 1991, the government finally devalued the gold cordoba at a rate of 5 to the dollar, set a rate of 5,000,000 old cordobas to one gold cordoba, and started to phase out the old cordoba. It is as yet unclear, however, whether the government will be able to achieve monetary and fiscal stability so as to maintain the new exchange rate.

The situation in Vietnam. Although attempts in the mid-1980's to unify and reform domestic food prices in Vietnam were not successful, the government continued its policy efforts in this direction, and several key changes in 1988 and 1989 portend more success. For one, the government eliminated food subsidies to urban areas and ceased selling food at low prices on a rationed basis, even as it tried to cushion the impact on urban consumers by instituting wage supplements and adjustments. A key step taken in 1988 was the elimination of barriers to the transfer of foodstuffs from one province or district to another. Finally, the government has tried to stabilize the commercial environment by introducing five-year contracts for farm taxes.

Private trade of agricultural products is handicapped because most of the distributional infrastructure, as well as a considerable share of food processing, is in the hands of the state. One finds statements that food markets have not become integrated on a national scale, but locally, market pricing appears to be taking hold.[13]

Market pricing also seems to be taking hold on the input side of agriculture. Although the government has tried to maintain partial control by exchanging one kilogram of urea fertilizer for two kilograms of paddy, a ratio said to be consistent with border (import) prices, a free market in both rice and fertilizer exists; in certain areas, such as the Mekong delta, the price ratios are different than the official ratio. The establishment of legal alternative sources of input supply has aided marketization in some areas. But the literature is unclear about the degree to which the production of certain key agricultural inputs remains monopolized; thus, the market prices probably do not reflect competitive pricing. At the end of the 1980's, 90 percent of fertilizer was said to be administratively allocated. Toward the end of the decade, however, the government (evidently impressed by Chinese successes in this area) was encouraging off-farm industrial production in the rural areas, with the result that farmers may now have multiple sources of supply for more inputs.

For a number of years, the government tolerated a black market in foreign currencies. In 1989, it significantly devalued the currency so that it was within 10 percent of the free-market rate. Although inflation continues, it appears that the official exchange rate has been kept relatively close to the black-market rate. In 1989, specialized foreign trade enterprises that had operated under the Ministry of Foreign Trade were transferred to the individual production ministries, and moreover, foreign trade by firms at the provincial and private levels was also permitted. At the end of the decade, some processed agricultural goods were traded by near-monopolies owned by the state, so that Vietnam must still take some important steps to achieve a more competitive foreign trade regime. The degree to which imported and domestic agricultural inputs compete against each other is unknown, but this is another area important for the success of the economic reforms.

Other supporting policies. For decollectivization to lead to a flourishing private agricultural sector, the government must follow a variety of other policies so that farmers can receive technical advice, commercial information, credit, irrigation water, and other assistance to function effectively in a market economy. It also requires special measures to foster entrepreneurship. Herein lie some difficulties, because the institutional

[13]Van Brabant, loc. cit.

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capacities of these governmental bureaucracies for carrying out appropriate policies are low and many of the functions of the various agencies overlap.

Relationship Between Political and Economic Reforms

Political democracy, private agriculture, and economic prosperity do not always occur simultaneously. As the example of the four Asian tigers (Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) demonstrates, impressive economic growth can occur in relatively authoritarian states. For Third World countries wishing to move from a collectivized to a market-oriented agricultural sector, several considerations related to politics must be brought to bear.

The government and the political party in power generally have much less presence in the rural areas of Third World countries than they had in Eastern Europe (China being an important exception). This means, as argued above, that central intervention into decision-making on the farms is less obtrusive than it was in Eastern Europe and that political change at the center results in fewer changes in the countryside. Moreover, it can be argued that given the relative isolation of the countryside and the lack of communications, most rural residents may be less concerned about their lack of civil and political liberties than urban dwellers. In the communist world, it has been the urban dwellers, not the farmers, who have usually been at the forefront of the fight for political reforms. In recent elections in Albania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, the communist party received a higher percentage of votes in the rural areas than in the cities.

Vietnam has attempted to decollectivize with very little political change. The Communist party still has a monopoly of power, and civil and political liberties have not been greatly expanded. Although there were certain periods during the 1980's when greater freedom of expression was permitted, the forces pushing for democracy suffered some serious setbacks in 1990. If the Vietnamese decollectivization is successful, this case will offer strong evidence for my hypothesis that in Third World countries, the linkage between economic and political reform, especially in the rural areas, is weak and that a country can have household agriculture functioning in a market environment without significant political reforms or political decentralization.

In many Third World countries wishing to decollectivize, however, one strong argument can be made for linking politics with privatization and marketization of the economy. This linkage may be the only way to attract foreign and domestic investment capital. In the traditional state-oriented economy of the socialist countries, the absence of democracy means that no matter what contracts are signed, private investment projects are still subject to arbitrary constraints and interventions by the government, especially where the investor has little recourse to obtain financial restitution in the domestic courts. A market economy with a liberal trade regime reduces these political risks.

At the same time, political liberalization can also lead to economic chaos, as previously-suppressed groups engage in a struggle for political power. To some extent, this has happened in Nicaragua, where political reforms have outpaced economic reforms. The press is unfettered, political activities by any party are unchecked, and civil liberties have increased. The political chaos in the country during 1990 and the government's inability to enforce its will created investment risks; the macroeconomic disequilibria leading to inflation and an overvalued exchange rate created too many investment risks to attract much in the way of foreign funds.

Nevertheless, the "concertación agreement" of October 1990 was an important step toward resolving the political crisis and, as I have argued above, establishing a long-lasting agrarian reform that is based primarily on smallholder agriculture. If the government can master the macroeconomic problems, if the foreign and domestic trade regimes are liberalized, and if the farms can obtain inputs and credit, the agricultural sector can achieve prosperity. But these are difficult tasks which, if they are not solved, may lead to a return of the Sandinistas in the next election and a possible reversal of many of the political reforms.

In Guyana, political and economic reforms have gone hand in hand. Political and civil rights increased considerably after the death of President Burnham,[14] and although there was an apparent setback in 1989, the situation still remains improved. By early 1991, political thuggery had declined, the opposition press was lively, and arbitrary political measures were reduced. Nevertheless, as I have argued above, there are reasons to doubt that both the economic and the political reforms will be completed. Indeed, one must be optimistic about the power of the International Monetary Fund to influence economic events in this destitute nation, and judge that the various opposition parties are incapable of overcoming their differences sufficiently to mount a serious threat to the ruling party's dominance (and self-confidence), to believe that political

[14]Guyana Human Rights Association. *Guyana Human Rights Report*. Georgetown, 1988.

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and economic reforms will continue to march together.

The case studies of Guyana, Vietnam, and Nicaragua in sum, reveal quite different relationships between political and economic reforms. This diversity of experience gives few grounds for optimism that political reforms will accompany decollectivization.

Summing Up

The weakness of most Third World socialist regimes, combined with the fact that many of them collectivized without a prior land reform, means that decollectivization of cooperative farms by returning the land to the previous owners is generally very difficult and that some type of new land redistribution is necessary. Although state farms may be more easily returned to their former owners, as shown by the Guyanese case, the Nicaraguan case illustrates this is not always so.

A breakup of the state or collective farms depends in considerable measure on several factors: the particular crop or animal agricultural production that is carried out, the technology employed, the degree of mechanization, and the desires of the people involved. In the Third World, a number of crops grown on these farms are plantation crops for which economies of scale often pertain, so that individual farming can bring significant economic disadvantages. On the other hand, the farms are generally less capital-intensive, the technologies actually employed often do not, in fact, feature significant economies of scale, and the rural population is often more willing to engage in household farming than are rural dwellers in Eastern Europe.

Management changes on the former state and collective farms after decollectivization are generally not as severe in the Third World as in Eastern Europe for several reasons. In most cases, government intervention has been less obtrusive than in most East European countries. Indeed, in many Third World countries, either the private-farm sector is relatively more important or a larger share of the collective farms are collectives in name only and are not modeled after the classic Soviet kolkhoz.

The problems faced by countries wishing to marketize their agricultural sector depend more on their size than on the level of their economic development. Most of the Third World countries with state and collective farms are relatively small. Thus, the major problem of marketization is reestablishing a competitive foreign trade sector, which in turn means setting a realistic exchange rate and providing alternative exporters of agricultural produce and importers of agricultural inputs with whom the farms can deal. In the larger Third World countries, such as Vietnam, the problems of creating a market-oriented agriculture are more similar to those encountered in Eastern Europe.

In the Third World, the degree to which a successful decollectivization depends on a significant political liberalization does not appear great, except if the given country wishes to attract foreign capital. During the 1980's, China was an example of decollectivization occurring in a highly undemocratic political system, and Vietnam (and Laos) in the 1990's may provide additional cases.

The diversity of the Third World Marxist regimes makes it difficult to make more generalizations, but at least one thing is certain: the process of decollectivization will follow a quite different path than that now being taken in Eastern Europe.

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Note

Who Ousted Nikita Sergeyevich?

Werner Hahn

WHO led the plot to oust Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev in October 1964? In Soviet reassessments of this event, historians and former leaders sharply disagree, with some blaming Mikhail Suslov, others Aleksandr Shelepin, others Leonid Brezhnev, and still others Nikolay Podgornyy.

In the current wave of *glasnost'* and filling-in of "blank spots" in Soviet history, new information is being published about many episodes in Soviet political life—including the overthrow of Khrushchev. Soviet historians and political scientists with inside knowledge—such as Roy Medvedev and Fedor Burlatskiy—started a debate over Khrushchev's overthrow by writing detailed new versions of the coup that were published in the official Soviet press in 1988. Subsequently, Khrushchev's son Sergey revealed fascinating new information about the coup from the perspective of Khrushchev and his family. In turn, the appearance of these versions prompted several retired Soviet leaders to make public their own versions based on their participation in the plot against Khrushchev. However, unlike other important episodes of Soviet history—for example, the arrest of Lavrentiy Beria—where one leader (Khrushchev) presented his insider's account (in several variations) and other participants were never heard from, this time we have been presented with varying versions by insiders. This unprecedented wealth of new information greatly enhances our knowledge, but at the same time illustrates how difficult it is to get an objective, consistent version even from the participants themselves.

The new information undermines the long-held interpretation that Suslov played the leading role—or at least one of the leading roles in the plot. Most new versions assert that Suslov had little to do with it, that Brezhnev led the plot, along with Central Committee Secretaries Podgornyy and Shelepin and KGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastnyy, and that the plot had been under way for many months and involved a large number of Central Committee members. Perhaps most important, the new versions make it clear that Khrushchev was not overthrown by his enemies (such as Suslov), but by some of his own protégés (Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Shelepin).

Accounts in the West

Previously, the most widely accepted view of the plot was that Suslov led it (based on his obvious opposition to Khrushchev for some time and also on his delivery of the October 1964 Central Committee plenum speech listing Khrushchev's errors) and that Brezhnev and Podgornyy—who were close to Khrushchev—were persuaded to join only later. Michel Tatu's account—written soon after the event—presented the most detailed and convincing arguments supporting this position. He contended that Suslov, the "main spokesman of the opposition," was "unquestionably the spearhead of the opposition," while Brezhnev, who "could not have played an active role in the preparations," and Podgornyy, whose behavior before the overthrow "suggested that he was not a member of the plot," were informed only at the last minute. Shelepin, Semichastnyy, and Ukrainian First Party Secretary Petro Shelest were promoted immediately after the coup, suggesting that they were being rewarded for their help.[1] Tatu portrayed the plot as originating only a few days before the

Werner Hahn is Senior Specialist for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Reston, VA). *The views in this article do not necessarily reflect the official position of the US government.*

[1] *Power in the Kremlin*, New York, Viking, 1967, pp. 403, 351, 420.

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coup and as restricted to a small circle—a logical assumption in view of the danger if such a plot were exposed.

Later, dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev included explanations of the coup in books published in the West. In his first book on Khrushchev, Medvedev gave the lead role to Suslov, declaring that Central Committee members "were briefed mainly by Suslov" on the intended move against Khrushchev. This account gave a lesser role to Brezhnev (Brezhnev phoned Khrushchev to persuade him to come back to Moscow) and made no mention of Podgornyy or Shelepin.[2]

In a subsequent book, Medvedev provided more detail and also altered the story somewhat, labeling Suslov and Shelepin "the prime movers"; he also mentioned that Khrushchev had briefly questioned Podgornyy about a possible plot, and described plotting during hunting and fishing trips hosted by Stavropol First Secretary Fedor Kulakov in September. He mentioned that there had been rumors of a discussion about removing Khrushchev in early 1964. Medvedev asserted that Khrushchev vigorously fought his removal at the October 13 meeting of the Presidium (as the Politburo was then called).[3]

Medvedev's version—apparently based on some insiders' information—sounded convincing, but like Tatu's, it is now being refuted on many points by the recent accounts of both observers and insiders.

Accounts in the Soviet Press

In the era of *glasnost'*, the first attempt to describe Khrushchev's overthrow in detail in the Soviet press was presented by Roy Medvedev in 1988. He again portrayed Suslov and Shelepin as the ringleaders, whom Brezhnev later joined. Medvedev made no mention of Nikolay Podgornyy:

At the center of the discussions were, as one could judge, M. A. Suslov and A. N. Shelepin. Of decisive importance was the joining of CPSU Central Committee Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and USSR Defense Minister R. Ya. Malinovskiy.[4]

According to Medvedev, it was Brezhnev who phoned Khrushchev on October 13 and persuaded him to return to Moscow to attend a Presidium meeting on agriculture. Semichastnyy met Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the airport and escorted them to the Presidium meeting, where "Suslov and Shelepin raised the question of removing Khrushchev from all his posts." Although Khrushchev at first stubbornly fought back, he eventually surrendered. At the plenum, Suslov delivered a long indictment of Khrushchev's errors. Medvedev also asserts that Stavropol First Secretary Kulakov organized hunting trips with other leaders to discuss moves against Khrushchev, and that former Presidium member Nikolay Ignatov engaged in similar discussions around the country.

Burlatskiy—a speechwriter for Khrushchev and a long-time Central Committee official—followed Medvedev with a remarkably detailed version of the coup in the September 14, 1988, issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. He contended that Shelepin was the ringleader, along with Suslov and Brezhnev:

Probably not everyone knows that Khrushchev's overthrow was not planned by Brezhnev. Many people think that M. A. Suslov did it. In fact, it was the work of a group headed by A. N. Shelepin. They used to meet in the most unlikely places, usually at a stadium during a soccer match. And there they plotted. A special role was assigned to Semichastnyy, leader of the KGB, who was recommended for that post by Shelepin. His task was to replace Khrushchev's bodyguard. And indeed, when Khrushchev was summoned to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium session from Pitsunda, where he was on vacation with Mikoyan at the time, on boarding the plane he saw a new bodyguard, not his own. Khrushchev apparently realized at once what was afoot, and unsuccessfully tried to persuade the pilot to land the plane in Kiev.

Burlatskiy contends that it is still unclear when Shelepin entered into the compact with Suslov and Brezhnev. It is only clear that Shelepin joined first with the former, then with the latter. Burlatskiy also wrote that the immediate pretext for the Presidium session was a speech by Khrushchev's son-in-law Aleksey Adzhubey in West Berlin, where Adzhubey said flippantly that it would cost the Soviet Union nothing to accept the unification of Germany. The GDR leaders immediately expressed their indignation to their Soviet colleagues, and this was the spark that started the conflagration.

In a four-part series in the October 1988 issues of *Ogonek*, Khrushchev's son Sergey presented a dramatic account of how he learned of the plot and sought to warn his father. According to him, the plot was led by Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Shelepin, and Semichastnyy, with former Presidium member Ignatov playing a big

[2] *Khrushchev—The Years in Power*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1976, pp. 172–76.
[3] *Khrushchev*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 227, 235.
[4] *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 27, July 1988.

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role and Krasnodar First Secretary Georgiy Vorob'yev (not Stavropol First Secretary Kulakov) hosting the vacationing leaders who discussed Khrushchev's removal. Brezhnev and Podgornyy, the senior CPSU secretaries, undertook most of the political preparation, canvassing and persuading Central Committee members and regional party officials. Sergey wrote that Brezhnev and Podgornyy were the "key figures." In talks with Presidium members, they repeatedly stressed how difficult it was to get along with Khrushchev. According to Sergey, "Brezhnev complained of Khrushchev's intolerance and sharp criticisms of him, especially about the fact that father once called him 'lazy'." Because of his "irresoluteness," however, Brezhnev only spoke of holding a plenum to "criticize" Khrushchev, rather than actually daring to suggest removing him.[5]

Sergey depicted Shelepin and Semichastnyy as playing especially devious roles, because to discredit Khrushchev, they fabricated stories about Khrushchev abusing his position by granting special favors to family members and relying on family members to conduct sensitive state matters (such as son-in-law Adzhubey's 1964 diplomatic mission to West Germany). Shelepin raised accusations that he, Sergey, had taken advantage of his father's position to acquire the title of doctor of science,[6] while Semichastnyy used KGB reports to portray Adzhubey's diplomatic activities in West Germany in a bad light.[7] Semichastnyy, as KGB chief, also controlled Khrushchev's guards, isolated Khrushchev from his supporters, and escorted him from the airport to the Presidium meeting held to oust him. Sergey considered the conspirators all the more duplicitous because, he said, Shelepin had consciously played up to him (Khrushchev's son), while Semichastnyy had married Adzhubey's sister and was a close friend of Khrushchev's son-in-law.[8]

In contrast to Medvedev, Sergey Khrushchev portrayed Suslov as playing a minor role. He wrote that "according to rumors he knew nothing about the impending coup and when he found out, became very frightened." Nevertheless, continued Sergey, Suslov "quickly reoriented himself" and agreed to be the one who phoned Khrushchev to persuade him to return from vacation to attend the Presidium meeting. He also delivered the main report against Khrushchev at the plenum. However, wrote Sergey, Suslov was "assigned" to deliver the report only because Brezhnev and Podgornyy had refused.[9]

Sergey's account of the debate in the Presidium—an account related by Anastas Mikoyan to a close friend—had Shelepin listing Khrushchev's errors "in the name of the others present," Shelest and Gennadiy Voronov sharply attacking Khrushchev, with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Aleksey Kosygin remaining silent, and Mikoyan halfheartedly suggesting that Khrushchev be allowed to keep one of his leadership posts.[10]

The Direct Participants Speak Out

These three accounts by interested observers prompted most surviving former Presidium members to give their own versions of the coup. Their versions differ considerably from those given above.[11]

Voronov's account. Gennadiy Voronov (Politburo member from 1961 to April 1973) gave his version of the plot against Khrushchev in a November 18, 1988, *Izvestiya* interview. He specifically said that "people now talk and write about Suslov as a key figure in those events," which is inaccurate:

The main thing in Suslov's position was readiness to follow whoever was stronger at the given moment. Thus, in 1964, they gave him an already-prepared report just before the plenum. The chief ideologue just had to read it. And that is what he did.

Mentioning Burlatskiy's writings about the mid-1960's, Voronov continued: "Some authors today write that the 'motor' behind the plot was Shelepin, along with Semichastnyy. This is not so. The 'senior comrades' of that time treated Shelepin, who did not seek power, and Semichastnyy condescendingly, as yesterday's Komsomols." In fact, according to Voronov, Brezhnev was the originator of the plot. Moreover, Brezhnev had long been involved in preparing a coup and had attempted to recruit many Central Committee members:

All this was being prepared for about a year. The threads led to Zavidovo, where Brezhnev usually went hunting. Brezhnev himself put by each name on a list of Central Committee members either a "plus" (for those who were ready to support him in the strug-

[5]"All-Union Pensioner," *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 43, October 1989, pp. 25–28.
[6]Ibid., p. 27.
[7]Ibid., No. 42, October 1988, p. 28.
[8]Ibid., No. 40, October 1988, p. 28, and No. 43, October 1988, p. 27.
[9]Ibid., No. 43, October 1988, p. 28.
[10]Ibid., p. 27.
[11]A few surviving former Presidium members of that era—Dmitriy Polyanskiy and Andrey Kirilenko—have yet to speak out.

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gle against Khrushchev) or "minus." Each person was individually worked over.

Voronov stated that Brezhnev himself had worked on him (Voronov) for a "whole night."[12]

Voronov then declared that Khrushchev had been better than Brezhnev. "Even N. S. Khrushchev's clear errors weigh much less than the main things that he did. . . . Instead of correcting the errors of a brilliant person heading the party, we gambled on another person far less brilliant." He praised Kosygin as much more competent, but complained that Brezhnev gradually beat him down. Voronov elaborated further on Khrushchev's good points in reminiscences published in the January 1989 issue of *Druzhba Narodov*.

Shelest's account. Petro Shelest (Politburo member from November 1964 to April 1973) had begun speaking out earlier, in a June 23, 1988, *Stroitel'naya Gazeta* interview, in which he bluntly blamed Brezhnev and Suslov for simply seizing power in a "palace coup" that he now declared to have been a mistake. He stressed Khrushchev's positive side, portrayed Brezhnev as mainly interested in accumulating honors, and castigated Suslov for being interested only in power and the "preservation of the bureaucratic command system of management developed under Stalin."

After the appearance of Medvedev's *Argumenty i Fakty* article about Khrushchev, Shelest was provoked to further frankness and wrote a letter to that periodical, which then interviewed him about Khrushchev.[13] He proceeded to dispute Medvedev's article for overrating Suslov and his role:

I believe that R. Medvedev's article made Suslov the hero of the coup. His name is mentioned 18 times. I believe that that role is exaggerated. Under Khrushchev, Suslov was not considered the second man in the leadership, as he was under Brezhnev. Other comrades prepared the report that Suslov delivered. The idea was that Brezhnev or, in the last resort, Podgornyy should deliver it. Brezhnev simply backed out, and Podgornyy categorically refused. Then Suslov was entrusted with doing it.

According to Shelest, although Shelepin had taken some part in preparing the materials for the plenum, Suslov knew nothing of the conspiracy until almost the last moment. When he was informed, said Shelest, "his lips turned blue and his mouth tightened. He could barely utter: 'What are you saying? There will be civil war'." Although Suslov was made the hero, it is a role he does not deserve. From beginning to end, said Shelest, the decisive roles in Khrushchev's removal belonged to Brezhnev and Podgornyy.

Shelest went on to say that he "sincerely regretted" Khrushchev's overthrow and criticized his own part in it. He called Brezhnev "cowardly, mistrustful, and dull-witted," labeled him as someone who "loved power and honors," and declared that Suslov caused "more harm than good," especially on nationality questions, and was basically a "Stalinist."

Shelest also told what happened at the October 13 Presidium meeting that ousted Khrushchev, stating that "apparently I alone" have a record of Khrushchev's speech at the meeting, "since no stenogram was made."[14] He related parts of Khrushchev's speech which indicate that Khrushchev did not fight back.[15]

Shelest continued to publicize his version in vivid and probably self-serving articles and interviews. In an interview in the September 10, 1989, issue of *Moskovskiye Novosti*, he assailed Burlatskiy's version (that Shelepin led the coup) as an "invention" and declared flatly that "Brezhnev and Podgornyy headed it." In long articles in the Ukrainian magazine *Ukraina* in mid-1990,[16] Shelest discussed the 1964 events in great detail, relating how Brezhnev in a strange July 1964 visit sounded him out about his relations with Khrushchev and complained how difficult Khrushchev was to work with.

[12]Adzhubey wrote in an October 1989 *Ogonek* issue (No. 41, p. 9) that Voronov in a "videotape recording" said that Brezhnev and Andropov had persuaded him to join by showing him a list of all the other Presidium members who had joined the plot.

[13]The January 14, 1989, issue of *Argumenty i Fakty*, which printed his interview, noted in the introduction that Shelest was responding to Medvedev's writings in their publication.

[14]A later article by Marxism-Leninism Institute official Nikolay Barsukov mentioned, however, that Shelepin had taped Khrushchev's speech at the Presidium session and had given the tape to the institute's Central Party Archive. "How N. Khrushchev was 'Dethroned'," *Obshchestvennyye Nauki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1989, p. 134.

[15]Shelest's interview prompted sniping against him in a Ukrainian Central Committee paper (controlled by his old rival and successor as Ukrainian first secretary, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi) aimed at portraying Shelest as an unprincipled, ungrateful schemer who turned against his patron Khrushchev for careerist reasons. Complaining that Shelest's interview might lead "many readers" to consider Shelest a "principled, unstained communist leader who only defends truth and honesty," a reporter who covered the Ukrainian leadership during the 1960's related in the March 22, 1989, issue of the Ukrainian Central Committee newspaper *Sil'ski Visti* how Khrushchev promoted Shelest to Ukrainian first secretary in 1963 over other, better-qualified candidates and demoted then Ukrainian Premier Shcherbytskyi—one of the "farsighted, judicious leaders" who openly objected to Khrushchev's scheme to set up separate industrial and agricultural party organs. Nevertheless, the reporter recalled, in October 1964, Shelest viciously attacked Khrushchev and bragged to a Ukrainian party *aktiv* meeting that he had been one of the first to attack Khrushchev at the October Presidium session.

[16]"I Foresaw Everything That Would Happen," *Ukraina* (Kiev), No. 21 May 1990, and No. 22, June 1990.

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Brezhnev eventually became frustrated when Shelest cautiously refused to commit himself. Shelest afterward asked his patron Podgornyy what was going on and found that Podgornyy was involved in Brezhnev's plan, although "they did not trust each other."

Shelest at some point joined the plotting and, judging by his description, eventually wound up playing a leading role because most of the others were simply too timid. Describing an early October meeting at Podgornyy's dacha, he characterizes Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Suslov as indecisive and unable to agree on what to do about Khrushchev and also claims that he was the one who opened the attack on Khrushchev at the October Presidium session because others were too timid.

Mazurov's account. In 1987 and 1988, Kirill Mazurov (Politburo member from March 1965 to November 1978) gave two interviews to Komsomol papers in which he spoke of conflicts with both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, but not about the plot.[17] But the spate of stories about the plot apparently also prompted him to respond, although in guarded fashion.

In a long 1989 interview, Mazurov detailed most of his conflicts with Khrushchev and Brezhnev and this time mentioned the plot, declaring that "assertions that a unified group of Stalinists removed Khrushchev are unfounded."[18] He argued that Khrushchev had done himself in by alienating people through his own actions. In each of his interviews, Mazurov, despite his criticisms of Khrushchev and his confirmation of his own violent arguments with him, portrayed Khrushchev more favorably than Brezhnev.

Semichastnyy's account. In an interview entitled "How They Removed N. S. Khrushchev," Vladimir Semichastnyy directly addressed the overthrow.[19] He declared that discussions about the need to remove Khrushchev had started in the spring of 1964 on the initiative of either Brezhnev or Podgornyy and that he had joined "from the very beginning." Semichastnyy indicated that Kosygin had been brought into the plan only toward the end, in late September.

In another interview, Semichastnyy raised the subject again and disputed some of the details contained in the accounts by Burlatskiy and Sergey Khrushchev.[20] Complaining that "now much untruth is being written" about the ouster, he said: "Look how many former Politburo members are alive: Shelepin, Shelest, Voronov, [Andrey] Kirilenko, Mazurov," and added, "You don't have to even dig in the archives, [just] go and ask" them. For example, Semichastnyy complained, "everyone writes" that it was Suslov who phoned Khrushchev to persuade him to return to Moscow, but he insisted that Brezhnev made the call and that Khrushchev had refused to return, only changing his mind several hours later. "After all, I was a witness," he declared. He ridiculed Burlatskiy's assertion that Khrushchev had tried to get the pilot to fly him to Kiev to seek support and noted that Shelest already knew about the plot and would have arrested him anyway. Sergey Khrushchev wrote that his father was accompanied by the chief of his bodyguard, but Semichastnyy disputes this ("I prudently sent the chief of his bodyguard on leave"). Semichastnyy maintained that he very much respected Khrushchev (more than he would say about Brezhnev) and that Khrushchev was not removed by a conspiracy but by party leadership bodies acting according to the rules.

Adzhubey's account. Khrushchev's son-in-law Aleksey Adzhubey's memoirs about the Khrushchev era, which appeared in the June and July 1988 issues of *Znamya,* said little about the plot against his father-in-law. (He mentioned only briefly that some of the intrigues described by Sergey Khrushchev had eventually come to Khrushchev's attention.) However, when later interviewed by Michel Tatu, he focused on Podgornyy as the main plotter.[21] Tatu wrote: "It is not Suslov but Podgornyy whom Aleksey Adzhubey regards as the main organizer of the plot." He quotes Adzhubey as follows:

I knew [Podgornyy] well. He was a man of limited abilities, but greedy for power, crude, and not easily frightened. He was not like Brezhnev, who was easily frightened. It is now clear that he and others had been working on all the Central Committee members since the summer. Brezhnev also decided to stake everything during the summer. But that was after Podgornyy.

Adzhubey added that at an October 14 airport meeting with visiting Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, Podgornyy said: "It's all over. We have broken Khrushchev."

Shelepin's account. A new round of memoir writing by Burlatskiy, Sergey Khrushchev, and USA and Cana-

[17] *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 9, 1987; and *Molod Ukrainy* (Kiev), May 3, 1988.

[18] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 19, 1989.

[19] "How They Removed N. S. Khrushchev," *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 20, May 1989.

[20] "I Would Cope with Any Work," *Ogonek*, No. 24, June 1989, pp. 24–26.

[21] *Le Monde* (Paris), Feb. 19–20, 1989.

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da Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov,[22] containing especially unfavorable comments about Aleksandr Shelepin, irritated the latter so much that he finally broke his long silence. After years of refusing all requests to say anything in public—so as not to dignify the non-objective writings about him, as he explained—he suddenly phoned *Trud* and offered his views of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Khrushchev's overthrow. In a series of articles, he directly disputed Burlatskiy, Sergey Khrushchev, and Arbatov, and gave his side, along with negative pictures of Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

On the overthrow, Shelepin declared that it was Brezhnev and Podgornyy who began talking to other top leaders about removing Khrushchev and that he (Shelepin) simply joined them. He denied Burlatskiy's stories of his plotting with other former Komsomol leaders against Khrushchev. Also indicating that Suslov played a minor role, he declared that Brezhnev and Podgornyy talked with Suslov last, "because they did not fully trust him" and that Brezhnev—"not Suslov, as some are writing—phoned Khrushchev to get him to return from vacation. Shelepin described in detail what individual Presidium members said during the showdown with Khrushchev and presented a stenogram of what Khrushchev said in response to the attacks at the Presidium meeting.[23]

Conclusions

It is ironic that many of those speaking out now and putting Khrushchev in a good light are leaders who clashed repeatedly with Khrushchev, who attacked him harshly in October 1964, and who benefited from his fall. Mazurov, by his own admission, fought constantly with Khrushchev. After years of being kept as a candidate member of the Presidium by Khrushchev, he was one of the biggest winners from Khrushchev's fall, rising to full Presidium member and first deputy premier in early 1965. Voronov, originally a Khrushchev protégé, was in conflict with him by 1964 and probably was saved from his own political demise by Khrushchev's fall. Shelest, a protégé of Podgornyy, was promoted to full Presidium membership a month after Khrushchev's fall. Sergey Khrushchev declared that Voronov and Shelest attacked Khrushchev sharply in October 1964, and Adzhubey's July 1988 *Znamya* memoir tells of Shelest viciously assailing Khrushchev in October 1964. Semichastnyy, who calls himself a Khrushchev protégé in his *Ogonek* interview, was promoted to full Central Committee membership at the November 1964 plenum as an apparent reward for his part in the conspiracy. Adzhubey states that "several days after Khrushchev's overthrow," Semichastnyy "finally got his long-desired military title," the rank of colonel general, which "Khrushchev had refused him."[24] These leaders and Semichastnyy now say that Khrushchev was a better leader than Brezhnev, and Voronov, Shelest, and Shelepin explicitly regret helping oust Khrushchev.

The recollections surprisingly highlight the fact that those leading the plot were the leaders closest to Khrushchev,[25] rather than those who were openly cool to him (Suslov, First Deputy Premier Kosygin, First Deputy Premier Dmitriy Ustinov, and Mazurov). Suslov's bad relations with Khrushchev were apparent to outside observers,[26] and Burlatskiy recently portrayed them as enemies:

Why did Khrushchev tolerate Suslov in his leadership so long, even while he got rid of very many of his opponents? It's hard to say—either he wanted to preserve continuity with the Stalin leadership or had some strange respect for the supposed Marxist-Leninist erudition of Mikhail Andreyevich, but he certainly didn't like him. I was present at one meeting where Khrushchev unloosed sharp and even improper attacks on Suslov.[27]

That relations between Khrushchev and Kosygin, Ustinov, and Mazurov were cold was also obvious at the time.[28]

Brezhnev and Podgornyy were long-time protégés of Khrushchev, who had raised them to be his top two deputies in the party—second and third secretaries of the Central Committee. Shelepin was also entrusted

[22]See Sergey Khrushchev, "All-Union Pensioner," *Druzhba Narodov* (Moscow), Nos. 5–7, 1990; and Georgiy Arbatov, "From the Recent Past," *Znamya* (Moscow), Nos. 9–10, 1990.

[23]"History Is a Harsh Teacher," *Trud* (Moscow), Mar. 14, 15, 19, 1991.

[24]*Ogonek*, No. 41, October 1989, p. 10.

[25]With one notable exception: Mikoyan—the Politburo member closest to Khrushchev—did not betray him.

[26]For example, Tatu, op. cit., p. 351, declared Suslov had become "the main spokesman of the opposition."

[27]"After Stalin," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), October 1989, p. 189.

[28]Tatu, op. cit., portrayed Kosygin as independent of Khrushchev and somewhat cool toward him (pp. 93, 181, 394, 401–03), declaring he was "quite capable of backing various groups that opposed Khrushchev, but not of leading them" (p. 342). For evidence of Ustinov's conflicts with Khrushchev, see Werner Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture 1960–1970*, Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, pp. 110, 173. On Mazurov's relations with Khrushchev, see ibid., pp. 33, 35, 80, 81, 86, 143, and 150. Mazurov himself told of some of his disputes with Khrushchev at the March 1965 plenum. Ustinov was clearly in on the plot by September 1964. Former Gosplan Chairman Vladimir Novikov tells in his memoirs how Ustinov at that time called him in and told him Khrushchev was going to be overthrown and asked him to write a speech condemning errors by Khrushchev. "In the Years of N. S. Khrushchev's Leadership," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), February 1989, p. 115.

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with key posts by Khrushchev, while Khrushchev named Semichastnyy chief of cadres for the whole party and later KGB chief. It is therefore perfectly understandable why Khrushchev was initially unwilling to believe his son's story that Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Shelepin were plotting against him: "No, that's unbelievable. Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Shelepin—these are quite varied people. It cannot be."[29] But it was Khrushchev's own protégés—especially Brezhnev, who was motivated by personal grievances and fear of losing his privileged position, judging by accounts of Shelest and Sergey Khrushchev—who overthrew him.

The problem posed by Khrushchev's unwillingness to believe that his closest protégés were plotting against him was apparently compounded by overconfidence that he could easily handle them. The former second secretary of Georgia's Communist party, Petr Rodiyonov, relates that Ignatov told him that at a Presidium meeting shortly before the October 1964 coup, Khrushchev had shocked his colleagues by suddenly accusing them of plotting against him. Ignatov reportedly concluded contemptuously that Khrushchev "himself was to blame" for his overthrow, since he had been warned of the plot and did nothing. Ignatov quoted Khrushchev as telling his colleagues: "What are you cooking up against me, friends? Look, if something happens I will throw you around like puppy dogs."[30]

[29] *Ogonek*, No. 41, October 1989, p. 27.
[30] "How Stagnation Was Begun," *Znamya*, August 1989, p. 186.

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Books

Communism and Its Discontents

Paul Hollander

CHRISTOPHER CERF and MARINA ALBEE, Eds. *Small Fires: Letters from the Soviet People to* Ogonyok *Magazine 1987–1990.* New York, Summit Books, 1990.

TIMOTHY GARTON ASH. *The Magic Lantern.* New York, Random House, 1990.

JACOBO TIMERMAN. *Cuba: A Journey.* New York, Knopf, 1990.

GUENTER LEWY. *The Cause That Failed.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1990.

THE collapse of communist systems provides a welcome opportunity not only for thanksgiving and relief but also for looking back at some of the guiding assumptions that structured public perception of these systems in the West in general and in the United States in particular. Considering the volume of misperceptions and misjudgments communist systems inspired over the decades, it should not be surprising that not only their legitimacy and material accomplishments, but their stability and staying power, were gravely misjudged. In effect, the study of these systems convinced most of us that their radical transformation, let alone collapse, was not a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future.

Many in the West vastly overestimated the strength, the staying power, and the material, moral, and human resources of these systems. They also misjudged the discontent these systems generated among people who had to live under them. The four books under review in this essay shed further light on the nature of discontents communist ideas engendered wherever they were instituted. The books also help us to understand why these systems lost their legitimacy, or why they were incapable of acquiring it in the first place.

Small Fires: Letters from the Soviet People to Ogonyok *Magazine 1987–1990* is a treasure trove of a stunning variety of complaints and criticisms expressed by more or less ordinary citizens in their letters to this popular Soviet weekly. *The Magic Lantern* by Timothy Garton Ash offers a glimpse of the disintegration of East European communist systems and the mood of their people as observed on the spot by the author. Jacobo Timerman's *Cuba: A Journey* offers rare insights into the many hideous qualities of life in Castro's Cuba. Finally, Guenter Lewy's *The Cause That Failed* examines the attractions and failures of "communism in American life."

FAILURE to understand the nature of discontents experienced by people in communist societies was part of a more general tendency among Western specialists, politicians, and educated publics to misperceive the nature of Marxist-Leninist systems and the everyday reality of life under communism. These misperceptions were more pronounced regarding the Soviet Union than the East European states. The elevation of the Soviet Union to the role of a superpower morally equivalent to the United States was one rich source of mistaken assumptions. Superpower status and moral equivalence with

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Paul Hollander is Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst, MA) and a Fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. His books include Soviet and American Society: A Comparison *(1978),* Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928–1978 *(1981) and* The Many Faces of Socialism: Essays in Comparative Sociology *(1983). His* Decline and Discontent: Communism and the West Today *will be published in 1991.*

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the United States implied a certain structural symmetry between the US and USSR as well. It was somehow inappropriate to anticipate the unraveling of a superpower even though numerous Western students of the Soviet system were well aware of its underdevelopment, indeed backwardness, except in matters military. Ironically, at the time (in the late 1980's) when there was a flourishing literature devoted to the weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and decline of the United States, little was said about the decline and imminent chaos of the Soviet Union. Amazing as it is in retrospect, many Western specialists seemed to assume that it was easier for the Soviet system with its far more limited economic resources and capabilities to maintain a global presence and a corresponding huge military force than for the United States to maintain a comparable posture.

Those associated with the anti-nuclear and peace movements in the West also contributed to the public's misreading of the character of Soviet-type systems.[1] These movements continually stressed the alleged similarities between ordinary American and Soviet people and cautioned against critical views of the Soviet Union that were seen to create friction and undermine the cause of peace. Certainly, the peace movement was a major source of blindness regarding the distinctive, and distinctly unattractive, attributes of the Soviet system.

Let us also recall here another misperception that was widely held by politicians as well as the educated public. It was the proposition that democratization (or liberalization) would only come about if and when the economy and the standards of living substantially improved, and when the system no longer felt threatened either from inside or outside. This view was deeply flawed. The Soviet Union was driven to reform—it is now widely believed—precisely because its economy was unable to deliver either the goods and services the population needed or the high-tech weapons the military coveted.

Another mistaken article of faith among politicians and publics in the West was that while communist systems left something to be desired with respect to political freedoms, they made impressive progress in eliminating material backwardness and meeting the basic economic needs of their people. Indeed, it used to be argued that communist systems were capable of these prodigious material achievements precisely because they restricted civil rights and liberties, which, in any event, were something of a luxury ordinary people did not need and could not even comprehend in a country like the Soviet Union (later, the generalization was applied to China, Cuba, and other communist states in the Third World).

One other major misperception concerned the legitimacy of the Soviet system. It was widely held that the Soviet masses basically accepted the system, that they could conceive of no alternatives to it and would not know what to do if given greater opportunities for free expression and freedom of association.

SEVERAL plausible explanations have been put forward to account for the recent upheaval and revolutions in the communist world. The most popular, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, is that confronted by severe economic problems, the Soviet leadership in general and Mikhail Gorbachev in particular concluded that only major political reforms could ensure the survival of the Soviet Union.

According to another theory, generational change was the explanation. Younger leaders like Gorbachev were not products of the Stalin era; moreover, in their formative years, they were witness to Nikita Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin's misdeeds, and to his limited attempts at reform, both of which made a deep impression.

There was also a more generalized version of the generational-change argument, the roots of which may be discerned in the old convergence theories that were popular in the 1960's and early 1970's. Optimistic Americans believed that as the Soviet Union became a more thoroughly modernized society, it would also have a better-educated population and a more complex economy, neither of which could be governed in a highly authoritarian manner.

In retrospect, it is something of a mystery why Soviet leaders seemed to assume that greater political freedom would rejuvenate the Soviet economy, improve the work ethic, and increase productivity in the absence of any fundamental changes in the economy itself. Exactly the opposite occurred: greater personal and group freedoms released long simmering discontents and further undermined civic and work discipline; productivity fell; the distribution system collapsed; and shortages became greater. It is possible that when political reforms failed to lead to economic improvements, they became discredited in the eyes of large segments of the population. It also appeared to large segments of the population that greater political freedoms were responsible for accelerated economic decline, new scarcities, and social disorganization, including

[1]For the East European opposition's perceptions of the Western peace movement, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, Ed., *In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc*, New York, Routledge, 1990.

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higher crime rates, ethnic strife, and movements for secession.

Rather than mutually reinforcing one another, in the Soviet Union, political and economic change have come into conflict. Further political reform is prevented by the state of the economy, but the economy is unlikely to improve unless major political reforms institute a government that is perceived as legitimate and thus can muster the political will to introduce the needed but painful economic measures.

We are truly a long way from understanding why and how the Soviet system and several other communist states around the world began to unravel. It is worth pointing out that hardly anybody (including this author) had anticipated these events, and especially the rapidity with which they unfolded. Communist systems in various parts of the world succeeded in projecting an image of solidity and stability; even when their problems and weaknesses were known, we credited them with greater staying power than they actually possessed.

It can be plausibly argued that the change spread from the center of the Soviet empire to the peripheries; once Gorbachev relaxed controls, the unraveling of the empire became a foregone conclusion. With regard to the Soviet case in particular, it is equally plausible and widely held that, as at other times in history, modest concessions whetted appetites, raised expectations, and led to new demands, and the Soviet leadership lost control. What had been intended as moderate reform to make "existing socialism" work better acquired a dynamic of its own, and the long-suppressed discontents found active expression both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has been much easier to comprehend. Communism in Eastern Europe was an alien import kept in place by the threat or actual use of force by Moscow. The opposition became emboldened once it became clear that the Soviet army would not again intervene on behalf of the threatened and unpopular local communist elites, and communist regimes fell in short order throughout the region.

WE may improve our understanding of the collapse or gradual disintegration of communist systems by more fully grasping the nature of the discontents they invariably generated wherever they were introduced. Of course, discontent by itself does not explain the recent events, since discontent with these regimes is nothing new. Generally speaking, there is no direct link between popular discontent and political change; unpopular regimes can persist for long periods of time.

It may well be that the discontents spawned by communist systems are in some ways unique. Let us review them briefly, beginning with their most common symptoms or manifestations, and then proceed to their apparent causes.

The most striking indications of the dissatisfaction within communist societies have been the recurrent exodus of large numbers of people from these countries whenever this was physically possible and the extraordinarily stringent measures these governments introduced to prevent such movements by their citizens. No other political systems in recent history produced such enormous waves of refugees, escaping both economic and political deprivations and doing so under conditions of danger and sometimes threat to life. Such "voting with their feet" occurred in every single communist system, sometimes involved 10–15 percent of the population (as in Cuba and Nicaragua), and encompassed virtually every stratum of the population, including the intended beneficiaries of these systems.

The second obvious indicator of discontent has been the uprisings and revolts from Kronstadt in 1921 to Tiananmen Square and Timoşoara in 1989. Virtually every communist state had to crush domestic opposition; a few of them inspired durable guerrilla movements (in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan). It can be also be noted here that not only did millions of former Soviet prisoners of war and slave laborers refuse to return to the USSR from Western Europe after World War II, but hundreds of thousands joined an anti-Soviet army organized by the Germans and led by General Andrey Vlasov.

The third important indicator of discontent (actual or potential) has been the very institutions and policies designed to reduce, discourage, forestall, and, if possible, totally eliminate expressions of diversity, dissent, and discontent. The one-party system has been the major institutional expression of these intentions. It was combined with the party-state monopoly over the means of mass communication, rigorous censorship, and, of course, the powerful political police forces set up specifically to ferret out and crush every nonconforming utterance or behavior.

No regime with a reasonably satisfied population needs such institutions and policies, and no ruling elite assured of its own legitimacy relies on them. The historical record makes quite clear that the intensity and endemic nature of the discontents communist systems have produced are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from those found in other societies. Perhaps the key difference lies in the fact that the deprivations and hardships citizens of communist states experi-

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ence seem arbitrary, unnecessary, and inexplicable, not in any way justified, necessary, inevitable, or part of the natural order of things. Many of the deprivations associated with these systems are linked to rapid, abrupt, ruthlessly imposed social change and the rearrangement of institutional structures, forcing people into unfamiliar and unwelcome institutional patterns. There is also regimentation or (more politely) "social mobilization." And all this takes place while the citizens are incessantly bombarded by vast quantities of propaganda that directly contradict their own daily experience.

The unique character of deprivations and grievances imposed by communist systems have three major components. First, there are the well-known material scarcities, usually including essentials such as food and shelter. Second, there is the experience of coercive intimidation and the associated personal insecurity combined with repressive regimentation that makes great demands on the time and energy of the citizens and interferes with both personal and group autonomy. Often there is also pressure to engage in displays of political loyalty totally at odds with the core beliefs of the citizen. Third, people living under such systems sense a persistent gap between the claims and promises of the authorities (theory) and the way things actually are (practice). The works under review provide evidence to support each of these generalizations.

BOTH the liberalization of the Soviet press and the vast range of hitherto suppressed disgust, rage, and indignation Soviet citizens have harbored are uniquely documented in *Small Fires: Letters of the Soviet People to* Ogonyok *Magazine 1987–1900*. As the late Andrey Sakharov noted: "Now the huge sea of popular grief and unsolved problems has exploded into a cascade of complaints and requests directed at newspapers and magazines . . . the press has become the final hope of people in despair" (p. 111). The number of letters *Ogonek* received grew from 12,000 in 1986 to 150,000 in 1989. It is safe to say that this publication has become the preeminent voice of dissent and discontent in the Soviet Union.

There is virtually no aspect of Soviet life that remains untouched in this volume. An engineer in Omsk tells about sausages that are only for display in the shop window, not for sale; an economist informs the public that researchers in Leningrad found that "the annual expenditure of time by Leningraders waiting for commercial, household, and medical services exceeds 850 million hours" (p. 25). A seeker for an automobile tire reveals that state stores selling such items barter them for "agricultural products, for example, wool, meat, butter, etc." (p. 27). The tire he wants can be his for 18 kilograms of butter. A war veteran eligible to buy a car "out of turn" reported that he would get it in the year 2051 (p. 127). A letter addressed to the minister of health cries out:

SOS! We don't want to die! We are people who suffer from bronchial asthma, heart disease and other ailments. There is no medicine! None at all! You might as well close the pharmacies. Who is going to save us? (p. 125)

A reader asks "how is a young, single woman supposed to raise and educate a child with a monthly state allowance of 20 rubles" (p. 119). A "Veteran of the Great Patriotic War" and party member since 1947 wrote: "For more than 20 years on the façade of one of the . . . buildings on Victory Prospekt you have been able to read these words which everybody knows all too well: 'Today's generation will live under Communism!' Another 20 years will pass, and another generation of people will appear . . . the slogan will remain" (p. 269). A graduate student in history was "amazed to learn . . . [from the 1988 edition of *The Modern Ideological Struggle*] that there is no anti-Semitism in the USSR, that the socialist revolution solved the nationalities question . . . and that economic crises are only possible under capitalism" (pp. 77–78).

Many letters complain about the persistent obstacles to learning the truth about the past. For example: "Today's generation should know the truth about what their fathers and grandfathers went through. . . . Take the famine of 1933, for example. . . . Was . . . [it] a fatal inevitability, or was it someone's fault and could it have been avoided" (pp. 243–44)?

New light is shed on the current Soviet political process by a writer who reports that in his district, participation in voting in repeat elections to the Congress of People's Deputies was encouraged by the promise of "ration coupons for alcoholic products" in exchange for voting (p. 93). A candidate of juridical sciences labels the one-party system "the main culprit in our tragic history" and holds it responsible for both "unfounded repressions, where millions of innocent people died," and for economic backwardness (p. 108).

The frustrations and inequalities in Soviet life were conveyed in another letter:

If a 'Big Boss' stood in line to see a local doctor . . . for two or three hours, and the doctor then treated him in five minutes; if he had to wait for two or three years for dentures; if he lay in a hospital hallway for a while and they didn't

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have the medication he needed; if he . . . ate foul-smelling meat . . . if he got back torn sheets from the laundry and had his brand-new sheets stolen; if his wife started wearing the kind of boots they sell in ordinary stores . . . then we could really expect some changes! (p. 13)

Several correspondents recalled their deportation, exile, or imprisonment as children or young adults, or those of their loved ones. Even in the punitive settlements the children "sang songs about Stalin, Voroshilov, Budennyy, and about our happy childhood" (p. 245). Others recalled the "relocation" of minorities such as the Ingush. A correspondent from the Amur oblast asked:

What kind of people have you made, Comrade Stalin? They say one thing, think something else, and do yet a third thing. It's just as if people were wearing masks. Here they don't like it when you are your own person. . . . That is the general rule of survival in a collective. Don't say what you yourself think; say what everybody thinks. The universal sense of enslavement and the put-on front disappear, from time to time, only with alcohol. (p. 256)

A scientific research worker's suggestion summed up the spirit of many letters:

I don't support the idea of reburying the remains of people who are guilty of crimes against the Soviet people. I say the dead should be left where they are, including those who are buried at the Kremlin Wall. But the tombstones should be marked with the words: "Guilty of bloody crimes against the nation and humanity."

Also, streets in Moscow need to be renamed. After all there are plenty of dead-end streets here. They should be named "Stalin Dead End" or "Brezhnev Dead End." (p. 268)

This sampling of the bitterness, despair, and indignation goes a long way to convey for the non-Soviet reader the variety and intensity of the frustrations and hardships experienced by ordinary Soviet citizens. Anger at being lied to for so long stands out. It would certainly be appropriate to publish follow-up volumes to *Little Fires,* or even annual selections of letters to *Ogonyok.* This would help us to track continuity and change in sources of discontent in Soviet life. In addition, the volume could be improved by providing the reader with some breakdown of the proportion of letters addressing particular issues. For example, it would be useful to know how many letters deal with shortages, or past repressions, or the shortcomings of the current leadership, or, say, what proportion of these letter-writers criticize or praise Stalin.

IN Timothy Garton Ash's *The Magic Lantern,* we are taken to an entirely different world: the euphoric days of dramatic change in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague as reported by the eyewitness-author, who has for some time been reporting and interpreting developments in Eastern Europe. *The Magic Lantern* describes how, true to the reality of Eastern Europe, discontents with the communist system were acted upon; here, complaining was replaced by the removal of systems that were universally detested. We learn of his conversations with Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and East Germans, and of his experiences during those exciting days when the first free elections were held in Poland, Hungary reburied the martyred leaders of the 1956 Revolution, and the Berlin Wall came down.

Garton Ash's account shows the enormous differences between conditions in Eastern Europe (or at any rate the four countries described) and the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe, he says, was capable of making the transition to political pluralism without revolutionary violence because its political culture allowed the democratic transformation to advance more rapidly than would be possible in the Soviet Union.

Garton Ash believes that the withdrawal of Soviet support for the East European communist regimes does not fully explain the sweeping transformations. The ruling elites of Eastern Europe still controlled formidable police and security forces, he says, and could have mounted "a last-ditch defense of their own power and privilege" (p. 141). In Garton Ash's view, the principal explanation for their failure to defend themselves by force lies in "the ruling elite's loss of belief in its own right to rule" (p. 142). Although this is plausible enough, we still do not fully understand the political-psychological processes that led to this paralysis of will at a particular point in time. Surely, the same leaders have long known that they had little legitimacy, yet they persisted in their positions of power and privilege either because of some residual belief in a scaled-down sense of mission or because of their interest in retaining power.

Garton Ash is concerned about the possibility that "1989 might . . . appear, to participants and historians, as just one brief shining moment between the sufferings of yesterday and those of tomorrow" (p. 155). He, like other observers, sees the dangerous connections between the new economic problems and political instability, and the reemergence of the old ethnic conflicts in this region.

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JACOBO Timerman's *Cuba: A Journey* portrays one of the few remaining ideal-typical totalitarian communist systems that has endured in spite of showing every classic sign of massive popular disaffection. At least 10 percent of Cuba's population "voted with their feet" by leaving the country, many of them escaping under extremely hazardous conditions. There was an anti-Castro guerrilla war in the Escambray mountains that took years to suppress. And, the system is a virtual garrison state with many layers of control, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, which monitor the daily life of the citizen at the neighborhood level. Material shortages have been constant and severe, as has been the regimentation of the population in military and paramilitary forces and in various types of "volunteer" work, such as cutting sugar cane. Huge public assemblies have also been common, often for the sole purpose of making the populace listen to the self-indulgent, rambling exhortations of the "Maximum Leader" for several hours on end. Freedom of expression is even more drastically limited than was the case in the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union.

Yet, the system has not only endured for more than 30 years but has even managed to maintain a moderately positive image among many Western intellectuals and journalists. With the exception of the memoirs of Armando F. Valladares,[2] the English-language literature on communist repression in Cuba has attracted little attention and is not extensive. For this reason, Timerman's new book is especially welcome, its credibility enhanced by his liberal credentials and the personal sufferings he had endured in Argentina, another police state.

Timerman, unlike most visitors, was allowed to drive around Cuba by himself and talk to many Cubans of different backgrounds. He quickly learned that ". . . in Cuba . . . everything one says or asks can be compromising; it appeared evident to me . . . that spontaneity of facial expression isn't matched by that of words. Cubans are verbally immobilized. Frozen" (p. 64). Elsewhere he notes: Cubans "have internalized their fear of the regime. . . " (p. 75). The great success of the Cuban police state is revealed in the finding that "it's impossible to maintain surveillance over every Cuban, but all Cubans feel as though they're being watched and controlled . . ." (p. 107).

Castro has been central to the survival of Cuban totalitarianism, both as an exceptionally power-hungry megalomaniac and as a charismatic leader. He is personally involved in supplying the propaganda diet of the population, not only in his notorious harangues to the assembled masses but also in written statements. According to Timerman, "Castro produces several of these statements daily and believes . . . that he is creating a new kind of revolutionary conscience . . . [whereas] his rhetoric has produced a vacuum in the conscience of the Cuban people, substituting stifling collective paranoia" (p. 116).

Castro's cult of personality is among the few that survive. Timerman writes:

> *In Cuba, one is informed daily that El Comandante's initiatives have produced historic changes in the cultivation and harvesting of sugar cane, in housing construction, in military strategy in Africa, in language teaching, in street cleaning. . . .* (p. 26)
>
> *If the cumulative tasks in Fidel Castro's workday, as described by [Gabriel] Garcia Marquez, are methodically enumerated, the figure emerging is a Rambo, someone who triumphs owing to his supernatural intelligence . . . [according to Marquez,] . . . "he has breakfast with no less than 200 pages of news from the entire world" . . . [moreover,] "bureaucratic incompetence . . . forced Fidel Castro . . . to involve himself personally . . . in how bread is made and beer distributed."* (pp. 34–35)

Castro's foremost American admirer, Saul Landau, even went beyond Marquez in his sincere sycophancy:

> *"As Fidel spoke, I allowed myself to listen closely and feel that peculiar sensation I experience in his presence, as if I am meeting with a force of nature, a man so filled with the energy of historical mission that he is almost a different species. Power radiates from him. . . ."* (p. 47)

Castro was also credited with reading and thoughtfully commenting on a "newly published orthopedic treatise" (p. 34). According to Marquez, he needs little sleep—an attribute Castro shared with Stalin and Mao. Marquez also lavished praise on Castro for such pearls of wisdom as "learning to rest is as important as learning to work." (It may be recalled that similar platitudes mouthed by Stalin and Mao also used to be treated as extraordinary revelations.)

Castro's power rests not merely on his alleged profundity and wisdom. A more prosaic but efficient source of control are the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Timerman saw a questionnaire

> *good neighbors are supposed to fill out and the CDR members are*

[2]Armando R. Valladares, *Against All Hope*, New York, Ballatine, 1987.

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supposed to bring to the police, keeping a copy for themselves. It is called Boleta Recogida de Opiniones *(Opinion Collection Form), and a good revolutionary records what he hears from his neighbors and colleagues on the street, in the darkness of a theater, in the endless line for milk, bread, or ice cream—even when he is unable to identify the speaker. . . .* (pp. 22–23)

Propaganda is a pervasive presence. Along a highway, posters demand "Discipline," "Efficiency," "Production"; and admonish and instruct: "Here you work for an ideal, not for money" (p. 100). Timerman is led to reflect: "I wonder whether it wouldn't be preferable to be subjected to subliminal pressures so as to be a consumer of a particular toothpaste, rather than be forcibly plunged into the collective misery described as a happy, victorious society" (p. 100).

Conformity is also ensured, at every level of society, by the population's unavoidable dependence on the goodwill of the authorities: "Writers have sons in the army, families to feed, the need to improve their housing, obtain spare parts for dilapidated cars, be able to publish. Everything depends on the state . . ." (p. 69).

Cuba, like other socialist states, suffers from chronic economic mismanagement and inefficiency and is incapable of producing enough food for its people despite its fertile soil and generous rainfall. Timerman learned about the shortages from personal encounters, as in the case of a schoolteacher who "has been waiting two years for an allotment of bricks to partition a room in his mother's house. Then he can get married" (p. 94).

Timerman's volume is a long-overdue reminder of what a wretched political system Cuba has and how poorly it has served its people. Why then has the Castro regime survived when other communist regimes beset by similar problems have fallen? At present, the discontents of the Cuban people are kept under tight lid by an efficient police state. In addition, in contrast to communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Cuban regime benefits from geographic isolation.

GUENTER Lewy's *The Cause That Failed* is a thorough and thoughtful examination of the American communist movement and its impact on and connections with other political and social movements such as the American Civil Liberties Union (pp. 157–65), the peace movement (pp. 187–94), the anti-nuclear movement (pp. 245–49), the anti–Vietnam war movement and the radical student movement of the 1960's (pp. 250–76), and the National Lawyers' Guild (pp. 283–87), among others. It is at once a study of failure and success: the American Communist party has shrunk drastically since World War II, but, concurrently, it benefited from the new climate of opinion emerging in the 1960's and from being perceived as a victim of McCarthyism and "red-baiting."

Since the 1960's, a whole school of social history emerged that romanticized and rehabilitated the American communist movement. Gradually, and contrary to much conventional wisdom, the rift between the new Left and old Left was healed as these groups discovered how much they had in common. Lewy writes:

Both were alienated from the basic values of American society and demanded a radical transformation of what they saw as a repressive political system. Both . . . considered socialism superior to capitalism and were in full sympathy with communist regimes in the Third World. . . . Both . . . praised the Soviet Union's support of national liberation movements . . . while the United States was castigated as a bastion of reaction and imperialism. Both agreed on the "myth of the Soviet threat" and the need to oppose anti-communism. (p. 282)

The Cause That Failed is more than a study of the influence and organizational linkages of the American Communist party. It also documents the susceptibility of idealistic citizens in a free society to a movement and its ideas that, wherever they were applied, created unfree societies. The book provides further evidence of the resistance of many on the Left to recognizing "the repressive potential of Marxism-Leninism." Many groups and movements on the Left, including the Communist party, have been reluctant to entertain the possibility of a connection between the theory and the appalling practices to which the theory led and which were legitimated by it. As one juxtaposes this book with the others discussed above, it becomes clear that the appeals of communism are inversely proportional to the experience of its attempted realization, that genuine belief in these ideals can only flourish in settings that have been untouched by the practices the theory has inspired.

IN the end, reflections on the failure of communist systems and the discontent they inspire lead back to the issue of theory and practice. Communist systems promised many things, including spectacular material progress, modernity without alienation, a sense of community, social justice, greater equality, and what in current terminology is called a "caring society." There was going to be no conflict between

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personal and social interest, between individual and society.

Of course, these unrealistic promises stemmed from the original utopian impulses embedded in Marxism-Leninism. Communist systems tried to change human beings and social institutions, first by persuasion and, when that failed, by force. They operated with an unrealistic conception of human nature: initially far too optimistic, later on deeply pessimistic—a pessimism that can be gauged by the progressive elimination of choice for the masses and by the increasingly coercive paternalism displayed by the leaders. Marxism-Leninism's misconceptions regarding human nature help to explain the monumental economic failures of communist systems, the political violence they inflicted on their people, and their final disintegration. The repression was the logical outcome of unpopular policies and illegitimate rulers.

The vast concentration of power and subsequent abuse of power were also encouraged by the philosophical legacy: Marxism-Leninism had a great and openly expressed aversion to the concentration of economic power in private hands but was indifferent to the concentration of political power, and had little concern with the consequences of concentrating *both* political and economic power in essentially the same hands. The idea that nationalizing the means of production would eliminate selfish interests, and thereby dramatically improve human behavior, was also a romantic fantasy.

In the final analysis, communist systems failed and were rejected by their putative beneficiaries because they could not deliver on their promises. Moreover, the discontents these systems generated had as much to do with things material as they did with individual and group freedoms. For most people, the contrast between "ought" and "is," between theory and practice, became intolerable in the end.

Many of the goals communist systems pursued were morally questionable to begin with; others were desirable but unattainable and were abandoned. In turn, the means used almost invariably undermined, and discredited, even the laudable ends. Retaining and maximizing power became a goal in itself, as communist elites proved as corruptible as any others and often more so. As the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the continuing upheaval elsewhere in the communist world show, overwhelming state power can discourage resistance and suppress expressions of discontent for lengthy periods of time, but it cannot legitimate—and thus sustain in the long run—systems that can neither satisfy the spirit nor nourish the body.

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Correction

Footnote 32 on page 103 of Robert Otto's "Contemporary Russian Nationalism," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1990, should read:

"On Barabashov, see *Literaturnaya Rossiya,* Jan. 19, 1990."

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